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• 




V 






"War Series, No. in. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



REPORT 



OF THE 



UTISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 



IN 



EGYPT 

18 8 2. 



Fart I TEXT. 



Part I— TEXT. 
Part II— PLATES. 



War Series, No. HI. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



REPORT 



(.)¥ T1IK 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 



EGYPT, 

18 8 2. 



LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER CASPAR Fr&OODRICH, 

UNITKD STATES NAVY. 



OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 

BUREAU OF ISr^.VIG-A.TIOlN" 

NAVY DEPARTMENT, 

18 8:i. 



/,4t r// 6 

V JUN S 1884) 

WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

9-18 EG 18 83. 



A / 



9 



\ 

o 



CONTENTS 



Page. 
Letter of transmittal 7 



F A. R T I . 

I. — Preliminary 9 

The negotiations immediately preceding hostilities. 

II. — General Review of the Defenses of Alexandria 13 

III.— The Attacking Fleet 25 

Alexandra — Inflexible — Sultan — Superb — Temsraire — Invinci- 
ble — Monarch — Penelope — Gun-vessels. 
IV. — The Bombardment 31 

Order of battle — The action — Report of the senior officer of the 
offshore squadron — Other details, &c. 

V. — The Effect upon the Ships 40 

Alexandra — Inflexible — Invincible — Penelope — Sultan — Superb. 

VI.— The Fortifications and the Damages sustained by them 46 

Silsileh — Pharos — Ada — The Ras-el-Tin Lines — The Hospital Bat- 
tery—The Central Battery— The Tower Battery— The Light- 
House Fort — Sale Aga — Unnamed battery — Oom-el-Kabebe — 
Mex Lines — Mex Fort — Marsa-el-Khanat — : Marabout — Ad- 
jemi. 
VII. — General Conclusions 69 



FART II. 

VIII. — Operations by the British Navy at Alexandria subsequent 

to the Bombardment 79 

The occupation— The landing party from the United States fleet — 
Arrival of troops — The destruction of Egyptian ammunition — 
The naval battery at Ramleh. 

LX. — Other Operations preceding the Change of Base 87 

The land defenses of Alexandria — The occupation of Ramleh — 
Defenses of Ramleh — The outpost at Antoniades Garden — 
The reconnaissance in force of August 5 — Operations at other 
points, 

X.— The Composition of the Expeditionary Force 97 

XI. — The Seizure of the Suez Canal and the Change of Base.. 105 
General report — Work at Port Said — In the canal — At Ismailia — 
South of Lake Timsah — At Chalouf— Action of M. de Les- 
seps — British proclamations. 

XII.— The Campaign 125 

Seizure of Neflche — El Magfar — Tel-el-Mahuta and Mahsameh — 
Kassassin — Action of August 28, at Kassassin — Condition of 
the advanced troops — Action of September 9, at Kassassin — 
Disposition of Egyptian troops at this time. 



4 CONTENTS. 

Page. 
XIII.— The Battle op Tel-el- Kebir and the Conclusion of the War. . 146 

The battle — Seizure of Zagazig — Of Cairo — The withdrawal of 
the British troops. 

IP^IRT III. 

XIV. — The Working op the Naval Transport Service 165 

XV.— The Armed Trains 182 

One employed at Alexandria — One employed on the Ismailia and 
Tel-el-Kebir line. 

XVI. — The Boat Transport on the Sweet Water Canal 190 

XVII.— The Naval Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir 196 

XVIII.— The Marine Battalions 2(4 

The Koyal Marine Light Infantry — The Royal Marine Artillery. 

XIX. — The Lines of Communication 208 

XX. — The Commissariat and Transport Corps 215 

XXI.— The Troops 221 

The cavalry — The mounted infantry — The infantry. 

XXII.— The Royal Artillery 23a 

16-pdr. — 13-pdr. — Artillery work during the campaign — El Mag- 
far — Tel- el-Mali ut a and Mahsameh — Kassassin. (For Tel-el- 
Kebir see p. 146 ante.) 

XXIIL— The Royal Engineers 249 

The 8th Company — 17th Company — 18th Company — 21st Com- 
pany — 24th Company — 26th Company — Establishment of a 
held company — The pontoon troop — Field park. 

XXIV. — The Railway Compani 258 

XXV.— The Telegraph Troop 266 

XXVI. —The Corps of Signalers 277 

XXVII.— The Military Police 286 

XXVIII.— The Medical Department 288 

XXIX.— The Army Post-Office 295 

XXX. — The Indian Contingent 297 

Peculiarity of organization inludian regiments — Equipment, fol- 
lowers, &c. (Kabul scale) — Cavalry — Infantry — The 7-pdr. 
jointed-steel M. L. R. and the mule battery — Indian rations — 
Outfit, "&c. — Indian transport — Medical arrangements — Vet- 
erinary department — Historical notes — Action at Chalouf — 
Serapenm. (For Tel-el-Kebir see p. — ante.) 
XXXI. — Miscellaneous ?: 333. 



IT. S. Flagship Lancaster, 2d Rate, 

Gravesend, England, May 30, 1883. 

Sir: In obedience to the Department's order of August 29, 1882, I 
have the honor to forward a report upon the British naval and military 
operations in Egypt during the past year. 

The report is based upon personal observation on the spot, upon the 
accounts of officers present at the several engagements, upon official 
reports, and other trustworthy documents. * * * 

My aim has been to make the development and progress of the cam- 
paign as clear as possible. I have touched upon organization and 
equipment only in so far as they are of especial interest, as they serve 
to throw light upon the methods employed, or as they furnish matter 
deserving analysis and serious attention. * * * 

It would give me pleasure if the 8tate Department could be informed 
of the valuable assistance rendered me by 0. Breed Eynaud, esq., our 
vice-consul at Malta. 

During my stay in Egypt I experienced nothing but kindness wherever 
my duty called me. Were I to mention the names of those to whom I 
am indebted for professional and other courtesies, I should simply have 
to inclose a list of the British officers of both services with whom I was 
brought in contact. I should, however, be gratified if some acknowledg- 
ment other than my own personal thanks could be made to General 
Lord Wolseley of Cairo, G. C. B., G. 0. M. G., &c, for his hospitable 
reception of me at his headquarters, and for his kindness in affording 
me all possible facilities for travel and for obtaining necessary data; to 
Admiral Lord Alcester, G. C. B., &c, for his many acts of politeness, 
which were only limited, in the direction of technical information, by 
the confidential nature of many of the official reports; and to Major G. 
B. N. Martin, R. A., and Captain George S. Clarke, E. E., for peculiarly 
valuable assistance at the cost of much trouble, and (in the last case) of 
great personal discomfort. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

C. F. GOODRICH, 
Lieutenant- Commander, United States Navy. 

To Hon. William E. Chandler, 

Secretary of the Wavy, Washington, I). G. 

Forwarded. 

C. H. BALDWIN, 

Bear-Admiral, 
Commanding United States Naval Force on European Station. 



.AJBBR-E VT A/riO N"S. 



E. N Royal Navy. 

R. A Royal Artillery. 

R. E Royal Engineers. 

R. H. A Royal Horse Artillery. 

R. M. A Royal Marine Artillery. 

R. M. L. I ..Royal Marine Light Infantry. 
N. A N Battery, AiBrigade (Royal 

Horse Artillery). 
N. 2 N Battery, Second Brigade 

(Mountain Artillery). 
1.3 First Battery, Third Brigade 

(Field Battery). 

M. L. R Muzzle-loading rifle. 

B. L. R Breech-loading rifle. 

S. B Smooth-bore. 

Pdr Pounder. 



o 


.Centimetre. 


A. D. C .. 


-Aide-de-camp. 


V. C 


.Victoria Cross. 


C.B 


.Commander of the Bath. 


K. C. B ... 


.Knight Commander of the 




Bath. 


G. C.B... 


.Grand Commander of the 




Bath. 


C. M. G... 


..Commander Saint Michael 




and Saint George. 


K. C. M. G 


. Knight Commander Saint Mi- 




chael and Saint George. 


C. S. I .... 


. Commander Star India. 


B. W. G... 


.British wire-gauge. 


R. L. G .. 


. Rifle, large grain. 


H. M. S . . 


.Her Majesty's Ship. 



6 



PART I 



THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE FORTIFICATIONS 



AT 



ALEXANDRIA 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERA 
TIONS IN EGYPT. ' 



i. 

PRELIMINARY. 



The political events which brought about the bombardment of the 
fortifications at Alexandria, and the dispatch of a British army corps 
to Egypt, do not come within the proviuce of this report. It will not, 
however, be out of place to refer briefly to a few of the principal feat- 
ures in the state of affairs immediately preceding hostilities. 

It will be remembered that by a series of bold, insubordinate, and 
successlul maneuvers, a group of men, for the most part officers in the 
Egyptian army, had gradually but surely wrested the power from the 
hands of the Khedive, their legitimate ruler, and had wielded it in 
such a manner as to paralyze trade, destroy confidence, and cause the 
foreign population to desert the country by thousands. The religious 
fanaticism of the Mohammedans, the vast majority of all the sects in 
Egypt, had been excited to a dangerous pitch. The presence of the 
French and British fleets, sent to Alexandria early in the year, in the 
hope that the mere display of their enormous preponderance of force 
would exert a calming influence, had only served to still further arouse 
the now practically universal hatred of the European. The country 
had already almost come to a standstill in all the arts of peace, when 
the massacre of June 11 completed the destruction of the hopes, yet 
entertained by a confiding few, that the excitement would pass tiway 
and matters return, of their own accord, to their original condition. 
The forbearance of the foreign residents was sorely tried ; yet, officially 
and privately, everything possible was done to avoid a conflict with the 
natives. Ships-of-war of all nations collected at Alexandria to receive 
and shelter or else forward the refugees that were swarming out of the 
land at the sacrifice of all their possessions, protection from insult and 
injury on shore being simply out of the question 

The military party openly conceded to be the sole rulers in Egypt 
now proceeded to take active steps, strengthening the fortifications of 
Alexandria, mounting new guns, &c. The British admiral, Sir Beau- 
champ Seymour, in view of the strained relations then existing, and of 
the formidable character of the unmounted guns at the disposition of 
the Egyptians, felt that he could not be justified in permitting such 

9 



10 

open acts of hostile preparation which would have for a result the 
infliction of increased injury upon the fleet he commanded, in the event 
of an engagement, now almost inevitable. 

The action which Admiral Seymour proceeded to take is indicated by 
the following telegram, which he sent on the 5th of July to the Admir- 
alty in London: 

Shall demand from military governor, to-morrow, cessation of all work on the bat- 
teries. As French appear indisposed to act, shall detain Penelope here until result 
of demand is known. 

On the following day he telegraphs again : 

Military commander assures me, in reply tu my note of to-day, no guns have been 
recently added to the forts or military preparations made. Dervish Pasha* confirms 
this statement. No signs of operations since yesterday afternoon, probably in obe- 
dience to Sultan's commands. Shall not hesitate acting if works be continued. 
# # # 

This telegram is based upon the following letters of that date: 

1. From Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour to the Military Commandant of Alexandria. 

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that it has been officially reported to 
me that yesterday two or more additional guns were mounted on the sea defenses, and 
that other warlike preparations are being made on the northern face of Alexandria 
against the squadron under my command. Under the circumstances I have to notify 
your Excellency that unless such proceedings be discontinued, or if, having been dis- 
continued, they should be renewed, it will become my duty to open fire on the works 
in course of construction. 

2. The reply. 

To the Admiral of the British Fleet: 

My Friend English Admiral: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th 
July, in which you state that you had been informed that two guns had been mounted 
and that other works are going on on the sea-shore, and in reply I beg to assure you 
that the said assertions are unfounded. * * * 

TOULBA. 
On July 9 Admiral Seymour telegraphs to the Admiralty: 

With reference to my telegram of the 4th of July, no doubt about armament. Guns 
are now being mounted in Fort Silsileh. Shall give foreign consuls notice at daylight 
to-morrow morning, and commence action twenty-four hours after unless forts on the 
isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbor are surrendered. 

The Admiralty replied directing the admiral to substitute for the 
word "surrendered" the words " temporarily surrendered for purposes 
of disarmament." 

The information upon which Admiral Seymour purposed acting was in 
the shape of a declaration from a lieutenant of Her Majesty's flagship 
Invincible, quoted here at length : 

I, Lieutenant Henry Theophilus Smith-Dorrien, do most solemnly declare that on the 
morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30 a. m., I drove through the Rosetta 



The Turkish commissioner sent to Egypt by His Majesty the Sultan. 



11 

gate, and passing the European cemeteries, reached the old quarantine station, where 
I left my carriage and proceeded on foot to the fort marked on admiralty chart " Tabia 
el Silsile," and when within 50 yards of the said fort I observed inside two working 
parties of Arabs, about 200 strong, under the superintendence of soldiers, parbuckling 
two smooth-bore guns, apparently 32-pounders, towards their respective carriages and 
slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbor, and which seemed to have been 
lately placed ready for their reception. 

Dated at Alexandria this 9th day of July, 1882. 

H. T. SMITH-DORRIEN, 
Lieutenant B. A T ., H. AT. S. Invincible, 

On the 10th the admiral sent the following letter to Toulba Pasha,, 
the military governor of Alexandria : 

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that as hostile preparations, evidently 
directed against the squadron under my command, were in progress during yesterday 
at Forts Isali,* Pharos, and Silsili.t I shall carry out the intention expressed to you 
in my letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th instant, unless previous 
to that hour you shall have temporarily surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarm- 
ing, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbor of 
Alexandria. 

The answer to the foregoing was signed by Ragheb Pasha, President 
of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The translation from 
the original French is as follows : 

Alexandria, July 10, 1882. 

Admiral: As I had the honor to promise in the conversation which I had with you 
this L.iorning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive, in a meeting of the 
Ministers and principal dignitaries of the state, the conditions contained in the letter 
you were good enough to address this morning to the commandant of the place, accord- 
ing to the terms of which you will put into execution to-morrow, the 11th instant, at 
daybreak, the intentions, expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the commandant 
of the place, if, before that time, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the 
southern shore of the port of Alexandria are not temporarily surrendered to you to 
be disarmed. 

I regret to announce to you that the Government of His Highness does not consider 
this proposition as acceptable. It does not in the least desire to alter its good rela- 
tions with Great Britain, "out it cannot perceive that it has taken any measures which 
can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet by works, by the mounting of new 
guns, or by other military preparations. 

Nevertheless as a proof of oar spirit of conciliation and of our desire, to a certain 
extent, to accede to your demand, we are disposed to dismount three guns in the bat- 
teries you have mentioned, either separated or together. 

If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the Government reserves its freedom 
of action ana" leaves with you the responsibility of this act of aggression. 

Receive, Admiral, the assurances, &c, &c. 

The rejoinder was as brief and to the point as the letter itself was long 
and rambling. The hotter was handed to the admiral during the night 
of July 10 and 11. The answer was returned at once. It ran thus: 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday'* 
date, and regret that I am unable to accept the proposal contained therein. 



* Saleh Aga. t Silsileh. 



12 

On July 10 the port was deserted by all the shipping that could 
get away except the Egyptian Government vessels, which were kept 
inside and brought close to the Ras-el-Tin palace, out of the reach of 
shot, and the inshore squadron of the British fleet, composed of the 
following ships, viz, the Invincible (flag), Monarch and Penelope, iron- 
clads; the Beacon, Bittern, Condor, Cygnet, and Decoy, gun-vessels, 
and the Helicon, tender and dispatch-boat. Outside the bar were the 
five armored ships, the Sultan (senior officer's), Alexandra, Inflexible, 
Superb, and Temeraire, anchored to the eastward of the Corvette Pass, 
and a large fleet of merchant vessels and men-of-war off the mouth of 
the Central or Boghaz Pass and placed out of the line of tire of the 
Egyptian batteries. 

Pending the preliminary negotiations, and in anticipation of serious 
work in Egypt, the authorities in England had begun preparations of a 
warlike nature. The Channel fleet, which had rendezvoused at Malta, 
was ordered to leave that port on July 9 for Cyprus, within easy 
reach of Alexandria, having on board two regiments of infantry and 
some eugineers belonging to the garrison of the former place. Two 
hired transports, the Nerissa and Ehosina, were to follow immediately 
with more troops. At home, the selection was made of the regiments 
it was determined to hold in readiness for foreign service ; the details of 
the commissariat and transport companies were perfected and draught 
animals secured, and the various officers of all branches, likely to be 
needed, were warned to expect definite orders at any moment. 

The Iris, steel dispatch-vessel, wit> ordnance and other stores, and 
the Humber, ammunition-ship, were sent to Alexandria from Malta, 
while an additional light iron-clad, the Penelope, drawing but 17 feet 
6 inches of water, and manned by men of the coast guard or reserve, 
sailed from the same port on July 3 to reinforce Sir Beauchanrp's fleet. 
Two days later, the Tamar, troop-ship, with the Eoyal Marine Light In- 
fantry and Royal Marine Artillery battalions, left Malta for Cyprus. 
Two small iron gun-boats for river service, the Don and the Dee, were 
sent out from England for contingent use in the Suez Canal, leaving 
Plymouth on July 9, in tow of the tug Samson. In all the dock-yards 
and arsenals unusual activity prevailed; extra bodies of workmen were 
taken on and no exertion spared to expedite the fitting out of ships 
and the equipment of men in both the army and the navy; while out- 
side, the Naval Transport Department was busy in preparing lists of 
steamers available as hired transports, and in determining their capac- 
ity for troops, for stores, and for animals. 

Before passing to the bombardment, and the damage sustained by 
the opposing forces, it is necessary to consider the nature and strength 
of the position defended and the resources of the attacking fleet. 



13 



II. 

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE DEFENSES OF ALEXANDRIA.. 

A glance at Plate 1 will show that the main harbor of Alexandria is 
a long, narrow, natnral basin of roughly rectangular shape, extend- 
ing in a general northeasterly and southwesterly direction, between the 
mainland and an outlying limestone reef, bounded, at one extremity, 
by the shoulder of land terminating at Fort Adjemi, and at the other 
by the stem of a T-shaped peninsula upon which the city is built. The 
length of this harbor is between five and six nautical miles, and its aver- 
age width one and a quarter. 

The western branch of the T-shaped peninsula is the longer of the 
two. Upon its farther point is the principal light-house of Alexandria. 
Stretching beyond this, and separated from it by a small channel navi- 
gable by boats, is a handsome breakwater, completed in 1874, built 
upon the reef and inclosing a spacious and vvell sheltered port. Beyond 
the city, to the eastward, is a small circular harbor, termed the ISTew Port, 
used only by small craft. 

Through the reef referred to above are three passages. The eastern 
or Corvette Pass lies close to the breakwater, and affords an entrance 
for vessels drawing under 18 feet of water. It makes a wide angle with 
the general direction of the reef. 

The Boghaz or Central Pass \dt\J§ main ship-channel. It has a rather 
awkward turn at its shallowest part. With very smooth water it is 
navigable by vessels drawing as much as 22 feet. In general terms 
its direction is normal to the reef. 

The western or Marabout Pass is seldom used, the leading-marks being 
very far inland and rather close together. A skillful pilot can keep a 
ship in not less than 23 feet, provided there is no swell on the bar. 

The distance over which these approaches are distributed (Adjemi 
being more than 7 nautical miles from Silsileh) and the exposed sit- 
uation of the town have necessitated the extension of the sea defenses 
of Alexandria along a line of inordinate length. The fortifications con- 
sist of nearly continuous series of open w r orks, having closed works at 
the principal salients. 

Eeferring to Plate 1, and beginning at the eastern extremity, it will 
be seen that the defenses are as follows: 
East of the city : 

1. Fort Silsileh. 

Korth of the city : 

2. Fort Pharos. 

3. Fort Ada. 

4. The Kas-el-Tin Lines. 

5. The Light- House Fort. 



\ 



14 

South of the city : 
G. Fort Saleh Aga. 

7. Unnamed open battery. 

8. Oom-el-Kabebe Fort. 

9. Fort Kumaria. 

Southwest of the city : 

10. The Mex Lines. 

11. Fort Mex. 

12. Mex Citadel or Fort Namusia. 

West of the city : 

13. Fort Marsa-el-Khauat. 

14. Fort Marabout. 

15. Fort Adjemi. 

The nomenclature adopted is that of Admiral Seymour's official report 
-of the bombardment. It must, however, be remembered that several 
of these works bear other names as well. 

The sites of the forts were, in the main, selected with good judgment. 
Silsileh defends the eastern approach, Pharos the eastern and northern, 
aided in the latter by Ada, the Easel-Tin Lines, and the Light-House 
Fort. The command of this last fort includes the Corvette and Boghaz 
Passes and the inner harbor. 

Any vessel attempting the Corvette or the Boghaz Pass would also 
be exposed to the fire of Saleh Aga, Oom-el-Kabebe, Kumaria, the Mex 
Lines, and Mex, while Marsa-el-Khanat and Marabout were admirably 
placed to protect the Marabout Pass. 

Saleh Aga, Oom-el-Kabebe, and Kumaria were furthermore intended 
to aid in the defense of the narrow neck of land lying between the 
Mediterranean on the north, or, strictly speaking, Alexandria Harbor, 
and Lake Marceotis on the south. 

Fort Adjemi is the newest work of all. If ever completed, it will be 
the strongest point of the sea defense of Alexandria, but it commands 
aline along which no one would ever dream of approaching, and is, 
practically, as useless as if planted in the middle of the Sahara. 

Besides these, an unimportant work on the southern shore of -the 
eastern harbor, variously designated, may be mentioned as existing. 
This, with Forts Kumaria and Adjemi, took no part in the action of 
July 11. 

The Pharillon, incorrectly marked as a fort on all charts, is an ancient 
square tower now in ruinous condition. It mounts no guns. 

The land about Alexandria being extremely low, none of these works 
have any considerable elevation above the sea. They are of old design 
and construction in every case (except J djemi), and they derive their 
value chiefly from the modern Armstrong muzzle loading rifles with 
which the principal among them are armed. To adapt the old fortifica- 
tions to the new guns, the parapets were sometimes heightened and 
thickened, embrasures cut, and traverses built. 



15 

The guns in these works are mounted in the open, none having over- 
head protection, except those in the casemates of Fort Pharos. In the 
majority of instances the parapet between the heavy rifles is provided 
with merlons, while the old-fashioned smooth-bores are mounted en 
barbette. 

The rifled guns were generally in batteries apart from the more anti- 
quated ordnance, although this rule was not observed in Forts Ada and 
Mex. 

While guns of nearly every description in their possession were used 
during the bombardment, the Egyptians placed most reliance upon the 
Armstrong rifles. 

The trace of the works was generally irregular, the irregularity 
sometimes, as in Fort Oom-el-Kabebe, reaching the grotesque. The 
form of the fort, both as to trace and profile, seems to have been gov- 
erned by the configuration of the ground. The Light-House Fort was 
the only one with a complete bastioned front. 

Without exception, in every fort there were buildings, such as shell- 
stores, barracks, and even magazines, showing well above the crest of 
the parapet and affording admirable targets to the attack. 

Of the materials of which the fortifications are constructed it is impos- 
sible to speak in adequate terms. A limestone, quarried near Mex, so 
soft that it is simply cut out with sharp tools, bonded with coarse lime 
mortar overcharged with sand, formed the retaining walls, and these 
were backed with sand. The penetration of the British modern pro- 
jectiles into this masonry could not be accurately determined. In the 
scarp of the Light-House Fort blind shell buried themselves more 
than ten feet, the debris behind them preventing the sounding rod from 
entering further. A similar experience was had at Fort Ada. 

The parapets are usually formed of light sand, which, in this dry 
climate, will stand at a slope of about 30°. In the newer batteries the 
superior and exterior slopes are covered with a light plaster, which 
splits off freely when walked over. 

The embrasures have 60° train, as a rule, and their soles a depression 
of from 3° to 5°. Their cheeks are revetted with concrete, and the sill 
is formed generally of a single piece of granite. 

The interior slopes are vertical and of varying height. The actual 

crest is ordinarily 18 inches 
above the top of the retaining 
wall, which is either built of 
regular masonry or of rough 
rubble laid in mortar. 

The sides of the ramps, the 

slopes in rear of the terreplein, 

&c, have vertical walls. 

The*tracks for the slide trucks of the rifled guns are of iron, laid on 

stone platforms; for those of the smooth-bores, of wood (usually rotten), 

arranged as shown in Fig. 1. 




16 

The pivots are. secured by wedges in the muzzles of old smooth- 
bore gnus sunk on end in the ma- 
sonry, Figs. 2, 3. As a finish, two 
neatly-fashioned stone steps are 
laid up to the muzzle of the gun. 

Great care has been taken to 
arrange the pieces of the steps 
radially. As a result they give 

____ absolutely no support at a place 

<s&e£&?s0s zzs pleat ama section where support is sadly needed. 

^^^afi^^^oKiXm. j n ver y f ew instances have the 

pivots thus secured stood thestrain 
of the action without complaining, 
while in some the smooth bore gun 
has started from its bed. In all 
cases the pivot proved to be the 
weakest point in the mounting of 



-~-A; 








-^- 







A///// 1 ''///„ W%'//$fflS& 



the guns. The slide of the Arm 
" IKpSZ.' strong gun is fitted with two bars 

^ffc ^>^'"H ! pi&i^'' or holdfasts (Plate 35), with eyes 

^ *""*- ! which slip over the pivot. A key 

through the pivot holds thein in 
place. The recoil of the gun naturally tends to lift these holdfasts off' 
the pivot. Occasionally the key has broken, or been sheared off, the 
holdfasts have left the pivot, the slide upended, and the gun been dis- 
abled (Plate 127). 

The magazines in these forts are, as a general rule, from 5 to 8 feet 
below the surface. They lack sufficient overhead protection. But, no 
rule being without its exceptions in this interesting collection of old- 
fashioned defensive works, those at Forts Ada and Mex were found to 
be in dangerously-exposed buildings. The passages leading into the 
magazines are planned solely with reference to convenience, and seem 
frequently to have been devised with a deliberate view to ready com- 
bustion. Ventilation is secured by means of vertical chimneys of the 
rudest nature, while the lighting arrangements are almost nil, a large 
double horn lantern being employed. As if to invite attack, their light- 
ning-conductors are tall and conspicuous. The floors are boarded and 
covered with copper or iron ! The only wonder is how any of these in- 
geniously-designed man-traps could have escaped destruction during 
the bombardment, or accidental explosion at any other time. 

The shell-houses are always in the open, and are without any pre- 
tense of protection. Asa consequence, they suffered badly in the ac- 
tion. The shells seem to have been well cared for, but to have been kept 
unfilled. Traces were very generally visible of the filling of projectiles 
during the engagement. 

The barracks connected with these forts are built in the simplest 



17 

fashion. A passage-way runs through the middle of a long room, with 
an earthen platform on each side, 18 inches high and 7 feet broad. 
This platform serves as a bed. Along the wall is a shelf, and under- 
neath the shelf a row of pegs. The windows are unglazed, but pro- 
vided with shutters. There was evidently no lavish waste of funds on 
the accommodations of a private soldier in Egypt. 

The ordnance mounted in these works was of the following types : 

RIFLES. 

10-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 18 tons. 
9-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 12 tons. 
8-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 9 tons. 
7-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 7 tons. 
40-pounder Armstrong B. L. R. 

SMOOTH-BORES. MORTARS. 

XV-inch. XX-inch. 

X-inch, heavy. XHI-inch, sea service. 

X-inch, medium. XIII inch, land service. 

X-inch, light. Xl-inch. 

6^-inch. • X-inch. 

X-inch howitzer. 

The Armstrong guns bear dates ranging from 1869 to 1874. The 
guns of each caliber are not all of the same pattern. 

The 10-inch guns were traversed by gearing, the smaller guns by 
tackles hooked to posts sunk in the ground. Their carriages were all 
fitted with plate compressors. Apparently in the heat of action the 
compressors were not always carefully attended to. Referring to Plate 
27, it will be observed that the rear slide trucks are placed very far in 
towards the muzzle of the gun. The shock of the recoil, especially if 
the latter is not controlled by the compressor, and if the gun brings 
up violently against the rear buffers, would occasion a tremendous 
shearing strain upon the key through the pivot-bolt, and if this key 
were to yield, nothing would remain to prevent the gun, carriage and 
all, from assuming the position indicated in Plate 27. 

Of the Armstrong guns, one, a 9-inch, was mounted on a Moncrieff 
carriage, behind the Khedive's palace in the Ras-el-Tin Lines. It would 
seem as though no one in authority among the Egyptians knew how to 
place this heavy and costly gun-carriage, for it was simply stuck up in 
an open space, towering high in air, and offering an admirable target. 
The gun was not fired during the action. 

The use of the XV-inch S. B. is not clearly established ; but the weight 
of evidence appears to be against their having been fired. They are 
believed to have been cast in France about forty years ago. In ex- 
ternal appearance they resemble the other smooth-bores seen in many 
of the plates. 

The 6£-ineh guns throw a shot weighing about 36 pounds. In ac- 
948 eg 2 



18 

counts of the engagement they are frequently spoken of as 32-pdrs. 
They date back to the time of Mehemet Ali. 

One X-inch howitzer was mounted in Fort Pharos. The carriage is 
too rotten to have been used. 

The mortars in the Ras-el-Tin Lines " were used pretty freely at first," 
and a X inch mortar in Marabout was undoubtedly fired. They scored 
nothing but misses. One hit would have probably given a new turn to 
the present development of ordnance. 

The B. L. R. 40-pdrs. were four in number. Two in the lower case- 
ment of Fort Pharos and one in Mex Citadel were mounted on wooden 
garrison carriages and were used during the action. The fourth was 
mounted at the western end of the Ras-el-Tin Lines, on the lift carriage 
designed by Beverly Kennon, but was not used during the action. 

The mounting of the S. B. guns was simple in the extreme — a 
wooden slide and top carriage, as shown in Plate 33, generally too 
rotten for safe employment; wooden quoins for elevating and a quad- 
rant for laying the gun. The tracks were even more rotten than the 
carriages. 

The Egyptian supply of ammunition was enormous. There were two 
kinds of M. L. R. shell, common and battering, in lavish profusion. The 
store of shrapnel was not so great. There was a fair proportion of 
chilled shot. 

There were hundreds of barrels of powder. The powder was compressed 

jMp. 4. in disks, shown in Figs. 4 and 5, manufactured jffy.s. 

by Messrs. Curtis & Harvey. The cartridges 
appear to have been filled as needed during the 
engagement. The rudeness of the scales found 
in or near the magazines must have caused 
the charge to vary in weight, and may thus *-<-- ** — > 
account for a portion of the great variation in range which was a char- 
acteristic of the Egyptian practice. The disks described were for use 
with the rifled guns. For the smooth-bores a large-graiued, finely- 
glazed powder, made by the same English firm, was provided. In 
addition some barrels of powder from the British Government factory 
at Waltham Abbey were found in the magazines. At Fort Marabout 
there was an ample supply of filled cartridges. 

Their stock of fuzes included Armstrong's combined time and percus- 
sion fuze, and two simple percussion fuzes, besides other well-known 
forms. 

The former, Figs. 6, 7, and 8, contain two independent trains. The 
first or percussion train is at the base of the fuze. X is a pellet of ful- 
minate of mercury, and Y a quick-composition, both carried by a plunger, 
a, on the outside of which is turned a broad, shallow groove to receive a 
brass ring, &, resting between the lower shoulder of the groove and the 
cylindrical guard c. The shock of firing dislodges the ring and leaves 





19 

the plunger free, on impact, to rush forward against the steel needle d y 
exploding the priming, and hence, in turn, the shell. 



jF&;G. 



Jfy.7. 



*&. <?. 





The time fuze is composed of the following parts: a primer ignited 
by concussion as the shot leaves its seat; a quick-match conveying the 
flame to a slow-composition ; a mechanical device by which the amount 
of this slow-composition to be burned can be regulated ; and, lastly, a 
channeFadmitting the flame, after the desired lapse of time, through the 
bottom of the fuze to the bursting-charge. The primer e is carried by 
a plunger,/, held in the thimble B by a fine copper wire (which breaks 
by the inertia of the plunger as the gun is fired), d is a steel needle, 



J^. 9. 




Jfy.10. 






■mn 




which ignites the primer. The flame communicates with a quick-match, 
h, extending radially across the fuze. The time-composition is pressed 
into a circular groove, i, Fig. 11, on the top of the shoulder. D, Fig. 9, 



20 

is a cover turned at will and clamped by the nut 0. On the inside of D 
is a groove, j, filled with quick-match. A fire-hole, fc, Fig. 19, also con- 
taining quick-composition, leads to this groove from a point at the bot- 
tom of the cover D. This point on the base of d corresponds to the 
index mark on the outside of the fuze. From this groove j there is a 
free passage to the base of the fuze, interrupted only by the safety 
disk 1, which is blown out in action by the flame on its way to the burst- 
ing-charge of the shell. 

The safety appliance in the percussion train seems less trustworthy 
than that of our Schenkel fuze, and the time arrangement appears very 
complicated. 

This fuze was employed later in the war by the battery of jointed 
mountain-gun accompanying the Indian Contingent. The officers of 
this battery spoke well of its action. 

The following is a description of the percussion fuze which was found 
after the bombardment in the greatest numbers, and may be assumed 
to have been most employed. 



^iff^ta. 



ttjf.33. 




e o 



.-_J5 



JVg.-L6. 

( <§> ©-V--* 
hi-'* 






m 
I 



— L& 



\j*&J?. 



<§> 



The disk a, Figs. 12, 13, 14, and 15, contains the fulminating composi- 
tion in a chamber, &, placed eccentrically underneath. The needle c is 
in the plunger d, and is also placed eccentrically. When a is turned 
through 90° by means of a key fitting into the key-holes e e, the fulmi- 
nate is brought opposite the needle and the fuze is rendered active. 
The plunger has a square tail working in a square hole in the stock, 
and hence cannot be turned. It is held near the bottom of the stock 
by a brittle wire. The stock is cut away on the face for an angular 
distance of 90°, Figs. 12 and 13. In this space a pin,/, inserted hori- 
zontally into the disk a, finds room to move. It is held, usually, in the 
safety position of the disk by a slight burr, g, cut into the stock with 



21 



a sharp tool. The fuze is set by moving the plug a until two feather- 
marks, one on the plug and one on the fuze stock, coincide. The 
plunger, Figs. 16 and 17, contains a magazine of quick-composition, h. 
A second type of percussion fuze was not examined, through lack of 
appliances for dealing with such dangerous articles. It is of brass, and 
very beautifully finished. Its external appearance is shown in Figs. 
18 and 19. 



^ff. is. 



*%,. 



20. 





A metal time fuze was used having a hexagonal head, on three sides 
of which were chisel marks, Figs. 20 and 21. These sides had each 
a hole plugged with a soft resinous composition. It is supposed that 
the marks corresponded to three known times of burning, but the fuze 
could not be opened for investigation. 

The other time fuzes were of the well-known Boxer type. In some 
cases they bore the British broad arrow, and were packed in boxes on 
which were pasted instructions for use from the British Eoyal Labora- 
tory. 

The mortar time fuzes were of the usual pattern. The longest of these 
fuzes burns for 69 seconds. 

For primers, an ordinary friction tube of the cross pattern was em- 
ployed, as well as another type in which the fulminate is packed in the 
main tube and is exploded by a fine twisted wire passing through it. 
In one smooth-bore gun a quick-match was found in the vent. 

On the part of the Egyptians, at least, the manner of carrying on 
the action was that of the last century. An enemy of to-day would have 
planted torpedoes in front of the fortifications and in the entrances to 
the harbor to such an extent as to seriously embarrass the attack, but 
the Egyptians neglected this branch of the art of military defenses, 



22 

although ample means were at hand. At Mex, after the bombardment, 
were found — 

500-pound gun-cotton mines (Figs. 22,23) 87 

250-pound gun-cotton mines (Figs. 24, 25) 87 

100-pound electro-contact mines (Fig. 27) 500 

Circuit closers (Fig. 26) 400 

Buoys, &c, in large numbers. 



■OOOOOOOOO 




JKgZd. 



~Fi 9 .Z5. 





jBcaZe of -incPt^a* 

linMinilMMlUMlnnliMII 

a a .za jcs so as «a 



Flg.ZtJ. 



1^,27. 




^& 




A large number of copper and zinc plates were found, and some sul- 
phuric acid, but no complete electric batteries. 

The mouth-pieces of the mines were found in a ravelin near Mex. 
Each contained two disks of gun-cotton fitted with a detonator. One 



23 

wire led from the detonator through the mouth-piece, and the other 
was soldered to the inside of the envelope, making a terminal earth. 

All the appliances necessary for torpedo operations except cable were 
present in sufficient quantities. Of cable only two knots could be found. 
It was 7-strand copper wire of the usual size (about 22 B. W. G.), and 
was insulated with gntta percha. 

Besides the gun-cotton blown up by the Monarch during the en- 
gagement, other stores were discovered near Mex. The gun-cotton 
was stowed in five wooden sheds, constructed for the purpose, each 
containing about five tons. That found after the bombardment was 
burnt by men from H. M. S. Hecla. In a smith's shed were 166 cases 
holding 664 of Abel's mechanical primers. The circuit closer was on 
a well-known principle. A vertical rod, articulated at the lower ex- 
tremity, carries near its upper extremity an insulated metal collar 
which is one pole of the circuit. The rod is kept centered in a water- 
tight aperture in the head of the case by a flexible diaphragm. A 
heavy shock would bring the collar in contact with the metal case, put 
the pole to earth, and thus complete the circuit (see Fig. 26). 

The failure to employ this torpedo apparatus must be regarded as 
due to the lack of experience and competent personnel. Professionally 
it is to be regretted that such a favorable opportunity of demonstrating 
the real value of this system of harbor defense was lost. The move- 
ments of the fleet would at least have been very greatly hampered by the 
moral effect, even if the ships themselves had entirely escaped injury. 

The defenses of Alexandria may be divided into two distinct lines : 
the northern, or outer, with terminals at Pharos and the Light-House; 
and the southern, or inner, between Saleh Aga and Marsa-el-Khanat, 
with an advanced flank at Marabout. 

Counting only those guns which could be trained upon the attack- 
ing fleet, the northern line was capable of bringing to bear the follow- 
ing pieces, viz : 

10-inch Armstrong M. L. R , 4 

9-inch Armstrong M. L. R *9 

8-inch Armstrong M. L. R 5 

7-inch Armstrong M. L. R 2 

40-pdr. Armstrong B. L. R 3 

XV-inchS. B 6 

X-inchS. B 31 

6^-mch S. B 25 

XV-inch mortar 1 

XHI-inch mortars 13 

Xl-inch mortars 2 

X-inch mortars 2 

In all 103 

The twenty large modern rifled guns were all in good condition, and 
without exception were used during the bombardment. They formed 

* That mounted on the Moncrieif carriage is not counted. 



24 

the main reliance of the Egyptians, and a fair proportion of the damage 
inflicted npon the ships was due to them. 

It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of the S. B. guns employed, 
nor indeed can it be said that any exact number was employed, as the 
conditions of the battle changed at every moment. Not less than one- 
fourth must be thrown out of consideration, as mounted too badly for 
efficient or even safe use. 

The mortars played, as has been stated, a very insignificant part in 
the eugagement. 

Including one of the Inflexible's turrets, the working broadside of 
the offshore squadron opposed to these batteries consisted originally of 
the following heavy guns : 

16-inch M. L. R. of 81 tons 2 

12-inch M. L. R. of 25 tons 1 

10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons 15 

9-inch M. L. R. of 12 tons 2 

84nch M . L. R. of 9 tons 6 

In all 26 

These were supplemented later by three more of 25 tons and two 
of 18 tons (the Temeraire's effective battery), and by the two 81-ton 
guns in the Inflexible's forward turret. These thirty-three guns were 
all used against Ada and Pharos. 

The inner line proper (not taking Marabout into consideration) could 
bring to bear the following pieces, viz : 

10-inch Armstrong, M. L. R - 1 

9-inch Armstrong, M. L. R 1 

8-inch Armstrong, M. L. R , 5 

40-pdr. Armstrong, B. L. R 1 

XV-inchS. B 4 

X-inchS. B : 33 

6HnchS. B 39 

Xlll-inch mortars : 9 

Xl-inch mortars 5 

X-inch mortars 4 

In all -* 102 

The eleven heavy modern guns were all manned and fired, but hardly 
more than one-half of the smooth-bores were fit for use, while men w r ere 
lacking to properly work even this small proportion of serviceable guns. 
Twenty-five may be regarded as a fair approximation to the number of 
the smooth bores served steadily at the outset. 

The inshore squadron could employ the following heavy guns (consid- 
ering only the broadside engaged), viz : 

12-inch M. L. R. of 25 tons *4 

9-inch M. L. R. of 12 tons 5 

8-inch M. L. R. of 9 tons ,---- 4 

In all --- 13 

* In the beginniug of the action the Temeraire assisted with her two barbette 25-ton 
guns of 12-inch caliber. 



25 

The bow and stero guns of the Monarch were of great value, and may 
certainly be counted as worth one more 9-inch gun. 

The fact that the attacking force could concentrate its whole fire 
against any single work on shore must not be lost sight of. It is thus 
possible to express the phases which the engagement either assumed, 
or might have been made to assume, in the form of numerical ratios. 

Fort Pharos 4 to 33 (actual). 

Fort Ada 5 to 28 or 33 (actual). 

lias-el-Tin Lines 7 to 26. 

Light-House Fort 4 to 26. 

Fort Mex 5 to 14 or 16 (actual). 

These ratios for the northern front might be almost indefinitely in- 
creased if allowance were made for the enormously superior weight of 
some of the British guns. They will, however, have sufficiently served 
their purpose if they convey a general, and not altogether inaccurate, 
notion of the relative strength of the opposite sides in the action of 
July 11. 



Ill 



THE ATTACKING FLEET. 

Admiral Seymour had at his disposal eight iron-clads and five wooden 
gun-boats. Of the former, five attacked the outer line of defenses, 
while the remaining three operated inside of the reef stretching from 
the breakwater to Fort Marabout. The gun-boats were variously em- 
ployed, their most serious eifort being directed against Fort Marabout. 

It is thought that a brief description of each vessel will result in a 
clearer conception of its powers of offense and defense. 




18 18 18 



The outside squadron was composed of the Alexandra, Inflexible, 
Sultan, Superb, and Temeraire, and was under the command of Cap- 
tain Walter J. Hunt-Grubbe, 0. B., A. D. C, as senior officer. 



26 

The Alexandra, completed in 1877, is of 9,490 tons displacement, and 
8,610 horse-power (indicated). A conventional view of her is given in 
Fig. 28. The armored parts are shaded. In Fig. 29 are half plans 
of her spar and main decks. She is a belted casemate ship, but pos- 
sesses ample bow and stern fire. Her armor is 13J* inches thick at the 
water-line amidships, and tapers fore and aft to 10 inches. The lower 
casemate has 9J inches of armor, and the upper, 6 inches. The main- 
deck battery consists of eight 10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons, the two forward 
ones being in corner ports and therefore capable of delivering their tire 
either ahead or abeam. The spar-deck battery comprises two 12-iuch 
M. L. E. of 25 tons, and two 10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons, all mounted in 
corner ports. The larger guns can fire from ahead to a little abaft the 
beam, and the smaller from a little forward of the beam to directly 
astern. Forward of the casemate, the ship's side tumbles home to allow 
bow fire from both main and spar deck batteries ; abaft the casemate, 
the same construction is adopted at the height of the spar deck. 

The Alexandra is well sparred, and is rigged as a bark. She car- 
ried a crew of 670 men. She' was Admiral Seymour's regular flagship, 
from which he had temporarily shifted his flag to a lighter vessel, ca- 
pable of readily entering the harbor of Alexandria. 

The Inflexible is a double- turreted sea-going ship of 11,880 tons dis- 
placement, and 8,010 indicated horse-power. Figs. 30 and 31. She 

.TFig.30. 




JfilgJl. 




has a central casemate, reaching to the spar deck and protecting the 
vital parts of the vessel. The armor of this casemate is on the sand- 
wich principle. At water line 12 inches of iron, 11 inches of wood, 12 
inches of iron, 6 inches of wood, inner skin of 2 inches of iron. Above 
water line 12 inches of iron, 11 inches of wood, 8 inches of iron, 10 inches 
of wood, and an inner skin of 2 inches of iron. Below water 12 inches 
of iron, 11 inches of wood, 4 inches of iron, 14 inches of wood, and an 

*Tke inner skin is included in the thickness of the armor. 



27 

inner skin of 2 inches of iron. An underwater armored deck, 3 inches 
thick, extends from this casemate to the bow and stern. The turrets 
are set at diagonally opposite corners of the citadel, so as to give com- 
plete fore-and-aft fire to all the guns. The turret armor is also on the 
sandwich principle, consisting of an outer compound plate of 4 inches 
of steel on 5 inches of iron, 8 inches of wood, 7 inches of iron, in all 
16 inches of metal. In each turret are two 16 inch M. L. R. of 81 tons 
weight. 

Forward of and abaft the turrets are comparatively narrow super- 
structures (21 and 30 feet wide), each about 100 feet in length, and 
built, for the accommodation of the crew and officers, inside the lines of 
fire. On top of the superstructures are a few small pieces, B. L. R. 
20-pdrs., Kordenfeldts, &c. 

The elevating and depressing of the 81- ton guns is performed auto- 
matically. These guns have no top carriage, properly speaking. The 
trunnions rest on blocks traveling on fixed slides, the recoil being taken 
up in hydraulic cylinders. The breech rests on a third block, sliding on 
a beam, which is capable of being turned about one end by a third piston. 
The gun is worked entirely by hydraulic power. 

The Inflexible is brig-rigged, and, though the largest man-of-war afloat 
to-day, carries only 484 men. 

The Sultan, launched in 1870, is represented in Figs. 32 and 33. She 



JVg.32. 




JFip. 33. 




J&ton 



■ guns 



is of 9,290 tons displacement, and has engines capable of developing 
7,736 horse-power. She is bark-rigged. She has an armored belt around 
the water-line and an armored citadel on the main deck, at the forward 
en d of which is a recessed port for obtaining bow fire. In this case- 
*mate are eight 10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons weight. On the upper deck is 
a smaller casemate containing four 9-inch M. L. R. of 12 tons weight, for 
which fore-and-aft fire is obtained by carrying the spar-deck rail inboard 
out of the line of fire. The armor varies in thickness from 11 to 7 inches. 



28 

The Sultan had but recently gone into commission, with a crew of 400 
men. 

The Superb, of 9,170 tons displacement and 7,430 indicated horse- 
power, was originally designed for the Turkish Government. She was 
completed in 1878, and sold by the builders to the English Government 
and equipped for sea-service in 1880. She is represented in Figs. 34 



Fig. 34* 




and 35. She has an armored belt at the water-line and a casemate 
amidships, on the main deck, in which are mounted twelve 10-inch M. 
L. E. of 18 tons weight. The corner guns are in recessed ports, giving 





JL<%g.Jtf. 

6JS ton guns 




2 .__^f 

18 ton ^-^^ 


o / O O o \ 


\»ton 
J guns 




-«B^ 1[ l,„,„i| r ,. r ,Hi| r , fr | | , .^ 

6 18 ton guns 





fire nearly ahead and astern. Four 10-inch M. L. E. of 18 tons weight 
complete her battery, two being carried in the bow and two in the 

Fig. 36. 




Fig. 37. 



/ 25 ton gun 




I ] n 25 ton gun 

stern. The armor is 13J inches thick ; that on the belt tapering to 7| 
inches forward and 5J inches aft. The Superb is bark-rigged, and she 
has a crew of 620 men. 

The Temeraire, shown in Figs. 36 and 37, is a belted casemate vessel, 



29 



carrying on the upper deck two fixed pear-shaped open turrets. Jn the 
casemate are four 10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons, and two 11-inch M. L. R. 
of 25 tons, the latter firing from corner ports, either ahead or abeam. 
The turrets have each a 25-ton gun mounted on the Rendel system. 
The guns are fired en barbette, then disappear by their own recoil; are 
loaded under cover and raised again to the firing position. The forward 
turret is protected by 11J inches of armor, the after one by 9J inches. 
The armored belt is 12 J inches thick amidships and tapers towards the 
bow and stern. The casemate armor varies from 10 to 8 inches in thick- 
ness. This very efficient vessel displaces 8,547 tons, and has engines 
capable of developing 7,520 horse-power. She is officially stated to 
have cost less than $2,000,000. Like the Inflexible she is brig-rigged. 
Her crew numbered 534 men. 

The inshore squadron of armored ships under the more immediate 
command of the Admiral consisted of the Invincible (flagship), the 
Monarch, and the Penelope. 

The Invincible, of 6,000 tons displacement, and engined up to 4,800 
horse-power, was designed in 1867. She is represented in Figs. 38 and 39. 



-Fiff- 36 




ttff.39. 
2 J2-ton puns, 




332 ton guns 

She has an armored belt and a short casemate. The main-deck case- 
mate mounts six 9-inch JVL L. R. of 12 tons weight. The spar-deck 
battery is composed of four similar guns, carried in a redoubt which 
projects sufficiently clear of the ship's side to give the desired fore and- 
aft fire from corner ports. In addition are four unprotected M. L. R. 64- 
pdrs. Her armor ranges from 9^ to 5J inches in thickness. Her crew 
was 450 strong. 

The Monarch, Figs. 40 and 41, is a masted sea-going, doubie-turreted 
monitor with high free-board, of 8,320 tons displacement and 7,840 in- 
dicated horse-power. She has an armored belt, an armored citadel, and 
armored ends. In the turrets are four 12-inch M. L. R. of 25 tons weight, 
protected by 11J inches of iron. In the bow are two 9-inch M. L. R. of 
12 tons weight, and in the stern one 7-inch M. L. R. of 6J tons weight. 
On her hurricane deck, which extends fore and aft above the turrets, 
are eight Nordenfeldt guns. Her crew is composed of 515 men. Her 
belt armor varies in thickness from 8 A- to 5 inches. 



30 



The PeD elope, the smallest of the iron-clads which took part in the 
engagement, is of the same general type as the Superb, but smaller 
(see Figs. 34, 35). The Penelope is classed as a corvette. She displaces 
4,470 tons, and is engined up to 4,700 indicated horse-power. She is a 
belted casemate cruiser, mounting eight 8-inch M. L. R. of 9 tons. She 
also carries three B. L. E. 40-pdrs. The maximum thickness of her 
armor is 6 inches, and her draught only 17 feet 6 inches. Her crew is 
223 men. 

Fig. i£Q. 




WMffl 



w^MMMmm£i. HIi 




J*fy.4Z. 



Z J&ton jmng. 




In addition the ships carried some B. L. R. 20-pdrs., and were well 
supplied with Nordenfeldts and Gatlings. The ships themselves, al- 
though spoken of by the popular name of iron-clad, are all iron-armored 
vessels. 

The gun-boats present at Alexandria during the bombardment are all 
of composite construction. The larger ones are bark-rigged. 

The Bittern displaces 805 tons, can develop 850 horse-power, and car- 
ries one 7-inch M. L. R. pivot, and two B. L. R. 40-pdrs. Her crew is 
composed of 90 men. 

The Condor is of about the same size. She carries one 7-inch M. L. R. 
pivot, and two M. L. R. 64-pdrs. Her crew is 100 strong. 

The Beacon displaces 603 tons, develops 510 horse power, while the 
Cygnet and Decoy are of but 440 tons displacement. Their crews were 
75, 60, and 50 men, respectively. They were armed with two 64-pdr. 
M. L. R. and two B. L. R. 20-pdrs. The Cygnet and Decoy are barken- 
tine-rigged. 

July 10 was spent in clearing the ships for action. .The lower rigging 
was "come up" in the line of fire and was carried inboard. The top- 
gallant masts were struck, bowsprits rigged in (on board the armored 
ships) until the cap touched the stem, leaving the whiskers and head rig- 
ging outboard. The lower and topsail yards were kept aloft. 

On board the gun-boats all the yards were sent down, and the top- 
masts housed, in addition to the other preparations usual on such 
occasions. 



31 
IV. 

THE BOMBARDMENT. 

During the night of July 10 and 11 the vessels of the British fleet 
took up the positions to which they had been severally assigned. At 
daybreak of the 11th the nature of the attack became evident. The 
heavier ships were placed to engage the northern line and the lighter 
ships the inner line. By referring to Plate 1, these original positions 
may be seen plotted at E, F, G, H. The Alexandra, Sultan, and Superb 
maneuvered under way at the outset, firing at the Light-House Fort 
and Bas-el-Tin Lines. The Inflexible was at anchor, directing the fire 
of one turret against the Light-House Fort, that of the other against 
Oom-el-Kabebe. The Temeraire was aground during the early part of 
the day firing at Mex. The Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope were 
under way out of the line of the Temeraire's fire, engaging Mex and 
Marsa-el-Khanat. 

The day was perfectly clear and the sea smooth. The wind was light 
from the northward and westward, blowing the smoke from the ships 
towards the shore and thus obscuring the target for a long time after each 
fire and making it difficult to watch and profit by the fall of the shot. A 
gun captain can correct his aim much better when he sees himself where 
the shot strikes than when it is reported from aloft by an observer. This 
circumstance and the fact that the sun at the beginning of the action was 
in the eyes of the British gunners were the only disadvantages under 
which the attack labored. Otherwise it would have been impossible to 
select more propitious conditions. 

Admiral Seymour's order of battle is here quoted at length : 

Invincible, at Alexandria, July 10, 1882. 

MEMORANDUM. 

In the event of my not receiving a satisfactory answer to a summons which I shall 
send to the Military Governor of Alexandria, calling on him to deliver up to me, tem- 
porarily, the works on the southern shore of the harbor, and those on the Eas-el- 
Tin Peninsula, the squadron under my command will attack the forts as soon as the 
twenty-four hours given to neutrals to leave the place have expired, which will be 
at 5 a. m. of the 11th. There will be two attacks : 

1. From the inside of the harbor, in which the Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope 
will take part. 

2. By the Sultan, Superb, Temeraire, Alexandra, and Inflexible, from outside the 
breakwater. 

Action will commence by signal from me, when the ship nearest the newly-erected 
earthwork near Fort Ada * will fire a shell into the earthwork. 

On the batteries opening on the offshore squadron in reply, every effort will be 
made by the ships to destroy the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin Peninsula, especially the 
Light-House Battery bearing on the harbor. When this is accomplished, the Sultan, 

* The Hospital Battery, Plates 21 and 22. 



32 

Superb, and Alexandra will move to the eastward and attack Fort Pharos, and, if 
possible, the Silsileh Battery. 

The Inflexible will move down this afternoon to the position off the Corvette Pass 
assigned to her yesterday, and be prepared to open fire on the guns in the Mex Lines, 
in support of the inshore squadron, when signal is made. 

The Temeraire, Sultan, and Alexandra will flank the works on Ras-el-Tin. 

The gun-vessels and gun-boats will remain outside and keep out of fire until a favor- 
able opportunity offers itself of moving into the attack of Mex. 

Ships must be guided in a great measure by the state of the weather, whether they 
anchor or remain under way. If they anchor, a wire hawser should be used as a 
spring. 

The men are to have breakfast at 4 30 a. m. and are to wear blue working rig. 

The inshore squadron will be under my personal command ; the offshore ships under 
that of Captain Hunt-Grubbe, C. B., of the Sultan. 

The Helicon and Condor will act as repeating ships. 

Finally, the object of this attack is the destruction of the earthworks and dis- 
mantling of the batteries on the sea fronts of Alexandria. It is possible that the 
work may not be accomplished under two or three days. 

Shell is to be expended with caution, notwithstanding that the Humber, with a 
fair proportion of reserve ammunition, maybe expected here on the 12th. 

Should the Achilles arrive in time, she is to attack Fort Pharos, or place herself 
where the senior officer of the offshore squadron may direct. 

BEARINGS. 

Line of ships NE. by E., 2± cables apart. 
Alexandra. 

Eunostos* light-house SE. by E. £E. 

Breakwater light-house S. £ W. 

Black Rockt Batteiy, distance, 1,500 yards. 

Sultan. 

Eunostos light-house E. by S. £ S. 
Breakwater light-house S. i W. 
Barrack Point, $ 1,750 yards. 

Superb. 

Eunostos light house E. ■£ S. 
Breakwater light-house S. £ E. 
Light-house, 1,950 yards. 

ADDITIONAL BEARINGS. 

: Inflexible, 3,700 yards N. by W. of Mex. 
Temeraire, 3,500 yards NNW. of Mex. 
Penelope, \ 
Invincible, C 1,000 to 1,300 yards W. by N. of Mex. 

Monarch, ) 

I have, &c, 

F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR, 
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. 
To the Captains and Officers 

Commanding H. M. Ships at and off Alexandria. 

*The principal light-house of Alexandria. 
tAfterwards known as Central Battery, Ras-el-Tin Lines. 

{Half way between the Tower Battery, Ras-el-Tin Lines, and the Light-House 
Fort. 



PLA.T3S 1- 



MEMNIiftllA 




JYTAffS/l - CL -ICh A „ A 



A ZfiPTIEH (POLICE STATION.) 
IN THE RUE FRANQ.UE. 

B.C . Car ft cols (station houses) 
-D. American Consulate. 

£1. Original line assumed by the outs/de squadron. 

T.Oric/nal posit/on taken by the Inflexible. 

G "■ , «. - Temeraire, 

IT. ■• LINE ASSUMED BY THE INSHORE SQUAD HOM 



33 

To the foregoing may be added the general instructions to command- 
ing officers to fire back at any fort that might open on them. 

The following is the official report of the action as given by Admiral 
Seymour. The paragraphs relating to individuals only are omitted : 

Invincible, at Alexandria, July 20, 1882. 
Sir: 

1. In continuation of my official report of proceedings, dated the 19th instant, I 
have the honor to submit, for their lordships 7 information, a more detailed account 
of the action which took place on the 11th, between the squadron under my com- 
mand and the forts which defend Alexandria, than I was enabled to forward at that 
time. ' 

2. As will be seen by the inclosed order of battle, a copy of which was supplied to 
each captain, I had decided to make two attacks, one by the Sultan, Superb, and 
Alexandra on the north face of Ras-el-Tin, supported by the fire from the after-tur- 
ret of the Inflexible, anchored off the entrance to the Corvette Pass, thus enfilading 
the Light-House batteries ; the other, by the Invincible. Monarch, and Penelope from 
inside the reefs, aided by the fire of the Inflexible's forward turret and the Temeraire 
which took up a position close to the fairway buoy of the Boghaz or principal pass 
leading into Alexandria Harbor. The Helicon and Condor were detailed for duty as 
repeating ships, and the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy were employed as directed 
by signal during the day. 

3. At 7 a. m. on the 11th I signaled from the Invincible to the Alexandra to fire a 
shell into the recently-armed earthworks termed the Hospital Battery, and followed 
this by a general signal to the fleet, "Attack the enemy's batteries," when immediate 
action ensued between all the ships, in the positions assigned to them, and the wbole 
of the forts commanding the entrance to the harbor of Alexandria. A steady fire was 
maintained on all sides until 10.30 a. m., when the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, 
which had been hitherto under way, anchored off the Light-House Fort, and by their 
welt-directed lire, assisted by that of the Inflexible, which weighed and joined them 
at 12.30 p. m., succeeded in silencing most of the guns in the forts on Ras-el-Tin; still 
some heavy guns in Fort Ada kept up a desultory fire. About 1.30 p. m. a shell from 
the Superb, whose practice in the afternoon was very good, blew up the magazine 
and caused the retreat of the remaining garrison. These ships then directed their 
attention to Fort Pharos, which was silenced with the assistance of the Temeraire, 
which joined them at 2.30 p. in., when a shot from the Inflexible dismounted one of 
the heavy guns.* The Hospital Battery was well fought throughout, and, although 
silenced for a time by a shell from the Inflexible, it was not until 5 p. m. that the 
artillerymen were compelled to retire from their guns by the fire of the offshore 
squadron and the Inflexible. The Invincible, with my flag, supported by the Penel- 
ope, both ships being at anchor, the latter on one occasion shifting berth, and assisted 
by the Monarch, under way inside the reefs, as well as by the Inflexible and Tem- 
eraire in the Boghaz and Corvette Channels, succeeded, after an engagement of some 
hours, in silencing and partially destroying the batteries and lines of Mex. Fort 
Marsa-el-Khanat was destroyed by the explosion of the magazine after half an hour's 
action with the Monarch, t 

About 2 p. m., seeing that the gunners of the western lower battery of Mex had aban- 
doned their guns, and that the supports had probably retired to the citadel, I called in 
the gun-vessels and gun-boats, and under cover of their fire landed a party of twelve vol- 
unteers, under the command of Lieutenant B. R. Bradford of the Invincible, accompa- 



*This remark is an error. No " heavy gun," if by that is meant a rifled gun, was 
dismounted in Fort Pharos. 

1 It was subsequently discovered that the explosion caused by the Monarch's fire was 
of a store of gun-cotton some distance in rear of the fort. The latter was unharmed. 



34 

niedby Lieutenant Richard Poore of that ship, Lieutenant the Honorable Hed worth 
Lambton ( my flag lieutenant), Major Tulloch, Welsh Regiment, attached to my staff, and 
Mr. Hardy, midship man in charge of the boat, who got on shore through the surf and 
destroyed, with charges of gun-cotton, two 10-inch M. L. R. guns, and spiked six smooth- 
bore gnus in the right-hand water battery at Mex, and returned without a casualty 
beyond the loss of one of their boats ( Bittern's dinghy) on the rocks. This was a haz- 
ardous operation very well carried out.* Previous to this, after the action had become 
general, Commander Lord Charles Beresford, of the Condor, stationed as repeating 
ship, seeing the accuracy with which two 10-inch rifled guns in Fort Marabout wore 
playing upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, steamed up to within rauge of his 7-inch 
90 cwt. gun, and by his excellent practice soon drew off the fire.t I then ordered him 
to be supported by the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy, the Cyguet having been 
engaged with the Ras-el-Tin forts during the early part of the day. I am happy to say, 
during the action, no casualties happened to those vessels, owing, in a great measure, 
to the able manner in which they were maneuvered, and their light draught enabling 
them to take up their position on the weakest point of the batteries. The action gen- 
erally terminated successfully at 5.30 p. in., when the ships anchored for'the night. 

4. The force opposed to us would have been more formidable had every gun mounted 
on the line of works been brought into action, but in the Ras-el-Tin batteries few of 
the large smooth-bores and fewer of the French 36-pounders, bought in the time of 
MehemetAli,were manned, the Egyptians preferring to use the English 10-inch, 9-inch, 
8-inch, aud smaller muzzle-loading rifled guns. These guns are precisely the same as 
those which Her Majesty's ships carry, and no better muzzle-loading guns can be 
found. They were abundantly, even lavishly, supplied with projectiles of the latest 
description, chilled shot, and the sighting of the guns was excellent. The same may 
be said of the guns in the Mex Lines, excepting that in them the 36-pounders were 
more used, and that one, if not two, 15-inch smooth-bores + were brought into action in 
addition to the 10-inch, 9-inch, aud smaller M. L. R. guns fired. Fort Marabout brought 
two 10-inch M. L. R. gunst into action at long range, shell after shell of which came 
up towards the inshore squadron in an excellent line, falling from ten to thirty yards 
short. Not one shell from the guns in the southern batteries burst on board Her 
Majesty's ships during the day. 

5. I forward for their lordships' perusal the official report of Captain Walter J. 
Hunt-Grubbe, C. B., A. D. C, of Her Majesty's ship Sultan, who most ably commanded 
the outside squadron, which bore the brunt of the action, as the accompanying state- 
ments of the damages sustained by the Sultan, Superb, aud Alexandra fully testify. 
I have no account of the damage sustained by the Penelope, as that vessel was shortly 



* In Fort Mex was but one 10-inch M. L. R. This audits neighbor, a 9-inch gun, were 
disabled by the landing party (see Plate 37). The wind had freshened slightly, mak- 
ing quite a surf at the spot where the party landed — marked a on Plate 37 — and 
adding a sensible risk to the peril of the undertaking. 

t These "10-inch rifled guns" are, in reality, 9-inch guns, on the east face of Fort 
Marabout, and are shown on Plate 32. The handling of the Condor was most seaman- 
like. Commander Lord Charles Beresford selected a position on the prolongation 
of the capital of the northeast bastion, where the guns of the fort could only be 
brought to bear upon him with great difficulty. Here, at 1,200 yards from the fort, 
he dropped a kedge and, keeping his ship constantly in motion either by paying out 
or hauling in his warp, he succeeded m evading the enemy's heavy shot, any one of 
which might have inflicted serious if not fatal damage. In addition, he made sharp 
use of his machine guns. When the risk this ship incurred is considered, it is impos- 
sible uot to couple her share in the action with the operations of the landing party 
from the Invincible as the two brilliant episodes of the day. 

iSee page 17. 



35 

afterwards detached from my flag. The upper works of the Invincible and Inflexible 
were a good deal knocked about, but no serious iujury was inflicted. No damage was 

done to the Temeraire or Monarch. 

* # # * * * * 

It is quite impossible for me to account for the very small loss sustained by Her 
Majesty's ships on this occasion, considering the amount of shell and shot which 
struck them, and the injuries inflicted on the hulls of the Sultan, Superb, and Alexan- 
dra, and in a lesser degree on those of the Invincible, Penelope, and Inflexible, but I may 
here express my deep regret that Lieutenant Francis Jackson and Mr. William Shan- 
non, carpenter of the Inflexible, should have fallen. The wounded, who when last 
heard from were doing well, were sent to Malta in the Humber. 



I have, &c. 



To the Secretary op the Admiralty. 



F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR, 
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. 



The special work done by the offshore squadron is thus described in 

the official report of its senior officer : 

July 14, 1882. 
Sir: 

1. In compliance with your memorandum of the 10th instant, I have great pleasure 
in reporting the successful manner in which the offshore squadron, under my per- 
sonal command, consisting of, at first, the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, and after- 
wards the Temeraire and Inflexible, attacked and silenced the earthworks and bat- 
teries on the 11th instant, comprising Forts Pharos and Ada, the batteries at Hospital 
Point, the new earthwork, which was of formidable nature, and the Light-House 
batteries bearing on the harbor. 

2. The action was commenced at 6.59 a. m., by the Alexandra firing a shell at the 
earthwork near Fort Ada, and a few minutes after all the forts replied and the action 
became general. 

3. At this time I was steaming in close order, at about 1,500 yards, past the batter- 
ies, and was turning in succession with a view to anchor in the order prescribed by 
you, but before doing so I again repassed. Finding, however, that the batteries 
were stronger than was anticipated, and that the Egyptian gunners were far from 
despicable, making, indeed, very good practice, I deemed it advisable to anchor and 
obtain the exact range. This was executed with great precision by the squadron, and 
we soon appeared to be dismounting their guns.* 

4. At 10.30 a. m. the Light-House Battery, which had been, earlier in the day, 
severely handled by the Inflexible, ceased to return our fire, their last rifled gun 
being disabled, though not before it had given us much trouble. 

5. At 12.45 p. in. the Temeraire and Inflexible (you no longer requiring their serv- 
ices) began to assist in our attack, shelling Forts Pharos and Ada with great effect. 

6. By this time the fire was considerably less, but one rifled gunt on the Hospital 
earthwork, which it was impossible to dismount, being invisible from the ship, did ua 
great damage. 

7. At 1.32 p. m. a shell from the Superb blew up the magazine by Fort Ada,t and 
that fort and Pharos were hurriedly evacuated. 

8. After This the enemy's firing ceased, and, on our side, it was confined to dislodg- 
ing parties of men, reported from time to time from the tops as reassembling in 
rear of the earth works. 

* More appearance than reality, as will be afterwards shown. 
t A 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R. 
tThis magazine was inside the fort. 



36 

9. The ships were handled and fought in a manner reflecting great credit on their 
officers and ships' companies. 

I have, &c, 

W. HUNT-GRUBBE, 

Captain. 
To Admiral Sir F. Bkauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., 

Commander-in-Chief. 

The parts omitted above are personal mentions and recommendations. 
In a dispatch of July 14, Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour further 
says : 

On the morning of the 12th I ordered the Temeraire and Inflexible to engage Fort 
Pharos, and after two or three shots had been fired, a flag of truce was hoisted on 
Fort Ras-el-Tin,* and I then sent my flag lieutenant, the Honorable Hedworth Lamb- 
ton, in to discover the reason, and, from his report, there is no doubt it was simply a 
ruse to gain time; and as negotiations failed, my demand being to surrender the 
batteries commanding the Boghaz Channel, one shot was fired into the Mex Barracks! 
Battery earthwork, when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant 
and Commander Morrison into the harbor in the Helicon, and on his going on board 
the Khedive's yacht, the Mahroussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported 
on his return after dark his belief that the town had been evacuated. 

To these official reports little need be added. The practice was, in 
the main, excellent. The fire of the Inflexible and Temeraire appeared 
to the writer, who was not far from either at the beginning of the ac- 
tion and during the forenoon, to be particularly good. The Inflexible 
seemed to use her small 20-pdrs. as range-finders, so as not to waste 
her valuable shot. A shrapnel burst prematurely iuside of one of her 
81-ton guns, inflicting no damage, its scattering pieces being plainly vis- 
ible on the water. 

On board of the Superb the fire from her small guns was stopped on 
account of the smoke they occasioned. 

The projectiles from the offshore squadron were heard to "wobble" 
greatly — noticeably in the cases of the broadside vessels — as indicated 
by a prolonged and heavy rumbling sound, like that of a distant rail- 
way train. 

The Egyptians were overmatched in guns both as to size and num- 
ber, but the way that they, responded to the heavy fire from the Eng- 
lish fleet was marvelous, standing to their batteries with unexpected and 
admirable courage. When the Inflexible's 1,700-pound projectiles struck 
the scarp of the Light-House Fort, immediately underneath an embras- 
ure, they would throw up a cloud of dust and fragments of stone as 
high as the light-house itself. To the looker-on it seemed impossible to 
live under such a fire, yet after a few minutes the dust would clear away 
and the gun's crew would pluckiiy toss another shell back at their huge 
opponent. The Egyptian practice was naturally subjected to keener 
criticism than the British, as the fall of each shot that failed of its tar- 

* The Light-House Fort. 
tMex Citadel. 



37 

get could be distinctly seen. The error was, generally speaking, caused 
by too much elevation. Certain of the guns were pointed with "con- 
summate skill," notably one 36-pdr. (6J-inch S. B.) in the citadel of Mex, 
which hulled the Invincible with persistent accuracy. 

Of the fuzes used by the British, the greater part were the u general- 
service percussion." It is impossible to exaggerate the misbehavior of 
this fuze on the occasion of the bombardment. The most careless wit- 
ness of the action could not help noticing the frequency of premature 
explosions, and of failures to explode at all. It is not beyond the limits 
of fair estimation to set down the number of the latter as reaching sev- 
eral hundred, while some British officers think the proportion uo less 
than four- fifths of all fired. In several instances fuzes were driven 
bodily into the bursting charge without exploding the shell. The stout- 
est apologist for this fuze, urging that it was designed for use against 
armored ships, and therefore given a retarded action, could neither ex- 
pect nor desire a more violent impact than is shown by this fact to have 
taken place. As a result of the unreliable nature of these fuzes, it may 
be mentioned that one of the Penelope's 8-inch shell was afterwards 
found lying harmless in a magazine containing over four hundred tons 
of powder. 

One or two of the British shell were split longitudinally into two 
parts, doubtless by the force of the blow they delivered, which was, how- 
ever, not sufficient to ignite the fuze. 

It is proper to remark that the entire subject of fuzes is now being 
overhauled in England, in response to the universal and loudly- expressed 
dissatisfaction at their performance during the bombardment. 

It has been already stated that the fire was ordered to be slow and 
deliberate, with the object of husbanding the supply of ammunition. 
Difficulty was experienced in obtaining the exact number of charges 
expended, or indeed accurate particulars of many interesting profes- 
sional matters connected with the bombardment, a spirit of mystery 
appearing to have prevailed. The following figures may be relied upon 
as approximately correct. 

The Monarch fired as follows: 117 12-inch shell from her turret guns; 
103 9 and 7 inch shell from her bow and stern guns. 

The Penelope fired 157 common shell, 38 shrapnel, 36 Palliser shell. 
She used 1 20" time fuze, 114 10" time fuzes, and the remainder, gen- 
eral-service percussion fuzes. 

The Superb fired 200 10-inch shell, mostly common, 10 10-inch shrap- 
nel, and a few 20-pounder shell. 

The Invincible fired about 220 shell of various kinds, mostly common 
(as distinguished from shrapnel). A few only were shrapnel and Pal- 
liser shell. The fuzes were chiefly percussion. She expended between 
two and three thousand rounds of Nordenfeldt ammunition. 

The Inflexible' s stock of ammunition was currently reported to have been 
reduced to 40 battering shell at the end of the day. 



38 

As regards the Sultan, the statement was made, and credibly too r 
that "she could not have continued the action for more than an hour 
longer, as the ammunition was nearly exhausted. 11 What is true of the 
Sultan is also doubtless true more or less of the other vessels — an. 
important point, that should be kept in mind. 

The outside squadron, as will be observed, began the action under 
way, at the minimum distance of about 1,500 yards, and anchored 
after passing the batteries a second time, the advantage of knowing 
the range exactly prevailing over the increased rislc of being hit. It then 
moved, from time to time, concentrating its fire on each work in suc- 
cession until the close of the day. 

In the inshore squadron the flagship was anchored for the most part 
at 1,300 yards from Mex, a position from which a clear view could be 
had, and was kept broadside to the wind on one side, and the batteries 
on the other, by a kedge carried out to windward. The Monarch and 
Penelope remained under way, passing and repassing the forts. The 
Penelope adopted the plan of steaming out three-quarters of a mile to- 
wards the reef and then drifting in, broadside on, until within about 
700 yards, while the Monarch appeared to keep more way on, moving in 
a line parallel with the shore. These ships exchanged a few shots with 
Fort Marabout, but at so great a range that they could neither inflict 
nor receive much damage. Later in the day, when the offshore squad- 
ron moved to the eastward to attack Fort Pharos, these two ships passed 
inside the breakwater and shelled Saleh Aga and the battery between 
Saleh Aga and Oom el-Kabebe. They would have gone up to the city 
had they not been recalled by signal. 

Machine guns were largely employed by the fleet. It is quite impos- 
sible to determine their exact value at Alexandria, for no record was 
kept by the Egyptians of their losses. The appearance of the buildings 
immediately in rear of the batteries, scarred and pitted by Nordenfeldt 
and Gatling bullets, proves that these weapons must have had some 
effect. This appearance is more marked at Mex than in the Ras-el-Tin 
Lines, a fact which might have been presupposed, the average range be- 
ing in the former case about one-half that in the latter^ and the num- 
ber of machine guns brought to bear being greater through the rein- 
forcement of the inshore squadron by the gun -boats after noon. Had 
machine guns contributed in any great measure to the result of the fight r 
they would have left more traces on the guns. Their value against 
properly-constructed forts can hardly be problematical. If mounted in 
the tops, and used at short range, against low parapets, as at Mex, they 
may be very useful, but in a general engagement at long range, as in the 
case of the outside fleet, where the fall of the bullets could not be ob- 
served and the aim corrected, owing to the distance of the object aimed 
at and the thickness of the smoke, they cannot be considered as really 
formidable. 

! 



39 
The English loss on July 11 is given in the following summary 



Ships. 


d 

3 

M 


I 
1 




l 

2 


3 

1 
6 
8 
8 
1 












2 
1 




Total 


6 


27 





The Egyptian forces at Alexandria were under the immediate com- 
mand of Toulba Pasha. From the best sources of information accessi- 
ble it is gathered that the defenses contained less than 2,000 artillerists. 
Of infantry and of civilian volunteers there was no lack. The dispo- 
sition of these troops has not been positively ascertained. It is known 
that the important post of Mex was commanded by an adjutant-major, 
who had with him one captain, three lieutenants, and 150 men. Of this 
small force one lieutenant was mortally wounded, 50 men killed, and 
48 wounded. Another account gives the loss as very much less. In 
this land it is hard to obtain the truth. 

Oom-el-Kabebe, as already mentioned, was subjected to the Inflex- 
ible^ fire during the forenoon. Its garrison consisted of 75 men, aided 
by a considerable number of Arab volunteers. Eighteen of these were 
wounded by splinters of masonry. In all, along the southern or inside 
line, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed and from 150 to 
200 wounded. Among the latter were several officers. 

In the northern line of defenses, one officer was killed in the Light- 
House Fort and one in the Ras-el-Tin Lines. In each of the foregoing, 
and in Fort Ada, one was wounded. At least 50 men were killed and 
150 wounded in these lines, but the record is very vague. Stray pieces 
of shell are reported by the chief of police to have killed and wounded 
between 150 and 200 citizen s, but this statement must be accepted only 
for what it is worth. 

It is thought that in the interest of impartiality the native Egyptian 
semi-official report of this engagement should be given. The following, 
taken from the London Times, is a translation of the account of the 
bombardment published in El Taif, an Arabic newspaper, the organ of 
Arabi Pasha : 

War News. — On Tuesday, 25 Shaban, 1299, at 12 o'clock in the morning (July 11, 
7 a. in.), the English opened fire on the forts of Alexandria and we returned the fire. 
At 10 a. m. an iron-clad foundered off Fort Ada. 

At noon two vessels were sunk between Foit Pharos and Fort Adjerni. 
At 1.30 p. m. a wooden man-of-war of eight guns was sunk. 
At 5 p. m. the large iron-clad was struck by a shell from Fort Pharos, the batterj 



40 

was injured, and a white flag was immediately hoisted by her as a signal to ceaso 
firing at her, whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for ten hours 
without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts were destroyed, but they were re- 
paired during the night. The shots and shells discharged from the two sides amounted 
to about 6,000, and this is the first time that so large a number of missiles have been 
discharged in so short a time. 

At 11 a. m., on Wednesday, the English ships again opened fire and were replied 
to by the forts, but after a short time the firing ceased on both sides, and a deputa- 
tion came from Admiral Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha, which ha 
could not accept. 

No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy fire as did the Egyp- 
tians under the fire of twenty-eight ships during ten hours. 

At 9 a. m., on Thursday, an English man-of-war was seen to put a small screw in 
place of the larger one which she had been using, and it was then known that her 
screw had been carried away by a shot from the forts. 

On examining other ships it was observed that eight had been severely battered oa 
their sides and that one had lost her funnel. 



THE EFFECT UPON THE SHIPS. 

Two of the armored ships, the Monarch and the Temeraire, were not 
injured at all. This immunity was due in the case of the former to her 
being kept continually in motion ; in the latter, to the fact that she 
was very distant from the enemy's batteries all the forenoon, being 
brought within short range later in the day, after the Egyptian gun- 
ners had become demoralized under the severe lire of the five preceding 
hours. 

The Condor was struck once, receiving a slight wound in the bow. 
Otherwise, the unarmored vessels were not touched, although the Cyg- 
net took a noticeable part in the morning's attack on the Light-House 
Fort, engaging from a point well outside of the line, followed by the 
offshore squadron, and all were exposed at Marabout and afterwards 
at Mex. 

The official report of the oamage sustained by the Alexandra is given 
below. This vessel was struck sixty-odd times. It is proper to recall 
the fact that she is the regular flagship of the British Mediterranean 

fleet. 

H. M. S. Alexandra, 

Alexandria, July 21, 1882. 

LIST OF DAMAGE TO HULL AND RIGGING SUSTAINED ON THE llTII INSTANT. 

1. Three shot-holes in recesses on mess deck, two on port side, one on starboard, 
the shot or shell carrying away several frames, disabling pump-gear, supporting- 
stanchion of deck, shield by fire-hearth, ladders, two mess-tables and their stools and 
fittings, knocking away soil-pipe of water-closets, besides several small defects caused 
by shell bursting. 



4i 

2. Shot-hole in torpedo-lieutenant's cabin, damaging frames, edge-straps, bulk- 
head of cabin, furniture, and engine-room coamings. 

3. Shot-hole through netting, after part of quarter-deck, port side, carrying away 
part of wardroom skylight, sashes, rails and stanchions of after-ladder, and stanch- 
ions of standard compass started. 

4. Shot-hole through cabin of staff-commander, completely destroying some furni- 
ture and damaging more. 

5. One shot-hole in captain's cabin on port and one on starboard side, completely 
destroying furniture in bed-cabin, and partially destroying furniture in sitting- 
cabin. 

6. Trunk of admiral's skylight completely destroyed. The shell, in falling, dam- 
aged captain's table in admiral's fore-cabin. 

7. Two shot-holes in commander's cabin, completely destroying cabin and all fur- 
niture, shell bursting in cabin. 

8. Steam-pinnace, port quarter, utterly destroyed; stern broken and bows shat- 
tered. 

9. Several loading-scuttles in upper and main batteries blown away and glasses 
broken, damaging chains, levers, &c. 

10. Sailing-pinnace: shell carried away starboard quarter and port gunwale. 

11. Lower part of ventilator to stoke-hole blown away. 

12. Fore and aft bridges blown away, and several ridge-stanchions damaged and 
blown away^ 

13. Several awning-stanchions broken and blown away, and stanchions in fore- 
castle damaged, &c. 

14. Two shot-holes in fore part of upper deck forward. 

15. Sashes of chart-house broken and furniture damaged. 

16. Seven streaks of upper deck forward much shattered. 

17. Several Avater- closets slightly damaged. 

18. Chock of naval-pipe forward slightly damaged. 

19. Main royal yard and fore top-gallant yard badly bruised. 

20. Shot-hole through starboard side of quarter-deck. 

21. Three streaks of deck in tstatf-commander's cabin badly shattered. 

22. Post-office and fittings damaged. 

23. Casing of soil-pipes, wardroom closets, blown away. 

24. Several side-steps, port side, blown away. 

25. Several plates of crown of lower glacis rivet-heads blown off and plates started. 

26. Outside plating in wake of mess-shelves on mess deck, port side, broken. 

27. Heel of fore-bitts damaged and iron safes in galley broken. 

28. Several streaks of deck on mess deck shattered. 

29. Plate under upper deck in torpedo-flat cracked. 

30. Several tubes through wings leaky. 

Twenty-four shot and shell penetrated the ship above the armor-plating, causing a 
considerable amount of damage to lower deck, galley, cabins, &c. Several shot and 
shell struck the armor-plating without doing any appreciable damage, but one which 
impinged on the upper edge of armor-plating just abaft mainmast, port side, indented 
the plate and made some jagged marks and holes to the depth of from one-half to oua 
inch. The foremost funnel was struck in three places, the standing rigging in eight, 
and running rigging in twenty-one places. 

RICH'D T. GRIGG, 
Carpenter, H. M. S. Alexandra. 



42 

Alexandria, July 21, 1882. 

LIST OF RIGGING SHOT AWAY. 

Fore rigging. — Fourth, fifth, and sixth shrouds shot away on port side just above 
deadej^e. 

Main rigging. — Second shroud, port side, six ratlines up from sheer-pole; eighth 
ehroud, port side, twenty-three ratines up from sheer-pole; third shroud, starboard 
side, nine ratlines up from sheer-pole. 

Mizzen rigging. — Fourth shroud, starboard side, nine ratlines up from sheer-pole; 
main top-gallant stay ; main royal stay. 

Running-rigging. — Port fore tack, topmast staysail halliards, fore-truss falls, fore truss 
tricing lines, foresail tackle, mainsail tackle, main-truss falls, main-truss tricing 
lines, whips for main buntlines, main vangs, fore vangs, mizzen vangs, main leech- 
lines, cross-jack lift, starboard main topsail clewlines, port boat's purchase falls,, 
fore and aft, wire, pendant, for placing boats. 

H. T. BURNETT, 

Boatswain. 

No mention, of course, is made of the fact that three of the guns were 
badly scored by shells bursting within them, and that in two guns the 
A- tube was split. These guns were carefully inspected after each round, 
and were used until the end of the action. The loss of time through 
this enforced precaution might have proved extremely awkward under 
other circumstances and in a more evenly-contested engagement. 

All the recorded damage is such as might naturally be expected in 
action except, possibly, No. 9 of the carpenter's report. Assuming that 
this was due to concussion and not to the entrance of a hostile shot into 
the Alexandra's casemate, an assumption warranted by the wording of 
the report, it falls at once into the same category as the others. 

In no respect were the Alexandra's powers as a fighting machine 
impaired by the injuries she received. 

The official report of the damage sustained by the Inflexible is a 
"confidential" document. It is known, however, that she suffered a 
good deal aloft, and that she was pierced under water, presumably, of 
course, outside of her casemate. The latter wound is said not to have 
been of a serious nature, but as it involved docking the ship when she 
arrived at Malta, it must have been too serious to have" been repaired 
by the mechanics on board. Its size and location were kept a secret. 
The after superstructure was perforated by a 10-inch Palliser shell just 
above the spar deck, on the starboard side. This shell first killed the 
carpenter, who was at work on a bulkhead in the officers' quarters, then 
struck a bitt inside, glanced up and a mortally wounded Lieutenant 
Jackson, who was directing the fire of a B. L. R. 20-pdr. mounted on 
the hurricane deck. 

The Inflexible's boat-davits are rigged to bring the boats during ac- 
tion above the superstructure and clear of the line of fire. The concus- 
sion of the discharge of her turret guns, burning 370 pounds of powder, 
was so great, when the guns were fired fore and aft, or nearly so, that 



43 

several of her boats were badly hurt, the planking being torn bodily 
from the frames. 

The following is the official report of the injury sustained by the 
Invincible. Being in a fixed position all day, her range was soon got- 
ten by the Egyptians, who hulled her repeatedly. Eeference has been 
made to a certain 6J-inch S. B. in Mex Citadel as particularly well 
served. On account of its masked situation great difficulty was expe- 
rienced on board the Invincible in obtaining the range in return. A. 
large number of the hits recorded are due to this one gun. 

H. M. S. Invincible, 

At Alexandria, July 21, 1882. 

LIST OF DAMAGES RECEIVED IN ACTION JULY 11. 

( Commencing forward and working aft. ) 

1. A dent in the doubling. plate, under hawse-pipe, 2 inches in depth and 9 inches 
in circumference; the doubling- plate is f inch thick ou side, plating f inch. 

2. A puncture made by a shot striking the head chute and bringing up against the 
water-way of the mess deck, about 3 feet 6 inches above water. 

3. A hole made by a shot passing through the ship's side, gouging the deck, carry- 
ing away the lockers and bulkhead of the chief petty officers' mess, finally lodging 
in the fire-hearth. 

4. A very large dent, about 3 feet farther aft and 3 feet above, starting the plate 
badly above, 5 feet 6 inches deep between the frames, showing quite an angle where 
the frames are situated from the outside. 

5. A hole on the upper deck, passing through the side, tearing away the wooden 
water-way and angle-iron of the gutter-way, stopping on the opposite side, slightly 
damaging the shot-racks and spirketing. 

6. A hole about 1 foot abaft, on a level with the mess-deck ports, passing through 
the side, carrying away a mess-shelf, a table leg (or crow's foot), iron stanchions, and 
torpedo air-pipes, passing on, striking a mess-stool and lockers, finally stopped by 
striking the iron plating, which is bulged out on the other side. 

7. A shot passing through lower half-port, striking and gouging a piece out of the 
iron ballards. 

8. A hole on the lower deck just before the funnel casing, caused by a shot which 
passed through the side, carrying away a mess-shelf, hammock bars, two pump stan- 
chions, and the rack in which they were stowed, passing through string of iron lad- 
der, and severely damaging an iron ventilator. 

9. A hole just before the upper battery, caused by a shot passing through side, car- 
rying away cistern-pipe of gun-room officers' water-closet, buckling up the iron bulk- 
head i 3 g inch thick, smashing the jamb of the doorway and the cat-block, and striking 
the port foremost battery door (armor plated), which was open. 

10. A hole just before the bridge, caused by a shot passing through the glacis-plate 
and the ship's side, and gouging the teak, -J inch thick, and wood water-way. 

11. A hole in the captain's galley, apparently caused by a rocket or splinter, just 
abaft the fore dead wood. 

12. A shot struck the fish davit, carrying away an iron stanchion and part of the 
fore and aft bridge, then struck the fore bitt-head, which it splintered. 

13. Molding on starboard quarter injured by shot or piece of shell. 

14. Several ropes aloft were cut away by shot. 

ROB. H. M. MOLYNEUX, 

Captain. 



44 



The Penelope was hulled eight times during the action, but no serious 
damage was done. Her commanding officer thought she was not struck 
by the rifled shell. One 36-pound shot entered the cabin and made an 
extraordinary corkscrew journey through store-rooms and state-rooms 



Jfy. ./. 





until it finally came to res^ .j^.^j. 

The muzzle of No. 2 gun on the 

port side was hit by a large 

round shot which took off a 

tapered flake about six inches 

long and six inches wide 

outer end, without disabl 

or indeed really damaging the 
gun. Figs. 42 and 43. On board of the Penelope this bruise was sup- 
posed to have been the work of a XV-inch shell. 

Many ropes were cut aloft, and the main yard was so injured that it 
had to be replaced. 

The following is the official report of damages sustained by the 
Sultan : 

H. M. Sultan, 
Off Alexandria, July 14, 1882. 

1. Four plates on starboard side in wake of sheet-anchor partly shot away ; ono 
frame broken, one frame bent in, and inside lining smashed in ; tumbler of sheet- 
anchor broken and part shot away ; side scuttle broken ; bulkhead of gun-room closet 
shot away ; the fore end of hammock berthing shaken and splintered by shell ; voice- 
pipe from upper battery deck shot away; gun-room water-closet and connections 
broken and part shot away; fore part of fore channel, starboard side, gone ; shutters 
to billboard broken. 

2. Upper part of coamings to fore ladder-way shot away. 

3. Transporting chock at knighthead, port side, splintered and part gone ; bow port 
gone ; upper part of bow port, starboard side, gone. 

4. Bulkheads of seamen's head and officers' water-closets, port side, much damaged 
and part blown away ; hole in lower edge of plate 16 inches by 12 inches ; upper edge 
of plate beneath torn down and edge strip broken. 

5. Three steps of the side of the port fore gangway shot away. 

6. Hole in side plating of sick-bay, port side, about 8 feet above water-lines, 16 
inches in diameter ; one frame broken and bent in ; water-way gonef gutter angle-iron 
bent in, and ten streaks of inside lining broken; framing of water-closet in sick- bay, 
port side, blown away and closet damaged; bulkhead of sick-bay much damaged hj 
shell; two rifle-racks on aft deck broken. 

7. Two ward closets much damaged ; hole in side of plating 12 feet above the water- 
line, 14 inches in diameter ; frame broken, lining smashed in, and two side scuttles 
broken. 

8. Armor plate about 22 feet abaft after gangway and 1 foot above the water-line 
dented by shot, and plate started. 

9. Armor plate under main-deck battery, 1 foot 6 inches, dented by shot. 

10. Berthing starboard side quarter-deck, cowl-head to ventilator to shaft-alley, 
starboard side quarter-deck damaged by shell. 

11. Hole 16 inches by 10 inches through mainmast, 17 feet from upper battery deok ; 
voice-pipe from upper battery deck to main top shot away.. 

12. Main topmast grazed by shot and lightning-conductor partly gone. 



45 

13. Mizzen topmast head and royal truck shot away. 

14. Four boats damaged by shell. * 
Running rigging cut through by shot and shell. 

Approved. 

W. HUNT-GRUBBE, 

Captain. 

The report of the Superb's wounds is quoted below. 

DAMAGE TO HULL AND RIGGING OF SUPERB DURING ACTION WITH THE BATTERIES 

AT ALEXANDRIA. 

I. The J-mch plating close before the battery on the port side shot through, the 
projectile (a 10-inch shell) passing through all the frames (ten in number) forming 
the lower part of the embrasure for the battery port, starting the upper plating 
about 2 feet in an upward direction, and starting the outside plating, making a 
hole in the side 10 feet loug by 4 feet deep down to within 3 feet of the water- 
line, striking the armor plate and bursting. 

N 2. The ^-inch plating a few feet before the fore torpedo-port, port side of mess deck, 
shot through about 4 feet above the water-line, making a hole 10 inches in diameter. 

3. The |-inch plating close abaft the battery on port side shot through, carrying 
away the frame angle-iron, and making a hole in the side 12 inches in diameter 5 
feet above the water-line. This was a 10-inch solid shot, now on board. 

4. The armor plates were struck in two places on the port side about 4 feet above 
the water-line, the one indenting the armor 3 inches; in the other the mark of the 
explosion of the shell is visible, and the plate is slightly started, breaking 14 rivet- 
heads of the plating forming the port sill. 

5. The foremast was shot through, making a hole about 12 inches in diameter close 
to the awning hoop. » 

6. Stanchion for after bridge shot away. 

7. Hammock berthing shot through in two places, carrying away three voice-tubes. 

8. Iron plating at lower part of embrasure port on port side under the poop, shot 
through close to the drop-bolt, breaking the port sill and starting the inside plating, 
and destroying the buckler port. 

9. Both platforms for accommodation-ladders shot away. 

10. Leadsman's stools shot away. 

Standing and running rigging. 

II. One 6-inch-wire shroud with iron ratlines shot away ; one top-gallant and one 
topmast backstay shot away; one fore brace, fore top-sail halliards, runuer of jib-stay 
and fore guy, fore top-gallant sheet, fore topsail buntlines, and fore top-gallant lift 
shot away ; main sheet, after-boom topping-lift, and mizzen top-mast rope and cross- 
jack truss shot away. 

THOMAS Le H. WARD, 

Captain. 

The Superb's wound, numbered 1 in the foregoing report, was to the 
observer the most striking of all in the fleet. In even a moderate sea 
the hole described would have been most annoying, resisting temporary 
plugging, and admitting water into an important compartment. 

The result of the damages just detailed was very slight. Viewed 
in relation to the circumstances in which the fleet was placed they were 
practically nothing. Not a gun was really disabled, nor the fighting 
qualities of a single ship affected. The following day all were ready 
and the crews eager to resume the engagement, which could have been 
continued jnst so long as the powder and shell held out. 



46 



VI . 

THE FORTIFICATIONS AND THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THEM. 

In this section the fortifications are described in detail and an account 
given of the part each took in the action, together with the effects upon 
it of the fire from the British fleet. 

Reverting to Plate 1, it will be seen that Fort Silsileh is the most 
eastern of the immediate sea defenses of Alexandria. It stands at the 
base of a long rocky spit which shuts in the eastern harbor, called gen- 
erally the New Port. The fort is a small work built around an old 
martello tower. Plate 2. It comprises two concentric batteries on 
the north face. The terreplein of the upper battery, it will be ob- 
served, has been widened and the parapet thickened from 15 feet to 36 
feet. The proper embrasures have been cut, and two M. L. R. guns, one 
8-inch and one 9-inch, have been mounted. These guns point towards 
the mouth of the harbor, at which place their fire crosses with tbat from 
the eastern face of Fort Pharos. Two X-inch shell guns are mounted 
€7i barbette on the east face of Silsileh, and more would have been put 
into position had time allowed. A Xlll-inch mortar completes the arma- 
ment of this fort, which is said to have fired " a few well-directed rounds " 
at the Temeraire when she came around to shell Fort Pharos. The 
Temeraire made no reply, however, and the fort is unscratched. 

The first tort in the northern line of defense is Pharos, admirably placed 
to command the eastern harbor and the approaches from the east and 
north, while the guns on its southern face may be trained directly upon 
the city itself. It stands upon the site of the famous light-house of 
Ptolemy Philadelphus, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. 
The old castle or keep is a fine specimen of mediaeval Arab architecture, 
erected at the close of the fifteenth century. The modern fort, built 
around it, was considerably strengthened in 1852. Its general appear- 
ance at the present moment, as seen from the shore -to the south- 
ward and westward, is given on Plate 3. It is connected with the city 
by a long causeway, shown in Plate 12. Plate 4 is a view of the 
northwest sea-face. From this it will be seen that there were two tiers 
of guns on this side, the lower in a casemate afleur Weau, the upper un- 
covered. Plate 5 gives the plan of the fort as a whole, a horizontal 
section through the casemate, and horizontal and vertical sections of the 
magazine. Fig. 48 is a principal section along the line A B, and Fig. 
47 an enlarged section of the casemate. These last figures are on Plate 
6, which also contains sections through the east and west faces, and an 
index sketch to the principal hits on the northwest scarp. 

The casemate was chiefly armed with 6J-inch S. B. guns on gar- 
rison carriages. Two embrasures in the west tower and that marked 
17 on the plan, Plate 5, were unoccupied. In embrasures Kos. 3 and 



47 

8 were the 40-pounder B. L. R. Armstrong guns already mentioned. Of 
this casemate it may be said that its walls, only 10 feet in thickness, 
could offer no adequate resistance to the heavy projectiles thrown at 
them, and that to work its guns under the fire of the British fleet re- 
quired great pluck and no prudence. 

The main strength of Fort Pharos lay in its upper battery. Here 
the thin walls of the old fortress have been thickened from 7 to 28 feet 
(measured through the base of the superior slope), and M. L R. guns 
mounted — two 8-inch and one 10-inch on the northwest face, one 9-inch 
on the north face, and two 9-inch on the northeast face. The last two 
were not used during the bombardment. Plate 7 gives a large-scale 
plan of this upper battery of rifled guns. Plate 8 shows the additional 
protection provided for them. The method, so clearly shown here, was 
-adopted in the case of the other and heavier guns not included in the 
pictures. 

The west face was armed with four X-inch S. B. guns, of little or no 
value, even if they could have been brought to bear. 

The south face mounted a formidable-looking battery of fourteen 
6^-mch S. B., bearing on the town. 

Four XIILinch mortars completed the armament. 

The series of plates numbered 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11 exhibit the gen- 
eral condition of the masonry of Fort Pharos after it had been subjected 
to the pounding of the British fleet. Particular attention is called to 
the ample breaches made in the west face, as seen in Plate 3. The one 
to the extreme left is doubtless due to several well-directed and concur- 
rent shells, exploding with unwonted accuracy after being fairly buried. 
Just to the left of the old castle or keep is another breach through 
which the Armstrong guns on the northwest face may be seen. Dif- 
ferent views of these breaches are exhibited in Plates 8, 11, and 12. 
(Plate 11 is a view of the ditch between the fort proper and the outer 
gallery.) As a result of the large breach shown more clearly in Plate 
12, the platform under a X inch S. B. gun is totally ruined, although 
the gun itself is unharmed. Recurring to Plate 3, a still wider breach 
is seen in the parapet of the west face, exposing a second X-inch S. B. 
gun, likewise put hors de combat. The shot-hole, just above the water 
is 15 feet wide and 11 feet high. 

The scars on the northwest face, the principal one engaged, are given 
in Plate 4. For the sake of clearness, the sketch, Fig. 44, Plate 6, is 
added as a key. 

Hit No. 1 is due to two shots, one above and to the right of the em- 
brasure (No. 11 on plan of casemate, Plate 5), the other at the left lower 
corner. Their effect has been to peel off the outer courses of masonry 
to the depth of 2 feet or so quite uniformly, and to block the gun in- 
side the casemate by a large mass of splinters. 

Hit No. 2 has knocked away 7 feet of the cordon, but has had no 
serious effect. 



48 

No. 3 appears to have been done by several bits in the same neigh- 
borhood. Of these, one is worthy of special notice. The shell entered 
the masonry to the depth of abont 3 feet and then burst, blowing out 
a fine crater and making a huge pile of dSbris at the foot of the scarp, 

No. 4 is the result of two 10-inch Palliser shell, one striking the 
cheek of the embrasure, the other immediately beneath the sole. Both 
projectiles entered the casemate and wrecked the gun and carriage be- 
yond imagination. 

No. 5, a shell cut out a portion of the cheek of the embrasure and 
burst inside the casemate, disabling the gun by masonry splinters. 

No. 6 is a deep hole. The projectile is doubtless lodged inside un- 
burst. The splinters of masonry falling behind it have so plugged the 
hole as to prevent probing. 

No. 7, a slice is cut out of the cheek of the embrasure. The gun was 
probably not seriously affected by this shot, but it was totally wrecked 
by the bursting of a shell underneath the carriage. 

Nos. 8 and 9, a series of surface wounds, due to several shell. 

No. 10 shows what is left of an embrasure. The gun and carriage 
inside are hopelessly and shockingly wrecked. 

The remaining embrasure on the right exhibits no scar, but enough 
masonry has been knocked off the inner edges to block the gun. 

The other casemate, Plate 5, in the northeast face, was less injured, 
not being subjected to so severe or so direct a hammering. Only that 
embrasure, No. 17, in which no gun was mounted, was struck. 

These galleries were simply slaughter-houses, a large number of men 
being killed and wounded, mostly by splinters of stone. The thinness 
of its walls and the lightness of its ordnance have been already re- 
marked upon. Nearly all of these guns were used. 

The condition of the casemate battery is given in the following sched- 
ule, the numbers being as on Plate 5: 

1. The gun is not hurt, but is unserviceable, being blocked by pieces 
of stone from the embrasure. • 

2. The gun and carriage are wrecked. 

3. 40-pclr. Armstrong B. L. E. is still serviceable. The left rear 
pier of the casemate is knocked away. 

4. Gun wrecked by a shell which burst under the platform. 

5. No damage. 

fi. Embrasure is broken and beaten in on the gun. 

7. See No. 4, page above. 

8, 9, and 10. In good condition. 

11. Total destruction of gun-carriage. 

12. Carriage blocked by debris of the masonry. 

Passing to the upper or/uncovered battery Plate 5, it is found 
that the rifled guns were not directly harmed by the British fire. The 
heaviest, a 10-inch gun, was blocked by the fall of pieces of masonry 
from the corner tower of the keep, under which it had been very indis- 



49 

creetly mounted. In addition, the sill of the embrasure was dislodged 
by a well-burst shell. The pivot is unshipped, but this could have been 
quickly remedied. (Plate 13.) 

The perfect condition of the 8-inch guns to the westward is shown in 
Plates 8, 9, and 12. 

The 9-inch guns to the eastward, not being engaged, were unharmed. 

In the northwest angle of the fort were two X-inch S. B. en 
barbette, which were worked during the bombardment. A well-placed 
shot has overturned one of the two. (Plate 8.) This is probably 
the gun referred to in the Admiral's report as having been dismounted 
by a shell from the Inflexible. Its neighbor, still standing, is said to 
have been the last gun fired by the Egyptians as the Inflexible steamed 
away at the close of the day. 

Of the four guns originally mounted on the west face, two are still 
serviceable. 

The smooth bores on the south front, which overlooks the eastern 
harbor, were destitute of cover against a rear or enfilading fire. Two 
of them, in consequence, were disabled. Gun ISTo. 8 of this battery, 
counting from the eastward, was put hors de combat by the destruction 
of its platform. (Plate 13.) The place of the gun adjoining is marked 
on the same plate by the ends of the brackets of the carriage 
standing on end. The gun itself received a blow square in the breech, 
which knocked it out of its carriage and over the parapet. It passed 
through the roof of the kitchen beneath (Plate 5) and planted itself 
vertically, with the muzzle down. (Plate 14.) The directness of the 
blow is indicated by the straightness of the path described by the gun 
in its flight and the absence of the cascabel. 

The rear face and keep show unmistakable traces of at least twelve 
good hits each, the rifle-gun battery eight, the left or west face eleven, 
the casemate, as judged from the inside, eleven, from the outside, eight- 
een. Many of these marks may have been duplicated, the destruction 
of the masonry rendering an accurate identification quite impossible. 
No traces of Gatliug or Kordenfeldt bullets or of shrapnel could be dis- 
covered. 

The practice on Fort Pharos, it will be remembered, was due to the 
combined efforts of the five heaviest ships in the fleet. 

Thirteen blind shell were found in Pharos and two broken 11-inch com- 
mon shell. The serge bags containing the bursting charge were white 
and clean. The powder itself was hard and caked. 

Summing up the damage done to this fort, it is seen — 

1st. That one rifled gun, the heaviest of all, was put Ivors de combat 
On account of the proximity of the keep, it could not have been perma- 
nently served at any time. 

2d. That one X-inch S. B. gun* in the upper battery was dismounted. 



* Those on the west face are not considered. 
948 E G 4 



50 

3d. That, in the northwest casemate, seven out of twelve guns were 
more or less disabled. 

4th. That the old-fashioned batteries, whether barbette or casemate, 
afforded very iuadequate protection. 

On the other hand it is also shown — 

1st. That five out of six, or, more justly, three out of four, rifled guns 
were unharmed. 

2d. That one X inch S. B. in the upper battery was still serviceable. 

3d. That the four 6£-ineh guns in the north casemate were unin- 
jured. 

4th. That two B. L. It. 40-pdrs. and three 6^-inch S. B. in the north- 
west casemate, five guns out of twelve, were not hurt. 

5th. That the modern batteries with thickened parapets gave ample 
protection against almost the heaviest guns now afloat. 

In Plate 8 a distant view may be had of Ada, the next fort to Pharos 
in the northern line of defense. 

Like Fort Pharos, Ada is built upon an outlying ledge of rocks and 
is connected with the mainland by a stone causeway. It is an irregu- 
lar four-sided work so placed that its principal faces point northeast 
and northwest, delivering cross-fires in front of Pharos on one hand and 
of the Basel-Tin Lines on the other. The former face is lightly armed 
with seven X-inch S. B. guns. Back of the north angle of the fort is a 
cavalier, B, with a solid masonry scarp, mounting one 8-inch M. L. B., 
capable of a certain amount of train on either front, with a X-inch S. B. 
mounted on each side. In the northwest face lies the strength of the 
fort, a modern cavalier with thickened walls (28 feet) carrying one 10-inch 
and three. 9-inch Armstrong M. L. R. Between this and the bastioned 
north angle is a low battery of X-inch S. B. guns. In addition to the 
guns enumerated, there are as usual some mortars (five XIII inch). 
Plate 15 gives a general plan of the fort, and Plate 16 the details of the 
larger rifled-gun battery, Cavalier A. 

The northeastern face points towards Fort Pharos, and therefore was 
not exposed to the attack, which was directed mainly against the west, 
ern battery where the heavy modern guns were mounted. 

On Plate 17 is a sketch, Fig. 49, of the principal scars on Cavalier A.> 

No. 1 is a hole made, probably, by a Palliser shell, which penetrated 
too deep for probing and now lies at the bottom unexploded. 

No. 2 is similar to the foregoing. The wall is shattered for over 3 feet 
across, and the crater is 4 feet deep. 

Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 are similar to No. 1, scaling off the outside stone 
work to the depth of about a foot and making a broad scar 9 feet in 
width extending from the cordon down. 

Nos. 7 and 8 are like No. 1. 

No. 9 is particularly noteworthy. One of the Innexible's shells has 
entered to the depth of over 8 feet, bursting inside and blowing out 
the mass of debris 12 feet across, seen lying beneath. 



51 

Nos. 10, 11, 12, and 13 resemble No. 1. 

No. 14 has burst on the cordon and cut down the scarp about 2 feet. 
This scarp was pitted all over by shrapnel balls. No machine-gun 
bullet-marks were detected. 

The hits on the superior and exterior slopes are sketched on Plate 
16. 

No. 1 is the No. 14 just described. It made a good crater, blowing 
out behind it the material it dislodged on entering. 

No. 2. The shell struck the exterior slope and burst well, making a 
large crater, which laps over upon the superior slope, and blowing down 
a part of the cheek of the embrasure. The damage is more apparent 
than real. 

Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are line craters of various sizes. None, however, are 
of a serious nature. 

No. 6 is the best of this series of hits, having been made by a plung- 
ing shot, which, if it had fallen a few feet either way, would have ruined 
a 9-inch M. L. E. This crater is 7 feet wide and 9 feet long. 

No. 7 resembles No. 3. 

On the superior slope, near hit No. 5, was one of the Inflexible's 16- 
inch Palliser shell pointing straight out to seaward. Such a position 
would seem to indicate that the shot had been fired at long range, had 
become unsteady in its flight, had capsized as it struck, and that enough 
velocity of rotation was left to roll it out of its bed up to the crest of 
the parapet. The general good behavior of these shell renders this case 
interesting because exceptional. 

The injuries received by the southeastern or shore side of this fort 
from plunging shot that had passed over the batteries are shown on 
Palte 18. 

There are two good hits on the parapet of Cavalier B and ten on its 
northwest scarp back of the water battery. The latter shows two hits 
on the parapet. 

Plate 19 is a view of what was left of the magazine after its ex- 
plosion at 1.32 p. m. This catastrophe, rendered possible by the ab- 
surdly insecure position of the magazine, silenced the fort. The num- 
ber of killed and wounded by this accident could not be ascertained, 
but it must have been a fair proportion of the garrison. The occurrence 
itself was a magnificent specimen of pyrotechnics, resembling the erup- 
tion of a volcano. It is hardly to be wondered at that the fort was 
" hurriedly evacuated" by the survivors. The high battery seen on the 
right in this plate is Cavalier B. 

Passing to the guns, it is found that the largest, a 10-inch Armstrong, 
was disabled. A shot had struck it on the muzzle, carried away the hold- 
fasts, and knocked the slide trucks off the tracks. The crew were evi- 
dently making an attempt to get the gun into position again at the time 
of the explosion, for the jacks were found under the slide after the ac- 
tion. The adjoining 9-inch guns were unharmed. 



52 

lu Cavalier B, one X-inch S. B. was dismounted by a shell from the 
fleet, (Plate 20.) 

In the lower sea battery, one X-iuch S. B. was dismounted by a shell, 
and a second was wrecked through the smashing of the slide by a plung- 
ing shot. 

Besides the shell from the 81-ton gun, already mentioned, three others 
were found unburst, one 9-inch Palliser, one 10-inch Palliser, and one 10- 
inch common shell. 

Summing up the damage done, we find — 

1st. That one 10-inch M. L. R. was put hors de combat by the British 
fire. 

2d. That of the smooth-bores which could be brought to bear, three 
out of seven were disabled if not dismounted. 

3d. That the magazine was exploded, and the fort, in consequence, 
abandoned. 

On the other hand — 

1st. Four out of the five rifled guns were still serviceable. 

2d. The disabled rifled guns could have been restored to efficient 
working order in a very short time. 

3d. The damage done to the walls and parapet was practically insig- 
nificant and could have been repaired, where necessary, in a few hours. 

Immediately southeast of Fort Ada, lying between it and Fort Pha- 
ros, and placed, so to speak, at the apex of there-entering angle formed 
by the coast as it runs from one to the other, is a new work known as 
Fort Ada Lunette. (Plate 12.) It took no part in the bombard- 
ment. 

Passing to the westward the coast recedes and assumes the shape 
of a narrow bight, about one thousand yards in length, being, for the 
most part a shelving, sandy beach, unprovided with defenses. At the 
western end of this bight begin the Ras-el-Tin Lines, in a new unfin- 
ished fortification, called, in Admiral Seymour's report, the Hos- 
pital Battery. By glancing at Plates 1 and 21 it is seen that 
these lines are a succession of open works, on the northwest side of 
the city, connected by a low parapet of varying form. The position 
is a strong one by nature, there being sufficient salients to permit, if 
properly utilized, concentration of fire at any desired point within range. 
A direct landing is out of the question in view of an outlying reef and 
of the height and steepness of the bank. An attendant drawback arises 
from the proximity of the city, into which any hostile shell, ricocheting 
upwards from the parapet, or fired with too great an elevation, must 
inevitably fall. This disadvantage is, however, common to all the sea 
defenses of the northern line. 

The Ras-el-Tin Lines comprised three rifled-gun batteries, known as 
the Hospital, Central, and Tower Batteries, the curtains between be- 
ing provided with smooth-bore guns and mortars. The total armament 
consisted of one 10-inch, two 8-inch, and two 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R., 



53 

four XV-inch S. B., sixteen X-inch J3. B., of various types, eleven 6J-inch 
S. B. (or 36-pdrs.), and one XX-inch, seven XM-inch, and one X-inch 
mortars. All of these rifled guns and most of the smooth-bores were 
worked. In addition were the 9-inch M. L. E. on a Moncrieff carriage, 
and the B. L. R. 40-pdr. Armstrong, on Kennon's lift-carriage already 
mentioned. This last gun is not shown on either plan. It stands about 
one hundred yards to the eastward of the Light-House Fort. The 
mounting of this piece is on a simple and ingenious plan, which may be 
described in a few words. The gnn on an ordinary carriage is borne on 
a counterpoised platform capable of being raised and lowered in a deep 
pit. (A gasometer will give a rough idea of the system of counterpoises.) 
At the bottom of the pit are the magazine and shell-room and the load- 
ing chamber. After firing, the gun is lowered for loading, then raised 
and fired over the bank. The cost of this system must be very great, 
and might find its justification in the case of a muzzle-loading gun in an 
exceptionally exposed position. 

The Bas el-Tin Lines were deficient in traverses, while the magazines 
were subject to the disadvantage of inadequate protection. In rear, at 
various points, were ample barracks, shell-houses, &c. Incidentally, 
these served the purpose of defining, with extreme clearness, the target 
aimed at by the British gunners, to the detriment of the garrisou. 

The details of the Hospital Battery are given in Plate 22. It was 
unfinished at the time of the bombardment, so that its guns did not 
enjoy the full measure of protection which it was designed to give them. 
This battery was very severely handled, the masonry battered in, and 
the guns blocked. It is simply impossible to note or even fairly esti- 
mate the number of hits. The left flank is completely breached and the 
top of the new expense magazine deeply scored by shells. The wreck- 
age of the right embrasure was caused by a 16-inch Palliser shell. The 
battery mounted two 7-inch M. L. R. The guns themselves were un- 
injured. Subsequently they were transported to Ramleh and mounted 
there in the British lines of defense. Upon one of them no less than 
49 shrapnel marks were counted, some as deep as half an inch. This? 
a 10-inch shrapnel, must have burst directly in front of the muzzle of the 
gun and have inflicted terrible damage upon the gun's crew. A shell 
burst under the front track of this gun, tore it up, and twisted the left 
front truck in its socket. In spite of all these disasters, and of the 
heavy machine-gun fire to which it was subjected, the Hospital Battery 
was fought until 3 p. m., or for eight hours. This circumstance alone 
would prove the stubbornness of the defense. It is proper to recall the 
words of Captain Hunt-Grubbe's official report: "One rifled gun in the 
Hospital earthworks, which it was impossible to dismount, being invis- 
ible from the ship, did us great damage." 

The smooth-bores to the westward of the Hospital Battery were nearly 
all worked more or less. One X-inch gun, marked a on Plate 21, was 
dismounted by a shell, and another, b, by its own recoil, having proba- 
bly been overcharged. 



54 

The buildings and walls in rear bear evidence of the use of Norden- 
feldt and Gatling guns by the fleet. 

The large modern work, called for the sake of clearness the Central 
Battery, is drawn on Plate 23, where the principal scars on the parapet 
are marked. Its relation to its neighbors appears on Plate 21. It suf- 
fered very severely, receiving the full attention of the broadside vessels 
in the offshore squadron. 

No. 1 is a deep cut on the right cheek of the embrasure, but of no 
practical damage. 

No. 2 is a similar wound on the other cheek. 

No. 3 is a good hit under the muzzle of the gun, wrecking the hold- 
fast. 

Nos. 1 and 5 are mere scores on the cheek, and may even be due to 
shrapnel. 

No. 6 is a fine crater, 11 feet in diameter, made by a well-burst shell. 
It cannot, however, be considered as a serious wound. 

No. 7 is a trench 6 feet long, 1 feet wide, and 1 foot deep, scooped 
out by a glancing shell. 

No. 8 is a severe wound in the sill of the embrasure, which was totally 
wrecked. The revetment of the interior slope is gone between the points 
marked d and e. 

No. 9 is a scooped trench like No. 7. 

The 10-inch rifled gun was put completely hors de combat. The right 
front truck is gone. The compressors appear to have failed, for the 
gun has recoiled violently and damaged the buffers. The masonry at 
the pivot has been battered in and the slide trucks are nearly off their 
tracks. The gun itself was struck on the chase, and the outer tube 
split 2 feet from the muzzle. 

Its immediate neighbor, a 9-inch M. L. E., is uninjured. The hold- 
fast shows a tendency to rise off the pivot. 

The remaining gun in this battery experienced a complication of 
troubles. It was rendered useless through the jamming of a shell in 
the bore. It was badly hit on the trunnion and on the right carriage- 
bracket 6 inches in rear of the trunnion. The holdfasts had begun to 
give way, and the pivot was bent, while the trucks were blocked by 
the fragments of the ruined embrasure. 

The third modern battery in the Easel-Tin Lines is distinguished by 
a martello tower around which it is built, and through which it is known 
as the Tower Battery. It is shown in detail on Plate 21, where the 
principal hits on the parapet are sketched in. 

No. 1 was probably made by a glancing shell which cut 2 feet out 
of the right cheek of the embrasure of the easternmost 8-inch M. L. E. 

No. 2 appears to be due to two well-burst shell. The right cheek is 
knocked away. 

No. 3 is a very good hit. The masonry at the angle is torn out and 
thrown down on the tracks, thus blocking the carriage. 



55 

No. 4. Several light hits on the superior slope. 

No. 5 is a crater about 9 feet across and 3 feet deep, made by a shell 
which burst after gettiug fairly buried. The end of the cheek of the 
embrasure is destroyed, but the gun was not damaged and the resisting 
power of the battery was unaffected. 

No. 6 is a breach 10 feet wide in the parapet, and is shown in sec- 
tion on Plate 24. It did no harm to the guns. 

No. 7 is a large crater, 10 feet in width by 6 feet in length and 3 feet 
in depth, caused by a well-burst shell. 

No. 8. The right cheek of the embrasure is cut away. 

The 8-inch Armstrong M. L. E. on the right of the battery was struck 
under the chase, but was not injured. The right front truck of the 
top carriage was smashed, and the left bracket was cut through by a 
splinter of masonry. The gun could have been used again. 

The other rilled gun was hopelessly wrecked. A shell had apparently 
fairly entered the embrasure, striking the chase and third coil, and* 
passing underneath the gun, had exploded inside the carriage. The 
brackets were blown clean out and the gun permanently disabled. 

A portion of the Eas el-Tin palace buildings, erroneously termed the 
harem, was set on fire by shells which were directed against the Tower 
and Central Batteries, but which overshot the mark and exploded inside 
this house. It is believed that this is the only building in Alexandria 
thus fired by British shells. 

In the Easel-Tin Lines the practice of the British fleet is seen to have 
been vastly more disastrous to the rifled guns than in either Pharos or 
Ada. Of the seven in all, mounted, the 10-inch, one each of the 9 and 
8 inch and both 7-inch guns were disabled, the latter being blocked by 
masonry splinters. There were thus left but one 9-inch and one 8-inch 
gun still serviceable. 

The parapets could all have been restored, temporarily at least, in a 
single night, and the 10-inch, possibly the 9-inch, and both 7-inch guns 
made capable of use in a very short time. 

The smooth-bores suffered but two wrecks, both near the Hospital 
Battery. The parapet here is so low that the crews could be readily 
driven from the guns by smaller pieces of ordnance, leaving the heavy 
guns of the fleet comparatively free to devote their entire attention to 
the rifled guns. The smooth-bore, bowled off" its carriage, was, how- 
ever, struck by a heavy shell. In spite of 20-pdrs., Nordenfeldts and 
(ratlings, these old-fashioned guns were vigorously served, doing much 
damage to the ships. 

The Eas-el-Tin Lines terminate to the westward in a well-designed 
bastioned fort, surrounding the modern light-house of Alexandria. 
The point on which the fort is situated is called Euuostos Point, and 
the fort itself has been termed variously as Euuostos, Eas-el-Tin, and 
the Light-House Fort. Plate 1, exhibits the general command of this 
work: northwest to seaward, west to seaward, in the direction of the 



56 

channels, across the bar, south aad southeast over the harbor. It is 
built on solid rock, the scarp rising abruptly from the level of the sea, 
above which, at the height of 28 feet, is the terreplein. The plans and 
sections of the fort are given on Plate 25, which also shows an enlarged 
plan of the west or main sea face. The parapet of the original fort had 
been greatly thickened prior to the mounting of the modern guns, and 
at the time of the bombardment the process of further increasing its 
defensive qualities was still going on. 

A landing pier and sally-port are on the south side. The main maga- 
zine is at b on the plan, smaller expense magazines being indicated by 
dotted lines in most of the traverses. 

The eastern part of the walled inclosure is a fortified barracks, afford- 
ing ample accommodation for a thousand men. The land approaches 
to the fort are commanded by loop-holed chambers, thrown forward 
Portions of the northern and southern walls are similarly pierced for 
musketry. 

The Light-House Fort mounted one 10-inch, four 9-inch, and one 8-inch 
Armstrong M. L. E. Of these the latter and one of the 9-inch guns 
could not be brought to bear on the British fleet. The west curtain car- 
ried two XV-inch and two X-inch cast-iron S. B. guns, which, however, 
were not manned or fired on July 11. On the north front are three 
more X-inch S. B. guns, and on the south front a large battery of twenty, 
one 6J-inch S. B. 

The four rifled guns on the west face were alone employed on the day 
of the bombardment. They were subjected to an extremely heavy fire 
(practically from all five ships of the offshore squadron), which has left 
well-marked traces. They were all, especially those in the south bastion, 
most indifferently protected, the parapet being dangerously low. 

On Plate 17, Fig. 51, is a sketch of the west face of the right or 
northern bastion, showing the principal scars. 

No. 1 is a large pile of debris knocked down by several shells. It is 
impossible to ascertain the exact number of hits that combined to pro- 
duce this effect. 

No. 2 is a hole 15 feet wide, the work of not less than two well-burst 
shell. The crater is 5 feet deep. 

No. 3. A shell burst well in the exterior slope, making a gap 9 feet 
7 inches wide. 

No. 4 is a clearly defined crater, 4 feet 6 inches wide, 4 feet high, 
and 3 feet 6 inches deep. 

On the scarp of the curtain are eleven hits. The largest, made by a 
shell from the Inflexible, is shown in Fig. 52, Plate 17. The average 
depth over the surface is 4 feet and at the hit 8 feet. The effect of the 
explosion is certainly extensive, but very little of the exterior slope is 
brought down, and the parapet is in no way weakened. The other hits 
on the scarp are of very slight importance; the projectiles have en- 
tered to the depth of about 3 or 4 feet each. All these wounds were 
occasioned by stray shell aimed at the guns in the bastions. 



57 

Passing to the curtain parapet, we find (see Plate 25) a number of 
good bits. 

No. 5 is a large, well -formed crater, about 9 feet in diameter, extend- 
ing half way across the parapet. 

No. 6 is a cut clear down to the cordon from 4 feet above the exterior 
crest. 

No. 7 is a trench scooped out of the top of a traverse containing an 
expense magazine. The trench is 8J feet long and 6 feet 9 inches 
wide. 

No. 8 is a beautiful breach, made by a plunging shot, cutting down 
the crest of the parapet along a distance of 12 feet. Fig. 53, Plate 
17, is a section through the middle of the gap. The shell must have 
exploded as soon as fairly buried. The mean thickness of the parapet 
is 18 feet. The path of the shot through it is 12 feet. 

No. 9 is a practicable breach at the angle between the curtain and 
the southern bastion. 

No. 10 is a good crater in the exterior slope, overlapping the superior 
slope. 

Nos. 11, 12, and 13. The corner is knocked down, but little real 
damage done. 

No. 14 is a scar on the right cheek of the bastion. 

No. 15. The shell burst well, blowing away the outer corner of the 
left cheek. 

No. 16 is a large, but not serious, crater in the traverse. 

Nos. 17 and 18 are good craters in the slopes running down over the 
cordon into the scarp. 

No. 19. Wrecked the embrasure. 

The right face of the south bastion is shown in Fig. 50, Plate 17. 

Hit No. 1 is the same as No. 18 just described. 

No. 2 is a hole 3 feet deep, 3 feet 6 inches high, and 2 feet 6 inches 
wide. 

No. 3 is similar to No. 2. On the ground, 6 feet distant, lies a 10-inch 
common shell pointing towards the hole. 

No. 4 is a hole into which a projectile has penetrated to the depth of 
at least 8 feet. 

No. 5 burst on the cordon, making a good crater 7 feet 6 inches long 
and 4 feet wide. 

No. 6 is similar to No. 2. 

No. 7 is a scar made by a 10-inch common shell which burst on im- 
pact, scaling off the wall over an area 7J feet long and 4 feet wide to 
the depth of a foot. 

Nos. 8 and 9 are two connecting craters made by blind shell. 

Passing to the inside of the northern bastion, and referring to Plate 
26, the damage sustained becomes evident at once. 

The 9-inch gun, mounted in the capital of the bastion, has been ren- 
dered useless by excessive and improperly controlled recoil. A stouter 



58 

forelock through the pivot would have resisted the shearing action of 
the sudden bump with which the gun came in, would have retained the 
holdfasts in place and the gun in serviceable condition. The state of 
its neighbor is the work of, perhaps, the best shot of the day. The gun 
itself is deeply scored under the chase. After inflicting this wound 
the shell probably passed inside the carnage aud burst, throwing the 
gun over backwards on top of several of the crew, who were found in 
that position on the following day. It is possible that the smashing of 
the trunnion band may have been due to another and previous shell. 

In the left, or southern bastion, the 10-inch M. L. R. guu was the last 
to be silenced. It was this gun that killed Lieutenant Jackson on board 
the Inflexible. The guu was hit on the A-tube but not damaged, being 
eventually placed hors de combat by the wrecking of the embrasure. 

Its neighbor, a 9-inch M. L. R., is said to have been the first gun 
disabled. It is shown in Plate 27. The embrasure is ruined, the pivot 
gone, and the gun is on end. It is not imjwssible that this result may 
have followed upon the knocking in of the sill of the embrasure, but it 
is more likely to have been due to a weak pivot and thus to be a mere 
duplication of the experience in the northern bastion. 

The third gun in this bastion, a 9-inch M. L. E., was not worked during 
the engagement. It bore upon the harbor. Being well masked, it es- 
caped injury. 

The remainiug rifled gun in the fort, an 8-inch Armstrong, mounted 
on the southern or inner face, was not worked. It is seen in Plate 
28. It suffered badly from reverse fire. The left training truck is gone 
and the embrasure wrecked. 

The masonry in the neighborhood and the walls of the buildings bear 
the impression of many Nordenfeldt bullets, shrapnel balls, &c. The 
buildings within the fort are terribly breached and damaged. The 
light-house itself did not escape; several holes of various sizes having 
been made in it by stray shell and shell fragments. The general state 
of affairs shown in Plate 29 is insignificant in comparison with that of 
the large shell-houses marked d and e on Plate 25. 

This fort ceased fire at 10.30 a. m. 

Extensive as are the damages noted as sustained by the masonry iu 
the Light-House Fort, due to the combined efforts of the offshore squad- 
ron aided by the Temeraire and the after or starboard turret of the In- 
flexible, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the main the 
thickened parapets resisted the impact extremely well, the sole prac- 
ticable breach being made in the thin 15-foot wall of the curtain, where, 
also, was cut the noteworthy gap already sketched and described. They 
failed to yield sufficient protection to the garrison, and they suffered 
greatly about the crests and about the cheeks of the embrasures, but 
through being too low, not too thin. 

If it is borne in mind that here were four guns whose positions could 
be unmistakably marked by ranges on high and conspicuous objects in 



59 

rear, engaged with, no less than twenty-six* guns, of which fifteen were 
as large as the largest gun in the fort and three were larger, the result 
of the work done can be readily understood. 

But two guns, one 10-inch aud one 9-inch M. L. R., can be considered 
as promising an immediate period of renewed usefulness. One 9-inch 
gun is ruined beyond redemption and the other can only be restored to 
working condition at the expense of much time aud labor. Through the 
iire of the fleet, three o«t of four are rendered unfit for employment. 
But, however, two of the four guns could have been gotten ready for 
fighting the next day. 

The lines on the southern shore of the bay begin close to the town at 
Fort Saleh Aga. Plates 1 and 30. 

This is an old work near the shore, consisting of a water battery and 
a square redoubt, the latter surrounded by a dry ditch. One face of 
the redoubt, mounting four 6£-inch S. B., is designed to command the 
shore approaches from the westward. The other faces bear upon the 
harbor, and mount, in all, five X-inch and twelve 6J-ineh S. B., with 
one Xl-inch mortar. Being an inner defense, Saleh Aga was not at- 
tacked until late in the afternoon of the day of the bombardment, being 
under the fire of the Monarch and Penelope for a very short time. The 
parapets are practically untouched. A 6^-inch S. B. gun was dis- 
mounted by the ships. 

Southwest of Saleh Aga, and distant from it about 800 yards, is an 
old-fashioned open battery, adjoining a martello tower, and mounting two 
X-inch S. B. and two 6^-inch S. B. guns. The parapet shows five or 
six good hits, and the scarp one more. None of them are at all serious. 
The extreme western gun of the four, one of the smaller type, has, 
unquestionably, been struck by a shell. The gun is cut in two, and the 
muzzle portion thrown many yards to the front. Ic is difficult to recon- 
cile the situation of this fragment with the evidence of the blow. 

At a second interval of about 800 yards is a closed work, known as 
Fort Oom-el-Kabebe, in many respects one of the most interesting of 
the forts about Alexandria. It stands back from the water on the 
comparatively high ground, about 80 feet in elevation, that lies between 
the harbor and Lake Mariout (ancient Maroeotis). The fort commands 
the inner harbor (see Plate 1), the Corvette and Boghaz Passes. After 
crossing the bar any vessel would still be continually under its fire 
until it actually reached the city. Plate 31 is an interior view of this 
fort, looking east, with the inner harbor as a background. On Plate 
32 is a general plan of the fort, a large irregular work, whose prin- 
cipal front is turned towards the northwest. The southern face is 
thrown back to command the land approaches from Mex. The east- 
ern side recedes towards the center, narrowing the work at this point. 



*The Temeraire's share in the operations against the Light-House Fort was incon- 
siderable. 



60 

Practically it consists of two connecting courts, with barracks and other 
buildings in each, two sides of which mount guns, the whole surrounded 
by a dry ditch 30 feet in width and of varying depth. A miter-shaped 
detached work at the eastern extremity contains a large defensible bar- 
racks. At one point of the principal face the old parapet has been 
thickened to about 27 feet, the terreplein widened, and two 8- inch Arm- 
strong M. L. E. mounted in embrasures. In addition to these are six 
X-inch S. B. and ten 6J-inch S. B., one Xlll-inch and two Xl-inch mor- 
tars. Plate 33 is an interior view at the western end, which includes, 
incidentally, the land between Oom-el-Kabebe and Mex. 

The professional interest which this fort offers is derived from the fact 
that, being engaged by the Inflexible at the long range of 3,800 yards, the 
shot struck the work at a considerable angle of fall. The most notice- 
able of the wounds inflicted by this vessel are marked on Plate 32. 

No. 1 is a fine breach in the counterscarp, 10 feet wide and 6 feet deep. 
The descent into the ditch, through this gap and over the dSbris at the 
bottom, would be very feasible. 

No. 2 is a small scar on the cordon. Near it are three small hits on 
the gorge of the work. 

No. 3 is a fine hole in the retaining wall of the scarp. The angle is 
cut away for 10 feet along each face, making an almost practicable 
breach. The shell has burst at exactly the right depth. 

No. 4, a small gouge out of the counterscarp, appears to have been 
done by the same shell which inflicted wound No. 3, in its flight. 

No. 5 is a splendid crater. The shell has fallen at an advantageous 
angle, and burst when well buried, blowing out the earth of the supe- 
rior slope from a hole 17 feet long, 14 feet wide, and 5 feet deep. 

No. 6 is similar to the above, but a trifle smaller superficially and 6 
inches shallower. 

No. 7 is best seen in Plate 31, immediately beyond and under the 
muzzle of the nearest gun. This was a dangerously effective shot, and 
must have inflicted great injury upon the garrison, through the splin- 
ters of the masonry it dislodged. It lacked but a few feet of lateral 
deviation to be by far the best shot of the day. 

No. 8 is a large breach in the counterscarp, measuring 12 feet across 
and reaching 3 feet down. As in the case of No. 1, the pile of debris 
beneath, together with the gap itself, forms an easy descent into the 
ditch. 

No 9 is an almost practicable breach in the scarp. It measures 10 
feet along the cordon. 

No. 10 is a shallow irregular crater in the superior slope, 2J feet across 
and 9 inches deep. 

No. 11 is a good crater, 7 J feet in diameter and nearly 5 feet deep. 

No. 12 is another serious hit, cutting down the parapet at the em- 
brasure nearly to the terreplein. The gun in the embrasure is broken 
up. These two results may be due to different shell. 



61 

No. 13 is a deep trough plowed in the superior slope, 7 feet wide at 
its greatest breadth and 12 feet long. It reaches to the crest of the 
parapet, along which it measures 3 feet. 

Eeference will be made later to these craters, whose extensive and 
dangerous character should be remembered. 

To the guns in Oom-el-Kabebe very little damage was done. The 
8-inch rifles were untouched, although literally covered with dust and 
gravel, tossed about by the shell as they landed. (The injury to the 
muzzle of the gun seen in Plate 35 was done by gun cotton after the 
occupation of the place by the British.) The X-inch S. B. on their right? 
is dismounted and thrown in rear of the terreplein (Plate 31), prob- 
ably by its own recoil. The first G| inch S. B. on their left, beyond the 
traverse shown in the plan, Plate 32, has come to an extraordinary end. 
The breech of the gun is seen in Plate 34 lying in the middle of the 
western court. It was, doubtless, knocked off' its carriage and smashed 
by a Palliser shell. The fracture, as inspected on the spot, is not that 
of a burst. A portion of the muzzle went through the air over the roofs 
of the intervening buildings and lodged in a wall at a, at the western 
end of the fort (see plan). The guns seen in the various plates to be 
lying alongside of their slides were capsized by blue-jackets from the 
fleet after the bombardment. 

Oom-el-Kabebe is stated to have been " most troublesome." Its prac- 
tice was certainly good. 

A large number of blind shell were found here. 

The firing of the Inflexible against this work, both as witnessed from 
the outer anchorage during the day and as seen in the results enumer- 
ated, was admirable. 

After all, but one gun was disabled by the fleet, and the damage to 
the parapet could have been repaired in a very short time. The para- 
pet itself was too low to give proper shelter against modern projectiles. 

Eeverting to Plate 33, the cage beacon in the half distance is one 
of the leading-marks for entering the Boghaz Pass. Immediately in 
front of it is a small detached work, known as Fort Kumaria, which 
took no part in the engagement. To the right is the outer harbor, 
bounded beyond by the shoulder of land which terminates at Fort 
Adjemi. Just over the right of Kumaria is the martello tower in the 
battery which begins the Mex Lines. The lateen yards belong to native 
craft at Mex, the buildings of which place appear close to the beacon. 
The miuarets are on an unfinished and long deserted summer palace of 
the Khedive, to the left of which is seen the citadel of Mex. 

Plate 1 shows that the Mex Lines extend along the shore for a dis- 
tance of 2,000 yards, beginning with the Martello Tower Battery, just 
pointed out, and ending in Mex Fort and the land lines which stretch 
across the isthmus from shore to shore. 

As every vessel entering the harbor must approach Mex, pass close 
to it, and remain for a long time within easy range of this series of for- 



62 

tifications, it naturally received great attention in the original design. 
The construction, having been effected in the early part of the century, 
falls far below the requirements of to-day. The guns are all mounted 
en barbette behind thin, old-fashioned walls in wretched condition. 

The trace of these lines is given on the conventional plan, Plate XL. 

In the lines proper, not including the fort of Mex, were mounted 
four XV-inch S. B., eleven X-inch S. B., and eight 6J-inch S. B. 

In the Martello Tower Battery, B 0, one X-inch gun was knocked 
over backwards by a shell, and one was dismounted by its own recoil. 

Near this, at Gr H, is a pair of XV-inch S, B., intact, on very rotten 
carriages. They were not served on July 11. 

The whole length of these lines was subjected to a very searching fire 
of machine guns throughout the day, particularly after the gun-boats 
came inside. The walls bear testimony to the sharpness of the fire. 

Back of the Mex Lines are two or three old forts, designed to guard 
the land approaches. One of them had been turned into a magazine^ 
where no less than 7,000 barrels of powder were stowed. Among them 
lay the Penelope's unexploded shell. 

To the eastward of- the village of Mex the land projects slightly into 
the sea, affording a site for a fort, whose only disadvantage is lack of 
elevation. On Plate 37 is a general plan of the fortification. 

The front is twice broken at a wide angle. The parapet of the west- 
ern portion has been greatly thickened and heightened, embrasures cut, 
and substantial emplacements prepared for two rifled guns. In Plate 
38 the line of separation between the new and the old work on the re- 
taining wall is clearly shown. 

To the left and rear of the new rifled-gun battery is a smooth-bore 
battery, facing in the same general direction. It can be seen in Plate 
39. The third battery of Fort Mex lies to the eastward of the heavy 
rifled-gun battery, and contains a number of guns of various calibers 
and types. Plate 40 is of special value in several respects. It shows 
the relation between this and the other lower battery, the low nature 
of the land, and the appearance of the harbor between Mex and Alex- 
andria. Its chief merit, however, is in making clearer than is pos- 
sible by any verbal description the inadequate protection enjoyed by the 
Egyptian guns and gunners during the bombardment, the total lack of 
overhead protection, the lack of traverses, the soft, friable character of 
the material used in the construction of the forts, and the brittleness of 
the mortar revetting employed on the slopes. It will be observed that 
nearly all of this revetment, which the picture shows to have been 
knocked oft' near the muzzles of the guns, is simply blown away by the 
concussion of the Egyptian firing, but little being destroyed by impact 
of the British shell. The integrity of this thin coating of plaster on 
the crest of the parapet in any of the fortifications at Alexandria is 
unfailing evidence that the gun immediately above it was not fired 
during the action. 



63 

At Mex preparations were making just before July 11 for the mount- 
ing of two more 10-ineh and two more 9-inch Armstrong M, L. E., the 
guns, carriages, and slides being in readiness on the spot. (Plates 40 
and 41.) The guns actually in place comprised one 10-inch, one 9-inch, 
and three 8-inch M. L. E. guns, four X-inch and five 6|-inch S. B. guns, 
six XITI-inch, two Xl-incb, and two X-inch mortars. 

The chief scars on the rifled-gun battery are sketched in on the plan 
of the fort, Plate 37. 

No. 1 is a small trench in the superior slope. 

No. 2 is a large but unimportant wound on the angle. 

No. 3 is a deep score in the exterior slope, due probably to shrapnel. 

No. 4 is a crater about 6 feet in diameter and 16 inches deep. 

No. 5 is- a series of small hits, knocking off the crest of the parapet 
and cutting away pieces of the interior slope. (Plate 39.) 

No. 6 is a small trench like No. 1. 

No. 7 is a cut down the exterior slope to the cordon, and is a good 
crater made by a well burst shell. 

No. 8 is an excellent gap. (Plate 38.) The interior slope is knocked 
away for a distance of 12 feet measured along the crest. 

Nos. 9 and 10 are craters made by good bursts. The former is 12 
feet long by 8£ feet wide, and is 2 feet 6 inches deep. 

No. 11 is a long, deep breach in the jetty-like wall, the prolongation 
of the scarp (but unbacked by earth filling). The splinters from this 
wall must have proved very harassing to the people in the fort. The 
gap itself extends into the scarp of the fortification, which is cut away 
to 5 feet below the cordon. 

The serious character of the pieces of stone hurled about by the im- 
pact of the ships' shells can be best appreciated from an inspection of 
Plates 39 and 42. The former shows how complete was the wreck of the 
10-inch-gun embrasure. 

In Plate 40 is seen the damage sustained by the eastern battery, and 
in Plates 39, 40, and 41 the nature of the injuries received by the build- 
ings within the enceinte. These were frightfully battered to pieces by 
shell that glanced up from the parapet or over shot their mark. 

In view of the tremendous fire to which Fort Mex was subjected and 
the comparatively short range at which all the ships, except the Teine- 
raire, engaged it, it is almost impossible to believe the fact that not a 
single gun here was dismounted or disabled during the action proper. 
The 10-inch and the 9-inch rifles (Plates 38 and 43) were wrecked with 
gun-cotton. The 8-inch gun, seen on the ground in Plate 41, was 
bowled over by the Penelope, long after the fort had ceased firing, 
and from a distance stated to be about 300 yards. The successful shot 
was the thirtieth of this series, and was aimed by the gunnery-lieuten- 
ant. The gun in going over has taken the top carriage with it and 
overturned the slide. The blow was received under the left side of the 



64 

first coil, tearing out a strip 2 feet long by nearly 5 inches wide, and 
starting the whole coil from the chase on the other side. The B-tube 
has a well-marked transverse split about 33 inches from the muzzle. 

The 10-inch rifle bears two scars from shells on the coils on the left 
side and several marks of Xordenfeldt bullets. One of the latter has 
scooped out a fine track 4J inches long on the breech, and another has 
entered the breech-coil to the depth of half an inch. 

The 9-inch rifle was struck on the right side just in front of the trun- 
nions by a fragment of shell, and on the breech-coil by a shell, which 
made a furrow a foot long, 7 inches wide, and an inch and a quarter deep, 
and then glanced off. (See Plate 42.) 

The carriage of the left X-inch S. B. in the lower battery was hit by 
a piece of shell, and the gun itself by many shrapnel balls, but neither 
was injured. 

The adjoining 8-inch rifled guns were struck by shrapnel balls, one 
showing twelve hits, the other nine. 

Mex was the only fort at Alexandria which could not have resumed 
the action on the following day, for the party which landed from the 
Invincible, at the spot marked a on Plate 37, completed the work of 
destruction but just began by the fleet, ruining the carriages of the two 
heavy guns by exploding gun-cotton inside the brackets, and spiking 
the remaining guns in the lower batteries. Except for this gallant and 
eminently successful exploit, the parapets might have been sufficiently 
repaired during the night by heavy gangs of natives to enable the gar- 
rison to reopen fire. The Egyptians here had lost so severely that only 
men of a high order of bravery could have been induced to expose them- 
selves to a repetition of the hammering they had endured on July 11. 
The actual garrison was whipped, and thoroughly whipped, after a most 
creditable and determined resistance, but it is hardly to be doubted 
that if it had been of a personnel similar to that on board the attacking 
fleet the spiking party would have had difficulty in executing their task, 
and on July 12 the challenge from the ships would have been promptly 
accepted. 

Mex Citadel, so called, is a large square fortified barracks, with a 
deep, wide ditch around it, situated on the top of the ridge back of 
Mex Fort. Adjoining the citadel on the northwest face is a small open 
battery mounting four GJ-inch guns. An embrasure was improvised in 
the western angle for a 40-pdr. Armstrong B. L. R. These guns were 
well served. The practice of one of the smooth-bores against the In- 
vincible received especial praise from Admiral Seymour. The walls 
show the traces of heavy return fire. The crew of the Armstrong gun 
suffered severely from a well-directed and well-burst shell. No real 
damage, however, was done to the guns or the fortification. 

Three thousand yards to the westward of Mex is a small old-fashioned 
fort, close to the sea, called, by Admiral Seymour, Marsa-el-Khanat. It 
mounted three X-inch S. B. and one GJ-inch S. B. In a yard near by 






65 

were found three 9-inch Armstrong M. L. R., ready for mounting. The 
fort thus strengthened would have been a formidable addition to the 
defenses of the Marabout Passage. The fort did not bear a scratch. 
Two of the X-inch guns had been, by this recoil, capsized. They were 
of the lightest pattern, and could not stand the heavy charges and solid 
shot with which they had evidently been fired. 

Fort Marabout, the westernmost of the forts bearing on the bay, is 
on the rocky island of the same name. It is an old-fashioned work with 
a steep scarp. The trace is long and narrow. (Plate 32.) Its north- 
eastern corner was prepared, in the same manner as elsewhere, for the 
reception of modern guns. It is well supplied with barracks, shell- 
stores, &c. 

In a were found large quantities of filled cartridges. As the build- 
ing projected well above the crest of the parapet, the wonder is but 
natural that these cartridges should have escaped explosion. The room 
served as an expense magazine. 

& is a kitchen ; c a store-house full of oil, in jars ; d is the principal 
magazine also well supplied with made cartridges ; e is a filling room for 
smooth-bore shells; / is a fuze store-house; in g were stores of timber; 
h is a filling room for shells; i is a store-room containing mortar imple- 
ments and stores; / and m are large and well-furnished stores of empty 
shells, both rifled and smooth-bore, together with ordnance stores of 
every description. 

The liberal scale of equipment observed in this fort is due to its re- 
moteness from the base at Alexandria and its insular position. 

Close to the entrance of the fort is a small landing pier. The arma- 
ment consisted of three 9-inch M. L. R., and of nine X-inch S. B. and 
sixteen 6J-inch S. B. guns. 

Five additional Armstrong M. L. E. were found in the fort awaiting 
the preparation of gun emplacements. These were one 10-inch, two 
8-inch, and two 7-inch guns. At least two would have been plac d on 
the east front to command the Marabout Channel. 

The northeastern corner received the fire of the Condor and other gun- 
boats, and the southeastern a few shots from the inside fleet, notably 
the Monarch. The scarp of the former is well pitted. It shows about 
twenty hits in all. The damage is, however, all apparent, none real. 

The rock on which the fort is built is plastered up to a smooth surface. 
This coating of plaster, which is about a foot thick, has peeled off freely 
where the shot have struck. A 64-pdr. shell, for instance, has made 
a hole 10 feet in diameter in this sham scarp. One small building was 
set on fire, a notable result in view of the large number of blind shell 
found in the fort. 

The irregular scarp at the southeast corner is natural. It has received 
several hits, thought to be due to the Monarch. 

The guns in this fort were uninjured. 

Of the neighboring fort, Adjemi, it is merely necessary to state that 
948 EG 5 



66 

it is commenced on a large scale. II n finished as it is, Adjeini mounts 
three 10-inch, five 9-inch, and one 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R. behind 
a 50-foot parapet, while the magazines, barracks, &c, are excellent in 
design. Being quite useless from its position, Adjemi was not engaged 
on July 11. A similar work near the city would have proved a serious 
antagonist to the British fleet. 

In considering the state of the southern line of defenses of Alexandria 
after the bombardment, it is more than ever necessary to distinguish 
between the real and the apparent damage done to them ; the former 
being those wounds which immediately affected their fighting qualities, 
in the disabling of the guns, the fatal breaching of the parapets, the 
wrecking of the gun-pivots, or the destruction of vitally important stores 
of ammunition; the latter being shell marks on the parapets, not neces- 
sarily fatal, however large, and especially shot wounds and holes in the 
buildings within the enceinte. Self-inflicted harm on each side is, of 
course, excluded. 

Applying this test and summing up the injuries received by the fortifi- 
cations of this line, one is amazed to find how slight they were in reality. 

Including even the rifled gun in Mex, which was dismounted by the 
Penelope at leisure after the fort had ceased firing, the following is the 
loss of offensive power occasioned directly by the fleet: 

In Saleh-Aga, one 6J-inch S. B. dismounted. 

In the next battery, one X-inch S. B. dismounted. 

In Oom-el-Kabebe, one 6J-inch S. B. dismounted. 

In Martello Tower Battery, one X-inch S. B. dismounted. 

In Mex Fort, one 8-inch M. L. R. dismounted. 

These make a total of but five guns in the sea batteries extending 
from Saleh Aga to Marsa-el-Khanat, and including both works. 

In the foregoing description of the effects on the fortifications at Al- 
exandria of the bombardment by the vessels under Admiral Sir Beau- 
champ Seymour, great prominence is given to the Inflexible's practice. 
This is due partly to the magnitude of the wounds she inflicted, but 
partly also to the fact that the guns she carried were the only ones of 
their type in the fleet, and that her projectiles were in consequence 
readily recognized even when in small fragments. The same facility of 
identification was impossible in the cases of the other ships. An 11- 
inch shell, for example, if found in the northern line, might have come* 
from either the Temeraire or the Alexandra. The confusion is still 
greater when the smaller shell are considered, for 10-inch guns were 
mounted by all the members of the offshore squadron, and 9-inch guns 
were carried by several in both squadrons. 

It is worthy of mention that the credit for best shooting seemed to be 
divided between the Temeraire and Inflexible, the only ships in which 
the guns were worked by hydraulic power. 

Postscript. — Since the foregoing was written a very interesting ar- 
ticle has been read before the United Service Institution by Captain 



67 

Walford, R. A., in which the expenditure of ammunition by the British 
fleet is given in detail. From Captain Walford's article the following 
tables are extracted: 





1 

• 


Filled 


shell. 




GO 

>> 

a 


Shot. 


j 




Ship. 


Common. 


09 

TO 


Shrapnel. 


a 

to 

a 

to 


Case. 
Total. 




379 

247 

257 

241 

227 

139 

221 

139 

21 

162 

66 

72 

69 

6 


23 
24 
83 

5 

70 

21 


1 
3 

25 
45 
129 
13 
25 
11 






4 
10 
12 
62 

6 




407 
338 
411 
380 
367 
228 
250 
208 
101 
201 

89 
143 

69 
6 




44 
34 
32 


10 










6 

37 

1 






2 


2 








61 
31 


18 






7 


8 
1 




12 


3 






71 










































Total 


2,246 


233 


261 


154 


175 


126 


3 


3,198 




70 


7 


8 


5 ! 


5.5 


"I 











Average number of rounds per heavy gun. 





Gun. 


i 


Ship. 


16-inch. 
12-inch. 


.2 


4 

a 

© 


r3 

to 

.5 


to 

a 


to 

.9 


H to 

gap 

1 






24.00 


22.1 

17.12 

19.37 








22.4 







12.5 






15.5 












19.3 




1 * 






28.8 


21 


28.8 






29.25 






24.00 


26.57 






34.00 


21.00 


27.5 








12.6 






12.6 




22 












22.0 




















22 


29.25 


30.06 


19.79 


14.00 


28.8 


21 


20.6 







68 



Expenditure of ammunition — shot and shell. 











Gun. 






1. 


Ship. 


o 
<6 


12-inch. 


,4 
O 

_g 


3 
a 

© 


O 

.2 

© 


© 

00 


4 


s 

© 








48 


221 
137 
310 








269 








50 






187 
310 

931 


























231 








117 






48 


i 

21 ! 1R« 






136 


84 




220 

126 
88 
16 








126 








88 
























16 

















65 ' 65 

















33 33 
















1 
















I 

I 
















! 




















88 


117 


184 


752 


224 


231 


135 


1,731 











Gun. 






Is 
% 

1 


Martini-Henry. 


§ 

o 


o 

1 




Ship. 


9 

-©• 



s 
o 

9* 

■<* 


as 

Q 
P 
© 
ft 
© 


ft 
© 


i 

ft 

© 


a 
pi 

o 
ft 


CD 
© 

* 
1 








138 

139 

60 

23 






407 
338 
411 
380 
367 
228 
250 
208 
101 
201 

89 
143 

69 
6 


5,000 
1,800 

2,000 

320 
1,000 


4,000 
1,800 
1,161 
1,672 
3,440 
160 
2,000 
2,000 


340 

2,000 

880 










41 

30 

153 


12 

28 
















96 








2,680 


21 








8 

18 

120 

53 






106 








1,000 














22 
128 






10 

8 




3 






200 


13 




56 










101 

49 

6 


42 
20 




















40 






































Total 


412 


152 


621 


224 


58 


3,198 


10, 160 


16, 233 


7,100 


37 







The amount of powder fired away was 131,856.5 pounds, of which amount the Inflexible used 39,000 
and the Superb 22,897.75 pounds. 



69 



VII. 

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. 

Such an occurrence as the bombardment of the fortifications at Alex- 
andria is so rare in recent naval annals that a proper consideration of 
its results must yield valuable lessons for the guidance of all interested 
in either offensive or defensive methods of warfare. Certain points 
suggest themselves naturally and almost inevitably. In other cases the 
inference drawn may be erroneous, but the arguments advanced are 
believed to warrant the deductions. The term "fort "is limited to the 
defensive works designed to protect a harbor from the entrance of an 
inimical lieet. 

1. The command of a fort, or its height above the level of the sea, is 
of enormous importance. 

A difference of a few feet in this respect may so change the angle of 
fall of a well-directed shot as to cause it to be received along the line 
of greatest instead of along the line of least resistance of the parapet, 
while, on the other hand, it gives the defense an increased chance of 
returning plunging shot that may strike a ship's deck, the part where 
she enjoys a minimum of protection. 

A comparison of the damage done on the masonry of the upper and 
lower batteries of Fort Pharos is instructive in this connection. In 
Fort Ada, again, the dismounted guns were all in the two lower bat- 
teries; and at FortOom-el-Kabebe, to contend against the unusually good 
command on the part of the fort and to secure a proper direction of 
descent for the projectile, the fleet was obliged to engage it by power- 
ful guns at great range. Now, great range is another expression for 
lessened probability of successful practice. Lastly, can any reasonable 
doubt be entertained that the Light-House Fort suffered more severely 
than Fort Pharos partly and largely, but not exclusively, because it 
was fourteen feet lower? 

2. As to the requisite thickness of the parapet. 

The British have no gun afloat which can send a projectile through, 
or seriously damage, a good earthen parapet 30 feet in thickness at or- 
dinarily practicable ranges. This statement may, it is thought, be ex- 
tended to embrace, as well, the 71- ton Krupp steel B. L. R., with its 
34,000 foot- tons of total energy, and even the 100-ton Armstrong M. L. R., 
which throws a shell having 41,000 foot-tons of stored-up energy, the 
additional 7,000 foot tons of energy not appearing to be sufficient to 
take its shot clean through where the first failed so completely. 

For the present, at least, 30 feet of well-packed loam may be accepted 
as yielding adequate protection. At the embrasure proper a small 
amount of heavy armor might be advantageously applied, in ways that 



70 

would naturally suggest themselves to the military engineer, who could 
thus secure cheap and efficient protection. 

3. The parapet must be high above the sill of the embrasure. If 
low, it may be gradually cut down to a dangerous extent, as at Mex 
(Plate 38). At Oom-el-Kabebe, where the crest was of the same height 
(6 feet above the terreplein), a comparatively large percentage of the 
garrison were wounded by masonry splinters alone, and the guns cov- 
ered with debris. The Light- House Fort suffered badly through the 
same defect in design. The condition of the 8-inch guns in Fort Pharos, 
mounted behind parapets 2 feet higher, may be instructively studied in 
Plates 8 and 9. With flat trajectories more damage must be expected 
from flying pieces of masonry than from the enemy's shell. By means 
of the former the horizontal motion of the shot is changed into ver- 
tical motion, which is vastly more dangerous to the people inside the 
fort. 

4. In constructing a fortification nothing should be allowed to appear 
above the crest of the parapet, and the latter should be an unbroken 
line. 

If this rule is not followed, the attack is furnished with an excellent 
target, or with means of readily identifying the position of the guns in 
the battery, and of concentrating its fire with ease upon any desired 
point. 

5. For this reason, among others, the system of mounting guns en 
barbette should not be followed. In fact, the barbette guns suffered 
most at Alexandria, being much more roughly treated than those in em- 
brasures, thus proving practically their theoretical deficiencies. Mer- 
lons, therefore, would appear to be indispensable in the uncovered bat- 
teries of any well designed fortified work. 

6. The British gunners were greatly aided in the task of pointing by 
having the black muzzles of the Egyptian guns clearly defined against 
the light-colored masonry of the parapet. Would it not be well to 
paint the guns of a color indistinguishable from that of their surround- 
ings ? 

7. The average value of armor has been greatly underrated. 

The resisting power of armor plates is determined under conditions 
which are in the highest degree favorable to the gun and unfavorable 
to the armor, the latter being placed so that the impact shall be nor- 
mal, and at a distance permitting the exhibition of the full effect of the 
energy stored up in the projectile. Moreover, the plate is ordinarily 
braced rigidly against the blow. That the first two conditions are just 
no one can deny. The last, however, does not hold in practice, a cer- 
tain amouut of elasticity, correctly, if vulgarly, known as "give," always 
existing. This "give" is certain to transmit the shock over a more or 
less extended surface, and thus to aid in keeping out the shot. Prac- 
tically, the question assumes this form: "Is it not both right and expe- 
dient for the naval architect to give a numerical expression to the risk 



71 

which experience has demonstrated may be incurred with impunity, 
and claim, for instance, that a 10-inch plate will resist a 10-inch shot 
fired under all the likely or even remotely probable conditions of bat- 
tle?" For we see that battering shell of this caliber were freely used 
by the Egyptians, one actually stopping on board of the Inflexible; we 
know that all the ships of the fleet were exposed to their lire; that in 
the Invincible and others they had even a stationary target; that in no 
case was the armor of any of the ships pierced, although the range was 
not excessive, and the armor plates, in most instances, of about 6 inches 
in thickness. It cannot, of course, be affirmed that a 10-inch Palliser 
shell struck and failed to penetrate a 6-inch plate. Among the multi- 
titude of these projectiles fired it is fair to assume that some of them did 
strike harmlessly upon the thinner plates carried by the older vessels of 
the fleet, in spite of the fact that their penetration at 1,500 yards may 
be justly set at 11 inches of iron, starting with a mnzzle velocity of 1,360 
feet per second and a penetration of 13J inches of iron. It is certain 
that the 6 and 8 inch armor of the Alexandra, and the 6-inch armor of 
the Sultan, were only dented to a slight extent by the heaviest blows 
they received. 

8. Recent high-poicered guns are not adapted to bombarding earth- 
works. 

These guns possess a flat trajectory and send their projectiles along 
the line of greatest resistance of the fortification. The best work done 
at Alexandria was on the parapet of Fort Oom-el-Kabebe, which was 
shelled by the Inflexible at nearly 4,000 yards. In this case, the shell 
having a considerable angle of descent, buried themselves well, and, in 
exploding, blew out large craters, one of which was 17 feet long by over 
5 feet deep. The great distance would forbid the placing of a sufficient 
number of these hits so close together as to breach the parapet, and the 
fire of the ships was too slow to keep the crews entirely away from the 
guns. 

If, however, in this sense, the best results from these modern weap- 
ons are only to be obtained by indefinitely increasing the fighting dis- 
tance, the value of the high power and flat trajectory is unquestion- 
ably negative. 

To the unprejudiced observer, the most striking characteristics of the 
bombardment are, without doubt, the excessive apparent and the slight 
real damage done to the fortifications. 

0. As a corollary to the above, the batteries of ships must be com- 
posite. Unless the ships themselves are to be armed for the purpose of 
either engaging other ships or batteries exclusively, they should be pre- 
pared for both classes of work. 

If Admiral Seymour had possessed a vessel carrying both heavy modern 
high powered guns and large howitzers or other shell-guns capable of great 
elevatton, and thus somewhat similar to the mortar in application, she 
ivould have been of immense value, for she could have run close into the 



72 

forts. With her shell and machine guns she could have driven the 
Egyptians away from their batteries, dismounting the latter with com- 
parative ease at short range with her powerful ordnance. Valuable as 
Gatlings and Nordenfeldts may be, under certain circumstances, it can- 
not be denied that they lack the moral effect of well-burst shell. Some- 
thing approaching vertical fire must be secured for operations of this 
nature. 

A British naval officer of standing, present at the engagement, stated 
that, in his opinion, an old line-of-battle ship, with her numerous, if 
smaller, guns, would have been more effective than the modern ships 
which took part in the bombardment. 

It may be urged, in reply, that these recent guns possess the ability 
to use shrapnel and canister. But any one familiar with these projectiles 
must know that the former is useful only when the range is accurately 
known and the fuze is capable of adjustment within very narrow limits; 
that the latter can only be employed at extremely close quarters ; and 
that, unless fired at high elevations and with reduced charges, involving 
different range tables and vast inconvenience, the objection of too great 
flatness of trajectory will still hold; nor do the gun-carriages and ports of 
to-day admit of an elevation sufficient to secure the desired advantage. 

10. The necessity of a thorough determination of the possibilities of 
vertical fire must be patent to the most careless reader of this report. 
It is hardly an exaggeration to suggest that of all the directions open 
to the development of ordnance, at the present time, this is by far the 
most promising and important. 

The writer feels strongly the desirability, not to say imperative obli- 
gation, of working out this old problem under the new conditions of 
the moment, and unhesitatingly recommends it as worthy of serious con- 
sideration and practical investigation. 

11. The system of imparting rotation to a shot by means of an ex- 
panding base ring was established as thoroughly trustworthy even when 
applied to so large a projectile as the lnfiexible's 16-inch, 1,700-pound 
shell. 

All that were found by the writer had lost the copper gas check, but 
the latter was generally not far distant from the sjpot where the shell 
landed. The track of the projectile over the water was not observed to 
have been marked by scattering pieces of the expansion ring that had 
stripped off*. Official statements on this point, by those in a position 
to notice, are wanting. 

12. The question is not unlikely to arise in the mind of the naval offi- 
cer, whether the good shooting of the Temeraire may not have been in 
a measure due to the unobstructed view had by the captains of her bar- 
bette guns. On this point no possible doubt can be entertained. 

To obtain really good aim without inconvenient straining, the eye 
must embrace, at will, the surroundings of the individual point selected 



73 

as a target. This condition is admirably secured in open -top turrets, 
and may be legitimately urged among the advantages they offer. 

13. The range at which the fleet engaged seems to have been need- 
lessly great. The outside vessels could have gone to within 1,000 yards 
on the northwest side of the Light-House Fort, and 800 yards abreast 
the Ras-el-Tin Lines ; to within 500 yards of Fort Ada and 200 yards 
of Fort Pharos. Along the southern line the ships could easily have 
gotten within 400 yards of all the batteries. This would have pre- 
vented the Temeraire from shelling Mex, but it is believed that the 
gain would have outbalanced the loss. It can hardly be doubted that 
the boldness of this move would have been rewarded by the speedier 
and more extensive dismounting of the guns, which was confessedly 
the chief object of the attack. Shrapnel and canister from a portion of 
the ships' batteries, supplemented by the machine guns at a more ap- 
propriate range than that originally adopted, would have prevented 
return fire from the shore, and the remainder could have been concen- 
trated on each gun in the forts in succession until bowled over. Close 
range and a stable platform, however, are necessary for such refinement 
of practice. 

It must be remembered that the target in each case at Alexandria 
was the muzzle of a gun — a mere pin's head at the distance at which the 
ships engaged — and that a successful hit meant either good luck or phe- 
nomenally good shooting. 

Hammering away "at long taw" was very skillful, and, in the end, 
was tolerably fortunate, but it is certain that the length of the action, 
while abundantly foreshadowed in Admiral Seymour's order of battle, 
was a disappointment to those who expected short work to be made of 
the Egyptians, while it drained the stock of ammunition to a dangerously 
low ebb. 

14. The outside squadron having tried both modes of attack, under 
way and at anchor, definitely solved one important problem. There 
remains no possible doubt that ships engaging forts not superior to them in 
force gain more in accuracy of fire by anchoring than in safety by keeping 

under way. 

A private account of the bombardment, written on board of the Invin- 
cible and published in the London Standard newspaper, refers to the 
Monarch as delivering a less effective fire, in consequence of keeping 
under way, than her neighbors. Her best work was at Marsa-el-Khanat, 
but the gun-cotton she blew up there was hundreds of yards in rear of 
the fort she aimed at. 

It is proper, at this place, to suggest that the slight damage done to 
the guns in the fort at Mex can probably be accounted for by the fact 
that the Invincible, although at anchor, was too distant, and the other 
ships were under way. 

15. One fact which struck the observer in passing through ihe forts at 



74 

Alexandria, in the northern line, is the lessened injury inflicted by the 
ships as they moved to the eastward. 

The Light-House Fort was entirely disabled ; the batteries in the Eas- 
el-Tin Lines were silenced, but not entirely'put hors de combat. Only one 
rifled gun was disabled in Fort Ada and one in Pharos. As the at- 
tacking squadron grew in strength, as it advanced against these works 
in the order named, and as the sun had moved out of the gunners' eyes to 
shine more fully on the target, an explanation (not the only one, how- 
ever) is found in the fact that the steady northwest breeze of that day 
had gradually raised a slight swell, making the afternoon practice less 
effective than that of the morning. This sea can be best described 
as slight and short, but its influence upon the bombardment is unmis- 
takable. 

16. It follows, as an inference from what has just been stated, that 
an additional advantage, not generally claimed for vessels with complete 
fore and aft fire, lies in their ability to ride at anchor, head to sea, and 
engage a fort, either ahead or astern, from a platform which is as steady 
as the circumstances can possibly permit. 

17. Besides the hints which may be incidentally derived from the 
foregoing notes it is well to add, for the guidance of officers command- 
ing vessels assigned to the task of demolishing fortifications, that there 
can be but two targets at which it is worth while to direct their fire. 
Te first is the muzzle of any gun actually served; the second is any build- 
ing known or believed to be a magazine or shell-house, which is visible 
above the parapet. 

All shot not placed in accordance with these rules are shot thrown 
away. They may make deep holes in the parapet and wound members 
of the garrison by splinters, but they are without real effect on the 
powers of the work either for offense or defense. It is advisable not 
to waste time and effort on a gun which may prove to be a quaker or 
unserviceable, but to confine the attack to the enemy's weapons in use. 
On the other hand, if an enemy allows an undue accumulation of in- 
flammable or explosive material in an exposed situation, it will j)robably 
be under a roof of some kind. Here lies the chance of igniting it by a 
well-burst shell. Lightning-conductors, as marking the site of the mag- 
azine, should be specially sought for, and, if found, fired at. Generally 
speaking, however, the most vulnerable parts of a fortification are the 
guns mounted in it, and to them most attention should be devoted. 

18. Having the essential facts of the last engagement between ships 
and earthworks at hand, it is impossible not to draw one broad infer- 
ence — that vessels are not yet and never will be able to fight on even terms 
with forts. 

The responsibility of the attack belongs to the former, while the lat- 
ter gain the credit of a drawn battle. The former cannot continue the 
action beyond a certain time, limited by the capacity of shell-rooms and 
magazines. The garrisons of the latter may wait quietly under cover 



75 

until the fire slackens, can then return it with interest, and continue it 
indefinitely, and absolutely at their own leisure. 

This disadvantage, and the obligation of assuming the initiative, 
should be recognized and well weighed before commencing operations. 

19. These deductions in no way touch the question of the ability of 
forts to stop the progress of modern ships. In this respect, and unaided 

by other modes of defense, by obstructions, &c, the works at Alexandria 
would have been utterly poiverless against the British fleet, which need 
hardly have paid them the compliment of a passing shot. 

20. The success which attended the efforts of the spiking party at 
Mex inspires the regret that similar work was not generally attempted 
by the fleet. 

It is easy to be wise after the event, and therefore it cannot now be 
doubted that, in this way, the true state of the morale of the garrison 
would have been revealed, and possibly such measures taken as might 
have prevented the burning of the city. A few hundred men could 
have seized and held the place on July 12, so great was the fear on the 
part of the Egyptians, both soldiers and citizens, caused by the bom- 
bardment — a fear not known, at the time, to the British commander-in- 
chief. In consequence of the lack of information, this memorable battle 
was followed by one of the most shocking, wanton, and deplorable ca- 
tastrophes of the century. 

21. The forts at Alexandria were badly bruised, but the more modern 
parapets were not seriously harmed. In the generality of cases the 
real damage they sustained could have been easily repaired in a single 
night. If the bombardment was directed against the forts in this, their 
defensive capacity, it must be pronounced a failure. If its object was 
the dismounting of the new rifled guns, it must be conceded that such 
results as attended the work of the inshore squadron (only one gun of 
this type being seriously affected), or even such as were achieved by 
the offshore squadron (less than one-half being permanently disabled), 
do not justify the verdict of success. 

In the wider sense of having driven the garrison from their batteries, 
and having silenced the forts, the fleet was unquestionably victorious. 

Into this product, however, enters the important element of morale. 
The British, while surprised by the tenacity of their opponents, ivere the 
first to confess that men of a stamp at all similar to their own would have 
accepted the gage thrown dozen the next day, and have renewed the fight. 

With a heavier sea running to render the fire of the fleet less accurate, 
and to embarrass the operation of replenishing its almost empty maga- 
zines and shell-rooms from the ammunition vessels in the outer road- 
stead, can any doubt be reasonably entertained that the struggle would 
have been vastly prolonged even if the final result had been unaltered? 



PAET II 



THE WAR EST EGYPT. 



VIII. 

OPERATIONS BY THE BRITISH NAVY AT ALEXANDRIA SUBSEQUENT TO 

THE BOMBARDMENT. 

The events of the day immediately following the bombardment have 
been already briefly referred to (p. 36). To give a clear idea of the de- 
mands of Admiral Seymour, and of the policy adopted by the Egyp- 
tians, the following letter is quoted at length. It is the report, to the 
admiral, of the officer sent to communicate with the military authorities 
ashore in response to their hoisting a flag of truce on the Light-House 
Fort. 

H. M. S. Invincible, 
Off Alexandria, July 12, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on arriving on board the Egyptian yacht 
Mahroussa I informed the captain that I had your orders to communicate with the 
military governor of Alexandria. 

His excellency Toulba Pasha, military governor, just then came alongside in a steam 
launch. He told me he was on the point of going out to the British admiral. 

I told him you could not hold any communication with him until, as a preliminary, 
Mex Batteries and Adjemi were surrendered, the former to he temporarily occupied by 
your forces, the offensive defenses of the latter to be destroyed. 

I carefully pointed out to the Pasha that these positions were practically in your 
power, that you did not intend to hoist the British flag or do anything to hurt the 
susceptibilities of the Egyptian nation, but you required the peaceful surrender as a 
guarantee of good faith. 

The Pasha, after a deal of temporizing and begging the question, said he had not 
the authority to comply with your demands, but must communicate with the Khe- 
dive, at Ramleh palace,, four or five miles distant. I asked him to do so by telegram. 
He replied, "There is no telegraph wire n — a mistake on his part. I then (at twenty 
minutes past 12) informed the Pasha he must give written surrender by 2 p. m. He 
begged for 3 p. m., pointing out the physical impossibility of communicating with 
Ramleh under that time. I informed him that I could not alter the time, and replied 
I was convinced that he, the gallant defender of Alexandria, had the power to sur- 
render what was required, pointing out to him that the forts in question had been 
silenced by our ships, and were no longer in a position to offer any resistance. He 
then asked, "What will the English admiral do if we cannot accept his terms?" I 
replied, u Destroy the whole of the fortifications." 

He then said, " There will be no men in them," to which I replied, "You would be 
delighted to hear that, as your object was the demolition of the forts, not the destruc- 
tion of men." 

The interview then ended, the Pasha ostensibly hurrying to Ramleh to consult 
the Khedive. The Bittern weighed at 2 p. m. I returned to the Mahroussa, com- 
pared watches with the captain (2.15 p. m.), and informed him, as time was up and 
no answer to your demand had arrived, you would recommence fire at 3.30 p. m. 

He asked me to wait a little longer, as the answer wonld come directly. I told him 
I would wait on board the Mahroussa till 2.30 p. m., but had not the authority to 
change the time for recommencing the fire on the forts, viz, 3.30 p. m. 

He hurried ashore to inform Admiral Kamil Pasha (sub-minister of marine). 

79 



80 

At 2.30 p. m., seeing mj boat alongside, lie returned and wished for further delay, 
which I declined and returned to the Bittern. 

In my opinion the sole object was to gain time to enable the soldiery and rabble to 
pillage and burn the town without the danger of a stray shell disturbing their oper- 
ations. 

Commander Brand of the Bittern informed me at least 500 troops in heavy march- 
ing order had evacuated Ras-el-Tin Avhile I was on board the Mahroussa. 

I have, &c, 

HEDWORTH LAMBTON, 
To Lieutenant. 

Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, 

Commander-in- Chief. 

The following extracts are from Admiral Seymour's official dispatches 
of the dates mentioned: 

[Of July 14.] 
As negotiations failed * * * one shot was fired into the Mex Barracks Battery 
earthwork,* when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant and Com- 
mander Morrison into the harbor in the Helicon, and on his going on board the Khe- 
dive's yacht, the Mahroussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported to me on 
his return after dark his belief that the town had been evacuated. 

This belief was quite correct. Under cover of the white flag, Arabi 
succeeded in getting his troops safely out of the city, which was given 
over to the mob for pillage and burning. Some smoke had been ob- 
served rising from the place before sunset, but after dark the flames 
were but too apparent. Alexandria had been fired in at least two quar- 
ters. 

[Of July 19.] 

At daylight [of the 13th] the [inshore] squadron was under way, and I proceeded 
up the harbor and found that the town was on fire in several places ; that the harem 
of the Ras-el-Tin palace was burning, and that the forts were evacuated. 

As by the most reliable authority I learned that the force of Arabi Pasha had only 
moved out as far as Pompey's Pillar, where they were said to be awaiting us, I had 
to be cautious in our proceedings, and, as a first measure, I landed a party from the 
Invincible and another from the Monarch, under Captain Fairfax, C. B., A. D. C, to 
spike or burst the guns between Gabarri and Tsali which bore upon the harbor. 

While this was being accomplished the gun-boats were sent to the ships outside to 
bring in the marines. Ras-el-Tin itself , was occupied and many of the guns bearing 
on our ships spiked. About the same time I received a visit from Ahmet Tewfik 
Effendi, A. D. C. to his excellency Dervish Pasha, who, accompanied by Colonel Zoh- 
rab Bey, A. D. C. to H. H. the Khedive, had come in from Ramleh palace, about 4 
miles from Alexandria, asking me if I would undertake to receive the Khedive, whose 
safety from the mutinous regiments surrounding him gave rise to much apprehension. 
I at once expressed my readiness and anxiety to be of service to His Highness, and 
at about 4 p. m. I had the honor to receive him at the gate of the palace, which 
fortunately had suffered only to a very slight extent from the fire of the ships on the 
llth instant. 
[Of July 14.] 

I regret to say that the city of Alexandria has suffered greatly from fire and pillage. 

At the same time the guns on the southern shore were being spiked. 

We occupied the Ras-el-Tin Lines with such men as we could spare. 

* This, the last shot of the engagement, struck the northeast angle of Mex Citadel. 



81 

I Of July 14.] 
In the evening [of the 13th] a party of blue-jackets landed with a Gatliug gun 
and cleared the streets of the Arabs, who were setting fire to and pillaging the town, 
[Of July 20.] 
In the evening [of the 13th] we landed all the marines fio.n the oifshore squadron 
and got a small patrol into the streets, but they were of little service. 

As explanatory of these brief notices, it is proper to state that the 
first party which landed from the ships was composed of 160 marines 
and 250 bine-jackets from the Monarch. Invincible, and Penelope, under 
the command of Commander Hammill, of the Monarch. They reached 
the Ras-el-Tin palace at 10.30 a. m., seized the western end of the pen- 
insula, and threw out a line of sentries north and south extending from 
shore to shore. At half-past twelve a small party of marines and a 
Gatling gun's crew from the Monarch pushed on towards the town, 
occupied the arsenal, and guarded the streets in the immediate neigh- 
borhood, making prisoners of the natives who were seen looting just 
outside of the gates, and firing upon those more remote. The arsenal 
then became a point of refuge for the Europeans still left alive in the 
city, who came down some seventy in number to seek protection. The 
Gatling gun was planted to command the principal street leading to 
the water-front through this part of the place, where there were many 
buildings burning and in ruins. 

During the afternoon the blue-jackets were re-embarked, and the ma- 
rines of the Superb, Inflexible, and Temeraire lauded in their stead. 

The patrolling of the city was begun, a company of Royal Marine 
Artillerymen, armed as infautry, marching through the Arab and Euro- 
pean quarters of Alexandria. They shot one or two natives caught in 
the act of setting fire to houses, and they shot three of the native police 
who were pillaging a house after having cruelly maltreated the door- 
keeper, an Arab faithful among the faithless. 

In the evening the marines were also landed from the Achilles and 
Sultan. 

The Inflexible, Temeraire, and the Achilles, an armored ship which 
arrived on the 12th, were stationed off Ramleh to command the land 
approaches to Alexandria from the southward and eastward. 

Of the events of July 14, Admiral Seymour says: 

Employed during the whole of the day landing as many men as we could spare from 
the squadron, and by evening we had occupied the most important positions. 
Appointed Captain John A. Fisher to take charge of the naval brigade. 

The fires had occasioned euormous damage in the European quarter, 
where had formerly stood many fine buildings, for the most part of 
French and Italian styles of architecture. The incendiarism was still 
going on. Not a street here was passable for any distance, all being 
more or less blocked by the smoking ruins of the fallen houses ; walls 
were still tumbling down, and the hot air was opaque with lime, dust^ 
and smoke. 

948 eg 6 



82 

Several ships of the Channel squadron having arrived, their marines 
were at once lauded. The entire city was now occupied. 

Alexandria being a walled town, the distribution of the force at Cap- 
tain Fisher's disposal was naturally governed by this fact, and was 
practically as follows : 

At the Ramleh gate were marines from the Monarch. 

At the Rosetta gate were marines from the Temeraire. 

At the Moharem Bey gate were marines from the Alexandra and 
Inflexible. 

At the Fort Kum-el-Dik gate were marines from the Sultan. 

At the Pompey's Pillar gate and Dead gate were marines from the 
Superb. 

At the Oaracol (B. on map) gate were marines from the Achilles. 

At the Gabarri railway station were marines and blue-jackets with 
Gatlings from the Alexandra. 

At the Zaptieh (A. on map) and the arsenal were marines from the 
Invincible. 

It was on this day that an armed force from the United States ships 
Lancaster, Nipsic, and Quinnebaug, composed of a Gatling gun and 
crew, a 3-inch B. L. R. and crew, and a company of marines, the whole 
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich, landed, occu- 
pied the United States consulate, and patrolled a large section of the 
European quarter of the town, extending to the Ramleh gate. The de- 
tails of this service and of the later service performed by Lieutenant 
Hutchins, are the subject of other official reports. 

On July 15, in view of a rumor that Arabi meant to attack the city, 
a large number of blue-jackets and marines with Gatlings were landed 
from the British ships, each, as a rule, reinforcing its own detachment 
ashore. The Minotaur's marines strengthened the post at the Ramleh 
gate, and her blue -jackets the weak part of the defense between Pom- 
pey's Pillar gate and Miniet-el-Bassal, the Alexandra's blue-jackets 
being stationed in the latter quarter to guard the bridge over the Mah- 
moudieh Cauai. It is now, however, believed that at about this time 
Arabi withdrew from the immediate neighborhood of Alexandria and 
encamped towards King Osman and Kafr Dowar, across the isthmus 
which connects the Alexandrian peninsula with the mainland. 

The police of the town was placed under the charge of Commander 
Lord Charles Beresford, of the Condor, with headquarters at the Zaptieh. 
To him all offenders were sent for investigation of charges and for pun- 
ishment. This as well as all subsequent action on the part of the British, 
whether by the army or the navy, was in the name and by the authority 
of the Khedive, and had for its aim the re-establishment of the latter's 
shattered power. 

On July 17 the 17th company of the Royal Engineers, 90 men, 
under Captain E. Wood, and the 1st battalion of the South Stafford- 



83 

shire Begiment (late 38th foot), 860 strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Thackwell, which had come from Malta, arrived in H. M. S. Northumber- 
land and were landed. The former went to Miniet-el-Bassal and began 
at once the work of improving and repairing the existing defenses. The 
technical details will be found in the section treating of the work done 
by the Boyal Engineers. 

The 38th marched to the Moharem Bey gate and relieved the marine 
sentries between Pompey's Pillar gate and the Barnleh gate. This relief 
was sadly needed, for the men were nearly tired out. No small part of 
their physical exhaustion was due to the attacks of insects, fleas and 
mosquitoes, which deprived them of proper sleep. Up to this time a 
few hundred men had held the city against a force estimated to be ten 
times as strong, and in the presence of an inimical and violent popula- 
tion. 

The troop-ship Tamar arrived at 2 a. m. of this day, having on board 
the marine battalions, 600 Royal Marine Light Infantry|under Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Ley, and 300 Royal Marine Artillery under Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Tuson. Jn the afternoon these troops were landed at Miniet-el- 
Bassal and took immediate charge of the western lines ; that is, from 
Pompey's Pillar gate to the Mahmoudieh Canal. 

These battalions formed the advance of the British expeditionary 
force, and Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K. C. B., had arrived 
to conduct their operations. 

On July 18 the 3d battalion of the King's Boyal Rifle Corps (late 
60th foot), 960-odd men, which had reached the outer roads the day 
before, in the Agincourt, were landed from that ship in a smaller trans- 
port, the Nerissa, by the same method as was employed in the disem- 
barkation of the 38th. The 60th went to Moharem Bey gate, relieving 
the posts of the 38th, which concentrated at the Bosetta gate. 

The land defense of the city was now definitely assumed by the army, 
assisted at the Bamleh gate by the marines from the Alexandra, Su- 
perb, and Temeraire, and elsewhere by the blue-jackets and their Gat- 
ling guns. The other bodies of marines landed from the ships were 
employed in patrolling and policing the town, being stationed as fol- 
lows : 

Bas-el-Tiu palace, half of Agincourt's party. 

Coast-guard station,* Sultan's party. 

Zaptieh, Monarch's party. 

Tribunal,! Minotaur's party. 

Caracol (O. on map), half of Agincourt's party. 

Caracol (B. on map), Achilles' party. 

Gabarri station, Inflexible's party. 

The whole of the marines now ashore were under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Legrand, B. M. L. L, who had come out from 

* Near the arsenal. 
t Diagonally across the street from the American consulate. 



84 

England for this purpose. These carried on the duty of constables, 
cases being tried at the Tribunal and Zaptieh, in the Rue Franque, and 
then sent to the arsenal for punishment. Strong measures had to be 
resorted to to keep the large population in order, especially in view of 
the great temptations aud opportunity for looting. 

Efforts were, however, made to secure a native police force as a sub- 
stitute, but the unsettled condition of things and the difficulty of getting 
trustworthy Egyptians rendered this a long and tedious process. 

It is impossible to give more than a general account of the work of 
the navy done ashore in and about Alexandria, for the number of men 
landed varied from day to day with the actual necessity or in accord- 
ance with the anticipation of offensive operations by the Egyptians. 
The term u naval brigade," as meaning a fixed organization, is, there- 
fore, incorrect in this instance. 

The matter of rationing these bodies of seamen and marines serving 
on shore was only difficult in the early days of the occupation, when 
wheeled and other transport was not easy to obtain and when the streets 
were blocked by debris. Each ship, therefore, at the outset kept its own 
landiug party supplied with food, the task being performed by those 
still on board. 

When the necessity of a more permanent and methodical arrangement 
became evident, a depot of supplies was established on shore, to which 
each ship contributed its quota. At this store, rations, as needed, were 
drawn by the several parties. The grog ration was maintained, and 
on occasion, after hard work, an extra " tot" was served out. It seemed, 
however, to be the experience of those officers best placed to judge, 
that an extra ration of cocoa was of more practical benefit than an 
extra ration of rum. 

The original landing parties carried two days' supplies in their haver- 
sacks. 

All hands were dressed in blue, and wore the blue cap, in its white 
cover, to which was attached a cape or havelock. 

The riflemen were equipped in heavy marching order, carrying their 
Martini- Henry rifles, sword-bayonets, and from LOO to 120 rounds of 
ammunition per man. 

The equipment of the British sailor landed for operations on shore is 
detailed in the section entitled u Tne Naval Brigade." 

To each gun's crew, 9-pdr. or Gatling, and to each infantry company 
landed at Alexandria was attached a mess-cook, and each detachment 
had two pioneers, carrying shovel, pick-ax, &c, four stretchermen, and 
a hospital steward. The subdivisions or pieces were commanded by 
sub-lieutenants or midshipmen, and the companies by lieutenants. 

Three 9-pdrs. were mounted in Fort Kum-el-Dik, as part of the per- 
manent defenses of the city, and were manned by blue-jackets from the 
fleet. 

After the advance of the army to Ramleh, the marine artillerymen 



85 

of the Inflexible Avere sent out to assist in mounting and working the 
guns there. 

Between July 18 and 26 the blue-jackets ashore were stationed at the 
Pompey's Pillar, Moharein Bey, and Rosetta gates, the Alexandra's de- 
tachment occupying the Basel-Tin peninsula. 

On July 26 the seamen from the Alexandra, Monarch, Sultan, and Su- 
perb went out to Ramleh, planting and manning six 9-pdrs., two 7-pdrs. 
and four Gatlings. This large detachment was under Commander 
Thomas, of the Alexandra, who was relieved a few days later by Com- 
mander Hammill, of the Monarch. 

On July 30 all the marines were withdrawn to their ships, but three 
days afterwards about 200 were again landed from the Alexandra and 
Superb. They were placed at Mex, under Lieutenant-Colonel Legrand, 
to guard that important outpost. On August 12 they were relieved by 
a company of the Royal Marine Artillery battalion. 

Immediately after the bombardment, the work of destroying the offen- 
sive capacity of the fortifications bearing on the sea was begun. Par- 
ties of men, mainly from the Hecla (torpedo-supply ship) and the Con- 
dor, destroyed the ammunition in the forts, throwing the powder and 
shell into the sea. Torpedo detachments from various ships wrecked 
the guns, all of which were thoroughly spiked. The light guns (6^-inch 
S. B.) were hove off their carriages and the rifled guns treated with gun- 
cotton. If the various plates giving views of these guns are studied, it 
will be seen that every one of the latter exhibits a slight bulge near the 
muzzle. The official report on this subject is, unfortunately, a confi- 
dential document, but it is believed that no gun resisted the detonation 
of a pound of gun- cotton placed about 18 inches inside of the bore. The 
result is a distortion sufficient to prevent the introduction of the shell, 
while the external appearance is only altered to the eye of the close pro- 
fessional observer. A much larger charge than usual must have been 
employed in the 8-inch gun at Oom el-Kabebe, whose muzzle is abso- 
lutely blown off. 

Hundreds of tons of gunj)owder were ruined, and scores of valuable 
guns rendered useless. The object or necessity of this destruction is 
hardly evident. 

The torpedo stores at Mex received a similar treatment. The cases 
were punctured freely with pick-axes. 

On about August 20 the defenses of Ramleh were strengthened by 
the mounting of three 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R. Two were taken from 
the Hospital Battery, and the third was found unmounted near Mex. 
Their position is given on Plate 45, at p. They were conveyed to 
their site by rail from the railway station at Moharem Bey, and skidded 
into place, the parbuckles being hauled on by a locomotive. The gun- 
platforms were constructed of heavy balks of timber, sided 8 inches 
by 10 inches, laid longitudinally and transversely. An auchor for the 
pivot-bolt was improvised by sinking a smooth-bore gun, muzzle up, in 



86 

the sand. The railway embankment was used as a parapet, the guns 
being mounted en barbette. The easternmost of the three guns was 
placed so as to command a long stretch of road, and therefore needed 
no lateral train. It was probably the one whose carriage truck had been 
injured on July 11. Its slide was lashed in place and backed by heavy 
timbers against the recoil. A pit was dug in the embankment and a 
rude magazine built in it, upright and cross timbers forming the sides 
and top. Sand-bags and earth were piled about it and above, as a pro- 
tection. 

This battery was brought up in answer to a 15 CI " Krupp gun mounted 
at King Osmau, Plate 44, but it was very little used, since it had the 
effect of drawing the Egyptian fire in the direction of the water tower 
and reservoir immediately in rear, serious damage to which would have 
been a real calamity. 

On a slight elevation back of the water tower were the other pieces 
in the naval battery, two 9-pdrs. on field carriages, firing through a 
low parapet of sand and sand-bags. This battery was manned by 
about eighty men, from the Inconstant, under Commander Parr. They 
lived in tents and had a regularly organized camp near their guns. 

The armed train is described elsewhere. 

On the water the navy was constantly engaged in landing troops and 
stores and in patrolling the approaches to the westward of Mex and the 
eastward of Eamleh. In the latter quarter, at certain points, the land 
is so low as to permit a ship anchored off the coast to throw her shell 
well up in the direction of Kafr Bowar. Never less than one iron-clad 
was kept here to prevent an advance from Aboukir or King Osman. 
The electric light was useful in the former connection. 

The navy, it will be seen, took a notable part in the passive defense 
of Alexandria, as well as in the various skirmishes and reconnaissances 
between Eamleh and Kafr Dowar. Its part in the reconnaissance in 
force of August 5, is contained in the account of that action given later. 

A fitting conclusion to this section is the testimony as to the effi- 
ciency of the aid rendered by the navy to the army, which is contained 
in the following letter: 

Eamleh, September 20. 
To the Chief of Staff: 

Sir: I have the honor to request that you will be good enough to bring to the notice 
of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt the excellent work performed on shore by the 
officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines during the period I have been 
in command at Alexandria. All requests from me for their employment on shore have 
been met with the utmost alacrity and good feeling by Admiral Dowell, C. B. The 
work performed by the several parties has been of an arduous and varied nature, but 
I particularize the following: Commander Haminett, R. N., with a party of blue- 
jackets from the Minotaur, landed on the nights of the 31st August and the 1st Sep- 
tember, and demolished by gun-cotton a house near our advanced posts on the canal, 
which afforded cover to the enemy. Commander Morrison, R. N., was relieved shortly 
after my assuming command by Commander Parr, R. N., whose men, under the direc- 



87 

tion of Lieutenant Scott, R. N., worked in a most praiseworthy and successful manner 
in mounting three 7-inch M. L. R. guns on the water-tower position. The sand being 
very heavy rendered the work most difficult. These guns were effectively used against 
the enemy's earthworks under the direction of Commander Parr and Lieutenant 
Wrey, R. N. It is right that I should add that Major-General Alison had, pre- 
vious to his departure, spoken to me of Lieutenant Scott's work in the highest terms 
of praise. We derived great assistance from a party of blue-jackets under Commander 
Henderson, who, with the twenty-first company Royal Engineers, all being under the 
command of Captain Puzey, R. E., repaired the rail between Kafr-el-Dowar and Alex- 
andria. The destruction of a heavy piece of masonry thrown up across the line 
demanded great exertion. The cutting of the Mex dam was an arduous piece of work 
performed by Lieutenant Scott, R. N., and a party of blue-jackets. They also built 
a retaining wall measuring 170 yards long, 12 feet broad at the top, aud 15 feet broad 
at the bottom. Good service was done by the Royal Marines while in garrison at 
Alexandria, under the command of Major French, R. M. A. 

I have, &c, 

EVELYN WOOD, 
Major-General, Commanding at Alexandria. 



IX. 

OTHER OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE CHANGE OF BASE.. 

In anticipation of the necessity of landing an armed force on Egyp- 
tian soil, the British Government had previously embarked the infantry 
and marine battalions, whose arrival at Alexandria has been already 
noted, and had sent the vessels conveying them to Cyprus, where they 
were to be held as a reserve in case of emergency. These troops had 
been summoned by Admiral Seymour to Alexandria shortly after the 
bombardment of the fortifications and the occupation of the town by 
the seamen and marines of the fleet. That they were not on hand to 
take possession of the place on the morning of July 12 is to be re- 
gretted. Had they , or indeed almost any member of men, greater than 
a mere handful, been landed at that time, the burning of the city, one 
of the greatest disasters of the age, would have been averted. It is so 
easy, however, to judge after the fact, that to many persons it is hard to 
understand that such an occurrence could have scarcely been foreseen, 
as a necessary consequence of the successful engagement of the forts 
and therefore as necessitating preparation on his part for the imme- 
diate disembarkation of armed men. Nor, in fact, does the discussion 
of the question properly belong to a report of this nature. Neverthe- 
less, viewed in the light of subsequent events, it conveys the lesson 
that, under similar circumstances, in the future, such prevision and 
preparation will be obligatory on the side of the attach to properly 
defend the interests of neutrals against the ravages of a semi-civilized 
enemy smarting under the sense of defeat. 

The role played by the British army at Alexandria was of a negative 
character, in the main consisting in an efficient if passive defense of the 



88 

city against the Egyptians encamped and intrenched at King Osman 
and Kafr Dowar. 

Possessing an ample port and exceptional dock facilities, Alexandria 
would have well served the purpose of a base in an advance into the 
interior, but certain strategic considerations relegated it to a position 
of minor importance. What those considerations were will transpire 
later. For the present, it is only necessary to study the needs of the 
defense and the measures taken to supply them. 

Referring to Plate 44, it will be seen that the city occupied a very 
exposed situation with an enormously long line to defend. At the 
eastern extremity of the Alexandrian peninsula were Aboukir and its 
nest of powerful forts, still in the hands of an Egyptian garrison of 
about 5,000 men. This garrison was in constant and direct communi- 
cation with the main body at Kafr Dowar. To command the approach 
from both of these quarters, possession of Ramleh was indispensable. 
The map, while indicating the location and general character of Lake 
Mariout (ancient Maroeotis), fails to show that it is a variable quantity, 
depending for its maximum depth upon the high water in the Nile, dur- 
ing the month of October, while in the summer its bed is a succession 
of shallow pools, quagmires, and dry places, and is readily passable in 
all directions by those familiar with it, so that the Egyptian army at 
Kafr Dowar was able at any time to march across it upon Alexandria. 
The approach would not have been attended by any special difficulty, 
for competent guides could have been secured by the hundred. 

The city walls on the southern side were in bad repair and were sur- 
rounded by villas, gardens, and villages which would have completely 
masked a night attack until too late to reinforce the point struck, while, 
at the southwestern part of the city, they had been removed to make 
way for the new suburb of Miniet-el-Bassal, where were the steamer 
docks and the Gabarri freight station. 

Eveu at this place the trouble did not cease. It was necessary to 
hold, as far as Mex, the strip of land which divides the harbor from 
Lake Mariout, if vessels were to enter and leave the port unmolested. 
The entire length of this line is between ten and eleven miles. At both 
ends of it the ships lent efficient aid, by their presence, but over the 
greater part nothing but troops could suffice. 

On July 24, Ramleh was seized and occupied. The following is the 
official dispatch on the subject sent by Sir Archibald Alison to the Sec- 
retary of State for War : 

July 24 — 11 p. m. 

Malabar, with one half battalion, arrived last night. At 3 o'clock this morning 
mounted infantry marched for the position in front; of Ramleh barracks [see Plate 
XLIX], which I intended to occupy at 6 o'clock. I followed by train, with Rifles 
[BCth], two 7-pdr. naval guns, and some sappers. On arriving at Ramleh, I found 
the ridge occupied by the mounted infantry. This ridge lies half-way betweeu the 
Khedive's palace on the sea and the Mahmoudieh Canal. It commands the bridge by 
which the Cairo Railway crosses that canal, and the point at which the canal, running 



89 

from Alexandria parallel to the sea, turns off at right angles inland towards Arabi's 
position. The key of this ridge is the tower of the Ranileh water-works, a strong, 
defensible building. I occupied this position at once with the Rifles, under Ashburn- 
ham, and guns, and established outposts at the railway bridge and in front of the 
canal bend. Shortly after we were in position, a small force of Arabi's cavalry, fol- 
lowed by infantry, advanced towards the railway bridge, within four hundred yards 
of the Rifles. After exchanging shots for some time, the cavalry retired rapidly on 
the Mahmoudieh Canal. The enemy's advance was more decided; considerable force 
of cavalry, with two horse-artillery guns, pushed on rapidly, the guns coming into 
action briskly ; infantry followed, and the movements of a considerable body of troops 
were observed upon the high ground behind. Arabi's attack was not pushed home, 
and the fire of his guns, brisk for some time, gradually died away. Firing ceased. 
There were no casualties on our side. 

This bloodless operation was the first encounter between the land 
forces on the two sides. 

The work of fortifying Eamleh was begun at once and prosecuted 
with vigor, for the force opposed to the British far outnumbered the 
latter at all times, and the need of the moment was to hold on until the 
army corps under General Wolseley, definitely ordered to Egypt on 
July 21, could be collected and transported to Alexandria. 

The measures taken to strengthen the position already seized at 
Eamleh can be readily comprehended by the aid of Plate 45. It may 
be well to mention that Eamleh is not a village or town, but a species 
of summer resort for the European residents of Alexandria, who have 
built houses and villas upon the sandy neck of lowland lying between 
Lakes Mariout and Aboukir on the one hand and the Mediterranean on 
the other. These houses are distributed over a length of several miles? 
and are mostly surrounded by high-walled inclosures, where with much 
effort in the direction of irrigation a few shrubs are made to grow. Be- 
tween these scattered country places the sand lies everywhere ankle 
deep. There is an occasional pretense of a road, like that, for instance, 
leading to Eosetta, but, generally speaking, communication between 
any two points is in the straightest possible line and through the sand. 

To supply the needed transit to and from the city, a private com- 
pany has built the Eamleh Eailway. This has no connection, material 
or otherwise, with the Egyptian Government lines. An incidental ad- 
vantage due to the occupation of Eamleh was the protection enjoyed 
by the Eamleh Eailway and by the other owners of property in this quar- 
ter. 

The water-works contain the pumping engines which deliver the fresh 
water for distribution from the Mahmoudieh Canal to the tower and 
reservoir just back of them on higher ground. These two points, the 
water- works and the water-tower, were the center of the defense. A 
strong detachment was always maintained at the former, while the 
headquarters were established at the latter. An elevation immediately 
in rear of the tower was strengthened, a trench dug, and a number of 
guns mounted, viz, five B. L. E. 40-pdrs. and two 12-pdrs. The maga- 
zine was sunk at n (Plate 45). At first, working parties ran a shelter 



90 

trench along the crest of the rising ground, and this was gradually 
converted into a musketry parapet 4J feet high. Emplacements for the 
40-pdr. and other guns were made, the platforms being of railway 
sleepers, and the parapets strongly revetted with sand-bags or timber. 
Small musketry redoubts were thrown up on the flanks of the position. 

To the east and west, at s and £, were intrenched infantry camps. The 
naval detachment was encamped at u. Their two 9-pdrs were mounted 
in the adjoining earthwork, while their 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R, 
were at p, near the water-tower. 

The extreme eastern picket was in a fortified house a mile and a half 
distant. Its object was to act as a feeler in the direction of Aboukir. 
It is not shown on Plate 45. Other pickets were established as in- 
dicated on the plan, where I I are shelter trenches ; j a small redoubt 
for musketry, and Jc the chief battery, mounting the guns already enu- 
merated. 

The Egyptians could advance from King Osman either by the road 
on the canal bank or that on the railway embankment. The outpost 
on the former line was called, and is marked on the plate, Dead Horse 
Picket ; on the latter, no regular picket was maintained beyond the 
iron railway bridge over the Mahmoudieh Canal, although vedettes were 
constantly thrown out in the direction of Mellaha Junction. 

As a barrier against a movement along the southern branch of the 
railway, that coming from the Gabarri station, a strong force was es- 
tablished at the Villa Antoniades on the canal, with strict orders to 
hold on, in the event of attack, whether reinforced or not. 

On Plate 45 is an enlarged view of this outpost, giving the details of 
the means employed to strengthen it. As a good piece of extemporized 
defense these means merit special mention. 

The men's tents were pitched on the roadway along the Mahmoudieh 
Canal, outside of the garden, the horses and mules being picketed at 
ft, a stable yard ; a is a tower utlized for signals and lookouts. From 
this point signals could be exchanged with headquarters at the Ramleh 
water-tower, while the view it commanded extended across the bed of 
Lake Mariout to King Osman, and swept on to the left to Ramleh. At 
b in the plan, inside of the entrance to the garden, was a semicircular 
breastwork facing the villa and reaching across the gateway. The front 
fence is of iron on a stone foundation. Upon the coping of the latter 
were piled stones, breast-high (see section), to make a shelter for rifle- 
men. At c was a stockade across the road, with an earthen parapet at 
the end adjoining the canal, where two B. L. R. 40-pdrs. were per- 
manently mounted on field carriages. These commanded the approach 
along the railway embankment. At d d are other stockades built across 
the road to protect the rear. At e e were temporary bridges across the 
canal. At I was a substantial palisade, a sort of tete-du-pont ; f was a 
deserted Arab village, the houses of which were loopholed and other- 
wise defended. A dry ditch was dug at m. On the roofs of the houses 



91 

were piled sand-bags for a breastwork, with a higher tier in rear to pro- 
tect the men against accidental reverse fire from the sharpshooters on 
top of the house n in the corner of the garden, g was an outlying house 
thoroughly loopholed and strengthened ; h h are shelter trenches, and 
i a redoubt where two 12-pdrs. were mounted during the day-time. 
These guns were withdrawn to the other side of the canal at nightfall 
and put at c, beside the 40-pdrs. 

The garrison at this point were composed of five companies of the 
Koyal Sussex Eegiment, 1st battalion (late 35th foot), under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hackett, and about 75 artillerymen. They managed their own 
transport, having a lot of Cyprus mules under their control, had good 
drinking-water from a well near by, and were able j;o supplement the 
army ration with milk, fruit, and vegetables brought in daily by natives. 
Under the shade of the trees on the bank of the canal, which furnished 
them with fresh water for washing and cooking, they were as comforta- 
ble as the flies and mosquitoes would permit, except for an occasional 
shell sent from King Osman by the largest Krupp gun at a range of 
8,000 yards. 

The general defense profited by the presence of the Mahmoudieh 
Canal, with its high banks, and by the railway embankment, which 
stretched from the Antoniades garden towards Ramleh. 

For night work an electric light was placed on the roof of a house at 
Fleming station, so as to illuminate the approaches from Aboukir and 
Kafr Do war. 

The following notes are by Captain E. Wood, commanding the 17th 
company Eoyal Engineers: 

The advanced posts were put in a state of defense. In some cases well-situated 
houses were selected; in others breastworks were constructed. Fascines of long reeds, 
picketed down with ribs of palm leaves, were used for revetting the interior slopes. 

Norton tube wells were driven, and wherever good water was found, wells from 
4 to 5 inches in diameter were sunk to depths varying from 8 to 20 feet. Light 
octagonal wooden curbs were used, behind which sheeting was driven. 

An infantry bridge 120 feet long was thrown over the Fresh-Water Canal one day. 
The water was only 3 feet deep, but the mud was so soft that a rod was easily 
pushed 6 feet into it. Some old boarded roofing was cut into squares of 6 feet. 
On these stout trestles were fixed, the wide bases preventing the piers sinking into 
the mud when the load came on. The shore piers were formed of tables found in 
neighboring cottages ; palm-tree logs were laid on the mud, the legs of the tables put 
astride of them and driven well home. 

Light pontons of canvas over framing of inch stuff were made, and a special super- 
structure with projecting ends, strongly braced, for rafting, was provided to suit the 
shallow muddy sides of the canal. The intention was to " track " the raft up the cen- 
ter of the canal by ropes on each bank, so as to use it as a floating bridge, or to 
complete the bridge from bank to bank by means of light composite beams (made by 
the sappers) thrown from shore piers; the materials for these piers would be carried 
on each bank by cart or otherwise. 

The company was moved before this scheme could be tried, but the want of it had 
been strongly felt when a reconnaissance against the enemy had been pushed on both 
banks of the canal. 



92 

Passing to the inner line of defeuse, the gates of the town were guarded 
by strong parties, and the 6J-inch S. B., mounted on the walls here and 
there, were manned, as well as the Gatlings. At the various gates 
draw-bridges over the dry ditch were fitted and the approaches mined. 
The mines of gunpowder were made of suitable metal cases, and were 
X^rovided with electric fazes from which the wires, concealed, passed 
inside the walls to a battery and firing key. 

Inside the town are two small old forts, Kum-el-Dik and Napoleon 
(Plate 1). These were garrisoned. The former commands the eastern 
approaches to the city, and mounts twelve 6J-inch S. B. (36-pdrs). In 
addition, were the three naval M. L. R. 9-pdrs. already mentioned. 

Fort Napoleon«is placed to overlook the directions southward and 
westward from the city as well as the harbor. It mounted six 6J-inch 
guns en barbette. It was of most value as a signal station, its position 
and elevation rendering it useful for speedy communication between the 
fleet and the troops on shore. 

These interior works supplemented the defense of the enceinte, of 
which the walls are high and bold. Outside of them runs a ditch from 
20 to 40 feet wide and half as deep. At the different gates the walls 
are thickened and guns mounted to sweep the road, while outside are 
advanced works on a large scale. 

Within the town, at the principal street corners, were plainly-marked 
sign-boards indicating, in English, the name of the street and the place 
or quarter to which it led ; and towards the southwestern part of the 
city, where walls are lacking, the streets were strongly barricaded. 
The barricades in the principal thoroughfares were so arranged that 
passage through them was possible at will. The bridge crossing the 
Mahmoudieh Canal at Miniet-el-Bassal was particularly defended, the 
barrier here being of iron plates with stone backing. A cob-work of 
stone surmounted the whole. 

The presence, within the walls, of a numerous and inimical popula- 
tion necessitated strong police measures to maintain a proper state of 
subjection, for the garrison was rarely more than from three to five 
thousand men, and much dependence had to be placed on a healthy 
morale on the part of the natives. 

Another serious menace lay in the shortness of the supply of water, 
for which Alexandria is almost exclusively dependent on the Mahmou- 
dieh Canal. The latter had been dammed by Arabi, soon after his evac- 
uation of the city, at a point near King Osmau. The water left in the 
canal below the dam, together with what might seep through it, and 
what was contained in the few wells and cisterns in and about Alexandria, 
was all that the inhabitants could rely upon. This stock was increased 
by large distillers ashore and afloat, but, even at best, the scarcity of 
this vital element was always felt as a present hardship and contin- 
gent calamity. The distribution of water was under military control. 
Towards the end of the war, the water was turned on, for the benefit 
of the residents, at certain points for a few hours every other day. 



93 

The monotony of the defense was broken by the arrival of new regi- 
ments, by occasional slight skirmishes, barren of results, and by sorties 
of the armored train. 

On August 5, however, a reconnaissance in force was made towards 
King Osman. The official telegraphic report by Major-General Alison 
follows: 

Alexandria, August 6 — 1.35 a. m, 

Persistent native reports existing for the last two days that Arabi was retiring from 
Kafr Dowar upon Dam an hour, I determined to make a reconnaissance which would 
ascertain clearly whether Arabi still held his original position strongly. For this pur- 
pose I directed a half battalion of the Duke of Cornwall Light Infantry and a half 
battalion of the South Staffordshire Regiment, with one 9-pdr. gun and the whole of 
the mounted infantry, to advance along the east bank of the Mahmoudieh Canal. 
The 60th Rifles, with one 9-pdr. gun, were to advance along the west bank. These 
constituted my left attack. They were to follow the line of the canal till they reached 
a house in a grove of trees towards the point where the railway coming from Cairo 
approaches nearest to the canal. Along this line of rail a strong battalion of marines 
was to come up in a train to Mellaha Junction, preceded by the naval armored train 
carrying one 40-pdr. and two 9-pdr. guns, a Nordenfeldt and two Catlings. The train 
was to stop at the Mellaha Junction. The marines were to detrain there and advance 
by the railway line, accompanied by the two 9-pdrs. and covered by the fire of the 40- 
pdr. from the train. The left column commenced its advance at a quarter to 5 in the 
afternoon from the out-picket station of the Ramleh lines, moving by both banks of 
the canal. It soon came into action with the enemy, who were strongly posted in a 
group of palm trees on the eastern side and a strong defensible house and gardens upon 
the other. These positions were carried. At this time Lieutenant Howard Vyse, of 
the Rifles, attached to the mounted infantry, and a soldier of the corps, were killed. 
The enemy then took up a second position half a mile in rear of the first, upon the east 
bank of the canal, among high crops and houses and behind the irregular bauks of the 
canal. From this position, also, the enemy was driven with great loss. 

I accompanied the right column myself, which followed what was the chord of the 
arc upon which the left column was moving. I placed the marines and the 9-pdr. 
guns, dragged by blue-jackets, to the west of aud under cover of the railway em- 
bankment, and moved them forward as rapidly as possible, and quite out of sight of 
the enemy engaged with Colonel Thackwell, with a view to cutting off their retreat. 
After a time our movement was perceived ; the enemy opened upon us with artillery. 
I pushed on as rapidly as possible till I came to the x>oint where the railway approaches 
nearest to the Mahmoudieh Canal. I then opened fire with musketry from the railway 
embankment upon the enemy lining the banks of the Mahmoudieh Canal. The two 
9-pdrs. were dragged up onto the embankment and came into action against the 
enemy's guns, the 40-pdr. firing over our heads against the point where the enemy's 
forces were beginning to appear. Fixing my right upon both sides of the embank- 
ment, I now threw forward two companies to carry a house near the canal, and fol- 
lowed up this movement by throwing some four companies still more to my left upon 
the banks of aud across the canal. I had now attained the position I wished, and 
formed a diagonal line across both the canal and the railway. The enemy fell back 
slowly before us. The fire of their 7-pdrs. and 9 cm guns, which they shortly after 
brought into action, was speedily got under by the fire of my artillery. The object of 
the reconnaissance on my part was attained. Desirous of inducing the enemy to de- 
velop his full power before withdrawing, I held my position for about three-quarters 
of an hour, until dusk was rapidly drawing on. I determined now to withdraw 
This movement was carried out with the most perfect regularity and precision by the 
Marine Battalion under Colonel Tuson. They fell back by alternate companies with 
the regularity of a field day. Every attempt of the enemy to advance was crushed by 



94 



the beautiful precision of the 40-pdr. and the steady fire of the 9-pdr. naval guns. 
The losses of the enemy seem to have been very great, and they were so dispirited 
that, contrary to the usual practice of Asiatics, they made no attempt to follow up 
our withdrawal. The guns and troops were quietly entrained at the Mellaha Junc- 
tion and slowly steamed back to Alexandria. At the same time, the left column with- 
drew along the banks of the canal to the Ramleh lines unmolested. 

As a reconnaissance, the success of the move was all I could wish. 

I regret to state that our loss has been somewhat heavy. It was especially so in the 
marine battalion and seamen under my immediate direction, who, I fear, have lost one 
man killed and some twenty wounded. In the left attack, as far as I have yet heard, 
there have been one officer and one private killed and six or seven privates wounded. 
The officer, I grieve to state, is Lieutenant Howard Vyse of the Rifles. He was one 
of the most promising officers I have ever met. Detailed lists of the killed and wounded 
will be telegraphed as soon as received. 

The following table gives the British loss in this engagement: 



Corps. 


Killed. 




Officers. 


Men. 








2 




1 






1 

1 

3" 


4 






20 









Total 


1 


27 







On the side of the defense, rumors were received afterwards that the 
losses had been very heavy. A Circassian, who made his way from 
Arabi's camp to Alexandria on August 9, stated that three officers and 
seventy-six men were killed and a large number wounded on this occa- 
sion. 

Beyond Mellaha Junction (see Plate 144), the ground between the 
canal and railway is occupied by native houses and gardens and is 
traversed in all directions by small irrigation ditches. Here were the 
outposts of the Egyptians, the point of attack. It was a place admit- 
ting of very thorough defense, and it gained in practical value on Au- 
gust 5, by the fact that the attack was divided, by the Mahmoudieh 
Canal, into two parts, which could only pass from one side to the other 
with great difficulty and at great risk. An enemy, on the alert, could 
liave routed the extreme left column before any assistance could have 
been rendered by its neighbors, the action taking place under the cover 
of the high canal banks. 

Four companies of the South Staffordshire Eegiment (late 38th foot) 
and four of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (late 46th foot), about 
800 in all, and the mounted infantry, numbering 80, formed the left 
attack. The mounted infantry were in advance; and six companies of 
the King's Koyal Bine Corps, about 500 strong, formed the center. To 
each of these two columns was attached a 9-pdr. naval gun on a field 
carriage, manned and served by blue-jackets under Commander Morri- 
son. The right attack fell to the combined marine battalions, 1,000 



95 

strong, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson, R. M. A. The blue- 
jackets numbered in all 200 men. 

In unofficial accounts of the action, reference is made to the inaccu- 
rate fire of the Egyptians, the majority of whose bullets passed harm- 
less overhead. This fault marks the Egyptian practice throughout the 
campaign. 

There appear to have been at least two distinct charges ; one by the 
advance of the Rifles and the other by the Marines. In both cases the 
Egyptians broke and ran, although enjoying excellent protection. In 
encounters with semi-civilized troops, cold steel has not yet lost its 
prestige. 

The tactics employed were the usual British formation for attack — 
about a third of each battalion being deployed in line at intervals of 
three paces, a second third 300 yards in rear as a support, and the 
remainder about the same distance again behind in reserve. 

The left wing had orders to seize a certain white house on the canal, 
but its commander, Lieutenaot-Oolonel Thackwell, of the 38th, mis- 
took the first white house reached for the one designated. In con- 
sequence, the left of the marines was uncovered, and the substantial 
benefits of the fight lost. Had the two wings joined, many prisoners 
would have been secured and two guns, if not more, captured. Signals 
were made to the left wing to advance, but the smoke of the battle and 
the failing light prevented their being read. 

The skill with which the blue-jackets did their part of the work is 
recorded in the official report quoted above. Their pluck is seen in the 
number of their losses, one being killed and four wounded out of 200 
men engaged. Their 9-pdrs., it must be remembered, were worked 
on the canal banks and railway embankment, and was entirely unpro- 
tected. 

It seems more than probable that Sir Archibald Alison could have 
continued the advance, headed by the marines, up to the main line at 
King Osman, had he been so desirous, for the Egyptians had refused 
to meet his men at short range, and had receded from point to point 
with alacrity. When the order was given to return, a battalion about 
300 or 400 strong, in front of the marines, was seen holding up a white 
flag in token of submission, but no time was left to take them as prison- 
ers. 

Beyond the moral effect on the attacking force of a successful brush 
with the enemy, the reconnaissance in force was barren of results. The 
strength of the Egyptians was neither developed nor ascertained, nor 
was the position held from which they had been driven. The balance 
of advantages seems to be negative; valuable lives were sacrificed, and 
the enemy regained the ground he had lost without suffering severely 
enough to be seriously affected. 

At this time, it is believed, the Egyptian force at Kafr Dowar and 
King Osman was made up of four regiments of infantry, one of cav airy 



96 

and several batteries of artilleiy, between 12,000 and 15,000 men in all, 
outnumbering the garrison of Alexandria at least four to one. 

To increase the defensive strength of the city an effort was made to 
flood Lake Mariout, whose bed is slightly below the level of the sea, 
by cutting a canal at Mex across the isthmus. The details are given 
in another report already made to the Department. The attempt re- 
sulted in failure. 

In other parts of Egypt little was done during the six weeks follow- 
ing the bombardment, except to gather a strong naval force at each 
end of the Suez Canal. At Suez, Rear- Admiral Sir William Hewett, 
Y. 0., commander-in-chief of the British squadrou in the East Indies, 
landed a force of 450 sailors and marines on August 2, seizing the 
town and protecting the valuable docks and the property of the Pe- 
ninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. He experienced 
no opposition, the place having been abandoned by the Egyptians, 
although in greatly superior force. His fleet there present comprised 
the Euryalus (flagship), a wooden-sheathed iron corvette of 18 guns 
and 400 men ; the Eclipse, wooden corvette, 12 guns and 200 men; the 
Ruby, composite sloop, 12 guns and 282 men; the Dragon, sloop, 6 guns 
and 140 men; the Mosquito, gun-boat, 4 guns and 60 men. 

The Penelope, on board of which Rear- Admiral Hoskins had hoisted 
his flag immediately after the bombardment, had gone to Port Said, 
where was also accumulating a considerable fleet. On August 5 the 
Agincourt, Monarch, and Northumberland, armored ships, the Tour- 
maline and Carysfort, wooden sloops, the Ready and Beacon, gun- 
vessels, &c, were at the northern end of the canal. The Don and 
Dee, iron river gun boats, arrived a few days later. The powerful light- 
draught iron-clad, the Orion, mounting four 25-ton guns, was sent to 
Ismailia, on July 26, where she was joined subsequently by the Carys- 
fort of 14 guns and 220. men, and the Cygnet, gun-boat. 

The lake (Timsah) was patrolled at night by a steam launch with 
an armed crew, which moved about twice in every watch. The Ori- 
on's electric light was also used during the first and mid watches for a 
space of about a quarter of an hour, from July 28 to August 20. Her 
electric-light apparatus consists of two C Gramme machines, driven by 
a Brotherhood engine, and two Mangin projectors, one with a plain 
glass front, while the other is provided with a vertical diverging lens 
which spreads the beam of light horizontally. 

The advance of the troops from England, the Guards brigade, com- 
manded by Major-General H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught, arrived 
in Alexandria on August 10 and 12 in the hired transports Orient, 
Iberia, and Batavia. It was composed of the 2d battalions of the 
Grenadier and Coldstream Guards and the 1st battalion of the Scots 
Guards. The general commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force, 
Sir Garnet Wolseley, reached Egypt on August 15 in the Calabria. 
Other transports were coming in rapidly, and everything pointed to 



97 

an immediate advance upon King Osman and Kafr Dowar. It had, 
however, been determined, long before, to seek a base in another quar- 
ter, and Alexandria soon reverted to its previous condition of quiet 
waiting, in which it was only disturbed by occasional night attempts 
by Bedouins to spike the British guns, and by infrequent and result- 
less skirmishes. 



X. 

THE COMPOSITION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 

The troops dispatched to Egypt by England formed an army corps 
of two divisions. 

Each division was composed of two brigades of infantry (four battal- 
ions each), besides certain other detachments from various corps which 
went under the general designation of "divisional troops." The divis- 
ional troops are under the immediate control of the division commander, 
and are intended to make the division an independent military unit in 
the event of separate action. In this case they included two squadrons 
of cavalry, a spare battalion of infantry, two field batteries of artillery, a 
company of royal engineers, a commissariat and transport company, one 
half of a bearer company (aids to the wounded), a field hospital, a field 
post-office, and a veterinary department. 

Besides the two divisions, are various other bodies of men known col- 
lectively as "corps troops," under the direct orders of the commander- 
in-chief or his chief of staff. These consisted of a cavalry brigade, with 
its battery of horse artillery, its commissariat and transport company, 
its half of a bearer company, and its field post-office ; of the corps artil- 
lery, two field and one horse batteries and the ammunition column; of 
the siege train, of the ordnance-store department, of the royal engi- 
neers, of the military police, of the veterinary department, of the com- 
missariat and transport corps, of one-half of a bearer company, of four 
field hospitals, and of the general post-office. 

Two additional battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery were 
sent out for garrison duty at Alexandria. 

These troops were reinforced in the field by the Indian Contingent, 
by the two battalions of marines, and by various detachments of sea- 
men from the fleet. 

Convenient depots were established at Malta and Cyprus, where 
were assembled various bodies of the different corps to be drawn upon 
as occasion demanded. 

At Gozo, the island adjoining Malta, and at Cyprus, large and com- 
modious hospitals were formed. 

The details of this disposition are shown in the accompanying tables. 

It must be borne in mind, however, that the troops thus described 
were not used together in accordance with the plan given on paper, but 
948 eg 7 



98 

were distributed according to circumstances by the commander-in-chief 
Thus, for instance, the 4th brigade, under Major- General Sir Evelyn 
Wood, was left at Alexandria when the base was changed to Ismailia, 
and its place filled at Tel-el-Kebir by a scratch brigade under Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Ashburnham. 

It may be remarked, in explanation, that in the British army the sup- 
plying of forage and rations falls to the Commissariat and Transport 
Corps: that of all military stores to the Ordnance Store Department. 

The following were the principal officers in the expeditionary force : 

General commanding -in-chief. — General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, G. C. 
B., G. C. M. G. 

Chief of the Staff.— General Sir John M. Adye, K. C. B., E. A. 

Officer commanding Boyal Artillery. — Brigadier-General W. H. Good- 
enough, R. A. 

Officer commanding Royal Engineers. — Brigadier-General C. B. P. N. H. 
Nugent, C. B., R. E. 

Provost Marshal. — Colonel H. G. Moore, V. C. 

Senior Commissariat Officer. — Commissary- General E. Morris, C. B. 

Senior Ordnance Store Officer. — Commissary-General of Ordnance H. 
A. Russell. 

Principal Medical Officer. — Surgeon-General J. A. Hanbury, M. B., 
C. B. 

Command of base and lines of communication. — Major-General W. Earle, 
C. S. I. 

1st Division. — Lieutenant-General G. H. S. Willis, C. B. 

1st brigade. — Major-General H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught, &c, &c. 

2d brigade. — Major-General G. Graham, V. C, C. B., R. E. 

2d Division. — Lieutenant-General Sir Edward B. Hamley, K. C. M. 
G., C. B., R. A. 

2d brigade. — Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K. C. B. 

4tth brigade.— Major-General Sir H. Evelyn Wood, G. C. M. G., K. C. B. 

Garrison of Alexandria. — Major-General G. B. Harman, C. B. 

Cavalry Division.— Major-General D. C. Drury-Lowe, C. B. 

1st Cavalry brigade. — Brigadier- General Sir Baker C. Russell, K. C- 
M. G., C. B., A. D. C. 

Indian Contingent.— Commanding, Major-General Sir Herbert T. 
Macpherson, V. C, K. C. B. 

2d Cavalry brigade. — Brigadier-General H. Williamson. 

Infantnj brigade. — Brigadier-General O. V. Tanner, C. B. 

The accompanying table gives the details of the force sent from Eng- 
land and Malta. That of the Indian Contingent will be found under 
another head. 



99 



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104 

SUMMARY. 



Troops. 



First division. 



Officers. Men 



Second division. 



cers. Men. 



Infantry : 

1st (or 3rd) brigade 

2nd (or 4th) brigade 

Divisional troops : 

Cavalry 

Infantry 

Royal Artillery (12 guns) — 

Royal Engineers 

Veterinary department 

Commissariat and transport 

Army Hospital Corps 

Field hospitals 

Post-office department 

Divisional staff 

Add warrant officers 



93 
123 



2,303 
3,058 



185 

4 

208 

71 



Total 



329 



521 



123 
106 

13 

30 

14 

6 

4 

3 

5 

16 



336 



3,076 
2,938 

287 
961 

398 

185 

4 

211 

72 

90 

3 

41 

14 



280 



SUMMARY OF CORPS TROOPS. 



Troops. 



Officers. 



Men. 



Cavalry brigade: 

Cavalry brigade staff 

Cavalry 

Royal Horse Artillery (6 guns) . 
Commissariat and transport . . . 

Army Hospital Corps 

Postal department 

Add warrant officers 



Total 

Corps Artillery 

Siege train 

Ordnance-Store Department. 

Corps Engineers 

Military police 

Veterinary department 

Chaplain's department 

Commissariat and transport . 

Army Hospital Corps 

Field hospitals 

Post-office department 

Add warrant officers 




8 

1,598 

175 

218 

71 

2 

5 



104 


1,877 


31 


695 


18 


56 L 


10 


150 


32 


751 


4 


138 


10 


10 


13 


8 


45 


560 


5 


72 


32 


180 


3 


35 





48 







Total corps troops. 



307 



ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS. 



Royal Marine Light Infantry 
Royal Marine Artillery .'. 

Total marines 



50 



1,006 
450 



1, 456 



The following are the totals of the principal corps. In the infantry 
is included the Royal Marine Artillery battalion, which was armed as 
a foot detachment. 

Officers and men. 

Infantry - 15,642 

Cavalry 2,304 

Artillery (including siege train) 2, 435 

Engineers 1> 161 

Commissariat and Transport Corps 1, 298 

Army Hospital Corps 313 

Army Medical Department 429 



105 

If to these is added the reinforcement of the Indian Contingent, the 
whole number of men landed in Egypt is found to be in the neighbor- 
hood of 35,000, while about 6,000 more were on their way or in reserve 
at near points. 



XI. 

TEE SEIZURE OF TEE SUEZ CANAL AND TEE CEANGE OF BASE. 

The British operations in Egypt were formally legitimized through 
the passage by Parliament, on July 28, of the bill granting £2,300,000 
sterling for the expense of the expedition. At the moment of which 
this report now treats the state of affairs may be briefly summarized 
as follows: 

The British had a foothold at Alexandria and at Suez, besides strong 
naval forces at Port Said and Ismailia. The Suez Canal was still 
open to traffic, vessels coming and going through it as usual, unmo- 
lested. Egyptian detachments held Port Said and Ismailia, in the in- 
terest of Arabi Pasha, who had been declared a rebel by the Khedive. 
These two ports were the only maritime places of importance to the 
attack. With the exception of Suez and Alexandria, the whole of Egypt 
lay in the possession of Arabi and his followers. It was known that 
these amounted to between 50,000 and 60,000 regulars, including the 
reserves, besides numberless volunteers generally spoken of vaguely as 
Bedouins. 

The ends which General Wolseley had to accomplish were three in 
number: first, to crush Arabi's forces; second, to seize Cairo and save 
it from the fate which had befallen Alexandria; third, tore-establish 
the Khedive's authority. The last, while politically embracing the two 
former, was, in a military sense, their necessary outcome, 

Referring to the map of Lower Egypt, Plate 47, it will be seen that 
€airo is at the apex of the delta, a district roughly 110 miles on each 
side of the triangle which it forms. Through this district run the two 
principal branches of the Kile, which separate a few miles below Cairo, 
and which serve as the main arteries of trade and of a vast system of 
irrigation canals and ditches. The banks of these canals and the rail- 
way embankments are the roads of this country, where wheeled vehicles 
are practically unknown outside of the larger towns. These embank- 
ments could have been readily utilized as formidable intrenchments. 
To engage Arabi in the delta would have been folly. Possessing an 
intimate knowledge of this network of dikes and water-courses, he 
could have avoided or sought battle at his own convenience, securing 
for himself the most advantageous conditions, and, if defeated, could 
have either retired to other and similar positions, or have carried on a 
prolonged and harassing guerrilla warfare, trusting to the high water 
in the Nile, now rapidly rising, to flood the ground in front of the Brit- 



106 

ish, and to defeat them by the malarial fevers which are the concomi- 
tant of the overflow. He could thus have retreated at comparative 
leisure, destroying all European property as he withdrew, and, if forced 
up the Nile Valley, leaving behind him a mass of smoking ruins to 
mark the site of Cairo. 

The French under Bonaparte in 1798 had marched from Alexandria 
to Damanhour and up the left bank of the western or Eosetta branch 
of the Nile to Cairo; but this route could only have been followed by 
General Wolseley after taking or turning the fortified lines at Kafr 
Dowar, and it was open to the further objections that along it Arabi 
could not be forced to fight in the open, and that a wide, deep, and 
swift river, almost devoid of bridges, lay between it and Cairo. 

The chances and probable results of a direct advance from Alexandria 
had been fully considered, and even before he left London General 
Wolseley had determined upon his plan of campaign, which involved the 
use of Ismailia, on the Suez Canal, as a base of operations. He hoped 
to be able to induce Arabi to fight a decisive battle at some point in the 
desert where the Egyptians could be absolutely crushed, and then to 
push on from that point, whatever it might be, and occupy Cairo. This 
probability of a fair fight in the open was in fact the main object to be sub- 
served by the selection of this route. As secondary advantages, how- 
ever, were, first, the relative proximity to Cairo of the base, 96 miles dis- 
tant by rail over this line, as compared with 127 miles from Alexandria ; 
second, the existence of a railway susceptible of easy defense, for the 
transportation of supplies from the base ; third, the greater salubrity 
of the desert region ; fourth, the possession of a well-sheltered inland 
harbor where the operation of disembarking could be conducted without 
interference from gales of wind or heavy surf. 

The precautions taken to keep the plan a military secret were thor- 
oughly successful. It was allowed to be understood that a combined 
attack on Aboukir and its forts was in course of preparation, and every 
facility was given to newspaper correspondents to obtain such details 
as might prudently be made public without exciting too much suspicion 
as being merely a ruse de guerre. In the mean time, General Wolseley 
and Admiral Seymour, in full accord, were busily employed in making- 
all the necessary arrangements for the transportation of troops to Is- 
mailia and the seizure of the Suez Canal. 

On August 18, several transports, with troops on board, steamed out- 
side the harbor of Alexandria and anchored off the Bogzha Pass. De- 
tailed instructions were issued for bombarding the forts at Aboukir and 
for landing the soldiers, as well as for a simultaneous advance on Arabi's 
left at King Osman. The troops selected for embarkation were the 1st 
division under Lieuten ant-General Willis, C. B. The 1st brigade of this 
division was composed of three battalions of the Guards. The 2nd brig- 
ade was incomplete at this time, only the 2nd battalion of the York and 
Lancaster Regiment (late 84th foot) and the 1st battalion of the West 



107 

Kent Begiment (late 50th foot) having arrived. This deficiency was 
made good by the marine battalions and the 3rd battalion of the Rifles ► 
On Saturday, August 19, the various transports moved to the eastward 
in a fleet escorted by the Inflexible, Minotaur, Superb, and Temeraire, 
and anchored in regular lines, according to a prearranged plan, in Abou- 
kir Bay, at 3.30 p. in., the men-of-war being nearest the beach. The troop- 
ship Euphrates, with the Duke of CorD wall's Light Infantry, the Bho- 
sina, with the Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion, and the Nerissa, 
with the Rifles and the Royal Marine Artillery battalion, pushed on to 
Port Said. These transports experienced singularly bad luck, the last 
two breaking down en route. The delay lesulting was not serious, for 
their escort, the Alexandra, towed the Nerissa at the reputed rate of 
twelve knots an hour, while the Euphrates helped the Rhosina. Alter 
dark these vessels were followed by the other transports, which left 
Arabi and Aboukir, in a military sense, dans Vair. On arriving at 
Port Said the next morning, they found the entire Maritime Canal in 
the hands of the British navy. 
The official reports descriptive of this operation are quoted at length. 

H. M. S. Penelope, 

Port Said, August 23, 1882. 
Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of my proceedings after I left 
Alexandria in the Iris, on the evening of the 16th instant, with the plan of operations 
agreed on between Sir Garnet Wolseley and yourself: 

2. I arrived at Port Said the next morning (Thursday) at 10 o'clock, and immedi- 
ately sent the Nyanza, condenser steamer, with tents, provisions, and 100 men of the 
Northumberland, to Ismailia, as a reinforcement to Captain Fitz Roy. 

3. On Friday morning, the 18th instant, Captain Fitz Roy joined me from Ismailia, 
and after discussion with him I gave him the accompanying orders with reference to 
the occupation of that place. 

4. I also arrauged for the occupation of Port Said by Captain Htnry Fairfax, of 
H. M. S. Monarch, to whom I gave the instructions appended. 

5. On Friday evening I brought in two companies of the battalion of Marines froin 
the Northumberland and placed them on board of the Monarch and Iris. 

6. M. Victor de Lesseps, who is the working head of the canal company at Ismailia, 
came on board on the 17th instant and entered into a long discussion, presenting a 
series of arguments against any possible intention on our part to disembark in the 
canal, and disputing the grounds of my intimation that I considered Ismailia, both 
town and port, to be Egyptian. He left with the conviction, I feel sure, on his part, 
that we, sooner or later, should use the canal for a military purpose, while I had 
imbibed a conviction that no remonstrance on our part would induce Count Ferdi- 
nand de Lesseps to willingly accept the position and withdraw his opposition to our 
doing so. 

7. I considered, therefore, that to insure the safe passage of our troops it was abso- 
lutely necessary that the barges and dredges, &c, should be occupied along the whole 
line of the canal to Ismailia ; and, further, that it was most desirable that the Kantara 
telegraph station should be seized and our through telegraphic communication be 
restored, while Arabics communication with Syria should be stopped. 

8. For this duty I selected Commander H. H. Edwards, of H. M. S. Ready, as an 
officer thoroughly conversant with the canal, and in whose judgment I had confi- 
dence. 

9. He started at 8 p. m. on Saturday evening, the 19th instant, taking the necessary 
telegraphists, and left the parties told off for each post as he passed up. 



108 

10. At the same time I brought in the remaining three companies of the battalion 
of Marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, from the Northumberland, and towards 
daylight transferred them to the Ready and Dee, with two launches from the Penelope, 
to facilitate their landing on arrival at Ismailia. 

11. The Falcon, which had just arrived from Alexandria, was sent an hour before 
sunset on the 19th to an anchorage off the coast halfway between Port Said and Ghe- 
niil. and the Northumberland anchored during the night off Ghemil Fort, the object 
being to check an exodus of the Arab coal-heavers from Port Said, and to create an 
impression that our intention was to attack that work. 

12. About 4 o'clock a. m. on the 20th the movement was executed simultaneously 
along the line with complete success, the rebels being completely taken by surprise; 
telegraphic communication was restored between Ismailia, Kantara, and Port Said, 
and the Syrian telegraph was under our control. It was found, however, that the 
latter had been previously disconnected. 

13. On your arrival in the Helicon, about 8 a. m. on the 20th, I had intended to pro- 
ceed at once to Ismailia to reinforce Captain Fitz Roy who was exposed to the possi- 
bility of attack by a large force of enemy moving down on him by rail. 

14. Circumstances, however, as you are aware, necessitated my remaining at Port 
Said to see the 1st Division of Transports into the canal, and by their entering I 
was precluded from going on for some time in my flagship. When night fell, there- 
fore, I went up to Ismailia in a picket-boat, and arrived about 4 a. m. 

15. I immediately landed and joined Captain Fitz Roy and inspected the position 
he had taken up. It appeared to me to have been admirably chosen, and the works 
thrown up for the protection of our men by Captain Stephenson's party, with the 
advantage of Major Fraser's, R. E., advice, to have been thoroughly satisfactory. 

16. It is known that three trains full of soldiers were moved down by the rebel general 
from Tel-el-Kebir with the view to attempt to retake the place, bathe was deterred 
from making an attack, probably by the shell-fire on the Nefiche station, and after 
some time spent in observation of our position, the trains ran back in the direction 
from whence they came. 

17. I would here draw your particular attention to the effective fire maintained by 
the Orion and Carysfort on a position which could only be seen from the mast-head 
of the latter at over 4,000 yards' distance ; a fire by which a train standing on the rails 
at the station was twice struck, and the carriages and trucks secured for our own uses. 

18. I inclose reports from Captains Fairfax and Fitz Roy and Commander Edwards, 
of their respective share in the operation, and desire to express my sense of the judg- 
ment, zeal, and ability shown by them in the performance of the difficult and delicate 
duties which devolved on them. I have, &c, 

A. H. HOSKINS, 

Bear-Admiral. 
To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., &c, 

Commander-in- Chief, Mediterranean. 

P. S. — My report would not be complete without my mentioning that I employed 
Captain Seymour, of the Iris, on the delicate duty of securing the canal company's 
office at Port Said, and in preventing any information being conveyed through it to 
their other stations, or to the rebels, a duty which was performed, as have all others 
on which I have employed Captain Seymour, entirely to my satisfaction. 

The following brief note contains the instructions from the Rear- 
Admiral to Captain Fitz Roy, of H. M. S. Orion, upon which the latter 

seized Ismailia: 

H. M. S. Penelope, 
Port Said, August 18, 1882. 
Memorandum. 

Some time before daylight on Sunday morning next you are to land the available 
force under your command at Ismailia, and proceed to occupy the town, which you 



109 

are to hold until you are reinforced, which will probably be at the latest within 
twenty-four hours. 

It is of the greatest importance that the telegraph office, both of the canal company 
and the Egyptian Government, should be seized at once and all telegrams prevented 
from passing. 

The waste- weir to the westward of the upper lock should also be seized at once, and 
held, if possible, until the troops arrive. As this is under the fire of the guns at. 
Nefiche, intrenchments should be thrown up as soon as possible to cover the men. 

You are to use your own discretion as to supporting this movement with the fire of 
the ships, but you will bear in mind that it is most desirable that no injury whatever 
should be done to the town of Ismailia or its inhabitants by any measures which you 
adopt yourself, and you should use every means in your power to prevent it on the- 
part of others. 

The Staff Commander of the Orion should be ready to place any ship arriving with 
troops in the best berths for them to occupy, with a view to the disembarkation and 
their draught of water. 

From the ^verbal communication we have had, the support you may expect from 
myself and Sir William Hewett is made fully known to you. 

In the event of your being attacked by a superior force of the enemy, you are to use 
your own discretion as to falling back upon the ships. 

Any i>ersons attempting to set fire to the houses should be at once shot. 

A. H. HOSKINS, 

Bear- Admiral.. 

To Captain R. O'B. Fitz Roy, 

H. M. S. Orion. 

The orders to Captains Fairfax and Seymour, charged with similar 
work at Port Said, the execution of which would occur in the presence 
of Kear- Admiral Hoskins, were more detailed : 

Penelope, at Port Said, 

August 19, 1882. 
At 3.30 a.m. on Sunday next, the 20th instant, Port Said is to be occupied in the 
following manner : 

2. The direction of operations will be under Captain Fairfax, of H. M. S. Monarch. 

3. The landing party will consist of — 

From H. M. S. Monarch, 100 seamen, small-arm men, 18 [«.] Gatling gun's crew, 48. 
Royal Marines, 1 Gatling gun. 

From H. M. S. Iris, 80 seamen, small-arm men, 18 [a] Gatling gun's crew, 28 Royal 
Marines, 1 Gatling gun. 

From H. M. S. Northumberland, battalion 200 Royal Marines. 

Total, 180 seamen, small- arm men, 36, Gatling-gun crews, 276 Royal Marines, 2 Gat- 
ling guns. 

Total strength, 492 men and 2 Gatling guns. 

4. The Iris' seamen and marines will at once proceed to the outskirts of the town 
by the Quay Eugenie (Plate LIT), and take the right of the line, to extend from the 
sea to Lake Menzaleh, between the European and Arab towns, i. e., from the right of 
the Rue du Nord to the beach. 

5. They will be followed i i mediately by the company of the Battalion of Marines 
from the Iris, who will turn to the left at the Rue de 1' Arsenal, and form round the 
north angle of the barracks. 

6. The Monarch's seamen and marines will form on the wharf opposite the ship and 
march by the Rue du Nord to the Consulate, which the marines will take charge of, 
posting sentries. The blue-jackets will continue on the same line of street, and form 
on the left of the Iris men, extending to Lake Menzaleh, and detaching a party to 
guard the reservoir and its neighborhood. 



110 

7. The Battalion Company of the Royal Marines of the Monarch will form on the 
left of the above on the wharf and march after the advance to the south corner of the 
barracks, taking care not to extend into the Rue de l'Arseual, so as not to be in the 
way of the fire of the Iris' detachment. The Egyptian troops are to be summoned to 
lay down their arms and then marched down to the wharf. 

8. One Gatling gun will accompany the advance of the Iris, and the other the Ma- 
rine Battalion Company of the Monarch to the entrance of the barracks. 

9. A sergeant's party is to be kept on the wharf to prevent any attempt being made 
to lire the custom-house, round which sentries are to be posted. 

10. The Khedive's Governor, now in the Poona, will be on board the Penelope, and 
land directly the occupation is effected, and aid in the maintenance of order with the 
police who are known to be loyal. 

10 a. Arrangements are to be made to send the breakfasts on shore, with anything 
else that may be wanted, at about 7 a. m. The men are to have a meal of cocoa be- 
fore landing. 

11. Care is to be taken that men do not land with loaded rifles, or load without 
orders, and it is to be impressed on all the landing party that no firing is to take place 
without orders, and that it is of the greatest importance to preserve amicable relations 
both with the white inhabitants of all nations and also with the Arabs, on whom we 
are dependent for the coaling of the ships. 

12. A guard must be placed by the Iris over the governor's house at the earliest 
opportunity. Arabi's Governor, Rouchdy Pasha, is to be received as a friend if he 
surrender himself. 

13. It is very desirable to secure the Bimbashi,* if possible, and Major Tulloch,t 
with an interpreter and a small party of picked men, will endeavor to effect this. 
Prisoners should be put on board the Iris when the Governor has been consulted as to 
who should be released and who retained as such. 

14. Marines will laud in blue with helmets, seamen in blue with white cap-covers. 
As soon as possible, a change of white clothing and hats for the seamen should be 
sent on shore, and strict attention is to be paid to their appearance on parade and 
their general tone and bearing. All defaulters are to be sent at once on board the 
Monarch. 

A patrol of trustworthy men under an officer is to be told off at once for the main- 
tenance of discipline amongst our own men, and such patrols as may be necessary to 
support the Egyptian police must be forthcoming immediately the occupation has 
taken place. Major Tulloch will be good enough to attach himself to the Governor 
pro tern, in order to insure requirements for the maintenance of order being promptly 
made known to Captain Fairfax or the officer deputed by him. 

Captain Seymour will carry out independently my private orders to him. 

Captain Fairfax will act as Military Commandant of Port Said during my absence 
until the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief is known. 

A. H. HOSKINS, 

Rear- Admiral. 

To Captain Henry Fairfax, C. B., A. D. C, of E.M. S. Monarch, and 

Captain Edward H. Seymour, of H. M. S. Iris. 

For the work to be done in the canal itself, between Port Said and 
Ismailia, the following instructions were given to Commander Edwards 
by Rear- Admiral Hoskins : 

Penelope, at Port Said, 

August 19, 1882. 
Commander Edwards, of H. M. S. Ready, will start soon after dark this evening with 
boats containing one company of the Northumberland's lauding party. 

* Military commandant. t Military A. D. C. to the commander-in-chief. 



Ill 

He is first to occupy the dredges, putting on board of each an officer and 15 men to 
prevent any communication with the shore ; and to insure each dredge being kept close 
to the bank out of the way of passing ships. Four days' provisions are to be put on 
board with each party. 

Having done this and given his orders to the officers, he is to proceed to Kantara 
and seize the telegraph office and both the Egyptian and Canal Company's wires, and 
allow no message to pass through till he is certain it is made either by us or in our 
interest. 

Having done this, he is to take steps to insure all the ships in the canal between 
Port Said and Lake Timsah bound north, i. e., to Port Said, being gared.* 

Sir William Hewett, at Suez, has been instructed to allow no ship to enter the canal 
on Saturday; therefore it may be assumed that there will be found no ships on the 
other side of Lake Timsah. 

DETAILS OF OPERATION. 

The following force will leave Port Said soon after nightfall, under Commander 
H. H. Edwards, who will have charge of the operations, viz: 3 officers and 35 men 
of H. M. S. Northumberland ; 4 officers and 56 men of H. M. S. Penelope ; total, 7 officers 
and 91 men. 

On proceeding up the canal 1 officer and 15 men are to be placed on board of each 
dredge met with, with orders to get her in to the bank as close as possible, or, if close, 
not to allow her to be moved. 

The officers and men of the Northumberland are to be landed at Kantara, with the 
telegraph clerks, who will accompany them and carry out the instructions given 
them. 

The remaining officers and men of the Penelope are to be kept ready to occupy any 
gave which may require it. 

All steamers met with bound northward, if gared, are to be ordered to remain so. 
If under way or secured to the bank of the canal, to make fast immediately in the 
next gare. At the same time a dispatch boat is to be sent back past the next gave to 
warn following vessels not to pass the gare. Until the vessel going north has gared 
they should make fast to the bank. 

The party of 1 officer and 10 men to be sent in a boat to occupy the gare station 
until this has been done, returning in the boat. 

For this service, a picket boat (Northumberland's), a torpedo boat (Iris), a steam 
cutter (Tourmaline's), and steam pinnace (Monarch's), will be appropriated. 

A. H. HOSKINS, 

Bear- Admiral. 

In obedience to these orders just quoted, the whole length of the 
canal was secured by the British. 

The occurrences at Port Said are thus described in an official report 
by Captain Fairfax, of the Monarch : 

H. M. S. Monarch, 

Port Said, August 21, 1882. 
Sir: In pursuance of your orders dated the 19th instant, that at 3.30 a. m. on the 
20th I was with the force named in the margin t to occupy the town of Port Said, and 
if possible, to surprise and capture the soldiers, whilst in the barracks and before 
they had any time to commit any acts of incendiarism, I made the following disposi- 
tion of the force under my command : 

The canal is, so to speak, a single-tracked road. The gares are the turnouts or 
sidings, where the floor of the canal is widened so that ships may pass each other. 
Gaiing is the operation of hauling out of the fairway, which is thus left clear, 
t Already detailed in Rear- Admiral Hoskins' orders. 



112 

1. Lieutenant A. Cook, R. N"., with Iris' naval brigade, a Gatling gun and a company 
of the Royal Marine battaliou, under the command of Captain R. P. Coffin, R. M. L. I. r 
were to land abreast of the Iris and double down tho beach, the company of ma- 
rines turning down the street in which the barracks are situated, and halting imme- 
diately opposite them, the men from H. M. S. Iris advancing along the beach till they 
reached the narrow neck of land which separates the European from the native town,, 
there to place sentries across from the sea to the road that passes down the center of it, 

2. Commander T. F. Hammill, with two companies of seamen from the Monarch, 
was ordered to land abreast of the ship, and doubling through the southern part of 
the town (leaving half a company to protect the block of buildings in which the 
British consulate is situated), to push on to the neck of land and form a line of sen- 
tries from Lake Menzaleh to the road, thus completing with the Iris men a chain of 
sentries right across from the lake to the sea, and barring escape from the town. 

3. The company of the Marine battalion under Captain F. M. Eden, R. M. L. I., and 
a Gatling from the Monarch under Lieutenant Charles Windham, R. N., were to proceed 
up the center of the town and halt on the other side of the barracks to that occupied 
by the other company of marines. 

4. Arrangements were made that the force should fall in with the least possible 
noise so as not to alarm the sentries on the quay. A lighter was planked over, and 
after dark placed alongside the ship ; this a few minutes before landing was hauled to 
the shore, and with the launch formed a tloating bridge over which the m*»n were able 
to pass. 

5. The Khedive's Governor, who had been living on board the P. & O. steamer, came 
on board the Monarch at 3 a. m. and landed with me. 

6. Major Tulloch, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (who gave me mnch valuable infor- 
mation and assistance), landed with six marines and secured three out of four sentries 
on the quay. 

7. At 3.30 commenced landing, and succeeded in getting on shore without obser- 
vation, and all the arrangements made werecarried out in every particular. I \va» 
accompanied by Major James W. Scott, R. M. L. I., commanding the two companies 
of the Royal Marine battalion, who posted his men in such a way that escape from 
the barracks was impossible. 

8. The soldiers, who when we arrived appeared to be asleep, were ordered to sur- 
render. Shortly after 160 fell in and laid down their arms. 

The Governor having addressed them, they swore allegiance to the Khedive, and 
his excellency then requested that I would permit them to return to their barracks, 
but two officers were arrested and sent on board H. M. S. Iris. 

9. On Monday afternoon I received a request from the Governor that I should make 
prisoners of the soldiers, as he found that they were leaving the town, and some were 
trying to incite the Arabs against the English. I therefore ordered two companies 
to arrest them in barracks, where only 52 were found. They were marched down to 
the quay, where they were embarked and sent off to H. M. S. Northumberland. 

10. I am much indebted to Commander T. F. Hammill and Major J. W. Scott, R. M. 
L. I., for the able way in which they executed my orders, the silent and orderly man- 
ner in which the work was done contributing very much to the success of the under- 
taking. 

11. The conduct of the officers and men landed gave me entire satisfaction. 

I have, &c, 

II. FAIRFAX, 

Caplain. 
To Rear- Admiral Anthony H. Hoskins, C. B., &c, 

Senior Officer. 

It may be well to add here that the Monarch had been so moored in 
the canal, off the town, that her forward turret gnus commanded the 
main street leading to the quay, while the Iris was to seaward of the 
Monarch where she could shell the beach and the Arab town. At 11 



113 

p. m. Saturday night the ship's company were called on deck and warned 
that they would be landed at 3 a. m. Strict silence was enjoined. This 
order was so carried out that the people on board of the French iron- 
clad La Galissoniere, moored astern of the Monarch and to the same 
buoy, knew nothing of what was going on. 

Of the arms surrendered by the garrison of Port Said but one piece 
was loaded. The military commandant was absent and all the Egyptian 
sentries were asleep at their posts. The place was held by the ships' 
marines and blue-jackets until September 16, when they were relieved 
by 200 Koyal Marine Light Infantry and 100 Eoyal Marine Artillery who 
came out from England. 

The work done in the canal between Port Said and Lake Timsah is 
thus detailed by Commander Edwards : 

H. M. S. Ready, at Ismailia, 

August 22, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to report my proceedings in carrying out your orders dated 
19th August, in connection with the occupation of certain points on the Suez Canal. 
Learning that it was very important that the dredger stationed at the ninth mile 
should be secured, I placed Lieutenant Davies, of the Penelope, with 20 men in charge 
of her. Proceeding up the canal, I informed all vessels bound to Port Said, also the 
gave keepers, that it would be necessary for the ships to remain in gave until they 
received further instructions. I detached Sub-Lieutenant Blomfield in Tourmaline's 
steam-cutter with six additional hands, to insure the above instructions being com- 
plied with, having previously obtained a promise from the English shipmasters that 
they would obey them. After occupying Kantara as instructed, I detached Lieutenant 
Barnes-Laurence in Iris' torpedo boat to insure the canal being kept clear. He reports 
that on his return to the gart at Kilometer No. 34, he found the Messageries Maritimes 
steamer Melbourne leaving, aud that on remonstrating with her captain he was in- 
formed that the steamer should only be stopped by armed force, and that the first man 
stepping on board would be the signal to let go the anchor and leave the ship in his 
hands. 

Lieutenant Barnes-Laurence not considering that his instructions warranted the 
use of force, left to report to me, and sent the Tourmaline's steam cutter to warn ships 
coming up from Port Said. 

Shortly after leaving, he observed the British steamers Ross-shire and Counsellor 
weigh and follow the Messageries steamer, upon which he chased them and compelled 
them to haul into the next gare, and having cautioned the masters, who reiterated their 
promise, he left to rejoin me. Mr. Blomfield informed me on his return that directly 
the Iris' torpedo boat was out of sight the English ships appear to have again left 
the gare, as he met them steaming down the canal at a point where it was useless to 
stop them. The other duties assigned to the party under my command were all punc- 
tually executed, and on Sunday, the 20th instant, all who could be spared were em- 
ployed lightening the steamer Kaiteur, aground in the canal, but she could not be 
moved. 

In conclusion, I beg to express my thanks to all the officers, especially Lieutenant 
Barnes-Laurence, of the Iris, Sub-Lieutenant R. G. H. Blomfield, of the Tourmaline, 
and Mr. A. H. Freeman, midshipman, of the Monarch, for their zealous attention to 
my orders, also my great satisfaction with the behavior of the men during nearly 48 
hours of continuous hard work. 

I have, &c, 

H. H. EDWARDS, 

Commander. 

To Rear- Admiral A. H. Hoskins, C. B., 

Second in Command. 
948 EG 8 



114 

To the casual reader of Commander Edwards' report it would seem 
that Lieutenant Barnes- Laurence was less deserving of commendation 
than of a court-martial. His unwillingness to accept the responsibility 
of stopping the French steamer Melbourne might have frustrated, as it 
certainly did delay, the execution of a strategic plan upon which de- 
pended the success of the whole campaign. 

The most important place to be seized was Ismailia, while the prox- 
imity of a large armed force of Egyptians rendered the task dangerous 
in the extreme. As elsewhere, the landing of the British was com- 
pletely unexpected and almost unresisted. The operations at this point 
are given in Captain Fitz Roy's official report, as follows: 

Orion, Lake Timsah, 

August 21, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that in accordance with yonr secret orders of the 
18th instant I took possession of Ismailia, the Arab town, and advanced sufficiently 
towards Nefiche to cover the weir. 

The force landed consisted of 565 officers and men, comprising 40 marines, one 
9-pounder gim's crew, one Gatling, a torpedo engineer party, and 12 riflemen from 
Orion, one Gatling and one rifle company from Northumberland, and one 7-pounder 
gun, Coquette's landing party, with 21 Royal Marine Artillery of Northumberland 
and Carysfort, under Captain Stephenson, C. B., including a company of marines 
under Captain Gore ; also 100 seamen and marines from the Nyanza, troop-ship, belong- 
ing to the Northumberland. 

The enemy were known to have a strong picket at Arab town, several patrols, and 
a guard at Ismailia, about 2,000 men and six guns encamped at Nefiche, and a con- 
siderable number of Bedouins in the neighborhood. 

At 3 a. m., in perfect silence, the Orion's and Coquette's men landed, the Carys- 
fort's shortly following, and advanced. The silence was so perfect that Commander 
Kane surrounded the lock guard before we were discovered. The lock guard fired 
their rifles and so did our men, and here Commander Kane was wounded by a rifle 
bullet on the left cheek. 

The governor's guard laid down their arms to Lieutenant Lenox Napier and the 
Royal Marine Artillery, under Lieutenant Swinburne. No further resistance was 
experienced in the town. Commander Kane seized the railway and telegraphs, the 
Orion's men the canal-lock bridge, town generally, and government house (with the 
governor), where I established my headquarters. 

Captain Stephenson and his party had slight skirmishing in advancing, and in 
Arab town some of the enemy were killed. The ships, at 3.40 a. m., bombarded the 
guard-houses at Arab town, firing five rounds of shell each. By 4 a. m. the whole 
place was occupied as ordered. By intercepted telegrams and reports, I ascertained 
the enemy were making arrangements to forward a large force to Nefiche to at once 
attack Ismailia and the ships. Considering this, the small force at my disposal, 
and that the inhabitants were getting alarmed, I determined to dislodge the enemy 
from Nefiche and destroy their camp and any trains running; therefore Orion and 
Carysfort commenced a slow bombardment at 11 a. m., at a distance of 4,200 yards. 
By noon the camp was destroyed and enemy retreating towards Cairo; also one train 
running south severely hit and stopped for a time. The bombardment was stopped 
for a short time, but at 4 p. m., as another train was seen arriving and discharging 
men from Cairo way, it was continued, wrecking the train, jamming and apparently 
overturning trucks on the line, driving every one away, and from the position of the 
train on the Suez line, completely blocking Arabi's communications with his forces 
between Nefiche and Suez by railroad. This was most satisfactory. The squadron 
was in charge of Commander Moore, Lieutenant Royds having charge of the Carysfort 



115 

and her guns, under Commander Moore's orders. Her mast-heads were the reconuoi- 
tering and lookout places. The bombardment then ceased until 10 p. in., after which 
shells were fired at Netiche, at intervals of half an hour, until daylight, to prevent 
the railway being cleared and to check troops coming by train from the west. My 
position was still an anxious one. At 6 p. m. 340 marines arrived, 200 reinforced 
Commander Kane, 140 Captain Stephenson, who had, with the assistance of Major 
Fraser, intrenched himself in advance of Arab town. Lieutenant Napier had secured 
his admirable position in the Khedive's palace, and I reinforced him with 20 seamen 
of Northumberland and an officer. I have since heard that on this afternoon Arabi, 
with 3,000 men in three trains, did advance to within a few miles of Nefiche, but re- 
tired again. During the night the search lights were worked as necessary. 

At 10.30 p. m. General Graham arrived with the advance guard of the army, rein- 
forced the different positions, and assumed military command. 

I was directed to retain command in Ismailia until 4 p. m. the 21st August, 1882, 
when Sir Garnet Wolseley relieved my guards. 

At 8 a. m. to-day I sent a Gatling gun and crew, under Lieutenant Adair and Lieu- 
tenant King-Harman, torpedo engineer party, with General Graham, to occupy Ne- 
fiche, where they now remain. I have also a steam cutter and the jolly-boat work- 
ing on the Fresh Water Canal to Nefiche. 

The officers and men did their work perfectly. I have to thank Captain Stephenson, 
Commander Kane, Commander Moore, Major Fraser, R. E., Lieutenants Napier, Royds, 
and King-Harman (who destroyed the railway approaches to my west front in two 
advanced positions) ; also my first lieutenant, Cross, who had, Avith a gun, charge of 
the canal bridge and town approaches specially. 

Seven prisoners, Arabi's soldiers, were taken near lock bridge and Arab town, sent 
on board Orion for two days, and, being disarmed, were allowed to proceed on shore. 

I had every reason, on the evening of the 20th August, 1882, to expect a night attack 
in force, so I placed the Ready and the Lee, that had arrived with the marines, close 
inshore in position that would cover a retreat on our part through the town. 

Captain Stephenson brings to my notice the services of Lieutenant Langley, the 
senior lieutenant of the Carysfort, with the landing party. I have great pleasure 
in also specially mentioning this officer to you. Captain Stephenson forwards a letter 
from Major Fraser, R. E. 

I have the honor to inclose herewith a report from Captain Stephenson. 

Major Fraser's report will follow. 

I have, «fec, 

ROBT. O'B. FITZ ROY, 

Captain. 

To Rear- Admiral Anthony H. Hoskins, C. B., 

Senior Officer. 

Captain Stephenson thus describes his particular share in the land- 
ing: 

Carysfort, at Ismailia, 

August 22, 1882. 

Sir : In accordance with your confidential memorandum, I landed with the force as 
per margin* at 3.30 a. m. of the 20th, leaving Lieutenant Thomas, H. M. S. North- 
umberland, with 13 small-arm men in charge of the telegraph station on the pier. 
I advanced with a strong advanced guard in skirmishing order, under Captain Gore, 
R. M. L. I., over the canal bridge, through European, native, and Arab towns, meet- 
ing no opposition. 

* Seventy-four small-arm men; 1 field gun's crew, 12 men; 1 Gatling gun's crew 
15 men; 24 pioneers, &c.,74 marines, 2 captains, and aid-de-camp; total 201. 



116 

2. Having taken possession of Arab town, I immediately loopholed it and threw up 
intrenchments under the guidance of Major Fraser, R. E. 

The Egyptian picket retiring was fired upon by the Gatling and 9-pounder guns. 
Two of the picket were killed, one carrying a Remington rifle, but no ammunition. 

3. About 8 a. m. three Egyptian mounted officers galloped towards our intrench- 
ments from Netiche, waving a flag of trace. They stated that they came to place 
themselves under my protection, and, receiving their swords and horses, I sent them 
under escort to you, and now forward their swords. 

4. About 10 p. m. General Graham, C. B., V. C, arrived with 300 of the 50th Regi- 
ment under Colonel Tyler, whom he placed under my command for the defense of this 
outpost. 

5. About 8 a. m. of the 21st, I advanced with the force under Major-General Gra- 
ham, with two Gatling guns, on Netiche, which was occupied without opposition r 
leaving the Gatlings for the defense of the railway bridge. I then returned to Isma- 
jlia, and embarked two small-arm companies and the 9-pounder field gun, in accord- 
ance with your orders. 

6. In referring to this service it is my pleasing duty to report the satisfactory behav- 
ior of all under my command. Intrenching the outpost under a burning sun was 
most trying, and I regret the death of A. Wager, ordinary seaman, from sun-stroke^ 

I would especially like to mention the name of Major Fraser, R. E., who was of 
great assistance in fortifying the Arab town ; Captain Gore, R. M. L. I., belonging 
to H. M. S. Northumberland, and Lieutenant Langley, senior and gunnery lieutenant 
of this ship, whose untiring zeal and energy deserve my best thanks. 
I inclose a report and sketch of the position from Major Fraser, R. E. 

I have, &c, 

H. F. STEPHENSON, 

Captain. 
To Captain R. O'B. Fitz Roy, 

Senior Officer, Ismailia. 

The engineer officer who had been sent to act under the orders of 
Captain Fitz Roy was the brigade major of the Corps Engineers. His 
account is of value as further elucidating the situation, and as indicat- 
ing the technical measures taken to improve the defenses of Ismailia. 
It is proper to state that where the town ends the desert of light sand 
begins at once. Major Fraser's report runs as follows : 

Ismailia, August 26, 1882. 

Sir : Having been detailed to accompany your force in taking Ismailia, I submit 
the following as to the part I took under your orders : 

The enemy being at Netiche with a force of all arms, it was to be expected that 
in the first instance he would resist us at the Arab village west of Ismailia. 

Your force of 200 men, viz, 150 small-arm men, one 9-pounder and one Gatling, hav- 
ing reached the bridge at the water- works about 4 a. m., I took some skirmishers for- 
ward so as to gain and secure the front for the main body, which came up by the 
canal. 

On moving into the open, a number of people appeared on our right front, and as 
a security I took, by your orders, a party of small-arm men and posted them on the 
bank in front of the bridge. 

After a little firing we found we were not attacked, and then organized the de- 
fense of the village. 

The village consists of low houses of sun-dried bricks, generally only one story high, 
with flat roofs and garden walls. There is a good east foreground towards Nefiche, 
but to the north and west it is more undulating. 

The garden walls were cut down, houses loopholed, lateral gaps, and gaps to the 
rear formed where required. The upper rooms of the few two-storied houses were 



117 

loopholed so as to give a double tier of fire, and the ends of streets were closed by 
shelter trenches. The gun and Gatling were intrenched with sand or sun-dried brick 
parapets, and platforms were made of doors. The spirit bottles were smashed in the 
grog shops, and the windows made defensible by filling up with boxes of wood con- 
taining sand. The sailors' cutlasses proved most useful for loopholing walls, and the 
shovels we took out enabled us in an hour or two to be in a state to resist serious at- 
tack. After some hours' labor we could let the men rest and feed. 

Before sunrise, Arabi Pasha must have learned of our landing by telegraph from 
Nefiche. 

Our information from all sources made i' appear probable that an attack in force 
would be made before we could be reinforced; it was therefore desirable to induce the 
Arabs to postpone the attack. 

Finding telegrams arriving from Cairo to the traffic manager, Ismailia, inignorauce 
of our arrival, I telegraphed in his name to the war minister at Cairo to say 5,000 Eng- 
lish were already on shore and asked him to inform the authorities. He acknowledged 
receipt and said he had done so. 

An officer, stating himself to be the chief of staff of Arabi's forces in the district, 
having come in to surrender, strongly advised the bombardment of Nefiche by the 
ships to prevent attack. This was done, and the effect was to cause the retreat of 
three trains of troops that approached Nefiche aud the abandonment of a fort at 
Nefiche, a very remarkable result, considering the place was only seen from the tops, 
and the range was 4,000 yards. 

In the afternoon I opened communication by placing two canal boats across the Sweet 
Water Canal, stern to stern. 

In the fighting line itself a party of Royal Marine Light Infantry held the shelter 
trench by tlie canal, where also was the signaling station. The marines also held the 
group of houses by the railway, and the blue-jackets held the remainder. 

In the evening, having been reinforced by some 140 marines (Royal Marine Artillery), 
they were posted along the high canal banks as a support for our fighting line. 

At night we posted sentries 300 to 400 yards to our frout and went rounds, and 
in the early morning Major-General Graham came in with part of his brigade and 
bivouacked in our rear. 

In conclusion I would draw your attention to the very efficient and willing man- 
ner in which all of your party did the work of intrenching, and the aptitude they 

showed for such work. 

I have, &c, 

T. FRASER, 
Major, Brigade Major B. E. 
To Capt. H. F. Stephenson, C. B., 

Commanding H. M. S. Carysfort. 

It is well to add, as a matter of professional detail, that the eighteen 
men composing the Gatling gun's crew of the Orion were armed with 
the Martini- Henry rifle; that they carried two days' provisions in their 
haversacks, and 120 rounds of ammunition distributed as follows: One 
large pouch or ball bag, with 40 loose rounds, and two small pouches 
each containing 40 cartridges in package. The dress was blue serge 
with straw hats aud regulation leggings. Later on, the men improvised 
puggeries. They had no tents. The other Gatling guns' crews were 
armed according to rule with cutlasses and revolvers. These and the 
9-pdr. guns' crews (of eighteen men usually) carried 36 rounds of pistol 
ammunition. In the .gun limbers were eight shell, twelve shrapnel, 
and four case-shot. This supply was subsequently increased to 75 
rounds, of pistol cartridges, all told, by addition sent to the front, while 



118 

the Gatlings had each 1,200 rounds with two spare eases of 680 car 
tridges each under the limbers. With each party went four stretcher- 
men armed with swords, eight spare-ammunition men similarly armed, 
two signal-men with kit, armed with swords and revolvers, an armorer 
with sword, pistol, and sack of tools, and two pioneers, one carrying a 
shovel slung over the left shoulder, a pick-ax in hand ; the other, a 
saw, file, and hand ax slung over the shoulder, and a felling-ax in 
hand. Each pioneer was armed with a bill-hook, saw-backed sword, 
and revolver. 

The lauding was effected at the central wharf. A large lighter had 
been secured and on it were placed the Northumberland's and a portion 
of the Orion's party, about 250 in all. They seized the wharf and main 
avenue up to the canal lock. The first lighter was followed by a smaller 
one with the balance of the Orion's men. 

The "torpedo party," under Lieutenant King-Harman, was composed 
of ten blue-jackets and nine artificers. They carried with them gun- 
cotton disks and the necessary electrical apparatus for their detonation. 
This party pushed on in the darkness, covered by a company from the 
Northumberland, and blew up the railway just behind the " canal de 
ceinture," about 500 yards from the station, using two 9-ounce disks of 
gun-cotton fired by a platinum wire-bridge fuze (25 grains of fulminate 
of mercury), insulated wicks, and a portable battery of three Leclanch6 
elements. This done, and railway access to Ismailia being pre vented, 
they retired to the town again. 

The shelling of Nefiche was a case of firing at a target invisible from 
the gun. As described by Lieutenant Langford, R. N., who directed 
the operation on board the Orion, under Commander Moore, the method 
appears to have been very simple. From the masthead an angle was 
taken between the ship's head and Nefiche station, just visible, and the 
gun was trained accordingly by the marks on the racer or training track- 
In this line of sight was a small bush on the low sand-hill to the west- 
ward of the lake, which gave the gun-captain a permanent point at 
which to aim. The distance was pricked off from the chart and the ele- 
vation subsequently corrected by watching the fall of the shot. The gun 
used was a 12-inch Armstrong M. L. R. of 25 tons, with common shell 
weighing 500 pounds, and time-fuzes cut to 14 seconds. 

Fifteen rounds were fired from the Orion, the last being at 8 a. m. of 
August 21. The same methods were adopted on board the Carysfort 
with similar but lessened results, due to the smaller size of her guns, 
the largest being 7-inch M. L. R. 

In the southern half of the canal from Lake Timsah to Suez the events 
of the day were on a smaller scale, but none the less interesting. It 
will be remembered that Suez had been in the possession of the British 
navy for nearly three weeks, and that the advance of the Indian Con- 
tingent, the 1st battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders (late 72d Foot), 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell, had come up from Aden where 



119 

they had been previously quartered. The following is the report of 
Kear-Admiral Sir William Hewett. the commander-in-chief of H. M. 
naval forces in the East Indies, the bulk of whose squadron had ren- 
dezvoused at the southern end of the Maritime Canal : 

Euryalus, at Suez, August 21, 1882. 
Sir: On Friday last, the 18th instant, I had the honor of receiviug, through Rear- 
Admiral Hoskins, C. B., a copy of the plan of operations in the Suez Canal, agreed to 
between yourself and Sir Garnet Wolseley, and your telegram of the 17th instant gave 
me authority to act on it. 

2. Immediately put in train the work to be carried out at Suez, and telegraphed to 
you that your instructions had been received and would be complied with. 

3. In the course of the same afternoon the rebels were observed intrenching them- 
selves in our front, and movements of Bedouins on our left flank also called for atten- 
tion. I consulted with Brigadier-General Tanner, C. B., who commanded the troops, 
and we agreed that the Naval Brigade would be too weak to hold the place by itself 
if attacked by a large force, such as we knew to be in our vicinity. I therefore, with 
the concurrence of the brigadier-general, telegraphed to you that 100 of the Seaforth 
Highlanders would be detained at Suez until the arrival of the troops from India. 

4. Later on, Captain Hastings, whom I had sent in the Seagull to reconnoiter the 
banks of the canal, returned with a report that showed the information sent me from 
time to time by Captain Fitz Roy of the movements of the enemy in our direction to 
be fairly correct ; and the Brigadier-General then agreed with me that it would not 
be prudent to send any of the Highlanders away without previously reconnoitering 
the neighborhood, for, as I have already stated in my telegram, the collection of mili- 
tary stores at Suez represented a considerable value, and a matter of still more serious 
consequence was the fact that the town had recently become crowded with women and 
children, Copt Christians, who had sought refuge at Suez from the brutalities of the 
surrounding Bedouins. 

5. On Friday night I caused the telegraph wires to be cut between Suez and the 
first canal station, and on Saturday morning notices were issued that from that date, 
the 19th instant, until the prohibition was formally removed, no ships or boats would 
be allowed to pass into the canal from the Suez side without my special permission. 
The damage to the wire on the above occasion was soon repaired, but on the following 
night I caused the poles which conveyed the line across the creek close to the com- 
pany's offices to be cut down, and placed a guard over them to prevent their being 
restored. 

At the time when it was decided to retain the Highlanders the regiment was already 
on board the Bancoora. This was on Saturday night, and their disembarkation on 
Sunday must have had a very puzzling effect upon the officials of the canal company 
and others who were interested in our movements. It must also have had the happy 
effect of qualifying any reports that may have reached the rebels that our troops were 
about to enter the canal. 

6. On Sunday morning at daylight 400 Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stockwell, were disembarked from the transport and marched 8 miles in the direction 
of Chalouf to make a feint attack in our front. Brigadier-General Tanner, C. B., 
accompanied this force, and at the same time I sent my flag captain, Captain A. P. 
Hastings, in the Seagull, with the Mosquito in company, and 200 of the Seaforth High- 
landers, to Chalouf by the Maritime Canal. 

7. The party under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell returned to Suez at about 4 p. m. 
without having touched the enemy; but later in the day Captain Hastings returned 
in a steam pinnace to report very successful operations from the gun- vessels. It appears 
that the first that was seen of the enemy along the canal was a small cavalry patrol 
about 3 miles this side of Chalouf, and on arrival at Chalouf his presence in forc« was 
only discovered by a few heads appearing over the railway embankment on the other 



120 

side of the Sweet Water Canal, this embankment forming a natural intrenchment 
behind which it was afterwards discovered there was some 600 infantry ready to resist 
oar advance. These men were extremely well armed and accoutered, and had a plen- 
tiful supply of ammunition with them. 

8. The manner in which the position was taken reflects the highest credit on Cap- 
tain Hastings, and I recommend him to your favorable notice. 

- 9. The coolness and dash of the Highlanders and the excellent fire from the ships' 
tops seem to have been the chief causes of success, and the conduct of all concerned 
appears to have been in every way creditable. 

10. I consider that credit must be given to Lieutenant-Colonel H. Helsham Jones, 
R. E., for the fact of there now being fresh water at Suez. Opening the lock gates 
above the point occupied, kept the canal below full, notwithstanding the waste which 
took place through a breach made by the enemy in the banks of the canal, which has 
since, however, been repaired by a company of the Madras Sappers. 

11. I am in hopes that the action taken at Chalouf will do much to secure the safety 
of the canal, and as the Indian forces are now arriving, the Highlanders will go to* 
Serapeum to-morrow. 

12. I beg to recommend to your favorable notice the officers mentioned by Captain 
Hastings in the accompanying letter. 

I have, &c, 

W. HEWETT, 
Bear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station. 
To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., 

Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. 

Captain Hastings' account of the occurrences in the Maritime Canal 
on the August 20, is as follows : 

H. M. S. Skagull, 

At Chalouf, August 20, 1882. 
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of my proceedings in command 
of the force* (as per margin) dispatched this day from Suez to secure the Fresh 
Water lock at Chalouf. 

2. On my arrival off the place, which is distant 15 miles from Suez, on the west bank 
of the Maritime Canal, there were at first but few signs of the enemy's presence ; there 
was no camp visible, and the first indication we saw of them was a few men's heads 
showing over the embankment of the railway on the other side of the Sweet Water 
Canal, which lay between us and the position the enemy occupied. This embank- 
ment, forming as it did a natural intrenchment, concealed a force of about 600 infan- 
try, and in the distance we saw from 40 to 50 cavalry patrolling in the direction of 
Suez. 

3. I first landed the Highlanders and the landing parties of the Seagull and Mos- 
quito without field guns, and then opened fire from the tops of the ships, which were 
armed as follows : 

Seagull: In foretop, a 7-pounder boat-gun; in maintop, a Gatling gun. Mos- 
quito: In foretop, a Gatling gun. 

For some time there was no reply to our fire, but presently we got a volley from 
the left which left no doubt as to the enemy's position. 

Previous to this, Captain Lendrum had occupied the lock with G company of the 
Seaforth Highlanders, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Helsham Jones, R. E., to whom I 
am much indebted for his valuable advice and assistance throughout the day, find- 
ing the gates open closed them, and so kept the Suez end of the canal full of water. 

*H. M. S. Seagull, Commander Mather Byles; H. M. S. Mosquito, Lieutenant and 
Commander the Honorable F. R. Sandilands, and 200 Seaforth Highlanders, commanded 
by Major Kelsey. 



121 

Had this not been done, it is needless to say that the canal would have soon emptied 
itself. 

Major Garuett's company and the men of the Mosquito now searched the village 
between the Fresh Water and Maritime Canals, where the firing was coming from» 
the advance of this party being protected by the small-arm companies of the Seagull 
and the remaining companies of the Highlanders, under Brevet Major Fergusson and 
Captain Hughes-Hallet. 

Previous to this the skiff of the Mosquito had been transported to the Fresh Water 
Canal, and I sent Lieutenant E. Eae, of H. M. S. Seagull, to the opposite bank in her 
to examine the enemy's movements. 

By this time Major Garnett had passed the village, which was found to be deserted, 
and had pushed his men across the canal by means of a boat obtained by Lieutenant 
H. G. Lang, of the Highlanders, who in a very plucky manner swam the canal and in 
the face of a hot fire procured it from under the opposite embankment. 

Sub-Lieutenant W. O. Story and the men of the Mosquito accompanied the High- 
landers, and the fire from this party was now so hot that the enemy was soon dis- 
lodged from his position. 

Another boat having been procured by Assistant Paymaster Thomas E. B. Rogers 
of H. M. S. Seagull, from the lock end of the canal, the remainder of the ships' land- 
ing party and the Highlanders were likewise crossed over the water and the enemy 
was soon in full retreat. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, R. E., accompanied me with his party. 

Some of the fugitives took the line of the railway, others went straight into the 
desert, while a few fled to a hill to the rear of their line, where they were eventually 
surrounded by Captain Hughes-Hallet and made prisoners of. 

At this point was captured a 7-pounder brass field piece of French make, from 
which two rounds had I teen fired before being seized. We now ceased firing and 
proceeded to embark onr prisoners. The enemy's loss was about 100 killed (includ- 
ing three officers, one of whom was the officer in command) and 62 prisoners, out of 
which 27 are wounded, and we have captured a large number of Remington rifles, 
with quantities of ammunition and stores. 

The enemy fought with bravery, but their shooting was most inferior, and, owing 
to this latter defect, I am happy to say there are only two casualties on our side, 
viz, Benjamin Davis, A. B., Euryalus, one of my boat's crew who accompanied me, 
slightly wounded, and Joseph Fernandez, wardroom steward of the Seagull, one of 
the stretcher party, severely wounded. Besides the above, I regret to say Corporal 
Hind and Private Reeves of the Highlanders were drowned in trying to cross the 
oanal. The wounded men are receiving every possible attention from Surgeons A. 
McKinley, of the Mosquito, and L. W. Vasey, of the Seagull, who were attached to 
the landing parties of their respective ships. 

The conduct of the seamen and marines under fire was everything that could be 
desired, and I would wish to express my admiration for the coolness and gallantry of 
the Highlanders, to which, with the excellent fire from the ships, the success of the 
day must be attributed. 

I have to thank Commander Mather Byles of the Seagull, Lieutenant-Colonel H. 
Helsham Jones, R. E., Lieutenant and Commander the Honorable F. R. Sandilands, 
of H. M. S. Mosquito, and Major W. F. Kelsey, of the Seaforth Highlanders, for their 
valuable co-operation and assistance, and I beg to bring to favorable notice the serv- 
ices of Lieutenaut E. Rae, who commanded the landing party from the Seagull; Sub- 
Lieutenant W. O. Story, who commanded the landing party from the Mosquito; Sub- 
Lieutenant E. J. Carus Wilson, who worked the Gatling gun in the maintop of the 
Seagull ; Mr. George Peavitt, gunner, who worked the 7-pounder in foretop of the 
Seagull; Mr. G. Gore Browne, midshipman, my aid-de-camp, who was most useful to 
me; and Mr. T. R. B. Rogers, assistant paymaster in charge, of the Seagull, who 
rendered good service by bringing the boat from the lock. 



122 

I attach a plan of the position drawn by Navigating Lieutenant Richard J. Rogers, 
ofH. M. S. Seagull. 
I have, &c, 

ALICK P. HASTINGS, 

Captain. 
To Rear-Admiral Sir W. N. W. Hewett, K. C. B.. V. C, 

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. 

The next report is by Major Kelsey, commanding the detachment of 
the Seaforth Highlanders engaged in the action at Chalonf, and is ren- 
dered to Captain Hastings : 

Chalouf, August 20, 1882. 

Sir : I have the honor to report for your information that on landing at Chalouf on 
the 20th August, 1882, I found two companies, each company 50 rifles, up in extended 
order, supported by two others, total 200 rifles. 

On arriving on the bank of the Fresh Water Canal, the enemy showed, and I opened 
fire about 11.30 a. m. ; at the same time I sent Captain Lendrum with one company; 
under the direction of Colonel Jones, R. E., to hold the lock about two miles to our 
right. 

About twenty minutes after the action commenced, I sent a company under command 
of Major Garnett, to work round through some houses on our extreme left ; this com- 
pany was supported by a party of blue-jackets and marines from H. M. S. Mosquito, 
under command of Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N., the houses were occupied by Major 
Garnett, and I reinforced him with half another company of Seaforth Highlanders, 
under command of Lieutenant Lang. The houses were passed through and the bank 
of the Fresh Water Canal lined. Major Garnett's party was here checked for some 
time until a boat was procured by Lieutenant Lang swimming over to the other side, 
under the enemy's fire, and bringing it back. Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N., and a 
party of blue-jackets then crossed and held a house until reinforced by the Seaforth 
Highlanders, then advanced and took the enemy in flank, who then retreated rapidly. 

About 4 p. m. Captain Hughes-Hallett took his company across the canal in a boat 
sent to me by Captain Lendrum from the lock he was occupying. This boat was towed 
up by a couple of men of his company under the direction of Paymaster Rogers, R. N., 
H. M. S. Seagull. As soon as Captain Hughes-Hallett's company had crossed, the 
remainder of our line was taken across, and advanced, driving the enemy before it. 

A party of bluejackets and marines from H. M. S. Seagull occupied a forward posi- 
tion in the center of our line during the action, and by their fire kept down the enemy's 
considerably. 

The Gatlings in the tops of H. M. S. Seagull and Mosquito kept up a galling fire 
during the day and did great execution. 

I beg to bring to your notice the name of Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N., H. M. S. Mos- 
quito. Major Garnett reports to me that he led his men in a forward and gallant 
manner. 

I regret to have to report the loss of two men of Major Garnett's company by drown- 
ing ; their names are Corporal David Hind and Private William Reeve. I inclose 
Major Garnett's report of the occurrence. 

I have, &c, 

W. F. KELSEY-, 
Major Commanding Detachment First Battalion Seaforth Highlanders. 

From the account of this affair given by an officer present, it is learned 
that the Egyptians engaged were mostly reserve men and old. So harsh 
had been the measures resorted to in recruiting that many had been 
brought down from the interior in chains. These chains were secured 



123 

to anklets, were of iron and weighed about 10 pounds. With such troops 
it is hardly to be wondered at that the aim should have been indifferent. 
They held their pieces at arm's length above the head and discharged 
them vaguely over the embankments behind which they had taken shel- 
ter. Even chance shots are neither safe nor welcome, so that the opera- 
tion was not free from danger, especially in the rear of the lines. To 
this shooting over may be attributed the slight damage done to the 
standing and running rigging of the gun-boats in the Maritime Canal. 
The crossing of the Fresh Water Canal should have been almost im- 
possible, the boats being so small as to convey but seven or eight at a 
time, and the canal being so full of reeds as to render swimming difficult 
and perilous. The dash of the British more than counterbalanced the 
disadvantages of numbers and of an attack on a position of much nat- 
ural strength. 

With the exception of the Serapeum stretch, between Lake Timsah 
and the Bitter Lakes, where no great annoyance or interruption of 
traffic was expected, the whole of the Maritime Canal was in the pos- 
session of the British navy by nightfall of August 20. 

On the following day, the Tourmaline and the Don moored perma- 
nently at Kantara, where the caravan road to Syria crosses the canal, 
and there established a strongly defended post, while the gun-boats in 
the southern half completed the link which perfected the chain from 
Port Said to Suez. 

Having seized the canal, the navy prepared to protect it. Between 
Ismailia and Suez this was effected by the Mosquito and Seagull, which 
patrolled it constantly, no force being permanently landed. In the 
northern half, the Tourmaline and Don held Kantara and the gares 
adjoining on either side. Strong detachments of sailors from the fleet 
at Port Said, with Gatlings, were landed at the other gares, breastworks 
were thrown up and regular camps established, each in command of 
a lieutenant. At Port Said a camp was pitched between the European 
and Arab towns, where never less than 500 blue-jackets and marines 
were kept. Intrench ments were thrown up across the isthmus from 
Lake Menzaleh to the Mediterranean, and field pieces mounted. In 
the canal itself, steam picket-boats, launches, &c, with armed crews, 
were used as patrols. The fast Thorneycroft torpedo launches of the 
Iris and Hecla were employed as dispatch-boats, making the passage 
between Port Said and Ismailia in about four hours and a half, their 
speed not being allowed to exceed ten knots. 

Sunday, August 20, was a busy day. The transport fleet arrived at 
Port Said from Alexandria and Aboukir early in the forenoon. Had it 
not been for the action of the master of the French steamer Melbourne, 
mentioned in the report of Commander Edwards, the transports could 
have pushed on at once into the canal and towards Ismailia. As it was 
they were obliged to wait until the way was clear. During this delay, 
and in anticipation of possible trouble, 300 of the York and Lancaster 



124 

Regiment were put on board H. M. S. Falcon (light-draught gun-boat), 
and a similar number of the West Kent Regiment on board H. M. S. 
Beacon, to form the advance. These vessels arrived at Ismailia in the 
evening of the same day. 

The Nerissa led the transport fleet, followed by the Rhosina, the 
troop-ship Euphrates, and others. Ismailia was reached that night and 
the next morning, the only accident being the grounding of the Cata- 
lonia, with the balance of the West Kent Regiment on board. She took 
against the west bank at the distance of 7 miles from Lake Timsah, 
but did not seriously interrupt the passage of other .vessels. 

The administration of the Suez Canal was in the hands of the British 
during Sunday, Monday, and part of Tuesday, the company's employes 
having orders from Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, the president, to aban- 
don their work. When it was found that the British could manage the 
traffic without the assistance of the French servants of the company — 
the large fleet that went through to Ismailia at this time being piloted by 
English naval officers — the company became anxious to resume its func- 
tions. Every obstacle had been thrown in the way of the use of the 
canal on the part of the British, its neutrality had been invoked, and 
Count de Lesseps had attempted to carry off all the employes from 
Ismailia, deserting the administration completely. This move was frus- 
trated by a refusal by the British senior naval officer to permit them to 
leave Lake Timsah, a fast torpedo launch barring their entrance into 
the canal. Count de Lesseps finally yielded to the convincing argu- 
ment of facts, and a modus vivendi was agreed to. Prior to this time, 
his expressions had been characterized by the most open hostility to 
the English; he had entertained Arabi at Ismailia, and had imbued 
that Oriental with his own notion that they would not dare to make 
use of the canal as a base of military action on account of the inviola- 
bility which it was supposed to enjoy. There is little doubt that his 
influence led Arabi to neglect the precaution of blocking the channel, 
and that practically, although not designedly, M. de Lesseps proved 
the strongest possible ally that England could have desired or secured. 
In this connection it may be allowable to quote a telegram from M. de 
Lesseps dated at Ismailia August 19: 

The English Admiral at Suez informs the company's chief traffic agent that in con- 
sequence of orders from his Government he forbids, until the receipt of further orders, 
any ship, large or small, even the company's boats, to enter the canal, and he will 
resort to force to prevent any attempt to contravene these orders. The Admiral more- 
over has placed a gun-boat at the mouth of the canal. I have protested against this 
act of violence and spoliation. 

In a circular of protest, the canal company from its principal office in 
Paris says, among other things: 

The company is obliged to * * * object to any military action by the English 
Government. 

And again : 

The company is obliged to protest against the claim of the English Government, 
which calls itself the Khedive's agent, to carry out any enterprise on the whole or a 



125 

part of the canal or its dependencies, no one, even with the Sultan's authorization, 
and, a fortiori, without that authorization, having a right to disturb the company in 
the free and peaceful enjoyment of its concession. 

The inference to Americans is obvious that the neutrality of any canal 
joining the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will be maintained, 
if at all, by the nation which can place and keep the strongest ships at each 
extremity. 

The exact footing of the British is denned by the following proclama- 
tions, the first by the senior naval officer present in that part of Egypt, 
the second by the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force: 

PROCLAMATION. 

His Highness the Khedive having given the Admiral commanding the British fleet 
authority to take charge of all places in or near the Maritime Canal as may be neces- 
sary for operations against the rebels, Rear- Admiral Hoskins, commanding the British 
vessels in the Maritime Canal, now takes possession of Port Said for the purpose indi- 
cated, and trusts that all the inhabitants will assist him, as far as lies in their power, 
in maintaining order and protecting life and property. 

The Governor, Ismael Pasha Hamdy, appointed by His Highness the Khedive, will 
resume his office and conduct his duties as formerly. 

The Captain of H. B. M. S. Monarch will act as military commandant of the gar- 
rison, and be responsible for the defense of the town against the rebels, and the sup- 
port of the Khedive's civil authorities against any attempt that may be made against 
life or property. 

The police patrols, which will consist of English soldiers and Egyptian police, will 
at once arrest all persons causing disturbances, more serious crimes being dealt with 
by martial law. 

The Rear- Admiral trusts that all business will be conducted and the affairs of the 
town go on in the ordinary course, under the rule of His Excellency the Governor. 

A. H. HOSKLNS, 
Bear- Admiral Commanding H. B. M. Ships in the Maritime Canal. 

Also, 

By Authority of the Khedive. 

proclamation to the egyptians. 

The General in Command of the British forces wishes to make known that the object 
of Her Majesty's Government in sending troops to this country is to re-establish the 
authority of the Khedive. The army is, therefore, only fighting against those who are 
in arms against His Highness. 

All peaceable inhabitants will be treated with kindness, and no violence will be 
offered to them ; their religion, mosques, families, and property will be respected. 
Any supplies which will be required will be paid for, and the inhabitants are invited 
to bring them. 

The General in Command will be glad to receive visits from the chiefs who are will- 
ing to assist in repressing the rebellion against the Khedive, the lawful ruler of Egypt 
appointed by the Sultan. 



XII. 

THE CAMPAIGN. 

The country between Ismailia and the delta is so monotonous that but 
few words of description are needed to give a notion of its character* 



126 

It is a desert of sand, across which run the Fresh (or Sweet) Water 
Canal and the railway, side by side. To the northward of these lines 
the ground is, as a rule, somewhat higher, sloping in a southerly direc- 
tion past the canal. The surface is slightly diversified by occasional 
low hummocks and mounds, and is dotted at great intervals by tufts 
of ''camel grass." The soil is a deep, light, shifting sand near Ismailia* 
but it gradually increases in firmness towards the westward, and at Tel- 
el-Kebir, especially on the upper crests of the hills, is a fairly compact 
gravel, over which progress is comparatively easy. The sky here is 
rarely cloudy, so that the sun beats down with full force during the day, 
while at night the radiation is so great that the air becomes cool and 
almost chilly. Shelter is needed against the sun in the day-time. At 
night a good blanket is indispensable, both on account of the lower 
temperature and the dews. 

On account of the -absence of rain and the dryness of the soil, stores 
of all kinds were freely piled up, uncovered, wherever needed, without 
fear of injury. The Sweet Water Canal furnished the necessary water, 
usually of good quality after filtering to get rid of the mud held in sus- 
pension. The extreme heat from about 9 a. m. to 4 p. m. rendered work 
of all kinds imprudent. 

The Egyptian flies, the worst of their species, make life almost un- 
bearable through their countless swarms and their loathsome sticki- 
ness. They disappear with the sun, being relieved by an equally ener- 
getic and numerous pest, the mosquito. 

No time was lost in pushing on the work begun at Ismailia. The 
advance was instituted on the day following the occupation. At 11 
a. m. Major-General Graham started from the town with 800 men and 
a small naval contingent, under Captain Stephenson of the Carysfort, 
and marched across the heavy sand, arriving at 1.30 p. m. The Egyp- 
tian camp was found to be deserted, the enemy* having retired up the 
Sweet Water Canal. A few tents were left behind and about thirty 
railway trucks full of provisions and ammunition. The entire force 
bivouacked here. 

The naval detachment was composed of two Gatling guns' crews from 
the Orion and Carysfort, a torpedo party from the Orion, and 104 ma- 
rines from the Northumberland. 

The position was at once placed in an efficient state of defense, shelter 
trenches were thrown up, one Gatling was placed to command the rail- 
way from Suez, the other that from Zagazig. Later in the day, a recon- 
naissance was made towards the westward, revealing the presence of 
the enemy about four miles distant. 

The troops had carried with them two days' rations. It was neces- 
sary to accumulate at least a small stock of stores before continuing 
the advance. In consequence, August 22 and 23 were devoted to prep- 
aration. 

* This term is used throughout as a convenient means of avoiding the too frequent 
repetition of the word ''Egyptians." 



127 

The operations of the 24th are best described in the official report 
quoted at length below. 

Ismailia, August 26, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to supplement my telegraphic dispatch of the 24th instant 
with a detailed report of the events which took place on that date in the neighbor- 
hood of Abu Suer, and of Tel-el-Mahuta, on the Sweet Water Canal, about 9 miles west 
of Ismailia. 

A gradual but continuous decrease of level in the canal determined me to push 
forward my available cavalry and artillery (very little of which had landed as yet) 
together with the two infantry battalions, which I had advanced toNefiche Junction 
on the 21st instant with the object of seizing and occupying a position on the canal 
and railway which would secure possession of that part of the water supply of the 
desert lying between Ismailia and the first cultivated portion of the delta, which I 
had reason to believe was the most vulnerable to damage at the hands of the enemy. 

The paramount importance of this object, as affecting all my future operations, 
induced me to risk a cavalry movement with horses which had been less than two 
days on shore after a long sea voyage, and also neutralized the objections, which I 
must otherwise have entertained, to placing the strain of a forward movement upon 
the recent and partially organized supply service. 

Accordingly, at 4 a. m. on the 24th, I advanced with the troops marginally noted,* 
whom I placed for the day under the command of Lieutenant-Geueral Willis, C. B., 
commanding 1st division, reached Nefiche at daybreak, and, following the general 
line of the railway, arrived at 7.30 a. m. on the north side of the canal, at a point 
about midway between the spot marked El-Magfar on the map and the village of 
Tel-el-Mahuta. 

At this point the enemy had constructed his first dam across the canal, and after 
some skirmishing with his scouts and light troops, in which two squadrons of House- 
hold Cavalry charged very gallantly, I took possession of it. 

From this point the enemy could be observed in force about one and a half miles 
further on, his vedettes holding a line extending across the canal, lining the crest of 
a ridge which curved round to my right flank at a general distance of about 2,000 
yards from my front. The canal and railway at Tel-el-Mahuta are close together, 
and both are there carried through deep cuttings, with mounds of sand and earth on 
both sides of them. These were strongly intrenched, and crowds of men could be 
seen at work there. At Mahuta the enemy had constructed a very large embankment 
across the railway and a wide and solid dam across the canal, which afforded him easy 
communication from one side to the other. 

From the statement of some prisoners taken by the mounted troops, as well as by 
the length of front covered by the enemy, it was apparent that he was in force at 
Mahuta, and I could see by the smoke of hfs locomotives, which kept constantly 
reaching his position throughout the forenoon, that he was being largely reinforced 
from Tel-el-Kebir. I could perceive that the enemy's force in my immediate front 
was large; I estimated it at 10,000 men and ten guns, but I have since found that it 
consisted of one regiment of cavalry, nine battalions of infantry (about 7,000 men), 
twelve guns, and a large but indefinite number of Bedouins. Although I had but 
three squadrons of cavalry, two guns, and about 1,000 infantry, I felt it would not be 
in consonance with the traditions of Her Majesty's army that we should retire, even 
temporarily, before Egyptian troops, no matter what their numbers might be. I decided j 
therefore, upon holding my ground until evening, by which time I knew that the rein- 
forcements I had sent for to Nefiche and Ismailia would reach me. I consequently 
took up a position, suited to the numbers at my disposal, with my left resting on the 

* Household Cavalry; Mounted Infantry; 2 guns battery N-A (N battery, A bri- 
gade), R. H. A. ; York and Lancaster; Marines. 



128 

captured dam over the canal, and the cavalry and mounted infautry covering the 
right. 

It was now 9 o'clock a. m. The enemy had kept gradually reinforcing his left, 
showing considerable skill in the method with which he swung round his left, mov- 
ing along the reverse slope of his position, and showing only his light troops upon the 
sky line. 

The two guns of N battery, A brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, only reached me at 
9 a. in., although the officer in command had made every effort to push his way as 
rapidly as possible through the deep sand over which our route lay. They took up a 
good position on a sandy hillock near the railway embankment, from which a good 
view of the enemy's position was to be obtained. By this time the enemy had opened 
a heavy artillery fire upon us, and his infantry advanced in very regular attack for- 
mation, halting and forming a line of shelter trenches about 1,000 yards from our 
position. On my left lie had pushed his infantry along the canal to within about 900 
yards of the dam held by the York and Lancaster Regiment, but the steady and well, 
directed fire of this battalion easily checked his movement upon that side. 

From 10 to 11 o'clock the enemy continued to develop his attack upon my center 
and right. His guns were served with considerable skill, the shells bursting well 
among us. Fortunately they were common shells with percussion fuzes, which sank 
so deep in the very soft sand before bursting that few splinters flew upwards; when 
he did use shrapnel the time-fuzes were badly cut. 

Feeling complete confidence in my ability to drive back any close attack the enemy 
might make, I did not allow our guns to open fire for some time after they were placed 
in position, hoping he might thereby be the more readily induced to advance to close 
quarters, under the notion that we had no artillery with us. When, however, he 
brought twelve guns into action, to relieve the Household Cavalry, into whose ranks 
and those of the Mounted Infantry he was throwing his shell with great accuracy, 
our two guns opened upon his twelve guns with marked effect, our practice being 
very good. 

The Household Cavalry and Mounted Infantry were skillfully maneuvered by Major- 
General Drury-Lowe on the extreme right, to check the enemy's advance on that side, 
but the horses, just landed from a long sea voyage and fatigued by their march across 
a desert deep in sand, were in no condition to charge. 

Major-General Drury-Lowe spoke in the highest terms of the manner in which the 
Mounted Infantry were handled throughout the arduous fighting that fell to their 
lot during the day. No troops could have behaved with greater dash or steadiness. 
I regret to say that Captain Parr was severely wounded, and also Lord Melgund 
slightly wounded, who was doing duty with the Mounted Infantry. The heat at this 
period of the day was very great. 

About noon two Gatlings, with a party of sailors under eommand of Lieutenant 
King-Harman, and belonging to H. M. S. Orion, arrived and took up a position for 
action. The manner in which the sailors brought these Gatlings into position, and 
the energy shown by them and by the Marine Artillery, deserve the highest commen- 
dation. 

The fire opened by the enemy on my right was as accurate as that which he had 
already directed against my front ; but although many shells continued to drop in 
and around the hillock where our two guns were in action, causing loss to the over- 
worked men of N battery, A brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, they continued to work 
their two guns with great steadiness during many hours, exposed to a concentrated 
fire from twelve guns and under very trying conditions of heat, glare, and sunshine. 

I desire to bring to notice the manner in which Lieutenant Hickman, Royal Horse 
Artillery, the officer commanding the division, performed his duty, and the spirit and 
resolution displayed by all ranks under him. Later on in the day, when these men 
were extremely tired, the men of the Royal Marine Artillery requested permission to 
help them, and did so until the close of the action. 



129 

At 3.30 p. m., the Household Cavalry, under General Lowe, and the Mounted Infantry 
again moved forward on my right, causing the enemy to partially withdraw his attack 
on that flank. 

At 1 p. m., the 2d battalion of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry had arrived 
from Nefiche. 

About 5.15 p. m., the enemy again advanced his left, pushing four guns across the 
ridge and moving his cavalry with a considerable force of infantry some distance down 
the slope, but not near enough to come within effective infantry or Gatling fire. 

At this time our reinforcements began to arrive rapidly. Colonel Sir Baker Russell 
with 350 sabers of the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards reached the field, and at 6 p. m. 
the brigade of Guards, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Conn aught, arrived. 
It was now too late to begin an offensive movement ; the troops I had with me were 
tired by their exertions during the early part of the day, and the brigade of Guards 
which had moved from Ismailia at 1.30 p. m., had suffered much from the great heat 
of the desert march. 

Shortly after sunset, the entire force bivouacked on the field which they had so 
tenaciously held all day, and the enemy withdrew across the ridge to his position at 
Mahuta. 

I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the men engaged and with 
the exertions made by the Cornwall Light Infantry and the brigade of Guards to 
reach the field in time to share in our operations. 

I have, &c, 

G. J. WOLSELEY, 

General. 

At nightfall the dam across the canal was strongly held by the York 
and Lancaster Regiment. From this point the line extended to the 
northward, the right being refused. The troops rested in their places. 

During the night reinforcements continued arriving, and at daybreak 
line of battle was formed in the following manner: 

Beginning on the left was Graham's brigade, or rather such of its 
component parts as had reached the front. It consisted then of the 
York and Lancaster Regiment, the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 
and the Marine Battalion. Then came four guns of battery A. 1, then 
the Guards brigade, then six guns N. A., then the cavalry, 4th and 7th 
Dragoon Guards, then two guns of battery A. 1, then the Household 
Cavalry, and lastly the Mounted Infantry. 

Battery N. A was strengthened by two guns each of N. 2, E. A., and 
battery G. B, B. H. A., that came up during the advance. 

On August 25 another short advance was made and Tel-el-Mahuta 
occupied. The following is the official report : 

Ismailia, August 27, 1882. 

Sir: In continuation of my dispatch No. 2 of yesterday's date, I have the honor to 
inform you of the events which took place on the 25th instant in the neighborhood 
of Tel-el-Mahuta, and further along the line of the canal and railway as far as the 
station of Mahsameh. 

The attack on the enemy's intrenched post at Tel-el-Mahuta, which was deferred 
on the 24th instant in consequence of the lateness of the hour at which the rein- 
forcements could arrive, and also because of the fatigue undergone by the troops in 
action, was successfully carried out shortly after daybreak on the 25th instant. 

Accompanied by General Sir J. Adye and the headquarters staff, I left Ismailia at 
3 a. m. and reached the scene of yesterday's fighting at 5.30 o'clock. I took with me 
the remaining squadron of the 1st cavalry brigade, most of whom had only landed 
948 EG 9 



130 

the previous day. The 1st division, including the troops marginally noted,* had 
by that hour quitted their bivouack and had advanced towards the enemy's position 
in the following order : The cavalry and mounted infantry formed the extreme right, 
thrown well forward upon the desert ridges over which the enemy had on the pre- 
vious day carried out his flank movement. The artillery moved on the left of the 
cavalry, towards the summit of the high ground overlooking the line of railway be- 
tween Ramses and the Mahsameh station. The infantry, on the left of the artillery r 
advanced in echelon from the right upon Mahuta, the brigade of Guards leading. 

When the summit of the ridge was gained, the enemy was observed to be abandon- 
ing his earthworks at the last-named place, and to be retiring his forces along the 
canal banks and the railway line towards Mahsameh. His railway trains were also 
to be seen in motion towards the same place. 

At 6.25 a. m. our artillery came into action against the enemy's infantry, and guns 
which were posted on the canal bank to the west of Mahuta. 

As it was of great importance to obtain possession, if possible, of some of the 
enemy's locomotives, I ordered the cavalry to push forward with all speed and at- 
tempt to cut off the retreating trains. The cavalry and eight guns moved as rapidly 
as their horses, which were in no condition for hard work, would permit. The ground 
was much better and harder than that moved over yesterday. 

The enemy offered considerable resistance in the neighborhood of Mahsameh, but 
nothing could stop the advance of our mounted troops, tired even as their horse s 
were. Mahsameh with its very extensive camp, left standing by the enemy, was soon 
in our possession. Seven Krupp guns, great quantities of ammunition, two large 
trains of railway wagons loaded with provisions, and vast supplies of various kinds 
fell into our hands. The enemy fled along the railway and canal banks, throwing 
away their arms and equipments and showing every sign of demoralization. Unfor- 
tunately there was not at this time in the whole cavalry brigade a troop that could 
gallop ; their long march and rapid advance having completely exhausted the horses, 
who were not yet fit for hard work after their long voyage from England. 

The results of the operations, extending over two days, have beeu most satisfactory. 
The enemy has been completely driven from the position at Tel-el-Mahuta, which he 
had 'taken such pains to fortify, and upon which he had, by force, compelled 7,000 
peasants to labor. 

The canal has been cleared for more than half the distance intervening between 
Ismailia and the delra, and the water supply completely secured to us. 

The railway line is in our possession for more than 20 miles from this place, and the 
vigor, dash, and energy displayed by the troops in the sudden forward movement, 
made with horses out of condition and from a base hastily organized, and where we are 
still contending with all the difficulties incidental to rapid disembarkations, have as- 
sured to the army an important strategic position, the possession of which cannot fail 
to influence the future operations of the campaign. 

Amongst the prisoners taken was Mahmoud Ferni Pasha, who was Chief Engineer 
to Arabi Pasha, a very important personage among the rebel chiefs. 

The enemy were commanded by Rashid Pasha, and the force he had collected at 
Mahuta and Mahsameh consisted often battalions of infantry (at least 8,000 men), of 
six squadrons of cavalry, and twenty guns, besides a large force of Bedouins. 

Owing to the result of the action of the previous day (24th instant) many of his 
troops had retreated during the night, and upon our guns opening on his works early 
on the morning of the 25th instant the 7,000 laborers ran away. Rashid Pasha then 
issued orders for a general retreat. 

Military operations in Egypt at this season of the year are very trying to the sol- 
diers engaged, and the complete absence of anything approaching the nature of a 
road renders all movements most difficult and fatiguing. 

Owing to the fact of this advance being made before the railway or the telegraph 

* Household Cavalry ; 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards ; battery N. A, R. H. A. ; 3rd bat- 
talion Royal Rifles. 



131 

lines had been repaired, or the canal cleared of obstructions, or any regular system of 
transport had been effectively organized, considerable exposure without tents, and 
severe privations as regards food, have been imposed upon all ranks. These hard- 
ships have, however, been cheerfully borne, and the conduct of the troops has been 
everything I could wish. 

The troops engaged were, upon both the 24th and 25th in - L aut, under the immediate 
command of Lieutenant-General Willis, C. B., who carried out my views in a most 
satisfactory manner. My advanced troops, under Major-General Graham, now hold 
the Kassassin lock. 

I cannot praise too highly the manner in which the cavalry, horse artillery, and 
mounted infantry were handled by Major-General Drury-Lowe, who speaks in the 
highest terms of the assistance rendered him by Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mc- 
Calmont, brigade major of the 1st cavalry brigade. He also begs me to mention 
his appreciation of the dash and skill with which the mounted infantry were com- 
manded by Captain Pigott, of the King's Royal Rifles. 

I am, &c, 

G. J. WOLSELEY, 

General. 

To the foregoing account it may be well to add that a small naval 
detachment took part in the operations of the day. It was composed of 
two Gatlings and 70 marines from the Carysfort and Orion, and was com- 
manded by Captain Fitz Roy of the latter vessel. 

The Marine Infantry battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard S. 
Jones, had left Ismailia at 4 p. m. the day previous, and had reached El 
Magfar at 1.30 a. m. of the 25th. It started again at 4 a. m. with the 
general advance, and at 5 p. m. was able to march into the Egyptian 
camp at Mahsameh, which had been seized by the cavalry in the morn- 
ing. So good a piece of work deserves record. 

The extreme right of the British line was on a ridge about a mile and 
a half from the center. When Mahsameh station was in plain sight, 
the two guns of battery A. 1, came into action and shelled the fugitives, 
the cavalry and mounted infantry dashing in and capturing the camp, 
which they occupied permanently until the advance on Tel-el-Kebir. 

The stock of provisions captured was a most welcome addition to 
the stores in hand, and, in particular, the grain left on the ground in 
large quantities was invaluable, for the horses had been for several days 
on an extremely short allowance of forage. 

It will be perceived that the operations of the day did not reach the 
dignity of an engagement, the Egyptians offering practically no resist- 
ance, but falling back on Tel-el-Kebir, where a large camp had been 
established north of the railway, and where extensive intrenchments 
were begun along the crest of a range of hills running north and south. 

On August 26 a small force of the 7th Dragoons occupied the lock 
in the Fresh Water Canal at Kassassin without opposition. This was 
a most important step, since the possession of the lock gave General 
Wolseley control of the water in the upper reach of the canal. That it 
could have been accomplished so readily is but another indication of the 
ignorance or habitual carelessness of the Egyptians. 

Later in the day the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the York and 



132 

Lancaster Regiment, and the Royal Marine Artillery marched up and 
established themselves at this point, the cavalry withdrawing to Mah- 
sameh, a mile and a half to the eastward. 

The force had now completely outrun its commissariat, and for two 
days the men had lived from hand to mouth. On the third day the 
navy succeeded in getting a few stores to the front by the Sweet Water 
Canal, but the prospects were, to say the least, gloomy. 

On August 27, the distribution of the troops was approximately as 
follows : 

At Kassassin lock were a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the York 
and Lancaster Regiment, the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 
Royal Marine Artillery battalion, and two guns of battery N. A. 

At Mahsameh, the Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th Dragoon 
Guards, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry and 13th Bengal Lancers, the Mounted 
Infantry, and the Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion. 

At Tel-el-Mahuta, the 1st brigade (Guards), the Rifles, the 24th com- 
pany Royal Engineers, and battery A. 1, R. A. 

At Nefiche, the West Kent Regiment. 

At Ismailia, the 7th, 8th, and 18th companies of Royal Engineers, 
besides many other corps landing from the transports. 

On August 28 the Egyptians made an effort to regain their lost 
ground by a serious attack on General Graham's force at Kassassin, 
as narrated in the official reports given herewith. The first is from 
Major-General Graham to General Wolseley: 

Kassassin, August 29, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that an important engagement with the enemy 
took place here yesterday, the 28th instant, in which, though attacked by a vastly 
superior force numerically, tried seriously by exposure to the sun and previous priva- 
tions, the troops I have the honor to command finally drove back the enemy at all 
points; and, with the aid of the cavalry under Major- General Drury-Lowe, C. B., 
inflicted severe chastisement. 

The position, the advanced brigade occupied at Kassassin, is not the best for defense. 
We are astride the canal (which runs nearly east and west), and hold the bridge and 
locks. Taking the west as our proper front, on our right the desert rises to a ridge, 
with an elevation of from 100 to 160 feet ; at a distance of from 2,000 to 3,000 yards 
there is the millet and palm covered plain of the Ouady, intersected by a disused 
branch of the caual. This ridge, on our right, is obviously a source of danger to a 
force too weak to occupy it, as I have already observed in a previous report. 

About 9.30 a. m. on the 28th instant the enemy's cavalry appeared in force on our 
left front on the north side of the Fresh Water Canal, and I at once heliographed to 
Major-General Drury-Lowe at Mahsameh. The force under my command, consisting 
of 57 cavalry, 70 mounted infantry, 1,728 infantry, and 40 artillery, with two 13-pdrs. 
as detailed in margin,* were at once posted by me under cover, fronting to the 

* Royal Horse Artillery, two guns, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. 40 

4th Dragoon Guards, officers, non-commissioned officers, arid men 15 

7th Dragoon Guards, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 42 

Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. 611 

York and Lancaster Regiment, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.. . 690 

Mounted Infantry, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 70 

Royal Marine Artillery, officers, non commissioned officers, and men 427 

Total 1,895 



133 

north and west, the cavalry and mounted infantry (50) being thrown out on the flanks 
to observe the enemy's movements while I awaited the development of his attack. 
About 11 a. m. it was reported that a large force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery 
were being moved round towards our right, behind the ridge. At 32 the enemy opened 
from two heavy guns on our left front, at least 4,000 yards off, the shot from which fell 
short. 

The enemy's attack seemed to languish, and about 3 p. m. the officer commanding 
the Mounted Infantry renorted the enemy retiring. 

The men had been suffering very much from their long exposure to the heat of the 
sun without food, so I ordered them back to their camps. Major-General Drury-Lowe 
brought a brigade of cavalry within 2 or 3 miles of the camp, and about 3 p. m. with- 
drew them to Mahsameh, as I had previously requested him not to engage them un- 
necessarily. 

At 4.30 p. m. the enemy advanced his infantry in great force, displaying a line of 
skirmishers at least a mile in length, with which he sought to overlap my front 
on the left, supported by a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, with which he 
searched the camp, wounding a sick officer in the house where I had established my 
headquarters, but which, as the best building, was now given up as a hospital. My 
dispositions to meet this attack were as follows: On the left the Marine Artillery 
were directed to take up a position on the south bank of the canal, where (secure 
from being turned themselves, the canal being 5 to 6 feet deep) they could check the 
enemy's advance by a flank fire (the Royal Marine Artillery, therefore, gave fire to 
west and northwest). 

In the center the 2d battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, extended a 
fighting line of three companies, facing west by north, about 800 yards to the right 
rear (east northeast) of the Royal Marine Artillery. The supports and reserves of the 
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were under cover of the railway embankment, 
facing north. The 2d battalion York and Lancaster extended the fighting line of 
the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with two and a half companies, keeping the 
remainder in support and reserve. 

The position of the infantry was, therefore, an irregular echelon, right thrown back. 
The troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards was kept on thi** flank, and the two 13-pdrs., 
now reinforced by two others, took up a position on the ridge. Unfortunately, these 
guns had only got their ammunition in their limbers, and had soon to cease firing for 
want of a further supply, though they did good service while it lasted. The Mounted 
Infantry and detachment of 4th Dragoon Guards occupied a portion of the gap be- 
tween the Royal Marine Artillery and Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and all the 
persistent efforts of the enemy to break through at this point were unavailing, owing 
to the steady fire of the Royal Marine Artillery and the gallant resistance of the little 
band of Mounted Infantry and detachment of 4th Dragoon Guards dismounted and 
employed as infantry. The enemy made great efforts to overcome this resistance, put- 
ting a number of men across the canal ; and three times his guns were kept from 
advancing by their horses and men being shot when trying to press past. In order to 
support the left, the companies on the left of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 
acing north, were spread out along the line of the railway embankment, and a fresh 
company from the right half battalion was moved to the left to prolong the line. 

Feeling secure on my left, I turned my attention to the right Ha lk. On the first 
notice of the attack (4.30 p. m.) I sent a message to Major-General Lowe, by helio- 
graph, and by a mounted officer to Mahsameh, 3 and 4 miles distant, requesting him 
to move up the cavalry brigade to cover my right flank, and to send forward the 
Royal Marine Light Infantry. 

At 5 p. m., thinking I saw the cavalry advancing, I sent an order to Major-Geueral 
Drury-Lowe to bring round his cavalry, under cover of the hill, fall upon the left 
flank of the enemy's skirmishers, and roll up his line. This order was received and 
gallantly executed. For an account of this part of the action, I beg to refer to Major- 
General Drury-Lowe's own report. 



134 

At 5 p. ra. I observed reinforcements coming to the enemy by train, and fearing a 
charge of cavalry on our exposed right, directed the officer commanding the reserve 
company of the York and Lancaster to prepare to receive them in line. Near the right 
of our position, on the line of railway, a Krupp gun, taken from the enemy at Mahsa- 
meh, had been mounted on a railway truck and was being worked by a gun detach- 
ment of the Eoyal Marine Artillery, under Captain Tucker. This gun was admirably 
served, and did great execution among the enemy. As the other guns had to cease 
firing for want of ammunition, Captain Tucker's gun became the target for the enemy's 
artillery, and I counted salvoes of four guns opening on him at once with shell and 
shrapnel ; but although everything around or in line was hit, not a man of the gun 
detachment was touched, and this gun continued to fire to the end, expending 93 
rounds. 

At 6.45 p. in. I order* d an advance, with the object of closing on the enemy's infan- 
try about the time of the expected cavalry charge. The advance was made very 
steadily, by the fighting line, in echelon from the left, about 600 yards to our west 
front, when the line fired volleys by companies, the reserves following in rear of the 
railway embankment. 

On arriving at the point held by the Mounted Infantry, a message reached me that 
the Royal Marine Light Infantry had come on to the ground on our right, and, gal- 
loping back, I at once directed them to advance in order of attack. This advance 
was continued for about 2 or 3 miles, supported by the Duke of Cornwall's Light In- 
fantry on the left, the York and Lancaster being left behind in reserve, the enemy 
falling back, only one attempt being made at a stand on our left, which broke at the 
first volley of the Royal Marines. 

At about 8.15 p. in. I first heard of the cavalry charge from an officer of the 1st 
Life Guards who had lost his way. 

We had now been advancing, for an hour and a half, in the moonlight, and my 
two aids-de-camp had had narrow escapes in mistaking detached bodies of the enemy 
for our own troops. Fearing some mistake might be made, and seeing no further 
chance of co-operation with the cavalry, I ordered the marines and Duke of Corn- 
wall's Light Infantry to retire at 8.45 p. m. Oq approaching the camp, I called in 
the other troops. 

The accompanying rough sketch shows approximately the position held by the in- 
fantry during the action. 

During the night the enemy made no sign, and this morning at daybreak I rode 
out over the battle-field, and have had all wounded that were found brought in. 

I append a detailed list of killed and wounded, an abstract of which is given in the 
margin.* The corps which suffered most heavily was the Royal Marine Artillery, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson, whom I would beg to bring especially to your notice. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tnson speaks in high terms of the conduct of Major Ogle, Captain 

*List of killed and ivounded. 



Organizations. 



P 



Cavalry (with General Graham's force) . 

Royal Marine Artillery 

Mounted Infantry 

Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 

York and Lancaster Regiment 

Army medical depaitment 



Total 



1 

7 ! 25 

... 7 

1 24 

1 11 

'I 

LI 67 



135 

Rawstorne, Lieutenants Pyin and Talbot, and of Captain and Adjutant Noble, whose 
horse was killed under him. The Mounted Infantry also suffered heavily, and, early 
in tbe action, were deprived of the service of their gallant leader, Lieutenant Pig- 
gott, an officer who deserves especial mention. Another valuable officer of this corps, 
Lieutenant Edwards, was also wounded. The services of the Mounted Infantry have 
been invaluable to me in the absence of a sufficient force of cavahy. I have also to 
briug to your uotice the admirable steadiness of the 2d battalion Duke of Cornwall's 
Light Infantry under fire, and during their advance under Colonel Richardson. This 
officer mentions Lieutenant-Colonel John, Major Grieve, Lieutenant and Adjutant 
Ashby, and Lieutenant Falls as being indefatigable in their exertions. The 2d Duke 
of Cornwall's Light Infantry were effectively supported by the 2d York and Lancaster 
under Colonel Wilson, to whose careful personal leading, ably supported by the offi- 
cers under him, much credit is due. The Royal Marine Light Infantry, although 
they arrived too late to take any decisive share in the action, showed by the prompt- 
itude of their march to the field, and the steadiness of their advance, under Colonel 
Jones, that they are well capable of sustaining the high character of their corps. 

In general, I cannot too highly express my opinion of the steadiness of the troops 
under fire, and the ready alacrity with which they carried out my orders. Although 
exposed for two hours to a heavy fire of artillery the lines I advanced were full of 
cheerful confidence and eager to close with the enemy. I may also mention that 
the five hours' exposure to the sun in the morning, expecting an attack, had been 
most trying to the men, and that the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry had not had 
time to eat their dinners before they were ordered out to meet the enemy. 

I estimate the enemy's force at 1,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry, and twelve guns. 

I beg to bring to your notice Major Hart, V. C, R. E., who showed the utmost de- 
votion on this as on other occasions. 

Lieutenant Pirie, 4th Dragoon Guards, was at* ached to me as extra aid-de-camp, 
and rendered invaluable service in carrying my orders to Major-General Drury-Lowe 
to charge. At the time I imagined the brigade to be near at hand, and Lieutenant 
Pirie galloped on until his horse dropped, fortunately near to a battery of Royal Artil- 
lery, where he got another horse and continued his gallop till he reached General 
Drury-Lowe. 

Captain Hare, my Brigade Major, also rendered good service in carrying messages 
and by his cheerful readiness to do any service required in the fighting line. 

I have, &c, 

GERALD GRAHAM, 
Major-General Commanding Advanced Brigade. 

The next report is on the special operations of the Cavalry Division, 
under Major-General Drury-Lowe, and is submitted by that officer to 
Lieutenant- General Willis, C. B. Its text is as follows: 

Mahsameh, August 29, 1882. 

Sir: Having received information from Major-General Graham, at Kassassin, that 
the enemy were advancing on his position, and hiving been told by Colonel Keyser 
that his signalers had been withdrawn, I turned out the following troops of the 1st 
cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell, viz, Household Cavalry , 
7th Dragoon Guards, and four guns N battery, A brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, 
and advanced towards the enemy's left. A distant and ineffective artillery fire was 
being directed against General Graham's position, but beyond this nothing was tak- 
ing place. I remained some hours, communicated with General Graham, and with- 
drew my brigade about 4.30 p. m. 

At about 5.30 Major Molyneux arrived from Kassassiu and gave me a message from 
General Graham that the enemy were advancing in force; I again, at 5.30 p. m. ; 
turned out the brigade, and moved to the sound of the heavy firing that was now tak- 



136 

ing place. En route, a galloper reached me from General Graham, who stated that 
the general desired him to say that " he was only just able to hold his own, and that 
he wished me to attack the left of the enemy's infantry skirmishers." The sun had 
now set, and a bright moon was shining. The light, however, was not good, owing 
to the haze, and we were guided by the flash of guns and musketry. I made a wide 
circuit to turn the enemy's left, and the brigade arrived without being noticed near 
this portion of their line. As we approached, a heavy fire of shells and musketry was 
opened upon us, which was practically harmless as it was very high. I cleared the 
front of our guns by a retirement of the first line, whilst the Household Cavalry, on 
their right, formed line. 

After a few rounds from our guns, Sir Baker Russell led a charge of the Household 
Cavalry, under Colonel Evart, against the enemy's infantry, which had commenced 
to advance. Moving most steadily towards the flash of the rifles the charge was 
right gallantly led and executed. The enemy's infantry was completely scattered 
and our cavalry swept through a battery of seven or nine guns which in daylight 
must have been captured, but, unfortunately, their exact position could not be found 
afterwards, and they were no doubt removed during the night, after our retirement. 
The enemy's loss was heavy, the ground being thickly strewn with their killed, and 
quantities of ammunition, &c. 1 beg to attach a list of casualties* sustained by the 
brigade, which, considering the nature of the attack, was not heavy. The greatest 
praise is due to the Household Cavalry for their behavior throughout, and I have to 
thank Brigadier-General Sir Baker Russell and the officers and men of the brigade 
for their gallant conduct. 

I have, &c, 

DRURY-LOWE, 
Major-General Commanding Cavalry Division. 

The reason of the lack of ammunition for the British artillery was 
the heaviness of the road from the base to the advanced brigade. 
Efforts were made to get up a proper supply, but the wagons stuck in 
the sand and were late in arriving. 

The immunity of the detachment of Royal Marine Artillery, working 
the 8 cm Krupp gun on the railway wagon, was thought by Captain 
Tucker to be due to constant shifting of its position on the rails. The 
gun itself was protected by a breastwork of sand-bags. 

The Egyptian attack is described by officers present as heavy and 
direct, and their fire rapid. The British troops, although greatly out- 
numbered, stood to their ground with coolness, expending their ammu- 
nition effectively and deliberately, for there appears to have been but a 
slight reserve supply at hand, holding the enemy in check for two hours, 
when his retreat began. This movement appears to have been accom- 
panied by very little fighting, and to have been conducted in good order. 

Two batteries of field artillery, A 1 and D 1, arrived from Mahuta, but 
too late to take part in the engagement. They had been obliged to 
drop their ammunition wagons in order to get their guns and limbers up. 

In spite of the wording of General Graham's report, it seems certain 
that the cavalry charge took place after the enemy had retreated several 
miles, and at about 9 p. m. From an account of an officer, a witness 
to the charge, it appears that at this time some of the enemy were ob- 
served making a movement on General Drury-Lowe's right. The cav- 

* Three killed and sixteen wounded. 



137 

airy advanced, the 4th Dragoon Guards on the left, the Household 
Cavalry on the right, and the four guns of battery ET. A., Eoyal Horse 
Artillery, in rear of the former. Approaching within 500 or 600 yards 
of the Egyptians, the guns were unmasked by the cavalry and brought 
quickly into action, ceasing fire when the Household Cavalry crossed in 
front to ride down the enemy. This moonlight charge was the most 
dramatic as it was one of the most gallant episodes of the campaign. 
It ended the battle in a brilliant and novel manner. 

The following telegrams from Arabi Pasha, published in the then 
official paper, give his view of this action. The translation is taken from 
the London Times newspaper : 

August 28. — Our victorious troops have worsted the enemy and made him retreat to 
Mahsameh, by the strength and power of God. At the present moment the two armies 
are facing each other at a distance of about 5,000 meters from Al-Mahsameh, and after 
a little rest, and when the horses have been watered, there will be a charge, please 
God. Give us the aid of your pure prayers in asking for succor from the Lord Al- 
mighty. 

August 28, 7.40 p. m. — The fighting has begun again. Cannon have been firing 
since 4 p. m. till 7.30 p. m., and still continue. I pray God for help against His enemies. 
Pray God to help His true believers. 

Till this hour the fighting continues with cannon and musketry. I thank God for 
the endurance He has given us, and pray for perfect help and victory. Pray to Him 
that He may help His servants, the true believers, and disappoint our treacherous 
enemies. It is now twenty minutes past eight in the evening. 

August 28, 11.15 p. m. — Thanks be to God, the fighting has ceased on both sides, 
after a serious engagement with musketry and cannon, followed by a charge by our 
cavalry on that of the enemy, when they were in a melee and used their swords against 
each other, after which they separated. God is the best protector. 

The results of this fight were of the greatest possible importance, 
small as was the force employed. It became evident, in the first place, 
that Arabi felt himself to be strong enough to assume the offensive and 
thus attempt to regain the prestige which he had lost at Magfar and 
Tel-el-Mahuta. In the second place, it showed the British that the 
task they had undertaken was likely to prove more than a parade across 
the desert, and that their enemy was willing to come within range and 
hold his own for hours together ; but it also showed that he would not 
stand an attack at close quarters, and that, unless in greatly superior 
numbers, he might be expected to give way if resolutely assailed. 

The value of the action in its influence on the morale of the British 
troops, and especially of the younger recruits, was incalculable. It gave 
them that self-reliance which can only be obtained through actual and 
successful contact with the enemy. 

The British left being well supported by the canal and its banks, the 
most obvious move on the part of the attack was to double up their 
right and force them back into the canal, cutting off communication 
with their rear. The Egyptians had no commander capable of realizing 
the importance of this object, and in consequence the main attack was 
in front, and the flanking movement half-hearted and unsuccessful. 



138 

The burying parties next morning found that many of the bodies had 
been shockingly mutilated during the night. The circumcised had all 
been spared. The persons committing these outrages followed a fixed 
plan which they applied to the uncircumcised corpses of both armies. 
Of these they had lopped off the feet, hands, and genitals, and had 
deeply gashed the abdomen and the upper part of the forehead. 

With this battle ends the first part of the campaign. On August 20 
Ismailia was seized, on the 26th Kassassin Lock occupied, and on the 
28th its possession secured to the British advance after an earnest 
effort at dislodgment by the Egyptians. 

The actual distance covered, a matter of 20 miles, is no measure of 
the result achieved. It must be borne in mind that in spite of certain 
favorable conditions, of which absence of rain was the principal, the 
advance was beset with many real difficulties. The railway was broken 
in several places and blocked at others. There were no locomotives to 
haul the trucks conveying stores from the base to the front, and the 
army transport had completely broken down. The draught animals 
were few and in poor condition, pack-mules were lacking in sufficient 
numbers, and camels were, practically, entirely wanting. The strong 
army carts, suitable for use on hard European roads, were so heavy 
as to stick hopelessly in the sand by their own weight. To each wagon 
designed for two horses not less than six were imperatively needed, and 
the more that could be hitched on the better. The navy was doing all 
it could to assist in getting supplies forward by the Sweet Water Canal 
(and its aid was of vital importance at this juncture). For the mo- 
ment it seemed doubtful whether even the few troops already pushed 
ahead could be maintained, and every effort was made towards keeping 
them furnished with the food requisite to enable them to pull through 
the crisis. To their excellent behavior, under the trying circumstances, 
all bear witness. They bore their privation, which was but one degree 
removed from being perilous, and their discomforts cheerfully and almost 
good-naturedly, but they suffered severely until the arrival of the loco- 
motives from Suez made it possible to supply them properly. 

The canal water was practically their sole supply (wells being rare, 
scant, and bad), and frequently this was loathsome. It is of light cof- 
fee color, due to the mud it contains. Filtration or decantation renders 
it clear, while its tlavor is, normally, extremely sweet and good; but 
the soldiers, having frequently no means of filtering or settling the 
water, had to drink it thick and tepid. Its excellent taste had been 
spoiled by the presence in the canal of the putrefying dead bodies of 
camels, horses, and human beings, and its innocuousness, in conse- 
quence, seriously questioned. Latterly it became too bad to support 
the fish that usually live in it, but that now died in large numbers, 
contributing their share to its offensiveness. Much labor was expended 
in cleaning out this reservoir of water, but the damage could not be 
entirely remedied. 



139 

In addition to this discomfort was the ever-present possibility of cut- 
ting the railway in rear, or of interrupting the caual traffic by strong 
raiding parties. Either of these contingencies would have seriously 
imperiled the troops at the front. 

Fears that these contingencies might be realized, combined with short 
rations, bad water, excessive heat, flies, mosquitoes, hard work, inade- 
quate shelter, sun-stroke, dysentery, and fever, rendered the advance 
more honorable than either safe or pleasant. 

The exertions made to meet the exigencies of the case are detailed 
under their appropriate heads. It is sufficient here to remark that the 
fight during the second part of the campaign was for adequate trans- 
port and for a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life for the troops 
already thrown to the front. 

In the mean time the 3d brigade, 2d division, composed of High- 
landers, had arrived at Ismailia. It was not landed at first, but was 
retained on the transports in the harbor, pending the solution of the 
transportation problem. 

On September 1 General Wolseley telegraphs to the Secretary of 
State for War, in London : 

Ismailia, September 1. 

In reply to your inquiry of 29th ultimo, circumstances have forced me ahead of 
transport, but it is rapidly becoming efficient. 

The necessity of securing a sufficient supply of fresh water in the canal rendered it 
imperative to push on as quickly as possible. 

My successes on the 24th and 25th, and retreat of the enemy, have enabled me to 
seize [the] two important positions on the canal of El Magfar and Kassassin Lock, 
the latter about 20 miles from this place. I am, therefore, in a more forward aud 
favorable position generally than I had anticipated, and am only now waiting till 
my transport arrangements are more complete, to enable me to make a further move- 
ment. 

In the absence of roads I had always calculated on partially using the canal and 
railway in sending supplies to the front, but the enemy having blocked the former 
by two large dams, and the latter by an embankment, and the partial removal of 
rails, it has been necessary to get these obstructions removed. I have one engine on 
the line, and expect a second from Suez to-night, and am preparing the land trans- 
port companies, some of which are now landing, to supplement the other means above 
indicated. 

A supply of mules has arrived from Cyprus. I expect 400 more from Malta and 
Italy to-morrow; and the large supply collected at Smyrna and Beyrout, at last re- 
leased by Ottoman Government, are on their way. 

In a desert country like this part of Egypt, it takes time to organize the lines of 
communication. 

The above telegram will make abundantly clear the state of affairs 
during this phase of the campaign. 

By September 2 the whole of the Indian Contingent had reached Suez 
except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and many of its troops had gone to the 
front. 

Except for an occasional reconnaissance, bringing about the inter, 
change of a few shots, and for one real assault, this period was one of 



140 

quiet preparation for a further advance, stores first, and then men, be- 
ing slowly accumulated at Kassassin. 

On September 6 the distribution of the forces was as is shown in the 
following table: 



Corps. 



Officers. 



Men. 



Horses. 



ISMAILIA. 

Cavalry : 

19th Hussars •. 

Infantry : 

Roy al Irish Fusiliers 

Royal Marine Light Infantry 

Royal Artillery: 

C battery, 3d brigade (C 3) 

J battery, 3d brigade (J. 3) 

F battery, 1st brigade (F. 1) 

5 battery, 1st brigade, Scottish division. 
Royal Engineers: 

8th and 18th companies 

Half of A troop 

Half of C troop 

Commissariat and Transport: 

2d, 8th, 11th, and 17th companies 

Ordnance Store Department 

Army Hospital Corps 

Indian Contingent: 

20th (Punjaub) Native Infantry 

Madras Sappers 

29th (Beloochees) Native Infantry 



NEFICHE. 



1st battalion Seaforth Highlanders 
7th Bengal Native Infantry 



TEL-EL-MAHUTA. 

Cavalry : 

4th Dragoon Guards 

Infantry : 

2d battalion Grenadier Guards 

2d battalion Coldstream Guards 

1st battalion Scots Guards 

Royal Artillery: 

J battery, 3d brigade (one-half) (J. 3).. 

N battery, 2d brigade (N. 2) 

I battery, 2d brigade (I. 2) 

5 battery, 1st brigade, Scottish division 
Royal Engineers: 

17th and 24th companies 

Detachment C troop 

Commissariat and Transport : 

12th company 

Army Hospital Corps : 

Field Hospital No. 2 

Half of No. 1 Bearer company 

Indian Contingent: 

13th Bengal Lancers 



MAHSAMEH. 

Cavalry : 

Household Cavalry 

7th Dragoon Guards 

Royal Horse ArtilleTy : 

N battery, A brigade (N. A) 

Armv Hospital Corps: 

No. 2 Bearer company 



KASSASSIN. 

Cavalry: 

19th Hussars 

4th Dragoon Guards , 

Mounted Infantry 

Infantry : 

Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 

Royal Marine Light Infantry 

Royal West Kent 

King's Royal Rifles 

York and Lancaster Regiment 

Royal Irish 

Royal Artillery : 

Royal Marine Artillerv (armed as infantry) . 

G battery, 3d brigade (horse) (G, 3) 

Abatterv, 1st brigade (field) (A. 2) 

D battery, 1st brigade (field) (D. 1) 



7 


130 


31 
3 


760 
101 


6 

6 
5 
3 


167 
168 
132 
129 


12 
2 
2 


235 
75 
76 


21 
5 

24 


744 

78 
200 


9 

7 
10 


490 

251 

485 


32 
6 


749 
512 



292 

668 
712 
700 



186 

190 

65 

113 



130 



70 



25 


430 


29 


500 


7 


174 


4 


98 


7 


130 


1 


38 


4 


76 


26 


680 


37 


850 


30 


800 


21 


661 


28 


689 


30 


735 


15 


424 


7 


174 


7 


194 



141 



Corps. 



Kassassin— Continued. 
Hoyal Engineers : 

'Half of A troop 

Half of C troop 

17th and 24th companies 

Commissariat and Transport : 

12th and 15th companies 

Army Hospital Corps : 

Field hospital No. S 

One-half IS T o. 1 Bearer company 

Indian Contingent: 

2d Regiment, Bengal Cavalry 

6th Regiment. Bengal Cavalry 

13th Regiment, Bengal Lancers 

7th battery, 1st brigade, Northern division 



Officers. 


Men. 


4 


105 


5 


82 


4 


138 


4 


260 


8 


37 


4 


73 


6 


180 


2 


120 


4 


250 


5 


247 



Horses. 



305 

25 
19 

198 

128 

275 

10 



(This last battery carried 7-pdr. screw-jointed guns on the backs of mules.) 

On September 9 the Egyptians made a desperate effort to crush the 
British force at Kassassin. The following is the official report of the 
engagement: 

Camp Kassassin, September 10, 1882. 

Sir: I have the honor to acquaint you that the enemy made a combined attack yes- 
terday morning upon this position, one column advancing from the north from the 
•Salihieh direction, the other from Tel-el- Kebir. Arabi Pasha was on the ground, but 
the attacking troops were commanded by Ali Fehmi Pasha, Rashld Pasha being, it 
is asserted by prisoners, in disgrace for having lost his camp and guns in the fight of 
the 25th ultimo, at Mahsameh station. The enemy's force was about thirty guns, 
of which we took four, and seventeen battalions of infantry, several squadrons of 
eavalry, and a few thousand Bedouins. 

From the information I have obtained from prisoners, it wonld seem that the enemy 
expected an easy victory, thinking the force here was only a weak advance guard. 

The troops in camp, when the attack began, were, as below, under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Willis, commanding 1st division. With these he immediately 
moved out, attacked and drove back the enemy, who retreated with loss within their 
line of works at Tel-el-Kebir, from which they opened an angry but harmless fire upon 
our troops, which had been halted beyond the range of their guns. 

Our troops moved with great steadiness, and Major-General Graham has especially 
brought to my notice the dashing manner in which two Krupp guns were taken by 
the battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry, and the excellent manner in which 
that battalion was handled by its confmanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. 

Our casualties were 3 men killed and 2 officers and 78 men wounded. Lieutenant 
Purvis, of H. M. S. Penelope, is amongst those who were severely wounded. He 
was in command of the naval detachment that was serving the 40-pdr., which is 
mounted on a railway truck. He is a very good officer, and I have to regret very 
much the loss of his valuable services with this army. With the exception of five, 
who were too severely injured to be moved by railway, all the wounded were sent to 
Ismailia last night, and those five were sent there this evening by the Fresh Water 
Canal. 

I have, &c, 

G. J. WOLSELEY, 

General, 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Egypt. 

The troops engaged were those enumerated in table (p. 140), as at 
Kassassin, with certain changes. Thus the detachment of 4th Dra- 



142 

goon Guards and the Mounted Infantry had joined the cavalry at Mah- 
saineh; of the Engineers, A and troops and the 17th company are 
not included among those that took part in the action, nor are the Com- 
missariat and Transport companies. Battery N.A, Eoyal Horse Artil- 
lery, worked with the Indian cavalry, while half of Battery 5.1 Scottish 
division, had come up and established three 25-pdrs. for the permanent 
defense of the position. These were "behind breastworks on the south 
side of the canal, close to the lock. 

The camp was situated near this lock, between the railway embank- 
ment and the canal, in a plain surrounded by hills on the west, north, 
and east. 

Two batteries of field artillery, A and D.l, were in gun-pits north of 
the camp, facing to the westward, the left of D.l resting on the rail- 
way. Upon the latter were the captured Krupp 8 cm gun, worked by 
Captain Tucker's detachment of Eoyal Marine Artillery, already men- 
tioned, and a B. L. E. 40-pdr. on an armored truck manned by blue- 
jackets from H. M. S. Penelope, described elsewhere. 

The Egyptian attack was meaut to be from two sides — on the west 
by a sortie of the Tel-el-Kebir garrison, and on the north by a body 
from Salihieh, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 5,000 men. 

There appears to be little doubt that the British came near being 
surprised. Early in the morning Colonel Pennington, of the 13th Bengal 
Lancers, going out to the westward to post vedettes, found the Egyp- 
tians advancing in force. Although but 50 men were with him, he 
dismounted them behind a ridge, and deliberately opened fire on the 
advancing enemy, and, when hard pushed, charged five squadrons of 
cavalry, killing ten men and capturing five horses. Immediate and 
timely warning of the impending danger was thus given to those in camp, 
enabling the line of battle to be formed, as shown in the accompany- 
ing diagram, not drawn to scale : 



M. A. 



ttt 



25 



D. C. L. I. pounders. 



Lock 
> and 
, Bridge. 



|(| Krupp 

1 cm. 
Infantry. J 



Rifles. Marines. 
Y. &L. 
W. K. and 
Eoyal Irish. 



Artillery. Indian 



i I 40 pdr. 
i.L.E. 



D.l.A.l. 



7. 1. G. B. 



Cavalry 



KA. 



The cavalry and battery N. A., Eoyal Horse Artillery, were kept back 
in anticipation of a move from the direction of Salihieh. 

By about 7 a. m. Arabi had succeeded in posting most of his guns on 
an eminence known as Mnth Hill, 2,000 yards to the British right front, 
while his infantry deployed for attack, with the right resting on the 



143 

canal, and then advanced to within 1,200 yards. A few of his troops 
were south of the canal. 

The testimony to the accuracy of the Egyptian artillery practice is very 
general, shot after shot falling admirably into the camp and lines. The 
shells, however, burst so indifferently as to neutralize the excellence of 
the aim. 

Batteries A.l and D.l, partly on account of the enemy's fire, and 
partly because of some uneven ground iu their front, soon left the pits 
and advanced slightly. These batteries, aided by G.B. and 7.1 on the 
right, and the railway guns on the left, replied vigorously with shell and 
shrapnel. The 25-pdrs. did excellent work on the enemy's right on 
both sides of the canal, sending their projectiles over the heads of the 
British infantry until the advance was begun. Batteries A.l and D.l 
shot down the detachments of two of the captured guns, which were 
seized by the line as it advanced. The other two were carried by a 
charge of the marines in their forward march. The battalion, in regu- 
lar formation for attack, came upon a battery of four guns which was 
playing briskly upon it at the distance of 1,400 yards. Without return- 
ing a shot, the marines kept on until they were 400 yards away, when 
they began firing volleys by half companies, still continuing the march. 
This steady work proved too severe for the Egyptians, who broke and 
ran, leaving two of the four guns behind. 

The infantry, also engaged, held its ground for an hour and a half, a 
forward movement not being permitted until it should be definitely 
known that no danger was to be apprehended from the north. At 8.30 
it was deemed prudent to assume the offensive, and the line was ordered 
to advance, the extreme right being, however, kept refused. The in- 
fantry and the four batteries of artillery on its right moved forward 
about a thousand yards, and re-engaged the enemy, who had retired. 
At 9.30 the advance was resumed, and the Egyptians were slowly driven 
back into their intrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir. These fortifications 
were approached to within 5,000 or 6,000 yards, more for the purpose of 
observation than of assault. At 12.30 the British started to return to 
Kassassin. 

In this action the British artillery proved its value, and received 
credit for the manner in which it was handled. The infantry had less 
opportunity of distinguishing itself, for the Egyptians were unwilling 
to engage at short range. 

The repulse did not take the form of a rout, although little doubt can 
be entertained that the retreating army would not have stopped at Tel- 
el- Kebir had a vigorous assault been attempted. In. fact, the British 
troops, both officers and men, were extremely anxious to continue the 
advance ; General Wolseley, however, would not give his consent, but 
ordered the withdrawal to Kassassin, merely observing that he was not 
ready. 

The Salihieh contingent was late in arriving on the scene of action. 



144 

It failed to unite with the troops from Tel-el-Kebir, and it was met by 
the cavalry division, under Major General Drury-Lowe, in the desert 
north of the lines. Seeing the impossibility of joining Arabi, in the 
face of the force unexpectedly found ready to receive him, its com- 
mander withdrew before General Drury-Lowe's advance, losing a field 
gun in his retreat. There was no fighting at this point. 

The failure of the movement was attributed by the Egyptians to their 
having kept too far to the eastward. 

The Egyptian version of the affair is worth reading. It runs as fol- 
lows, and is from a telegram sent by Arabi to the ministry of war at 
Cairo : 

September 9. — Last night some mounted Arabs of the province of Sharkiyeh, belong- 
ing to the tribes of Nakiat, Tamailat, Ayad, and Haim, rode out towards the enemy 
at 2 a. m., under the command of Ali Bey Ismet, superintendent of the Arabs, and 
with them Captain Abdul Hamid Effendi Hamdy and 40 cavalry soldiers. They went 
forward as far as the enemy's outposts, rode at them, and fired a volley, which made 
them retire, and then the Arabs found forty-five oxen grazing [sic] which they drove 
off, while some of the party remained to keep back the enemy. At sunrise the enemy 
came out with infautry, cavalry, and artillery, and firing began, and continued on 
both sides for about an hour. Then the Arabs charged like lions, displaying a cour- 
age and bravery which enabled them to drive back the enemy, who were much more 
numerous than themselves. Then they followed the enemy, driving them until they 
had killed about 100 of them, and dispersed the rest, driving them back into their 
tents. The Arabs captured the oxen, about 500 meters of torpedo wire, and other 
military stores, and they returned to their posts victorious. This engagement, in- 
cluding the attack and pursuit, lasted about six hours. * * * Thanks be to God, 
not one of the Arabs nor of the soldiers was wounded. Give this news to those under 
your administration. 

Also, a second telegram, dated September 10 (Arabic) : 

On this day, September 9, an engagement took place with the enemy at 5 a. m. 
Our force was composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the two directions of 
Ras-el-Ouady and of Salihieh. After the enemy had hidden himself behind his in- 
trenchments at the bridge of Al-Kassassin, our troops retired to their x>osts in perfect 
order, and when there was a considerable distance between them the enemy came out 
of his retrenchments and endeavored to cut off our troops. The engagement lasted 
till 5 p. m., when the enemy retreated, defeated with great loss, to Al-Kassassin- 
Thanks be to God, our losses were very small in comparison with those of the enemy. 
We and our officers and the conquering army, his excellency Mahmoud Pasha Samy,* 
and his officers and soldiers, are all in perfect health, our two divisions being at their 
post in perfect condition of readiness; and we pray God to give us the victory over 
our enemies and to strengthen our courageous men against them, for the sake of the 
Lord of the beginning and of the end. Amen. O Lord of the Universe. 

A more minute account is rendered three days later: 

September 12.— I give you good news, which will cause you joy and will delight 
each individual of the people — namely, that the engagement of Saturday (9th Sep- 
tember) was the most serious battle that has yet taken place between us and the 
English, for the force of both armies was very great, and the fighting lasted for twelve 
hours, with impetuosity and daring, while the cannonade and the discharge of mus- 
ketry were unceasing, pouring down like rain on the field of battle. Still we lost only 

* The commandant at Salihieh. 



145 

31 men, martyrized, and 150 were slightly, not dangerously, wounded, according to 
the official returns presented by the various regiments, with great exactness and pre- 
cision. It had been thought that our casualties would have been double that number 
owing to the seriousness of the engagement and its long duration. Moreover, from 
true observation it has been proved to us that the number of the enemy killed and 
remaining on the field of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were insufficient for 
carrying off the wounded. * * * 

In the writing of dispatches, if in nothing else, Arabi was truly Na- 
poleonic. 

On September 9 the Highland brigade, under Major-G-eneral Alison, 
K. 0. B., started from Ismailia for the front. 

The 10th, 11th, and 12th were occupied in bringing up the troops to 
Kassassin and in making preparations for a general advance. 

During the latter part of this second or quiescent period of the cam- 
paign, reconnaissances were made daily in the direction of Tel el-Kebir, 
but serious engagements were strictly forbidden. The military hab- 
its of the Egyptians were carefully studied. On one occasion Colonel 
Buller, V.C., C.B., G. M. G., of the Intelligence Department, managed to 
get around the enemy's flank as far as Karaini, and to ascertain that his 
outposts at night were withdrawn to very near the trenches. 

The transport question, the only obstacle in the way of further offen- 
sive operations on the part of General Wolseley, had received a so- 
lution which, if not complete, was measurably satisfactory. The rail- 
way service had been developed to an extent sufficient to permit the 
accumulation of supplies beyond the needs of daily consumption, and 
the anxiety which had been experienced in the earlier stages of the 
campaign had given place to impatience to resume the march to Cairo. 
The war now passes into its last period. 

The following table gives the disposition and a fairly trustworthy 
enumeration of the Egyptian forces at this time. 





In command. 


Infantry. 


Artillery. 


Cavalry. 


« o 

cS O 

i— i TS 

u 
H 




Place. 


no 

s 

'3d 




w 





& 


a 

3 


p 

s 




o 
H 


Tel-el-Kebir 


Arabi Pasha, Ali Ru- 
by Pasha. 

Toulba Pasha 

Halil Khamil 


8 

2 


24, 000 
6,000 


60 

40 
18 
18 
12 


1,000 

800 
350 
350 
200 


2 


1,000 


2,500 

6,000 
5, 0(0 
5, 000 
5,000 


38, 500 
12 800 








200 
200 


5,550 


Aboukir and Rosetta . . 


Khoutshid Pasha 

Mahmoud Samy Pa- 
sha 
Abdul Al Pasha 


3 

2 
4 


9,000 

5,500 
12, 000 


14, 550 
5,200 

5,500 




















12, 000 



















Total regulars, say 60,000 ; total irreguls 

948 EG 10 



say 34,000 ; grand total, about 94,000 men. 



,146 

XIII. 

THE BATTLE OF TEL-EL-EEBIE AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE JTAR. 

To remain behind and guard the line of communication during the 
forward movement now to be undertaken, the following detail of men 
was made : 



Place. 



British troops. 



Indian Contingent. 



19th Hus- 
sars. 



Ismailia . . 
Nefiche . . . 
Mahuta . . . 
Mahsameh 
Kassassin 



800 of the Manchester Regiment 

50 of the West Kent Regiment 

100 of the West Kent Regiment 

100 of the West Kent Regiment 

200 of the West Kent Regiment 

24th and 26th companies Royal Engineers 



500 native infantry . . . 
150 native infantry . .. 

50 native infantry 

100 native infantry . . . 



1 troop. 
1 troop. 



1 troop. 



At 2 p. m. on September 12, the army having concentrated at Kas- 
sassin, the Boyal Irish Fusiliers being the last battalion to arrive, two 
days' rations were served out for man and beast. At 5 p. m. the men's 
valises (newpattern of knapsack), blankets, and all baggage were stacked 
beside the railway, and a non-commissioned officer and two men detailed 
from each company to stay by them. After sunset no bugles were allowed 
to be sounded. The camp was to be left under the command of General 
Nugent, E. E. 

The regimental transport was ordered to carry cooking utensils, two 
days' rations, one day's fuel, butchers' tools and signaling instruments, 
together with as many overcoats or blankets as could be taken without 
overloading ; to be brigaded at daylight of the next day, and to follow 
along the northern side of the canal. With each battalion were to go 
the usual water-carts and stretchermen (four to each company). The 
men were to carry two days' provisions in their haversacks, and, before 
starting, were to fill their water-bottles with tea. Each man had on his 
person 100 rounds of ammunition, and 30 additional rounds per man were 
to follow in rear on mules. 

After dark all tents were struck and piled near the railway, and the 
camp fires were left burning. The troops formed in order of battle as 
shown on Plate 49. In the 1st division the formation was by half 
battalions in columns of companies; in the 2d division, by half battal- 
ions in double company columns at deploying intervals, thus : 

2d division. 1st division. 



The batteries of artillery were all placed by 10 p. m., and the other 
corps formed on them. The men then rested on their arms waiting for 
the word to advance. The right of the Highland brigade, the guiding 



147 

point, was to follow a line of telegraph poles, 100 yards apart, which had 
been planted the evening before by the Telegraph Troop, and when these 
ended was to be directed by Lieutenant Wyatt Rawson, R. N., naval 
aid-de-cainp to General Wolseley. The vacant space in the front line 
was covered by a succession of infantry files at intervals of ten paces. 
Similar files maintained the distance and communication between the 
leading and supporting brigades in each division, while the intervals be- 
tween the artillery and the neighboring infantry brigades were bridged 
over by mounted non-commissioned officers. The attack on the intrench- 
ments of Tel-el-Kebir was to be made at the point of the bayonet, in 
the same formation, without change except in deploying the rear com- 
panies. 

During the march several halts were made to rest the troops, one, 
towards 3 a. m., being nearly an hour in length. Daybreak was the 
time fixed for arrival at the fortified lines, and it would have been as 
undesirable to reach them too soon as too late. 

The position selected by the Egyptians for a final stand was by nature 
the strongest it was possible to find in that flat section of country. Near 
the station of Tel-el-Kebir there is a general and gradual ri§e of the ground 
towards the west, culminating in a range of hills that stretch from a point 
on the railway, about a mile and a half east of the station, northward to 
Salihieh. Roughly parallel to the Sweet Water Canal is a second series 
of hills intersecting the first about two miles distant from the railway 
(at Q on Plate 50). Viewed from the railway this east and west range 
appears as a moderate hill. Its real character, however, is that of a 
table-land sloping away to the northward, with a rather steeper descent 
towards the south. The generally even nature of the ground is seen in 
Plate 51, together with its extreme barrenness, amounting to desola- 
tion. 

The Egyptian intrenchments were laid out along the crests of these 
two ranges, the north and south lines being prolonged over two miles 
beyond the intersection. 

The plan included an ample dry ditch, from 8 to 12 feet wide, and 
from 5 to 9 feet deep, in front of a breastwork from 4 to 6 feet high, 
with a banquette in rear. The trace was broken by occasional salients 
where were placed well-designed redoubts possessing a wide command 
on either flank. The sides of these redoubts are marked on Plate 50. 
In rear were frequent shelter trenches irregularly spaced. Passages 
through the parapet for field pieces and vehicles were provided in va- 
rious places, and were guarded by outlying traverses and breastworks. 
The revetment differed mainly in the care which had been bestowed 
upon it, and consisted mostly of reeds, grass, &c. The interior slopes 
were the only ones thus treated. (See Plate 52.) 

The southern portion of the defenses was practically completed at 
the time of the battle. Here the revetment was neatly finished, as in 
Plate 54. Work was in progress on the northern and western lines, 
their extremities being scarcely more than laid out. 



148 

The extent of these defensive works, which is enormous in compari- 
son with the number of troops at Arabi's disposal, would seem to imply 
an inordinate reliance upon mere ditches and breastworks to keep out 
an enemy, however vigorous. It led, as a necessary consequence, to the 
excessive spreading-out of the defenders, and the fatal weakening of the 
force which could be gathered at any given point. Had the same amount 
of labor been expended in several concentric lines, it would have resulted 
in a position of great strength, permitting the retiring, if necessary, from 
one line to the next, and an almost indefinite prolonging of the tight. 

At the southern end of the line (see Plate 50) there were two well- 
built redoubts, one on each bank of the canal, mounting three guns. A 
view of these redoubts is given on Plate 54, while sections and the 
plan of that on the northern bank are seen on Plate 55. Connecting 
the two, and stopping the How of water in the Sweet Water Canal, was 
a stout dam. 

The section of the parapet between the canal and the railway is shown 
at B, Plate 55. In rear of this line were various shelters, some of which 
are given in section at C, I), and F of the same plate. 

On each side of the railway was one gun. The form of the gun em- 
placement is shown at E. 

Plate 56, A 1 H is a section through the gap and its defenses ; I J 
K are sections of the parapet and shelters adjoining. A view of L is 
given on Plate 02. 

In front of this portion of the lines, and distant about 1,100 yards, was 
a formidable outwork marked M on Plate 50, and given in plan and 
section on Plate 56. This was a polygonally-shaped redoubt, entirely 
lacking in protection against reverse lire. It was provided with an 
envelope in front and on either flank. It mounted eight guns. From 
an inspection of the section, it is seen that the battery itself had no 
banquette between the embrasures, and hence was ill-adapted to de- 
fense by musketry. Once the men were driven out of the envelope, 
the battery itself would surely fall. It may be pointed out that this 
defect exists in all the batteries at Tel-el-Kebir. 

N is a four-gun battery, in rear of which, on the highest point of the 
inclosure, was a lookout aud telegraph station, the wire running back to 
Arabi's headquarters, near the railway station, and in the midst of a 
large camp. The diminished size of the ditch from this part of the lines 
northward is very noticeable. The attack was evidently hoped for at 
and near the railway. 

At Q the junction of the two series of intrenchments was the most 
elaborately finished of all the redoubts. It mounted five guns, as shown 
on Plate 15. It had no envelope, but was amply provided with trav- 
erses and expense magazines. This battery was the left of the attack, 
being struck fairly by the Highland Light Infantry, the extreme left 
battalion of the line. It is on the second of a succession of knolls, on 
each of which a battery was constructed. 



149 

The lines adjoining as far as V were carried by the Highland brigade. 
The forms of the parapet are given in Plate 57, where they are marked 
R S, S T, T Y, respectively. They are much less effective as defenses 
than those to the southward, and, as the event proved, were incapable 
of acting as serious obstacles to resolute men. 

Battery V, Plate 58, was a formidable work within a spacious en- 
velope, and mounted five gnus. The work itself was completed, but 
parts of the accessory defenses were still unfinished. It was turned by 
the Highlanders, who passed to the southward. 

The attack of the 2d brigade took place in next liue of trenches as 
far as W. The ditch, as seen by the section at V, Plate 59, was of the 
same general character as that encountered by the Highlanders, but 
was a trifle larger in its dimensions. It varied, however, not being a 
completed work. 

The redoubts W and Y are shown both in plan and section on the 
same plate. As indicated, this part of the line was hardly begun. 

As regards the east and west line, from A' and E' to O', enough of 
the details are shown on Plate CO to make its character clear. It was 
absolutely useless in the battle, being taken by the Highlanders in rear 
and by the second brigade in the flank. 

The soil at Tel-el-Kebir is sand and gravel, easily worked, but as 
easily displaced. The interior slopes were revetted with tufts of grass, 
&c, while the exterior slopes were allowed to assume their natural talus. 
The ground is hard enough to retain, approximately, the shape indicated 
in the ditch sections, but the passage of the first few men invariably 
broke down the sides of the ditch, making a causeway for those who came 
behind. 

A defect of design in the redoubts is the lack of sufficient depres- 
sion to the soles of the embrasures. In consequence, the projectiles 
were harmless at close quarters, passing well over the heads of the 
British. 

The account of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, contained in General 
Wolseley's report, is given below at full length. The omitted para- 
graphs relate to events subsequent to the action, and are quoted else- 
where : 

Cairo, September 16, 1882. 

Sir: I have already had the honor of reporting to you by telegraph that I attacked 
the intrenched position of Tel-el-Kebir a little before sunrise on the morning of the 
13th instant, completely defeating the enemy, with very great loss, and capturing 
fifty-nine field guns, vast quantities of ammunition, military stores, and supplies of 

all sorts. 

* * # *» * * * 

From the daily reconnaissance of the position at Tel-el-Kebir made from our camp 
at Kassassiu, especially from the good view I obtained of the enemy's works on the 
9th instant, when our troops drove back within the intrenchments the force of thir- 
teen battalions, five squadrons, and eighteen guns that had attacked our camp in the 
morning, it was evident that their works were of great extent and of a formidable 
character. All the information obtained from spies and prisoners led me to believe 



lftO 

that tlie enemy's force at Tel-el-Kebir consisted of from sixty to seventy horsed guns r 
which were mostly distributed along their line of works, of two infantry divisions 
(twenty-four battalions) of about 20,000 men, and three regiments of cavalry, to- 
gether with about 6,000 Bedouins and irregulars, besides a force of about 5,000 men, 
with twenty-four guns, at Salihieh, all under the immediate command of Arabi Pasha. 
I have since been able to verify these numbers, which are certainly not overstated, 
except as regards the number of guns at Tel-el-Kebir, which I believe to have been 
fifty-nine, the number we took in the works and during the pursuit. 

Owing to the numerous detachments I was obliged to make for the defense of my 
long line of communications from Suez to Ismailia, and thence on to Kassassin, and 
owing to the losses incurred in previous actions, I could only place in line about 11,000 
bayonets, 2,000 sabers, and sixty field guns. 

The enemy's position was a strong one. There was no cover of any kind in the des- 
ert lying between my camp at Kassassin and the enemy's works north of the cauaL 
These works extended from a point on the canal l-£ miles east of the railway station 
of Tel-el-Kebir for a distance almost due north of about 3-| miles. 

The general character of the ground which forms the northern boundary of the val- 
ley through which the Ismailia Canal and railway run is that of gently undulating 
and rounded slopes, which rise gradually to a fine open plateau from 90 to 100 feet 
above the valley. The southern extremity of this plateau is about a mile from the 
railway, and is nearly parallel to it. To have marched over this plateau upon the 
enemy's position by daylight our troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like 
slope in full view of the enemy, and under the fire of his well-served artillery, for 
about 5 miles. Such an operation would have entailed enormous losses from an enemy 
with guns and men well protected by intrenchments from any artillery fire we could 
have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the enemy's position either by the 
right or left was an operation that would have entailed a very wide turning move- 
ment, and therefore a long, difficult, and fatiguing march, and what is of more im- 
portance, it would not have accomplished the object I had in view, namely, to grapple 
with the enemy at such close quarters that he should not be able to shake himself free 
from our clutches except by a general fight of all his army. I wished to make the 
battle a final one; whereas a wide turning movement would probably have only forced 
him to retreat, and would have left him free to have moved his troops in good order to 
some other position further back. My desire was to fight him decisively where he 
was in the open desert before he could retire to take up fresh positions more difficult 
of access in the cultivated country in his rear. That cultivated country is practically 
impassable to a regular army, being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep 
canals. 

I had ascertained by frequent reconnaissances, that the enemy did not push his out- 
posts far beyond his works at night, and I had good reason for believing that he then 
kept a very bad look-out. These circumstances, and the very great reliance I had in 
the steadiness of our splendid infantry, determined me to resort to the extremely diffi- 
cult operation of a night march, to be followed by an attack before daylight, on the 
enemy's position. The result was all I could have wished for. 

At dawn on the morning of the 12th instant, accompanied by all the generals and 
brigadiers, I inspected the enemy's works aud explained to them my intended plan of 
attack, and gave to each a sketch showing the formation in which it was to be effected. 

As soon as it was dark, on the evening of the 12th instant, I struck my camp at 
Kassassin, and the troops moved into position, the left being at near the point marked 
"Ninth Hill" on sketch A, where they bivouacked. 

No fires were allowed, and even smoking was prohibited, and all were ordered to 
maintain the utmost silence throughout the night's operation. At 1.30 a. m. on the 
morning of the 13th instant, I gave the order for the advance of the 1st and 2d 
divisions simultaneously. The night was very dark, and it was difficult to maintain 
the desired formation, but, by means of connecting files between the battalions and 
brigades, and between the first and second lines, and through the untiring exertions of 



151 

the generals and the officers of the staff generally, this difficulty was effectually over- 
come. 

The Indian Contingent — 7. 1, E. A. (mountain battery), 1st battalion Seaforth High- 
landers, 3d battalion Native Infantry, made up of detachments of 7th Bengal Native 
Infantry, 20th Punjaub Infantry, and 29th (Beloochees) — under Major-General Sir H. 
Macpherson, and the Naval Brigade, under Captain Fitz Roy, R. N., did not move 
until 2.30 a. m. To have moved them earlier would have given the alarm to the 
enemy, owing to the number of villages in the cultivated land south of the canal. 

Telegraphic communication by means of an insulated cable was kept up through 
Kassassin all through the night between the Indian Contingent, on the south of the 
canal, and the Royal Marine Artillery, with which I moved, in rear of the 2d division. 

In moving over the desert at night there are no landmarks to guide one's move- 
ments. We had, consequently, to direct our course by the stars. This was well and 
correctly effected, and the leading brigades of each division both reached the enemy's 
works within a couple of minutes of each other. 

The enemy were completely surprised, and it was not until one or two of their ad- 
vanced sentries fired their rifles that they realized our close proximity to their works. 
These were, however, very quickly lined with infantry, who opened a deafening 
musketry fire, and their guns came into action immediately. Our troops advanced 
steadily without firing a shot, in obedience to the orders they had received, and when 
close to the works, went straight for them, charging with a ringing cheer. 

Major-General Graham reports: "The steadiness of the advance of the 2d brigade 
gade (2d Royal Irish Regiment, Royal Marine Light Infantry, 2d battalion York and 
Lancaster Regiment, 1st battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers), under what appeared to be 
an overwhelming fire of musketry and artillery, will remain a proud remembrance." 

The 2d brigade was well supported by the brigade of Guards under His Royal High^- 
ness the Duke of Connaught. 

On the left, the Highland brigade (1st battalion Royal Highlanders, 1st battalion 
Gordon Highlanders, 1st battalion Cameron Highlanders, 2d battalion Highland 
Light Infantry), under Major-General Sir A. Alison, had reached the works a few 
minutes before the 2d brigade had done so, and in a dashing manner stormed them 
at the point of the bayonet, without firing a shot until within the enemy's lines. 
They were well supported by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and the 3d Royal 
Rifles, both under the command of Colonel Ashburnham of the last-named corps. 

In the center, between these two attacks, marched seven batteries of artillery, 
deployed into one line, under the command of Brigadier-General Goodenough, and 
after the capture of the enemy's works several of these batteries did good service, 
and inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy, in some instances firing canister at 
short ranges. 

On the extreme left the Indian Contingent and the NaA r al Brigade, under the com- 
mand of Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V. C, advanced steadily and in silence, 
the Seaforth Highlanders leading until an advanced battery of the enemy was reached 
(it is not shown in sketch A), when it was most gallantly stormed by the Highlanders, 
supported by the Native Infantry battalions. 

The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, attached temporarily to General Mac- 
pherson, did good service in pursuing the enemy through the village of Tel-el-Kebir. 

The Indian Contingent scarcely lost a man, a happy circumstance, which I attribute 
to the excellent arrangements made by General Macpherson, and to the fact that, start- 
ing one hour later than the 1st and 2d divisions, the resistance of the enemy was so 
shaken by the earlier attacks north of the canal that he soon gave way before the im- 
petuous onslaught of the Seaforth Highlanders. 

The Cavalry division, on the extreme right of the line, swept round the northern 
extremity of the enemy's works, charging the enemy's troops as they endeavored to 
escape. Most of the enemy, however, threw away their arms, and, begging for mercy* 
were unmolested by our men. To have made them prisoners would have taken up 
too much time, the cavalry being required for the more important work of pushing 
on to Cairo. 



152 

Such is a general outline of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. All the previous actions of 
this short campaign were chiefly cavalry and artillery affairs ; but that of the 13th 
instant was essentially an infantry battle, and was one that, from the time we started, 
at 1.30 a. m., until nearly 6 a. m., when it was practically over, was peculiarly cal- 
culated to test, in the most crucial manner, the quality and the fighting discipline of 
our infantry. 

I do not believe that at any previous period of our military history has the British 
infantry distinguished itself more than upon this occasion. 

I have heard it said of our present infantry regiments that the men are too young, 
and their training for maneuvering and for fighting and their powers of endurance 
are not sufficient for the requirements of modern war. After a trial of an exception- 
ally severe kind, both in movement and attack, I can say emphatically that I never 
wish to have under my orders better infantry battalions than those whom I am proud 
to have commanded at Tel-el-Kebir. 

Our casualties have been numerous, but not so many as I had anticipated. Her 
Majesty has to deplore the loss of many gallant men, who died as became the soldiers 
of an army that is proud of the glorious traditions it has inherited. 

It would be impossible in this dispatch to bring to your notice the services of those 
officers whom I consider especially worthy of mention. I shall do so in a subsequent 
dispatch, but I cannot close this without placing on record how much I am indebted 
to the following officers who took part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and who, by their 
zeal and ability, contributed so largely to its success: 

General Sir John Adye, K. C. B., chief of the staff'; Lieutenant-Generals Willis and 
Sir E. Hamley, Major- Generals Sir A. Alison, His Eoyal Highness the Duke of Con- 
naught, Drury-Lowe, Sir H. Macpherson, and Graham; Brigadier-Generals Good- 
enough, R. A., Sir Baker Russell,- the Honorable J. Dormer; Deputy Adjutant-General 
Tanner, and Colonel Ashburnham, who temporarily commanded a brigade during the 
action ; and to Captain Fitz Roy, who commanded the Naval Brigade. 

Brigadier-General Nugent, R. E., remained during the action in command of the 
camp left at Kassassin to cover the rear of the army operating in his immediate front 
and to protect that position, with all its stores and depots, from any possible attack 
from the enemy's force at Salihieh. He rejoined me ; n the evening at Tel-el-Kebir, 
having carried out the orders he had received. 

The medical arrangements were all they should have been, and reflect the highest 
credit upon Surgeon-General Hanbury. 

In the removal of the wounded on the 13th and 14th instant to Ismailia, the canal- 
boat service, worked by the Royal Navy, under Commander Moore, R. N., did most 
excellent work, and the army is deeply indebted to that officer and to those under his 
command for the aid he afforded the wounded, and for the satisfactory manner in 
which he moved a large number of them by water to Ismailia. 

No exertion has been spared on the part of Major-General Earle, commanding the 
line of communications, and of Commissary-General Morris, to supply all the wants 
of this army during its advance from Ismailia. 

To the headquarters staff, and to officers composing the staff of each division, my 
best thanks are due for the able manner in which they performed their duty. 

In conclusion I wish to express my deep sense of the high military spirit displayed 
throughout the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and during all our previous engagements, by 
commanding officers, by all regimental officers, and by evt-ry non-commissioned officer 
and private now serving in Egypt. I have also the honor to inclose a roll of the 
casualties which occurred at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. 

Major George Fitz George, 20th Hussars, the senior member of my personal staff, is 
the bearer of this dispatch, and I have the honor to recommend him to your favorable 
consideration. 

I have, &c, 

G. J. WOLSELEY, General, 
Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in Egypt. 



153 



Summary of the killed, wounded, and missinq in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir 



Killed. 



Corps. 



Staff, army corps 

Staff, 1st division - 

2d battalion Grenadier Guards 

2d battalion Coldstream Guards 

1st batta ion Scots Guards 

2d battalion Royal Irish 

Royal Ma line Light Infantry 

2d battalion York and Lancaster 

1st battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers 

19th Hussars 

2d battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 

Royal Artillery - 

1st battalion Royal Highlanders 

1st battalion Gordon Highlanders 

1st batt lion Cameron Highlanders 

2d battalion Highland Light Infantry 

3rd battalion King's Royal Rifles 

1st battalion Seaforth Highlanders 

Native troops 

Chaplains 



■I a 

a to 



Wounded. 



It 

II 
6° 



Missing. 



§0 



•s a 



a a 



27 353 



Since dead. 



tOne since dead. 



The fullness of General Wolseley's official report renders extensive 
comment unnecessary; nevertheless a few words maybe added to make 
the individual parts of the battle more distinct. 

It may be observed, passim, that the night march offered two great 
advantages : avoidance of the heat of day-time and a period of fourteen 
hours' light for pursuit of the Egyptians if defeated. 

Practically there were three separate but nearly simultaneous in- 
fantry attacks: by the 1st division, under General Willis; by the 2d 
division, under General Hamley; and away on the extreme left, south 
of the canal, by the Indian Contingent, under General Macpherson. In 
point of time, General Hamley's was somewhat earlier than the others, 
and General Macpherson's the last of the three. 

When the action began, at early dawn, General Willis' leading bri- 
gade, commanded by Major-General Graham, was about 900 yards from 
the intrenchments. Partly owing to the difficulty of keeping a proper 
alignment during the night march, partly to the fact that the line of 
march was not normal to the line of the earthworks, and partly to the 
confusion created by an Egyptian scout who galloped into his lines, 
General Willis was obliged to form again under heavy fire, changing 
front forward on the left company before assaulting, adopting the reg- 
ular attack formation. At 300 yards' distance a volley was fired by the 
British, after which they rushed up to 150 yards' distance, fired a second 



154 

volley, and then reached the ditch. Here the fighting line was joined by 
the supports, a last volley delivered, the ditch jumped, and the works 
cleared at the point of the bayonet. As soon as the brigade reached 
the parapet, the Egyptians broke and ran, some stopping occasionally 
to fire back at their pursuers, who chased them for upwards of a mile, 
only halting when the artillery had gotten inside the works and had 
begun shelling the fugitives. 

This brigade struck the tranches not 100 yards from the point aimed 
at. It was longer exposed to the Egyptian fire than were the High- 
landers, whose attack had begun a few minutes previous and had fully 
aroused the whole line of the defense, which had been sleeping on their 
arms behind the parapets. 

To the Highland brigade, led by Major-General Alison, fell the task 
of carrying the lines to the left. The first shots were fired at them 
at 4.55 a. m. from a picket of about 30 men posted 150 yards in front 
of the intrenchments, then 300 yards distant from the Highlanders. 
Immediately afterwards the enemy opened with artillery and then with 
musketry. Without returning this fire the brigade advanced stead- 
ily for about 100 yards further, when the fire became a perfect blaze. 
At 150 yards bayonets were ordered to be fixed, and the bugle sounded 
the advance, when, with a yell, the men charged in the dim light 
through the smoke, carrying the lines in fine style in the face of de- 
termined opposition. The enemy did not run far, but halted at about 
60 yards in rear and delivered a heavy cross-fire. The left battalion, 
the Highland Light Infantry, struck the strong redoubt (Q, Plate 50} 
with a high scarp, which held the center companies for a moment, but 
the flank companies got around it and took it. The rest of the brigade 
pushed steadily on, driving the enemy before it, and capturing three 
batteries of field guns. The advance was continued, and Arabi's head- 
quarters and the canal bridge seized at 6.45 a. m. The Highland Light 
Infantry, which had suffered severely, soon afterwards joined the rest 
of the brigade. 

The force under the command of General Macpherson was the Naval 
Light Battery and the Indian Contingent, less the latter's cavalry, one 
of its two batteries of artillery, and a considerable number of its infan- 
try detailed as guards along the line of communication. 

The advance of this division was by the south bank of the canal, the 
Naval Light Battery of 6 Gatlings accompanying it on the northern 
side along the railway embankment. 

General Macpherson started an hour later than the main army, but was 
within gunshot when the action was begun by the Highland brigade. 
The Egyptian artillery at once opened fire down the line of the canal, al- 
though it was still too dark to see the approaching troops plainly, while 
the infantry lost no time in opening a heavy fusilade. The Contingent 
immediately left the exposed canal bank by which it had been proceed- 
ing, and took to a more sheltered roadway beside it. The Seaforth High- 



155 

landers, who were leading, deployed for attack. The first obstacle en- 
countered was in the shape of a battery of 7-pdr. Lahitte howitzers 
in gun-pits, barring the way. This was first opened on with case by the 
mule battery, and then carried gallantly by the JSeaforth Highlanders 
with a rush at the point of the bayonet. In continuation of this line 
of gun-pits was a long shelter trench, which was at once evacuated, the 
Egyptians retreating into some villages near by, whence they were 
driven by the native Indian troops. 

On the other side of the canal the Naval Gatlings were busily employed 
firing on the Egyptian lines in front and on either hand. 

The British advance was not checked for an instant, but was continued 
rapidly into and past the intrench men ts and on to the bridge and rail- 
way station. One squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, which had 
remained with General Macpherson, charged the fugitives on the ex- 
treme left across the cultivated ground. 

The operations of the Artillery brigade are given in the following 
note, by Captain Martiu, R. A., aid-de-camp to the general commanding : 

Seven batteries were formed up in line at full intervals between the 4th brigade 
and the Guards brigade. There were intervals of 150 yards on either flank between 
the guns and the infantry. General Goodenough commanded the forty-two guns in 
person, and directed their march from the left of the line, keeping up the touch to 
either flank during the night march. 

At 4.55 a. m. the first shot was fired by the enemy. About two minutes afterwards 
the enemy opened fire all along the intrenchments and from his guns. At this time 
the line of guns was some 800 yards from the intrenchments. It was too dark to lay 
guns, and, moreover, the Highland brigade overlapped the front of four batteries, so 
General Goodenough awaited the development of the attack and halted. In five or 
six minutes, seeing from the flashes that the attack was gaining ground, he ordered 
an advance from the center in echelon, thus : 

N.2 and 1.2. 
H.l, J. 3; C.3. A.landD.l. 

In this order, favored by the darkness, and on the left by smoke, the leading di- 
vision, IST.2, and 1.2, approached the trenches to about 300 yards. General Goodenough 
then halted the guns, rode forward into the intrenchments, and finding the attack 
successful, directed the leading division to enter. N.2 led the way in column of route. 
The first gun cantered into the ditch and over the parapet somehow, bringing down 
some of the earthwork and making some sort of a way for the other guns. N.2, fol- 
lowed by 1.2, rushed through the infantry and came into action beyond them, firing 
west and northwest at groups of the enemy, who were falling back, fighting. It be- 
came daylight suddenly, just before the guns entered the works — time about 5.10 a. m. 
About 5.15 (as I judge it) Graham's attack approached, and about 5.20 a swarm of 
fugitives came rushing back from his direction (the right attack). About 5.25, N.2 
was ordered to cease firing, and work down the ridge running southwest to the camp 
and railway station. This was done, the battery coming into action frequently at 
close ranges, and keeping the masses of fugitives on the move. 1.2 was directed, a 
few minutes later, to follow N.2. The ridge ended some five or six hundred yards 
from the station. N.2 reached this point and opened fire at trains moving off and 
the fugitives retiring by the railway embankment. 1.2 arrived here just as the firing 
ended, at 6.40 a. m. 

A.l and D.l, seeing the leading division enter the works, and their front not being 
covered by infantry, trotted forward and came into action at 200 yards from the in- 



156 

trenchments and opened fire with case and shrapnel. When the parapet in their im- 
mediate front was silenced, they again advanced, swung forward the left and enfi- 
laded the line of parapets northwards. This was to assist General Graham's attack. 
On this succeeding, they were ordered southward to silence the outwork (M, Plate 
LIV), which had been missed by the Highland brigade in the dark. Finding the 
gorge open, they went for it and settled the matter with a few rounds of case. The 
Egyptians got a gun or two round to meet them, but before they could do much harm 
were shot down. A.l and D.l then made for the camp, bringing in the six guns in 
the outwork with them. 

C.3, J. 3, and H.l, finding the Highland attack successful, advanced to the parapet, 
cleared a way through it, and entered. They came into action successively, beyond 
the infantry, and fired a few rounds at the enemy falling back. Seeing N.2 working 
down the ridge towards the camp and station, C.3, and subsequently J. 3 and H. 1, 
followed in that direction. C.3 came into action at the end of the ridge and fired at 
the trains moving off and the fugitives near the bridge and station. It ceased fire at 
6.40 a. m. J. 3 and H.l were arriviug at this time. H.l was halfrd a few minutes un- 
til the Indian Contingent came up to the bridge over the canal. It was then directed 
to join that body, and went on to Zazazig. 

On the extreme right, the Cavalry division, under Major-General 
Drury-Lowe, was designedly late in arriving, being fully 2 miles dis- 
tant when the first shot was fired at the Highlanders. Hearing the 
sound it quickened its pace, reaching the intrenchments in time to per- 
mit its two horse batteries N.A. and G.B. to take in reverse and enfilade 
the lines north of General Graham's assault, while the cavalry took up 
the pursuit of the runaways, as described in the official report, and gal- 
loped to the railway station, capturing several traius and locomotives. 
The whole division, cavalry and artillery, united shortly afterwards at 
the bridge over the canal prior to advancing towards Cairo. 

The Egyptians were sleeping in the trenches when the attack was 
made, and although, in one sense, surprised, were nevertheless quite 
ready. General Hainley thinks the alarm was given by mounted scouts 
who were met on the march. Yet Arabi and his second in command 
were both aroused by the noise of the fight, and both, without a mo- 
ment's hesitation, ran away. The warning could not have been of very 
great value at the best. 

The supply of ammunition was practically inexhaustible. At inter- 
vals of three or four yards were open boxes, each containing 1,050 car- 
tridges. The fire was for the most part ill-directed and too high. It 
appeared to the British as though they merely rested their pieces on 
the parapet, loading and firing as rapidly as possible without stopping 
to take aim. The fusillade was tremendous while it lasted, but it could 
only be really effective when the attacking troops were actually on the 
parapet. By that time the result of the action was beyond doubt. 
Their artillerists made, as usual, the mistake of using shell instead of 
shrapnel and canister. The former bury themselves in the soft ground 
to a considerable depth before the percussion fuzes act, and, in conse- 
quence, the explosion is muffled and comparatively innocuous. Many 
of the shells actually passed over the heads of the supporting brigades. 

The trenches, after the battle, were found to be filled with dead, mostly 



157 

bayoneted, and the ground in rear, as far as the railway station, was dot- 
ted with the bodies of those shot down in retreat. The British cavalry 
sweeping around the northern end of the intrenchments cut down the 
fugitives by scores, until it became evident that the rout was complete. 
After that all were spared who had thrown away their arms and who 
offered no resistance. Most of the bodies were observed to be lying on 
their backs facing the trenches as if the men had stopped to have a 
parting shot at their pursuers. 

The Egyptian loss in killed alone was not far from 2,000. There was 
no return of their wounded, the army organization having disappeared, 
but 534 were treated at Tel-el-Kebir during the four days succeeding 
the battle, 27 capital operations being performed. Of these wounded 
202 w^re soon able to go to their own homes, while the balance were sent 
to Cairo in charge of Egyptian surgeons. The British medical author- 
ities did all in their power to alleviate the sufferings of these poor 
wretches, and furnished tins of meat, bottles of brandy, and skins of 
water to the railway trucks conveying them away. Many more who 
were slightly wounded must have managed to get to the neighboring 
villages and eventually to their homes, and thus have escaped euume 
ration. It may be remarked, apropos, that the Egyptian hospital ar- 
rangements were of the most meager description. 

It is stated, and the statement bears the stamp of credibility, that 
extremely few superior officers were killed or wounded, and, as has been 
already mentioned, the two in chief command were the first to escape. 
Arabi himself mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards Belbeis. 
There appears to be no doubt that proper leaders in every sense of the 
word were wanting on the Egyptian side, and that the officers set a 
shocking example to the men. It has been humorously, and more or less 
truthfully, remarked that each officer knew that he would run but hoped 
his neighbor would stay. 

The men displayed real courage at Tel-el-Kebir, as the desperate strug- 
gle in the trenches and their heavy loss in killed abundantly prove. 
The black regiments, composed of negroes from the Soudan, were espe- 
cially noticeable for their pluck, fighting bravely, hand to hand, with the 
British. More intelligence and less downright cowardice in the upper 
grades might have converted these men into a formidable army. 

So many cases are authenticated of the virulence displayed by the 
Egyptian wounded, that it is demonstrated beyond question that many of 
these fellows not only shot at the stretchermen engaged in carrying off 
the injured, but in some cases actually killed the very Englishmen who 
had stopped to give them water or to bind their wounds. 

The Egyptian guns were 8 cm and 9 cm Krupp steel B. L. R. of the old 
pattern (1808), all mounted on field carriages. The small-arms were of 
the well-known Remington make. These showed a defect in design, break- 
ing readily at the small of the stock. 

In the previous encounters between the British and the Egyptians, 



158 

the artillery and cavalry had borne the brunt of the fighting and had 
carried off the honors, but the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was, as General 
Wolseley states, an infantry action. The tactics employed, a direct 
assault without flank movements of any kind, were of the simplest 
description. The object to get at close quarters with the enemy and 
crush him, was accomplished. After the attack, Arabi's army ceased to 
exist. In scattered groups it might be found all over Egypt, but as an 
organization it may be said to have been annihilated. 

In view of the decisiveness of the victory, comment appears unnec- 
essary. It may be alleged that the mode of attack adopted was hazard- 
ous to the degree of imprudence: that no commander would dare to em- 
ploy such tactics on European territory; that a night march of 9 miles 
could only be followed by a properly disposed and immediate assault 
under circumstances so exceptional as to be providential. It must, how- 
ever, be remembered that General Wolseley understood his enemy, knew 
his military habits and numbers, as well as the ground intervening, had 
a fairly good idea of his iutrenchments, a just appreciation of his mor- 
ale, a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him, and 
confidence in the officers and men of his own command. What he 
would have done, had the enemy been of a different character, is 
another question, whose consideration does not come within the province 
of this report. It seems a sufficient answer to such criticisms as are 
briefly referred to above to remark that the means were adjusted to the 
end to be reached, and that the justification (if any be needed) of the 
risks incurred lies in the success which attended them, a success as rare 
as it was complete. 

No time was lost in reaping the fruits of the morning's work. Ad- 
vances were at once ordered in two directions, the one along the rail- 
way to the important railway center of Zagazig, whence a double-tracked 
road proceeds to Cairo via Benha and a single tracked road via Belbeis, 
the other along the Ismailieh or Sweet Water Canal to Cairo. Of these 
movements General Wolseley speaks in his report of September 16 in 
the following terms: 

The enemy were pursued to Zagazig, 25 miles from our camp at Kassassin, by the 
Indian Contingent, the leading detachment of which reached that place, under 
Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V. C, a little after 4 p. m., and by the Cavalry 
division, under General Lowe, to Belbeis, which was occupied in the evening. Ma- 
jor-General Lowe was ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo, as I wag 
most anxious to save that city from the fate which befell Alexandria in July last. 

These orders were ably carried out, General Lowe reaching the great barracks of 
Abbassieh, just outside of Cairo, at 4.45 p. m. on the 14th instant. The cavalry 
marched 65 miles in these two days. The garrison of about 10,000 men, summoned, 
by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Stewart, assistant adjutant-general to the Cavalry division, 
to surrender, laid down their arms, and our troops took possession of the citadel. A 
message was sent to Arabi Pasha through the prefect of the city, calling upon him 
to surrender forthwith, which he did unconditionally. He was accompanied by 
Toulba Pasha, who was also one of the leading rebels in arms against the Khedive. 

The Guards, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, reached Cairo early 
on the 15th instant. 



159 

The result of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir has been the entire collapse of the rebellion. 
The only place that has not, as yet, surrendered, is Daniietta, and its capture or sur- 
render can be easily effected at our leisure. 

The men of the rebel array having laid down or thrown away their arms in their 
flight, have now dispersed to their homes, and the country is so rapidly returning to 
its ordinary condition of peace that I am able to report the war to be at an end, and 
that the object for which this portion of Her Majesty's army was sent to Egypt has 
been fully accomplished. 

The seizure of Zagazig was effected in the dashing manner peculiar 
to all the incidents of the day, and shows what may be done by a few 
bold men. 

The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry left with the Indian Con- 
tingent led the way, and when within about 5 miles of the town 
broke into a gallop. The horses being somewhat fatigued by the hard 
work of the preceding twenty hours, were not in a condition to keep to- 
gether, and, as a consequence, the best got to the front and the others 
dropped to the rear. The advance of the squadron was, therefore, com- 
posed of Major E. M. Jennings, Lieutenant Burns-Murdock, B. E., and 
not above half a dozen troopers. These pushed right into the railway 

station where were five trains filled with soldiers, and seven locomotives. 

* 7 

At the sight of this handful of men, the engine drivers either surren- 
dered or ran away, except one who began opening his throttle, and was 
shot by Lieutenant Burns-Murdoch, while the Egyptian soldiers, hun- 
dreds in number and too demoralized to think of resistance, threw away 
their arms, left the cars, and ran off as rapidly as possible. By 9 p. m. 
the entire force under General Macpherson had reached Zagazig, not a 
man having fallen out by the way. 

In the other direction, similar energy was displayed. The Cavalry 
division crossed the Sweet Water Canal at Tel-el-Kebir, and following 
the canal bank proceeded with all practicable speed, keeping irp a run- 
ning fight with Arabi's rear guard. It reached Belbeis that night and 
bivouacked. Making an early start the next morning (September 14), 
and leaving the cultivated ground a few miles south of Khankah, to 
strike across the desert intervening, it reached Cairo at 4.45 p. m. 

The garrison of the city was divided into two parts : one, from 6,000 
to 7,000 strong, at Abbasieh; the other, of from 3,000 to 4,000 men, at 
the citadel on a high hill within the city. The former having surrendered 
at once to General Drury-Lowe, the Mounted Infantry and two squad- 
rons of the 4th Dragoon Guards were immediately sent to demand 
the surrender of the latter. The Egyptians here, without hesitation, 
submitted to a force not one- tenth of their own number. Both garrisons 
were merely called upon to lay down their arms and accouterments, to 
go to their homes and keep the peace, conditions which they accepted 
with cheerful promptness. 

The leader of the rebellion had caught a train at Belbeis the day be- 
fore and had gone to Cairo, where he quickly began preparations for the 
destruction of the city, drawing up an elaborate plan for a repetition 



160 

of the Alexandria outrage. According to this scheme, the place was 
divided into a number of districts, and fire was to be simultaneously 
applied, on signal, to certain houses indicated. 

The vigor displayed by General Drury-Lowe in this march, and his 
audacity in exacting the yielding of a force, securely placed in positions 
of immense natural and artificial strength, and many times his own in 
number, were attended by results of inestimable value. Arabi's plan 
of revenge was defeated, and Cairo saved from ruin, while he himself 
was lodged in prison, and the only body of his followers from whom 
serious harm could have been anticipated were hurrying to their vil- 
lages in all possible directions, glad of a return to peaceful and congenial 
occupations. 

With the successful issue of the attack on Tel-el-Kebir, the British 
Commander-in-Chief accomplished the first of his aims, the crushing of 
the force in armed rebellion against the Khedive. Through the agency 
of his lieutenant, General Drury-Lowe, the second was achieved in the 
salvation of Cairo from destruction. 

So carefully had General Wolseley matured his plans before quitting 
England, that he had predicted his arrival in Cairo on September 16. 
Under the circumstances, an error of v one day on his part may be par- 
doned ; he entered the city with the Guards brigade, by rail, on the 
morning of the loth. 

The submission of the Egyptian troops in various other quarters, Kafr 
Dowar, Aboukir, Eosetta, Tantah, &c, followed in rapid succession. 
Damietta, the last fortress to hold out, was evacuated without a struggle 
on the approach of a British force dispatched from Alexandria, for its 
subjection, under Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, on the 23d of the 
month, when its commander, Abdul Al, from whom resistance had been 
expected, gave himself up unconditionally. 

The last military object of the war was now reached in the restoration 
of the Khedive's authority over the whole of Lower Egypt. 

Steps were immediately taken to send away all the troops, except a 
small contingent, which it was decided to retain in the country until the 
government could be effectively re-established. The base was changed 
back again to Alexandria, various corps re-embarked for England, 
and the Indian Contingent started from Suez. By November 1, the 
force left in Egypt for the support of the Khedive was about 11,000 
men under Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K. C. B., and comprised 
the 2d division of the Army Corps, the 7th Dragoon Guards, 19th Hus- 
sars, batteries G.B and C.3, the 17th and 21st companies of Royal 
Engineers, with two battalions of infantry, the 2d Royal Irish and 2d 
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, which, together with two batteries 
of garrison artillery, were to constitute the garrison of Alexandria. The 
brigade commanders were changed and stood as follows: 1st brigade, 
Major-General W. Earle, C. B., C. S. I. ; 2d brigade, Major-General G. 
Graham, Y. C, K. C. B., R. E. ; Cavalry brigade, Brigadier-General W. 



161 

Arbuthnot; in command at Alexandria, Major-General G-. B. Harman, 
C. B. 

The troubles with which the Khedive had now to contend were purely 
political. Their solution bids fair, in point of time, to contrast strongly 
with that of the military difficulties so resolutely grappled by the British 
expeditionary force. 

From the first gun of the bombardment until the occupation of Cairo 
but sixty-six days were consumed, the campaign proper taking twenty- 
five in all. The rapidity with which the blow was prepared was the 
outcome of England's maritime supremacy, but the force with which it 
was delivered was drawn from skill in plan joined to vigor, courage, 
and self-confidence in execution. 
948 EG 11 



PAET III. 



MISCELLANEOUS. 



' 163 



XIV. 

THE WORKING OF THE NAVAL TRANSPORT SERVICE. 

The entire British sea transport is managed by the Eoyal Navy, and 
is presided over by a naval officer at the Admiralty, entitled the Di- 
rector of Transports. The present incumbent is Admiral W. E. Mends 
At each principal port at home and abroad, in the colonies, is a Trans- 
port Officer, in charge of the transport operations at that point. To him 
all Masters of transports are directly responsible, reporting to him on 
arrival and every morning afterwards for instructions. 

The army is represented in this connection by a Military Landing 
Officer, through whom the commanding military officer transacts all 
business relating to the sea transport of troops, animals, and material. 
Practically, the Army states the number or quantity of the latter to be 
moved and the Navy furnishes the means. The responsibility of the 
Navy begins at the water-line on embarking or loading, and ends at 
the water-line on disembarking or unloading. 

A naval officer may be or may not be sent in each hired transport as 
Transport Officer. His duties are mainly those of superintendence, 
the Master not being relieved of his responsibility in any way. He 
examines and signs all the Master's reports, and ascertains the latitude 
and longitude daily by observation. It would appear as though the 
Transport Officer is only really needed on board of a ship commanded 
by a stupid or malicious Master. 

The ships employed by Great Britain to convey troops and munitions 
of war, fall under three categories: First, private vessels, belonging to 
established lines, making regular trips over a fixed route, on board of 
which passage and freight are secured; second, Her Majesty's troopers; 
third, hired transports. 

The steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com- 
pany were, during the campaign, the principal representatives of the 
first category. In addition to their usual accommodations, these steam- 
ers were obliged to provide fittings, according to the Government regu- 
lations, in proportion to the troops carried. 

The vessels of the second category suffice for the ordinary needs of 
the army, in times of peace, in exchanging battalions, bringing home 
invalided soldiers, &c. 

165 



166 



The following table is sufficiently descriptive of them 





Displacement. 


Indicated horse- 
power. 


Capacity. 


Transport. 


u 

© 

s 


© 

a 

o 


© 
8 


m 
© 

u 
o 

w 


Crocodile 

Euphrates 

Jumna 


! Tons. 

! 6,211 

! 6,211 

! 6,211 

6,211 


4,180 
3,900 
3,040 
4,890 
4,030 
2,570 
1,440 
2,500 
2,500 


200 
200 
200 
200 
200 


90 
90 
90 
90 
90 


1,097 
1,097 
1,097 
1,097 
1,097 
1,097 
800 
1,097 
1,097 


58 
58 
58 
58 


Serapis 


6,211 

i 5,920 

1 2, 500 

i 4,690 

4,650 


58 

58 








8 


Himalaya 

Tamar .' 






10 






10 



The five first named are of one class, large u Indian troopers," the cost 
of their maintenance being at the charge of the Indian Government. 
The soldiers' wives live apart at the forward end of the main deck, 
where they are bulkheaded off. Their quarters include a spacious 
hospital and a wash-room, &c. The bunks here are in two tiers of 
galvanized -iron frames. 

The accompanying series of deck plans of the Jumna (Plates 61, 62, 
63, 64, 65) exhibit the internal arrangements of this type more clearly 
than a written description. 

The entire equipment of hammocks and mess gear is maintained on 
board, so that the troops have everything ready on their arrival. They 
keep clean and in order the parts of the ship devoted to them. Twenty 
men go to a mess. . 

These steamers can make from 10 to 12 knots continuously. One 
peculiarity of their construction is not evident from the plans. Between 
the quarter-deck and forecastle a tier of rooms runs along the ship's side, 
but within these limits the "saloon deck" is a well. Attention is called 
to the pontons these ships carry. Mess-tables for the troops rest on a 
cleat at the side and the other end is suspended from the beam over- 
head. 

The ships are of iron and are provided with water-tight bulkheads 
and ample pumps for emptying the bilge as well as for extinguishing 
fire. They are an integral part of the Eoyal Navy, and are subject to 
the same discipline. Their routine, however, is adapted to the peculiar 
service they perform. 

In all cases involving the moving of any considerable number of men 
at a time it is upon the third category, hired transports, that the bulk 
of the labor must fall. A list of vessels available for this work is al- 
ways kept at the Admiralty, but in case of need, as when the Egyptian 
expedition was resolved upon, bids are invited by advertisements. The 
hired transports are all iron screw vessels provided with an adequate 
number of water-tight compartments, and it is required that they must 



■ 167 

have made at least one long voyage. When not intended exclusively as 
freight ships they must be not less than 6 feet high between decks, 
measuring from deck to beam, and the higher the better. If it is con- 
templated to carry horses in the hold, the height of the latter must be 
12 feet or over. The charter is based upon the gross tonnage, so much 
per ton per month being paid. For the campaign just ended, the prices 
paid varied according to circumstances, the size, nature, and condition 
of the ship, the amount of internal fitting needed, &c. For the imperial 
transports, those briuging troops out from England, the average was 
20s. 8d. per ton. The Indian transports were more expensive, costing 
about half as much again, a fact due to the scarcity, at the time, of 
suitable steamers in the ports of India. 

The steamer offered for hire is subjected to a rigid inspection inside 
and out by Naval Transport Officers, who may cause the owner to dock 
her at his own expense. The engines and boilers are examined by Na- 
val Engineers. A trial trip at the dock or under way may be exacted. 
When accepted, the rate of hire represents the charge for her use as a 
ship, complete in all respects and ready for sea. She can be employed 
in any manner that may be ordered, to carry troops, animals, or stores, 
or to serve as a hospital ship. She carries a blue pendant and the blue 
or naval reserve ensign, with a yellow anchor in the fly. She is given 
a number, by which she is known and registered. The number is painted 
on each bow and quarter in figures 3 feet long. The British transports 
in the Egyptian campaign were all painted black, and carried their num- 
bers in black on a white rectangular ground. Those which brought the 
Indian Contingent were lead-colored, and had their numbers painted 
in red figures. On each a war risk is assumed by the Government 
equal to her value. The owners must cut the decks for increased ven- 
tilation and hatchway accommodation where ordered, take down or re- 
arrange cabins or bulkheads, and they have no claim for compensation 
for any such alteration or for any restoration at the termination of the 
service. All special fittings required for the particular duty on which 
the ship may be employed are put in at the expense of the Government. 
These fittings are Government property and can be altered or removed 
at the pleasure of the Admiralty during the charter, but all left stand- 
ing at its expiration become the property of the ship -owner. 

The Government furnishes all provisions, medical comforts, forage, 
and bedding needed for the troops and animals, or else they are pro- 
vided by the owners according to a fixed scale of compensation. The 
owners also provide, on an established schedule, table utensils and 
other articles for use on troop decks, for cooking, distilling, baking, &c, 
tools and other articles employed about horses and m^les, receiving a 
money allowance per man or animal of the number fitted for, and a per 
diem sum for the number actually carried. 

Pay begins the day the fittings are completed, provided the ship is 
in all respects ready for sea. Should the Government elect to put up 
the fittings, it has the right to ten days without payment. 



168 

The Government supplies all coal, except that burned in the ship's 
galley for her own crew and for first and second class passengers. 

The entire charge for wages, food, or other expenses of any sort for 
officers, crew, or other civilian persons, is borne by the owners. The 
latter must keep the vessel in repair and in readiness to move when 
desired. If through derangement of hull or machinery she is unable to 
sail when ordered, the owner forfeits a certain proportion of the hire. 

The crew must be at least three men to every ] 00 tons up to 1,000 
tons, and three to every 200 additional tons. They must be physically 
satisfactory, and may if desired be inspected by a medical officer of 
the navy. 

The carrying capacity is determined by a competent inspector, and is 
based upon the following conditions : 

First-class passengers (officers, &c.) have separate cabius of at least 
30 superficial feet of floor ; if two are in one room, then of 42 superficial 
feet. 

Second-class passengers have such standing berths or other second- 
class accommodations as the ship affords. These passengers are war- 
rant officers and their families, staff sergeants, and the like. 

Third-class passengers (troops) are apportioned to the available berth- 
ing space, each hammock occupying 6 feet by 16 inches. One-fourth 
more than the number which can be swung in hammocks at a time may 
be embarked. 

The number of horse stalls that can be erected is equal to the running 
length of the space chosen, in inches, divided by 27, the width of each 
stall. 

It may be fairly estimated that each man occupies 52 and each horse 
126 cubic feet. Eoughly speaking, each man conveyed requires from 3 
to 4 tons, and each horse, from 8 to 10 tons of gross tonnage. This 
mode of looking at the question gives a notion of the magnitude of the 
task of transporting any large body of troops. 

The transport is thoroughly inspected before the embarkation of the 
troops by a board composed of two naval officers, one military staff offi- 
cer, and one military officer not under the rank of captain. The senior 
military medical officer of the station and the surgeon in medical charge 
of the troops to be embarked accompany the board and express their 
opinion as to the sanitary arrangements. The embarkation form is 
given on page 173. 

After the soldiers are on board a final inspection is held before the 
ship puts to sea, by two naval officers, one army field officer (not belong- 
ing to the corps embarked), and one army officer not under the rank of 
captain. An army medical officer, not in medical charge of the troops 
embarked, expresses his opinion as to the sanitary arrangements. 

The standard of messing for first-class passengers and the number of 
meals served are the same as on board first-class passenger steamers. 
Ale, beer, wine, and spirits are only furnished on payment. The sec- 



169 



ond-class passengers have u a good, respectable table," and receive a 
pint of beer or ale daily. Third-class passengers (troops) have the army 
ration. 

When more than 50 men disembark a report is made out by the mil- 
itary commanding officer upon the mess and other arrangements, the 
cleanliness of the ship, &c. This report is evidence of the way in which 
the contract has been discharged. 

The Transport Officer furnishes the Master of the hired transport with 
a monthly certificate of efficiency, which forms the basis of claim for 
compensation. For short terms, one month's hire is paid in advance. 
The final account is not settled until all possible bills have been audited. 
The document required to obtain a first advance is the embarkation re- 
turn. The balance of hire is not paid until the report by the military 
commanding officer has been received. The claim for allowance on the 
score of mess is based on the mess certificate, and in the case of troops 
supplied, on a similar certificate. 

The following notes are relative to the fittings necessary to the con- 
version of a vessel into a transport : 

Non-commissioned officers are allowed 20 inches hammock drift. All 
billets are clearly numbered and assigned. The head and foot hooks 
are 9 feet apart, and the hammocks overlap 
18 inches at each end. When the height 
from deck to beam exceeds 7 feet, hammock 
beams are run athwartships at 6 feet 6 inches 
above the deck. 

Fig. 55 shows the mess table and benches 
as arranged along the ship's side. A batten 
is run fore and aft at the side. Upon this the 
outboard end is placed, the inner resting on 
a trestle. Underneath the table is a shelf 9 
inches broad. 

Along the side of the troop-deck and over 
the mess tables a long batten is run, with 
fpegs for clothing and accouterments, three 
ifor each man. 

Arm racks of the common pattern are placed as needed. Two broad 
^horizontal pieces are secured to a bulkhead, the upper perforated for 
ithe muzzles of the rifles, the lower scored to receive the butts. 

Temporary latrines are built on deck, at the rate of 3 per cent, of the 



JK 9 . 55. 




tforce fitted for, in covered houses 6 feet high in the 
clear, Fig. 56. The trough is lined with lead, and a 
sheet-iron soil pipe is carried dowu outside of the ship. 
Ajnple water supply for flushing is insisted upon. A 
comfortable step, a hinged seat and a grating bottom 
are exacted. In addition, as many urinals, as may be 
adeemed necessary, are built of wood lined with lead, 
:and having a proper discharge-pipe overboard. 



Fig. 56. 



/, 




170 

A liouse, usually beside the latrines, is built on deck for water-proof 
coats and caps, and must be large enough to contain one third of those 
belonging to the troops to be embarked. The sides are fitted with pegs 
and the ceiling with hooks. This u coat room" is in charge of a non- 
commissioned officer. 

The troop hospital is a proper space below, screened off by canvas. 
These screens can be rolled and stopped up. Standing bunks 6 feet long 
and 27 inches wide, in one or two tiers, as directed, are built. The frame 
is of wood, but the bottom of iron netting, 4-inch mesh. Inside the 
hospital is a dispensary with drawers or cupboards, work-table, bottle- 
racks, washstand, &c, all simply but solidly constructed. 

The ventilation is carefully attended to, the decks being cut, and air- 
pipes put in where ordered. A simple plan for exhausting the foul air 
was fitted to the transports during this campaign. A steam jet is intro- 
duced into an iron ventilator. Tubes and wooden trunks run through, 
and from all the horse and troop decks, to connect with the ventilator, 
and are perforated where they are designed to be effective. The steam 
jet draws the foul air from below through the air trunks and discharges 
it overboard. When not in use as an aspirator, the steam being shut 
off, the ventilator cowl is turned to the wind, and the apparatus answers 
the purpose of an inspirator. 

The magazine is built of two tiers of crossed deal boards, fastened 
with copper nails. It must be large enough to hold one hundred rounds 
per rifle. 

Other special rooms are also built, including bread rooms, an issuing 
room, a helmet room, a baggage room, &c, all provided with proper 
locks or bolts and padlocks. 

The hammocks are stowed in temporary bins built where ordered, 
preferably in covered houses on the upper deck. 

The prison is designed for four men, is 6 feet 6 inches wide, and 12 
feet 6 inches long in the clear. It is fitted with three inside removable 
bulkheads, so as to be divided into four separate cells. The frames are 
4 inches square and 2 feet apart, well cleated, top and bottom. The ends 
and sides are of two layers of f -inch boards crossed and nailed. A 6-inch 
space is left at the bottom of the bulkhead and another 18 inches wide 
at the top, for ventilation. Iron bars J inch in diameter and 3 inches 
apart fill up the space. Each of the four cells into which the inclosure 
may be divided has a bench, and a stout iron jackstay in the deck, to 
which violent men may be shackled. 

The troop galley and bakery are always built on the upper deck. 
They are simply stout wooden houses of the necessary capacity. The 
sides and deck are lined with tin or sheet-iron. The floor is paved with 
tiles laid in cement. The coppers must hold three pints per man and 
be fitted with proper apparatus. 

The fittings for the accommodation of troops are such as would nat- 
urally suggest themselves to an intelligent officer, and therefore have 



171 

been rather referred to than minutely described. The horse-stalls, how- 
ever, are especially the outcome of long experience. 

The series of plates, 66 to 70, give the details of the present plan. 
The stalls are so designed that by lowering the breast rail, parting 
bars, and haunch rail, they may be used for pack horses and mules. 
To shorten up the stall an extra piece 4 inches thick is provided and 
fastened to the inside of the regular haunch rail. Each deck or com- 
partment is furnished with one pump (or more if required), to bring 
fresh water from the hold. When not practicable to have scuppers to 
convey the urine overboard, it is first collected in tanks below and then 
pumped into the sea. One or two loose box-stalls are provided for sick 
horses, and 5 per cent, of the stalls are 6 inches longer and 2 inches 
wider thao the others. But nine-tenths of the stalls are ever occupied, 
the other tenth being for shifting the horses. A large number of these 
stalls are always kept on hand, ready for use. The animals are usually 
hoisted on board by a steam winch, in stout slings, and are discharged 
in the same manner. But few of the transports had loading ports large 
enough to admit a horse. * 

It is one of the rules in all hired transports that there shall be no 
smoking below the spar deck. This rule is most imperative. 

The discipline of the troops embarked is in the hands of the military 
commanding officer. 

For sanitary purposes, sawdust (for use about horses particularly) 
MaeDougalPs disinfecting po.wder, chloride of lime, and carbolic acid 
are freely used. The men are only allowed below during meal hours 
and at night. 

The Master of the transport must obey the orders of the Transport 
Officer on board, the Transport Officer ashore, or of the Senior Naval Offi- 
cer present. Should there be no naval officer at hand he must obey 
the orders of the military or other Government authority. 

Either the Master or the first officer must sleep on board. The crew 
must be exercised in lowering and getting boats out and in. In the log- 
book must be kept a complete record of all that relates to the troops 
or Government property on board. The log is inspected daily by the 
Transport Officer in Charge. 

As in the Government service, the Master is liable to punishment for 
misconduct, the Senior Naval Officer at the first port touched having 
the power to suspend him from his duties. The Flag Officer of the 
station can, if necessary, remove him from his ship. 

For the Master's guidance a set of instructions is furnished him which 
defines his duties and responsibilities very minutely, especially in regard 
to the expenditure of the Government stores with which he is intrusted. 
The rationing of the troops and animals embarked is his particular 
charge, and he always keeps or should keep on hand a sufficient amount 
of forage, provisions, bedding, &c. He is subjected to a very rigid system 
of accounts, quarterly and other returns. By the terms of the charter 
party the owners are pecuniarily responsible for any loss of or damage 



172 

to the Government stores arising out of incapacity or negligence on the 
part of the personnel of the transport. He is responsible for the general 
good order and condition of the ship, although the troops keep clean 
the hoise and troop decks, &c. The Master is therefore ordered to 
co operate to the full extent of his power with the military command- 
ing officer on board to secure this end. The precautions to be taken 
against fire are very clearly set forth in orders, and the Master held 
to a strict observance. These precautions are of the usual nature com- 
mon to all naval vessels. 

The crew of the transport and her boats are at all times available for 
the public service in any desired way. The men are not expected to 
work more than ten hours in this connection any day in port, nor to do 
exceptional duty on Sunday. If so exceptionally employed they re- 
ceive extra compensation according to a fixed scale as shown below. 

The landing of troops or stores is simple and effective. A petty officer 
is sent in charge with every lighter or boat load and is provided with a 
list of the troops, animals, or stores contained therein. This list, called 
the " landing note " (see page 174), is signed by the master, and is 
handed by the petty officer in charge of the lighter to the Military Land- 
ing Officer. A stub copy is retained on board the transport. From 
these stubs a report is made the following day to the Transport Officer 
on shore. The appended form is not in the "Kegulations for Her Ma- 
jesty's Transport," and the other following it is a new form substituted 
for the old one. 



Transport No. — , } 

1882. \ 


Application for extra 


pay to merchant seamen for working over time. 


Dates employed (Sun 
days in red ink). 


No. 


Rank or 
rating. 


No. of 
hours. 


How employed. 


Amount. 


Eemarks. 






• 






£ s. d. 





Approved for payment at the undermentioned rates. 



leer in charge of working party. 



Captain B. N., Prin. Tran. Officer. 
Per day of 10 hours : 

(1) When employed on exceptional duties away 

from their own ships during working hours on 

week days Petty officers, Is. 3d. per day : others, 1*. per day. 

For every extra hour heyond 10 hours : 
<2) When employed on exceptional duties on 

working days heyond 10 hours, exclusive of 

meals either in their own ships or elsewhere.. Petty officers, Id. per hour; others, 5c?. per hour. 
For every hour thus employed on Sundays : 
(3) When employed on exceptional duties on 

Sundays, whether in their own ships or on 

duties unconnected therewith Petty officers, lOd. per hour; others, Id. per hour. 

Admira'ty letter AG No. 11, fgif, of 11th August, 1882. 



173 



^ 



o 



H W ' 



e=i 



i 


a 

© 








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-TKjoiA 'p9S89ta jsji; A'lsp ^uqAi. uq 




— 


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•sosjoh 




05 
& 

g a 

S 58 

o 

o 


•(soAiM. ,ejaxp 
qos gureq' ^on) 9p3ta9£ 






•(gJ9ipxosSai9q^on) aiuj^; 






Troops, third-class 
passengers, and 
tlieir families. 


'11 J9pun ugjpxxqo 






•P9moA\ 




•U9K 








13 
eS as 

c« a 

ca-^ 


'11 J9pim ugjpjrqo 








•ngnio a\ 






•U9M 




* .a 

cs © 

o £ © 

r-1 ©^ 

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•SpXBAldTl pUB 9X JO l U9J^ 






Hi 

? © 

S © n 
O » 03 

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'9X Jtapun U9jpxiqQ 






•epTOAidn pxre 9X 
jo sj9!rqSn«p jo 'S9atm 






•07? 'SJ90TJJO 






03 

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u 
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174 

[On the reverse side.] 
Nominal list of officers and their families. 









o 

-iS KB 

MS 

%£ 

. P 
Sg 

O —1 

r- 


to 
© 

-P 

i 
p 

3 


Servants. 


Regiment or corps. 


Officers. 


u 

_p 
'£ 

o.2 
■2-2 






Rank. 


Name. 


a2 

(B O 


i 













Landing Note — Transport No. 



[Number of lighter, — . Date, 



1882. Hour left ship or shore, — m. Hour cleared, — m. 



Name of petty officer in charge, 



PASSENGERS OR HORSES. 



Regiment or department. 



Officers. 



Men. 



Horses. 



Office column not to be 
filled up on board. 



CARGO. 



Description. 



No. of 
packages. 



To whom addressed. 



Office column not to be 
filled up on board. 



Master. 



The foregoing paragraphs give a general idea of the hired transport 
service. Like all organizations, however perfect in theory, it depends 
ultimately for its successful working upon the intelligence and vigor of 
those to whom its administration is intrusted. 



175 

For the campaign in Egypt the entire local control of the transports 
was given to Captain Harry H. Eawson, E. N., with the title of u Prin- 
cipal Transport Officer." This officer had, four years previously, been in 
charge of the disembarkation of troops and stores at Cyprus, where his 
skill and executive ability won him commendation. Profiting by his 
experience, he matured his plans before leaving England, and had elab- 
orated them so thoroughly that, as far as he was concerned, it may be 
said that no point was neglected and no precaution omitted which could 
facilitate the important duty that fell to his lot. 

Foreseeing the difficulty he might have to encounter, if dependent on 
the naval vessels in port for assistance in the shape of men and boats, 
he succeeded in obtaining H. M. S. Thalia for the special needs of dis- 
embarkation. The commanding officer of this vessel, Captain J. W. 
Brackenbury, was, so to speak, Captain Eawson's second in command. 
He assumed the title and functions of u Disembarkation Officer." 

The Thalia, 2,240 tons displacement, and 1,600 indicated horse-power, 
technically known as an u armed trooper," is an old wooden corvette with 
a light spar deck added. On this deck are a few 64-pdrs., with Gatlings, 
Kordenfeldts, and 7-pdr. and 9-pdr. boat-guns. The main deck is usu- 
ally devoted to troops, of whom she can readily carry a few hundred. 
In this case she brought out no soldiers. She was given an abnormally 
large crew, 430 in number, particularly strong in mechanics of all sorts, 
and an extra supply of boats, one 37-foot steam-pinnace, two 25-foot 
steam-cutters, besides three pulling cutters and five gigs. She was 
subject to the immediate orders of the Principal Transport Officer. An 
electric light for night operations was placed on board of her. 

At Ismailia, where the greater part of the work was done, Captain 
Eawson established his office on board the hired transport Nevada (of 
the Williams and Guion Line), close to the Central Wharf, maintaining 
communication with the Thalia, the Central Wharf, and the Military 
Headquarters on shore, by means of semaphore and flag signals. 

Every transport that came out from England brought horse boats 
and "flats," so that as the troops arrived at Ismailia the means of land- 
ing them were always on hand in more than adequate quantity. In all, 
at this place, there were no less than (>0 horse-boats and flats, and 20 
open lighters of various sizes and patterns. The lighters were gotten 
at Malta, Alexandria, Port Said, and elsewhere, and were collected at 
Ismailia. 

Fig. 57 represents a horse-boat. The bow may be either square or sharp. 
These boats could land ten animals, or Fig.sz 

two field guns with their limbers. The 
cross braces are hinged and pinned. The 
flap at the stern lowers to form a gang- 
plank which is useful in landing vehicles 
as well as animals. The " flats" are 
square-ended lighters decked over. 




176 



The pontoon-rafts carried by the Indian troopers (Jumna and class), 
to which reference has been already made, were most useful at Ismail ia 



J?ig. J8. 




JFVg.sa 




on account of their great capac- 
ity, each carrying as many as 35 
horses at a time. Figs. 58 and 59 
represent roughly these rafts as 
seen when put together. In the 
top of each pontoon are jogs for 
eceiving four cross-pieces, which 
are lashed in place to ring-bolts. 
Upon the chesses or cross-pieces 
is laid a suitable platform. Each 
pontoon is of iron, 36 feet long and 5 feet in diameter. 

Powerful tugs, nine in number, five screw and four paddle, were bought 
or hired and sent to Lake Timsah. . The largest was the Storm Cock, 
included in the list of hired transports. The lighters were handled 
mainly by working parties from the Thalia, who were busy day and 
night. As a rule, a steam-launch was placed between two lighters. 
The disembarkation of the troops being conducted on both sides of the 
ship at once, was rapidly effected without confusion. By putting the 
men directly on the large tugs, and using both gangways at once, a bat- 
talion of infantry could be landed in a very short time. The two Irish 
regiments, the Eoyal Irish and the Koyal Irish Fusiliers, were landed at 
night with their baggage in two hours, and the Highland brigade, between 
3,000 and 4,000 strong, in three hours, but without baggage. 

When the articles to be landed were heavy and the tugs very busy 
the lighters were placed alongside the transport, and after receiving 
the freight, the Thalia's men in charge laid out lines, and assisted by 
the soldiers warped themselves ashore. The artillery was chiefly landed 
in this way on the beach, which is of shelving sand. The other naval 
vessels in port aided to some extent, mainly in furnishing steam cutters 
and launches. 

On board the Thalia the working gangs were detailed from "each 
part of the ship" so as to keep the men under the petty officers to whom 
they were accustomed. Although the labor was arduous and incessant, 
the men enjoyed excellent health throughout. This is attributed by 
Captain Brackenbury to his rule never to permit a party to begin work 
at any hour of the day or night without first having had at least a bis- 
cuit and a cup of hot cocoa. This beverage was ready in the galley at all 
times. As soon as the men returned to the ship another ration was 
served out. 

To attend to the work ashore, a naval officer was kept at each pier, ( 
who worked in conjunction with the a Military Landing Officer." It may 
be remarked that wherever the army and navy came in contact during 
this campaign they pulled together with great harmony and effect. 
While this circumstance is largelv due to the fact that the duties of each 



177 

are sharply and clearly defined, so that no doubt can exist as to ivhere the 
province of the one begins and the other ends, the spirit of mutual accom- 
modation and good will which marked the relations of the two services 
was the ultimate cause of this satisfactory result. 

The task of landing at the base at Ismailia was accomplished rapidly, 
without a hitch of any sort, and without damage to a man or an animal. 
The conditions were most favorable — smooth water, no rain, and an unva- 
rying breeze; but to profit by these favorable conditions, energy and fore- 
thought were indispensable. 

The speed and ease with which large bodies of men can be conveyed 
in these days of steam, render possible to a great maritime power like 
England the landing of an army at a great distance from home in com- 
paratively little time. The attach is vastly more independent now than 
formerly , and can select its point of debarkation without regard to contrary 
winds and perverse currents. These considerations entail the necessity 
of efficient defense, no matter how remote the coast may be from powers 
that are to be dreaded, and are of especial value in connection with our 
own isolated but not unattackable position. 

The transports which brought the British troops from England to 
Egypt accomplished their journey, on the average, in a little more than 
one-third of the time consumed by Bonaparte's flotilla in 1798 in the pas- 
sage from Toulon to Alexandria over a distance less than half as great. 

The details of the imperial transports are given in the accompanying 
table, together with the duty they performed. 
948 EG 12 



178 



Details of the 



Name. 



Nyanza . 

Osprey.. 

Calabria 
Holland. 
Empusa 
Viking . 



Tonnage. 



1,216 
557 



653 1, 869 

538 1, 094 



2, 03ljl,290 3,221 

2, 462 1, 385:3, 847 

732 421 1, 153 

1, 686 902! 2, 588 



Tower Hill 12,616 

Pelican 1, 689 



Nevada 

City of New York 
Grecian 



12 Caspian. 



Prussian. 

Palmyra . 
Batavia . . 
Greece... 



Canadian 



Montreal 

City of Paris. 



Orient 

Iberia 

Egyptian Monarch 



Olympus 

City of Lincoln . . - 



Texas 

Ludgate Hill 



Whitley 
France.. 



Italy. 



Tagus 

Oxenholme 



Carthage 

Catalonia . 
Bolivar . . . 



2, 355 

2,286 

2,374 
1,718 

1,940 

1,382 
1,628 
3,242 



2,160 
1 



3,440 

2,982 

2,552 

1,585 
2,601 

1,839 

2,702 

736 
3,238 

2,659 

1,250 
1,714 

2,588 



1. 405 4, 020 

89712, 585 

i 

1, 2613, 616 

1,24513,521 

1, 238:3, 612 
1, 010 2, 727 



3, 093 
1,57 



762 

925 

1,067 

1,036 



1,148 
1,093 

1,945 

v 

V 

830 

584 

978 



1,043 



1,510 

658 
951 



2,424 

1,748 

487 



3.029 

2,144 
2,553 

4, ■■■ 

2,905 



3,307 
3,085 



5,385 

4.670 

3,915 

2,415 
3,185 

2,817 

4,162 

1,139 
4,281 

4,169 

1,912 

2,665 

5,012 

4,841 
2,064 



200 

250 

220 
300 
120 
350 

600 
270 

400 

500 

400 
400 

400 

212 
450 
400 

280 



375 

450 



1,000 

750 

500 

270 
350 

350 

600 

120 

400 

500 

'200 
350 

850 

|P0 
400 



26 



July 12 
July 21 



July 22 

July 22 

July 23 

2iJuly 25 



3 ( July 28 

2 July 25 

2 July 24 

2 July 24 

2jJuly 25 

2 July 24 

July 25 

July 24 

2 July 24 

2 July 25 

July 25 



July 24 
July 24 



July 23 

July 24 

July 25 

July 26 
July 25 

July 24 

July 29 

July 24 
July 30 

July 28 

July 25 
Aug. 

July 25 

2 July 24 

2 July 28 



Place or port at 
which to be dis- 
charged. 



United E'ingdom . 
London 



United Kingdom. 
River Thames . . . 
United Kingdom . 
.do 



.do 
do 

do. 

.do. 

.do. 
.do. 

.do. 

do. 
.do. 
.do. 



.do. 



.do. 
.do. 



.do. 
.do. 



.do. 



...do. 
...do. 



....do 

River Thames . 



United Kingdom 
River Thames..,. 



Liverpool Docks 

United Kingdom. 
do 



.do. 



....do. 
....do. 



Pen. & Orient 



Gen. St. Nav, 
Co. 



National 

Collins, London 
Thistle 



Hill. 
Bird 



Owners, line, 
or company. 



"Williams & 

Guion. 
Inman 



Allen. 
....do 



.do 



Cunard . . 
...do ... 
National. 



Allen 



....do , 
Inman 



Orient ... 
.do ... 
Monarch. 



Union . 

Thistle 



Dominion 
Hill 



D.N. Shields. 
National 



....do 

Pen. & Orient. 



Pen. <fe Orient. 



Cunard 

West Indian. 



a At 14 knots ; b at 11J to 12 knots. 



Imperial Transports. 



179 



Accommo 
dation. 



8> 



250 220 
300 240 



250132 

180176 
210 210 



156 



28f 



106 



250 242 

7 



108 



300 270 
6 



850 110 

l 

785J 55 
300J266 



2200 

.180 



Troops car 
lied. 






214 219 

252239 



213 117 

178 173 
180 204 



Corps. 



Commissariat stores 



58 



103 



Household Cavalry 

.do 

Commissariat stores 

18th Co. Royal Engineers. 
12th Co. Commissariat & 

Transport. 
N. A, Royal Horse Artil- 
lery. 
Bearer Company ; 1 held 

hospital ; 15th Co. Com. 

& Trans. 
2d Brigade staff; 2d Batt. 

York and Lancaster. 
Part of 4th Dragoon 

Guards. 

N. 2, Eoyal Artillery 

Signalers; detachment of 

8th Co. Commissariat & 

Transport. 
11th Co. Commissariat & 

Transport. 

A. 1, Royal Artillery 

2d Batt. Grenadier Guards. 
Part of 4th Dragoon 

Guards. 
8th Company Royal Engi 

neers ; railway staff and 

material. 
2 squadrons ] 9th Hussars . 
2d Batt. Royal Irish and 

100 men 2d Bearer Com- 
pany. 
Staffs 1st Div. & 1st Brigade 

Scots Guards. 
2d Batt. Coldstream Guards 

Part of 7th Dragoon 

Guards. 
C. 3, Royal Artillery ... 
I. 2, Royal Artillery 



Ammunition reserve, T. 1, 

R A. 
G. Royal Horse Artillery . . 



Port of em 
barkation. 



London. 
....do.. 



London 

Southampton 
London , 



Liverpool 

Kingstown . . 
Southampton 



...do .. 
London 



.do 



Portsmouth... 
Queenstown . . 
Southampton . 

London 



Southampton 
Portsmouth.. 



London 

Kingstown . . . 



London 



Southampton 
London 



Portsmouth. 
London 



Date. 



Aug. 
Aug. 



Aug. 
Aug. 
Aug. 



Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 



Aug. 

Aug. 
July 
Aug. 



Aug. 9 



Aug. 
Aug. 



July 

Aug. 

Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 

Aug. 

Aug. 



Aug. 15 
Aug. 14 



Remarks. 



Fitted as con- 
denser. 
12 knots 



Aug. 18 

Aug. 16 Twin screw. 

Aug. 17 



J.. do 
Aug. 21 

Aug. 20 
Aug. 22 

Aug. 25 

Aug. 14 
Aug. 12 
Aug. 21 

Aug. 23 



Aug. 22 
Aug. 21 



Aug. 10 

Aug. 12 

Aug. 17 

Aug. 
Aug. 22 

Aug. 25 

Aug. 21 



•|13 

14 
15 
16 

11 



Charter extend 
ed. 

Charter extend- 
ed 2 months 



300 



774 



59 



2d Battalion Highland 
Light Infantry; staff 3d 
Brigade. 

Part of 7th Dragoon 
Guards. 



Portsmouth... 
Southampton . 



Aug. 
Aug. 



Aug. 



Aug. 18 



107 



48 ! 1824 






100 



Ponton and Telegraph 
Troops and field park. 

5 field hospitals; staff of 
Carthage as hospital ship. 

1st Batt. West Kent, 4th 
Brigade staff. 

12th and 15th Companies, 
and part of 17th Company 
Commissariat & Trans 
port ; 42 men of 2d Bearer 
Company. 



London 

> London.. . 

Portsmouth . 
Portsmouth. 



Aug. 

Aug. 

Aug. 
Aug. 



11 



Aug. 26 

Aug. 21 

Aug. 15 
Aug. 25 



* Four ladies as nurses. 



180 



Details of the Imperial 



67 



Name. 



Ascalon 

Assyrian Monarch 



Lusitania. 
Teviot.... 
Courland . 
Arab 

Capella... 
Nepaul . . . 
Marathon. 



Duke of Argyll... 



Irthington 
British Prince 



Californian. 
Storm Cock. 
Recovery . . . 
Notting Hill 



Lisbon. 
Neera . 



Rhosina 

Nerissa 

Manikins Tower 



North Britain 

Lydian Monarch. 



Stelling 

Leechmere • 
Adjutant. .., 



Amethyst , 
Dalbeattie 
Osiris , 



Libra 
Kent. 



Thursby 

Persian Monarch 

Medway 

Tana 

Helen Newton... 



Tonnage. 



1, 950 

2,608 

2,425 
1, 

438 
2,044 



1 
1,553 

2,037 

1,290 

2,548 

1,287 

91 

255 

2,616 

860 
1,397 

1,774 

1,299 

1,803 

1,118 
2,546 

565 

724 

1,478 

872 

1,224 

557 
6G6 

321 



401 
1, 362 

1,407 
708 
803 

1,126 



1,548 
850 

1,078 

671 

1,425 

544 

238 

230 

1,405 



474 
770 



932 
701 
947 

611 

1,370 

324 

396 
797 



485 
"655 



477 
379 



176 



2, 351 

3, 970 

3,832 
2,057 
1,240 
3, 

3,359 
3,536 
2,403 

3,114 

1,961 
3,973 

1,831 
329 
484 

4,021 

1,334 
2,167 

2,706 

2,000 

2,750 

1,729 
3.915 



1,120 
2,275 



1,357 
1,395 
1,879 

1,034 
1,045 

497 



300 
500 

550 

250 

130 

500 

450 

GOO 

300 

400 

200 

350 

250 
250 
150 
600 



120 

300 



250 
260 

300 

175 

500 

100 
100 
230 



110 
120 
200 

250 



71 



Aug. 4 
July 31 

Aug. 

Aug. 

July 21 

Aug. 

July 31 

Aug. 

July 28 

July 30 



July 

July 

July 
July 
July 
July 



Aug. 
Aug. 



June 
June 
June 



June 21 
Aug. 9 

Aug. 7 
Aug. 7 
Aug. 11 

Aug. 12 
Aug. 12 
Aug. 15 

Aug. 15 
Aug. 16 

Aug. 9 



Place or port at 
which to be dis- 
charged. 



United Kingdom. 
do 



.do. 



....do 

...do 

Southampton 

United Kingdom 

....do 

....do 



United Kingdom 
Bombay. 

United Kingdom . . 

....do 



.do. 
.do, 
.do. 



United Kingdom 
or Aden, Bombay, 
or Calcutta. 

Gibraltar 

Alexandria, Malta, 
Portsmouth or the 
River Thames. 

Malta, Alexandria, or 
Port Said. 

Malta or United King- 
dom. 

Malta or Alexandria . . 



Malta 

United Kingdom 



.do 

.do 

.do 



.. do...... 

Malta 

Alexandria . 



United Kingdom 

Malta or United King 

dom. 
Gibraltar 



Owners, line, 
or company. 



Monarch. 
Orient . . . 



A. Norwood, 

London. 
D. Currie 



Union 

Star 

Pen. & Orient. 
Cunard 



Ducal. 



Princes 



West Indian.. 



Hill. 



Monarch. 



Bird 



Magdala. 
Ely Rice. 



Transports — Continued. 



181 



Accommo- 
dation. 


Troops 
carried. 


Corps. 


Port of em- 
barkation. 


Date. 


Remarks. 




£ 

Z 
o 

S 


3 

i 

i 
i 
to 

i 

2 
1 
2 

4 
2 


o 
= 

Ft 

d 
d 

170 
300 

870 

250 

100 

770 
90 
780 
200 

320 

100 
350 
200 


* 

C 

w 

127 
2GS 

6 
90 

55 
147 

196 

153 

50 


■i 

z 

■a 

5 

6 
18 

29 

11 
12 
32 
3G 
31 
13 

9 

2 

13 

6 


6 

i 

i 
i 

9 
1 
1 
1 
1 

4 

2 




2 

d 

170 

28] 

859 

285 
91 

729 
81 

772 

211 

323 

40 

310 
183 


0B 

i. 

o 

w 

125 

263 

54 
3 
6 

4 
65 
55 
54 

187 

150 

37 


be 

q 

i 


bfl 

> 


- 


7 
18 


J.3, Royal Artillery 

2 squadrons 19th Hussars . 

1st Batt. Shropshire Regi- 
ment. 

Ordnance stores and garri- 
son artillery (2 batt.). 

2d and 7th C. <fc T. Cos. for 
Cyprus. 

1st Batt. Roy. Irish Fusi- 
liers. 

Headquarter and artillery 
staffs. 

1st Batt. Royal Highland- 
ers. 

\ Bearer Company; 2 field 
hospitals; horses of R. 
Irish Regment. 

24th Co. Royal Engineers: 


Portsmouth 

Southampton . . 

Kingstown 

Woolwich 

Woolwich 

Southampton . . 

Liverpool 

London 

Portsmouth 


Aug. 12 
Aug. 10 

Aug. 10 

Aug. 15 

Aug. 2 

Aug. 8 

Aug. 5 

Aug. 8 

An?. 8 


Aug. 25 
Aug. 22 

Aug. 21 

Sept. 5 
Cyprus 
Aug. 15 

Aug. 19 

Aug. 17 

Aug. 20 

Aug. 21 

Aug. 21 

Sept. 4 
Aug. 19 




w 


Charter renew- 
ed. 


36 

37 


20 

13 
33 
35 


Stopped at Mal- 
ta 6 days 
Hospital ship.. 

Charter renew- 
ed. 


J8 

39 
40 
41 


30 
13 


Charter extend- 
ed. 


42 


14 


Southampton . . A n p- « 




44 


1 


part of 17th Co. C. &T.; 

horses of R. I. Pus. 
Ordnance-Store Depart-j Woolwich |Aug. 19 

nient. 
D.l Royal Artillery Portsmouth ' A no-. 8 




43 


?1 




46 


IT 


2(5th Co. Royal Engineers. 


Southampton .. 


Aug. 9 


Aug. 23 




47 




Tug • - 


48 


























Salvage tug . . . 


49 




1 


400 
200 






^ 






Mules from Natal (turned 
hack at Aden). 








5(1 












51 












5-' 












53 


















..... 






54 












Condensing 
ship. 
. . do 


55 




i 

2 


300 
350 


268 
104 


io 
8 


5 

.. 
4 


3\U> 
297 


268 
95 










56 


18 


Parts of 8th, 11th, and 12th 
Cos. C. & T. 


London 

Portsmouth 


Aug. 14 
Aug. 16 


Aug. 27 


} 


58 




do 










'Vi 


fi 


(3 off., 3W. O.. 143 men & 
6 horses for Malta) ; Mil- 
itary police, &c. 




London 


Aug. 17 


Aug. 30 




fifl 






fi? 




do 










ti-> 




Railway material from 
Alexandria. 










fia 












64 




do 










65 




....do 










fifi 














67 




























fifl 




























m 




























70 




























71 




























7? 




























73 































No final period. 



182 

It may be pointed out that the embarkation of troops was carried on 
simultaneously at Liverpool, London, Portsmouth, Woolwich, and South- 
ampton in England, and at Kingstown and Queenstown in Ireland. The 
first body of troops to sail from England in the hired transport fleet was 
the Scots Guards in the Orient, and the last of the fighting line, J bat- 
tery, 3rd brigade, Eoyal Artillery, followed two weeks later. 

The gross tonnage of the fleet was thus distributed : 



Troops, &c. 




Tonnage. 



Cavalry 

Artillery 

Infantry 

Eoyal Engineers 

Ordnance-store Department. 
Commissariat and Transpor 

Army Hospital Corps 

Hospital ships 

Miscellaneous 



30, 269 

30, 736 
38, 968 
10, 252 

3,971 

31, 276 



7,615 



* Two were shared with the Commissariat and Transport Corps. 
t Shared with the Commissariat and Transport Corps. 



XV 



THE ARMED TRAINS. 



Two armed railway trains were employed during the late campaign 
in Egypt, one at Alexandria and the other on the Ismailia and Tel-el- 
Kebir Line. Both were rigged and operated by seamen from the Brit- 
ish fleet. The former has been described by Lieutenant Barnes of the 
TJ. S. S. Mpsic in a report already made public. The accuracy of this 
report is sufficient excuse for quoting it at length. Plates 71 and 72 
give general views of the train. 

U. S. S. Nipsic (Third Rate), 

Alexandria, Egypt, September 8, 1882. 

Sir : I have the honor to report that I have visited and examined the armored 
train used by the English forces in their operations against the Egyptian insurgents 
under Arabi Pasha, I found Lieutenant Poor, E. N., of H. M. S. Inconstant, in 
charge, who kindly pointed out and explained to me its details and the mode of oper- 
ation. 

Its components vary somewhat at different times, according to the force it carries, 
but may be regarded as consisting of six different parts, as follows: 

First. One or more vacant platform cars, intended to feel the way and give notice 
of any obstructions upon the track before they are reached by the more important 
parts of the train, or to take the shock of torpedoes. 

Second. A platform car carrying one gun, a 40-pdr. Armstrong of old pattern, so 
arranged as to admit of training about four points upon either side. It rests upon a 
solid platform of wood 4 inches thick, in which is fitted a pivot which holds the slide, 
and with a breeching hitched to a bolt on each side of the car checks the recoil. This 



183 

ear is unarmored, except at the front end, where, inside the wooden end wall, is an 
iron plate -^ of an inch in thickness, inclosing on three sides a wooden box 3 feet in 
thickness, and as high as will permit the free working of the gun, the box being filled 
with bags of sand and a few others hanging from the plates on the sides. At the rear 
end of the*car is a wooden wall some 3 feet high, on which are hung the implements 
for serving the gun. On the floor near by are carried a few rounds of ammunition. 

Third. The locomotive. This is protected on each side by three bars of railroad 
iron hung with wire partly covering the boiler, and an inch plate of iron about 2 feet 
toy 4 covering the cylinder, the piston rod and its connections. The caboose is pro- 
tected by iron plates -^ of an inch in thickness, backed with bags of sand. Although 
the most vital, this is the weakest part of the train. A large part of the boiler and 
considerable machinery are exposed, but can hardly be better protected, as the springs 
will hardly sustain any additional weight. Its armor is the heaviest, but it is not- 
complete. I think lighter armor more completely shielding the locomotive would be 
preferable, for the train can hardly expect to withstand even the fire of field guns 
unless at long range, and the rest of the train is designed to be proof only against 
musketry. 

Fourth. A platform car protected on all sides by a movable wooden wall 2 inches 
thick, backed with iron plates - x 3 g- of an inch thick, and sand-bags, the sides of a 
height convenient for firing over by men kneeling upon the lower^tier of sand-bags. 
Around the walls hang a supply of intrenching tools, such as picks and shovels, and 
at one end lies a pile of a dozen stretchers. On each side outside is lashed a small 
spar, a handspike, and several looms of oars or similar small pieces of wood, with 
short pieces lashed across their ends. These are designed for carrying the gun in 
case of need. By lashing one of the spars on top of the gun and crossing the other 
pieces under it, the latter with the short pieces at their ends, will permit fifty men to 
get a good hold without crowding. This car is intended to carry a force armed with 
rifles. 

Fifth. A car similar to the one just described and protected in the same way, armed 
with a Gatling in front and a Nordenfeldt in rear, between which is carried a supply of 
ammunition — 5,000 rounds for the former and 12,000 for the latter. This car also 
carries intrenching tools. 

Sixth. A platform car protected in the same way as the last two, carrying two 9- 
pdr. R. H. with a small supply of ammunition. They are intended principally for 
service off the train, and heavy skids are carried for convenience in putting them off 
or taking them on the car. 

At times another car is carried protected like the rest, except that the rear wall is 
higher and has a port where a Gatling is mounted. 

A n amber of drag ropes are carried so that in case of any accident disabling the 
locomotive the men may man them on the side away from the enemy and thus draw 
the train while retreating. 

One of the cars usually carries a tripod of small spars surmounted by a platform, 
forming a lookout elevated 20 feet above the train, which commands a good view 
of the country and makes ib difficult for the enemy to conceal his men behind small' 
irregularities of the ground. 

A second train closely follows the first as a supply and relief train. 

The front end of its advance car carries a steam derrick intended for use in clear- 
ing away wrecks. If a car of the fighting train should be demolished by the enemy's 
fire, or from any cause, the relief train would draw away the cars in rear of it to the 
nearest switch (and there is one near the point of operations), then return, and, 
with the derrick, dump the wreck clear of the track, after which it would draw away 
the rest of the train. 

This train carries tools and materials for repairing the track or even laying a new 
one should it be cut or torn up in their rear ; also gun-cotton, torpedoes, and an elec- 



184 

trie battery and wires for destroying by explosives whatever it may be advisable thus 
to get out of the way. 

A most interesting and elaborate feature of the supply train is a magazine ear — a 
platform car protected by wooden walls and iron plates like those in the fighting 
train. The magazine is in front and further protected by a solid wooden backing of 
12 inches on all sides, except in rear, where it is open. Leaving a space high enough 
for a powder tank it is covered with a half-inch iron plate, bars of railroad iron laid 
close together, and above all bags of sand. The rear half of the car is divided by 
pieces of plank laid across into compartments, in which are stowed shell, shrapnel, 
and canister for both 40-pdr. and the 9-pdrs. The ammunition is carried by hand 
from the magazine car to the fighting train, the men running along the railroad under 
the shelter of its embankment. 

The supply train also carries a few passenger cars, used as quarters for officers and 
men, and two box cars for their cooking and messing arrangements; but they are 
never taken beyond the junction near the English lines, at Eamleh. 

At present these trains pass the day at the freight depot in this city but at 8 p. m. 
go out, pass the night reconnoitering between the English and Egyptian lines, and 
at 6 a. m. return to the city. 

For a time it was claimed that the armored train did excellent work, but I cannot 
learn that it was used except as auxiliary to reconnoitering parties.. I do not regard 
it as of much military value, for its operations are limited to one track, and it can 
be easily avoided or successfully opposed by heavy guns mounted near the track. 
Arabi Pasha has adopted the latter means, and with his 7-inch rifles has made it dan- 
gerous for the train to approach nearer than 6,000 yards to his fortifications, which 
is about the distance of the English lines. The train is armored only sufficiently to 
withstand rifle fire, nor can it well be protected against the fire of any guns as heavy 
as it carries. As Arabi's guns are effective at 6,000 yards, and the heaviest in the 
train at not more than 3,500, it is obvious that at present it is of little use, but it is 
intended to increase its efficiency by mounting upon it a 9-inch rifle. 

It was at first intended to advance to the attack supported by a skirmish line, but 
that plan has been abandoned, and the force, originally two hundred men, is now re- 
duced to fifty. Its first use was attended with considerable fighting, and it went, 
through one prolonged engagement, but its operations are now limited to an occa- 
sional shot with its heaviest gun, which accomplishes little. The train has been 
manned and operated entirely by blue-jackets from the English fleet. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

N. H. BARNES, 
Lieutenant, United States Navy. 

To Commander H. B. Seely, U. S. N., 

Commanding U. S. S. Nipsic. 

The " 7-inch rifles" spoken of in the foregoing were, in reality, the 
15 cm Krnpp so frequently referred to in the paragraphs relating to the 
operations about Alexandria. 

The first trip of the train took place on the of July 27. It was com- 
posed as shown in the following diagram : 



NbrOenfeldt, 1_ 



Fig .60. 
Hhigi-ne, 



Gahirig 



o 



J rx 



^~> 



The Armed. FrainjffnuJuly SFth « 



185 



So satisfactory were the results of the trip and so promising was 
this mode of warfare, that on the next day the train was made up on 
a larger scale, as shown below. 

In the gun-truck were rails and pot sleepers for repairing the line 
where necessary. 



12 ". '-- 



R 



rt 






O 






I*. 



r s 



(5 



,i 



$•§ 



ft 



<o 



* 



* 



t 



?•;. 



t~ ft 



J—z- 



f f 



** 



HE- 



jf. 



M 



Is | 



- =~T 



O 



«5 

4- ^ 



^T— -- 






Even this extension seemed inadequate, and, on August 4 the train 
was composed of no less than nine trucks besides the locomotive, and 
was arranged as seen in Fig. 62. 



186 

The train as thus formed took part in the reconnaissance in force of 
that day, described on page 166. 

The cars in front of the steam crane were pushed forward and un- 
coupled, the locomotive then backing down out of range, with the bal- 
ance of the train. General Alison bears witness to the excellent prac- 
tice of the 40-pdrs. thus mounted on that occasion. 

The armed train, which had reached the unwieldy development of a 
movable citadel, was after this divided into two parts — a fighting line 
and a reserve, so to speak. The composition of these parts is shown in 
the accompanying diagram. 

The reserve train was to be kept out of range. In this shape the train 
did service during the remainder of the month of August. On Sep- 
tember 3 it was definitely devoted to outpost duty, as described by Lieu- 
tenant Barnes, the reserve train being left at Gabarri. The working 
train after this date was made up as shown in Fig. 64. 

Ftp. 6* 



WdrOenfel M\ 



True??. , , 4Qpcbr. 



O 



3 



Mnybne 
The Armed Train after Sept. 3& . 

The personnel was distributed as follows : 

Me 

Tothe40-pdr 12 

To theGatling 4 

TotheNordenfeldt. 4 

To the Infantry Company 40 

Total fighting nien 60 

This last development may be accepted as the result of five weeks' 
experience, and as indicating what those in charge thought the best 
composition for patrol and outpost work over a short line and from a 
fixed base. To put Lieutenant Barnes 7 verdict in another form, it may 
be fairly stated that the sphere of real usefulness of such an armed train 
lies without the limit of effective range of the enemy 1 s guns. For serious 
attack, therefore, it must mount pieces of greater range than the enemy's, 
while it will rarely enjoy such freedom from mines and malicious tam- 
pering with the rails as characterized the operations at Alexandria. 

The detachment" lived in comparative luxury, being quartered in first- 
class railway carriages on the dock at Gabarri. The rations were sup- 
plied by the army commissariat. The health of officers and men was 
fair. At the outset the drinking water was taken from the same well 
as that which furnished the locomotive, but as its use was followed by 
attacks of diarrhoea and dysentery, recourse was had to distilled water. 
Each man had his blanket and a shift of clothes, both blue and white. 
The arms were rifles and cutlasses. 



187 

The value of this train was impaired by the superior range and power 
of the Krupp gun which the Egyptians mounted, after a short while, in 
the King Osman lines. Its gunners succeeded in obtaining great accu- 
racy of practice and in frequently placing its 84-pound shell in danger- 
ous proximity to the armed train. 

The 9-inch 12-ton M. L. E. which Lieutenant Barnes speaks of as about 
to be mounted on a railway truck and used against the Krupp just 
mentioned, was only ready for service the day after the battle of Tel- 
el-Kebir. A few experiments were made, first with 15 pounds of pow- 
der and no shot, then with 30 pounds of powder and a common shell 
weighing 230 pounds, and, lastly, with 50 pounds of powder and a 255- 
pound chilled shell. The truck was left free on the rails, the recoil of 
the gun being thus converted into retrograde motion of the truck. The 
results of these trials were considered to be satisfactory. It is, however, 
open to grave doubt, whether so heavy a gun could be permanently or 
even frequently used on an ordinary line and on a car not specially con- 
structed to carry so great a weight and to resist so violent a shock. 

The other armed train employed in Egypt was prepared and manned 
from H. M. S. Penelope. 

Upon a four-wheeled open truck a platform was laid of 3-inch planks 
fore and aft. These planks were bolted through the floor of the truck. 
On the sides of the truck were placed half-inch steel plates, riveted to 
the angle-iron frame of the truck. These plates being 6 feet long by 3 
wide and standing on their edges formed a low breastwork that was 

Fig. 65. 




Breastwork; Penelope's 
T^ain. 



fairly bullet proof. The top edges of these plates were connected by 
small lap plates, 6 by 3 inches, bolted with half-inch bolts. 

Outside of all were awning stanchions bolted to the side of the truck. 
An awning was fitted to the cars, and from the ridge-rope were sus- 



pended the belts of the gun's crew. Sand- 
bags were hung around the car outside of 
the steel plates. 

A breast-piece was built up at the front 
end of the truck of timber, 8 inches square, 
and was secured firmly to the bottom frame 
by five 2£-inch stay-bolts, as seen in the ac- 
companying sketch, Fig. 66. 



Fig. 66. 




Breast 



■piece, 



Armed Train? 



188 




The magazine was built in an open 
box-car. Just within the wooden 
sides of the car was stacked a tier 
of sand-bags, extending around the 
front and sides. Figs. 67 and 68. 
Inside the sand- bags were thin steel 
plates, held in place by long bolts 



Fiy* 68. 



SheUIfoam 






nnx 



Magazine 



Magazine 
passing between the bags and through the side of 
the car. The space inclosed within was divided by 
a transverse steel plate into two compartments, the 
forward one for shells, the rear for charges. The 
roof was of loose boards, on which were laid, first, 
f-inch iron plates, and then sand-bags. The en- 
trances to the magazine and shell room were open- pianof Aimrnvnitiar, 
ings in the roof. Car.FenelQirts£rme& 

The provisions for the men were carried in the Train. 

gun truck, and the tents, three in number, were slung underneath. 

The detachment was composed of twenty-four men in all, equipped 
with rifle and sword-bayonet and carrying 60 rounds of ammunition. 
A gunner's mate and an armorer were in the party. The 40-pdr. am- 
munition consisted of 230 rounds, mostly shrapnel. 

In action the gun, having reached its position, was left alone, and the 
magazine truck run 50 or 60 yards to the rear. The supply of ammu- 
nition was maintained by hand. 

The first start of the armed train was made on August 26, when it 
was dragged from Ismailia to Nefiche by sixteen horses, four abreast. 
A few days later, it returned to Ismailia for certain repairs and im- 
provements. 

On September 1 it went to Kassassin. The part it took in the action 
of September 9 is described in a verbal account by Sub- Lieutenant 
Erskine, E. K., upon whom the command devolved after the wounding 
of Lieutenant Purvis. 

When the infantry was called out under arms, trains were clearly seen 
coming up from Tel-el-Kebir to within 5,000 yards, where they dis- 
charged their cargoes of troops and retired. The 40-pdr. opened on the 
artillery posted on the enemy's right, engaging at about 4,000 yards, 
but not firing often for fear of inflicting damage on the British infantry 
in front through the stripping of the shell, a not infrequent occurrence. The 
Egyptian fire was very hot, their shell falling all about the camp and 
among the troops. Early in the engagement, Lieutenant Purvis was 
wounded, losing his left foot. 

The enemy's advance being checked and his retirement begun, the 
40-pdr. was pushed forward by hand to keep within range. Parts of 
the train were hit several times. One shell burst under a truck which 
had been placed in front of the gun to explode any mine which might 
have been laid under the rails, and a second burst near the magazine* 



189 

No real damage was sustained. Having succeeded in securing a pair 
of horses, Sub-Lieutenant Erskine chased the Egyptians upwards of two 
miles. 

The 40-pdr. expended about 40 rounds in all, and did good execution. 
The moral effect of its comparatively large projectiles was, perhaps, of 
even more influence than its practice. The lack of an engine prevented 
easy change of position, and the fire was embarrassed by the presence 
of another gun, the captured 8 cm Krupp, worked by the Eoyal Marine 
Artillery, immediately ahead of it on the rails. 

This was the only engagement in which the Ismailia armed train took 
part. It shared in the advance on Tel-el-Kebir, where it was not fired. 
It went on to Zagazig, Benha, and to Tan tan, when that town surren- 
dered to General Alison and the Highlanders. It finally returned to 
Ismailia for re-embarkation on September 23. 

At no time during the four weeks spent on shore was the detachment 
without ample supplies of all kinds. Its sanitary condition was excellent. 
The men were always in good spirits and looked upon the unusual service 
which they were called upon to perform as partaking of the nature of 
a pic-nic. They expressed themselves to the writer as anxious to pro- 
long their stay with the army. They had managed to make themselves 
very comfortable in their train, and even to provide themselves with, 
certain luxuries occasionally. Their cheerfulness and well-being were 
but another example of the general rule of the war — everywhere the 
seamen operating on shore were well sheltered, well fed, and glad to re- 
main on duty with the land forces. 

The value of a gun permanently mounted on a railway carriage de- 
pends mainly upon its size. On the one hand, it must be heavier than the 
ordinary field piece, to justify the sacrifice of mobility entailed, and, on 
the other hand, a limit to its weight is reached when it becomes impos- 
sible to give the gun the maximum train its mounting permits with- 
out incurring an imprudent risk. It is doubtful whether guns weighing 
more than four or five tons can be advantageously employed in this 
manner. It finds its most favorable use in defending a long stretch of 
straight road, near or along which the enemy must advance, attacking with 
infantry and field pieces. These conditions were fulfilled at Kassassin, 
where the armed train did its best work. Against a flank attack such a 
gun is powerless, and hence is not adapted to independent operations on 
any scale. 



190 



XVI. 

THE BOAT TRANSPORT IN THE SWEET WATER CANAL. 

The selection of the line of the railway from Ismailia to Zagazig along 
the Fresh Water Canal for the advance, secured to the British expedi- 
tionary force in Egypt the additional advantage of water transport be- 
tween the base and the front. The importance of this particular trans- 
portation is shown by the fact that it was the first established. 

On of August 21, the day after the seizure of Ismailia, Major-Gen- 
eral Graham was at Nefiche with the advance. To retain possession 
of the railway junction and canal lock at that point was a military ne- 
cessity, unless the campaign was to be conducted on the defensive. 
Graham had to be supported both by reinforcements and material. To 
get the latter to him was no easy matter, for the railway was broken 
down and wheeled transport absolutely useless. There remained only 
the Sweet Water Canal as an available channel. 

Admiral Seymour, who had come around from Alexandria in the 
Helicon to Lake Timsah, when addressed on the subject, at once, as 
was to have been expected, put the thing on a permanent footing. 
The service was inaugurated that afternoon, when two steam pinnaces 
and two cutters, from H. M. S. Orion, entered the canal through the 
locks at Ismailia (Plate 48) and took provisions to Nefiche. Eeturn- 
ing at once to Ismailia, their trips were then continued day and night, 
as rapidly as possible, for the next seventy two hours, following up 
the army in its march to Magfar. Here was encountered an obstacle 
of the most serious nature, a dam across the canal, which effectually 
stopped for the moment all further progress by boat to the westward. It 
had been constructed with the hope of cutting off this practically sole sup- 
ply of water from the attacking force. There were distillers on board all 
the steamers in the harbor, which could be employed as a last resource, 
but to burden the feeble transport service with the maintenance of the 
water ration, would have insured perhaps not the failure, but at least 
the inordinate prolonging of the campaign. 

The dam at El Magfar gave immense trouble, for it was skillfully 
built of crossed layers of rushes packed in with mud. It is but scant 
justice to say of the Egyptians that if they thoroughly understand con- 
struction in any material, that material is mud. Vain efforts were made 
to blow it up. It had finally to be picked to pieces and removed by 
handfuls. Even when destroyed as a dam, parts of it still remained 
as a bar and gave much subsequent trouble. 

The boat transport had developed into a definite service under Com- 
mander A. W. Moore, E. N., the second in command of the Orion. As 
assistants, he had one lieutenant at Ismailia, and a second at the front r 
wherever that might chance to be. A naval engineer was stationed at 



191 

each end of the route to inspect the machinery of all boats propelled 
by steam, and at Ismailia a small repair shop was established with a 
working equipment of tools, material, and artificers. 

In addition to the boats 7 crews, Commander Moore had a working- 
party of 30 men from the Orion and Penelope, divided between the sta- 
tions as finally fixed at Kassassin, Tel-el-Mahuta, El Magfar, and Isma- 
ilia, at each of which tents were pitched and a camp routine initiated. 
These tents were drawn from the army, were six in all, four Bell and 
two Indian. 

The boats employed varied in number, size, and kind. The water in 
the canal grew steadily shallower, the supply above being shut off by 
the Egyptians, who were able to control its flow past the lock at Abou 
Hamed beyond Tel-el-Kebir, the leakage into the British lines through 
the dams at Tel-el-Kebir not being sufficient to replace the loss by 
leakage into Lake Timsah, by actual consumption, and by evaporation. 
Nothing could have been better than a canal transport service if at all 
permanent or certain, but the decreasing depth of water caused the 
service to change from day to day, as the heavier boats were gradually 
withdrawn. 

The original force was augmented, on August 25 and afterwards, by 
the purchase of twelve native boats of different sizes. Their capacities 
ranged from 3 to 10 tons. The rough sketch, Fig. 69, will suffice to give 




an idea of their general build and appearance. They were deficient in 
thwart-ship bracing, and would open out when heavily laden. The 
larger ones could not be loaded to their full capacity on account of lack 
of water. 



192 

Six horse-boats belonging to the naval transport service, and all the 
steam launches which the fleet could spare, were also admitted into the 
canal. The latter boats comprised six steam pinnaces, each from 35 to 
37 feet long, and a 42-foot picket-boat from the Alexandra, which, how- 
ever, drew too much water to be of any use. These were employed to 
tow the other boats, lighters, &c, and were in charge of sub-lieutenants 
or other junior officers. 

The larger steamers drew 39 inches of water and the smaller 33. Com- 
mander Moore asked for a minimum depth of 42 inches throughout, after 
the lock at Kassassin had passed into the possession of the advance. 
The reach of the canal above this lock was tolerably well filled rto the 
depth of 5 feet 6 inches. It was not, however, deemed prudent to draw 
upon this supply of water, so greatly needed at the front, by allowing 
enough of it to flow into the Kassassin-Ismailia reach to secure the 
depth Commander Moore desired. 

The first two steam pinnaces had been thoroughly equipped for contin- 
gent action with the enemy, one carrying a Nordenfeldt, with its mus- 
ketry shield, the other a Gatling gun. The subsequent necessity of re- 
ducing the draught as much as possible caused Commander Moore to 
remove this armament as well as such other weights as could be dis- 
pensed with from all the boats in his little fleet. 

The crews were composed of one coxswain, two seamen, two leading 
stokers or artificers, and two stokers. The coxswain was armed with a 
revolver, the rest with rifles. Each man carried 60 rounds of ammuni- 
tion. The kits consisted of one spare suit of blue, a blanket, a water- 
bottle, haversack, and the usual pot, pannikin, &c. 

There were many drawbacks and hitches, owing for the most part to 
insufficient water in the canal, but no serious injury or avoidable inter- 
ruption of the traffic. Among the petty sources of inconvenience and 
discomfort was the frequent fouling of the screws by clothing and other 
articles which had been thrown into the canal. Near Mahsameh the 
bed of the canal seemed to be quite covered with rush bags, doubtless 
used for conveying earth and sand in the construction of trenches, dams, 
&c. It was no unusual experience to have the screws fouled by these 
baskets as often as a dozen times in a mile. Again, the shallowness of 
the water prevented the attainment of satisfactory speed, while the fine 
mud it contained clogged up the boilers and gave great trouble. 

A special advantage enjoyed by the men engaged in this service was 
the catching of fish, particularly an excellent species of mullet, from 
5 to 6 pounds in weight, which abounds in the Sweet Water Canal. 
Large numbers of these mullet jumped into the boats while under way, 
being frightened by the noise of the screw. It was rarely that a trip 
was made without a catch and its welcome addition to the ration. 

The night work between the army posts was conducted with extreme 
caution, as the Bedouins might easily have made a raid upon a tow 
while outside of the defended points of the canal, and have inflicted 



193 

severe damage. In this respect the newer type of boats was preferable, 
being comparatively noiseless, while the older made a noise which could 
be heard miles away.* 

Commander Moore established a species of headquarters at El Magfar, 
where he kept a full stock of rations for his men. Three days' supplies 
were drawn at a time from the Orion and taken for issue to this place 

The crews of these boats, with but few exceptions, were unchanged 
throughout the operations, yet this work was severe in the extreme, 
while life was rendered almost intolerable by the swarms of flies during 
the day and the mosquitoes at night. To do justi e to these pests re- 
quires a fund of objurgation not at the command of the average mortal. 
Of the men sent back to the ship all were on account of sickness, four 
of the number being disabled by mosquito bites. 

Each boat carried a light in the bow, which was effectually screened 
from observation from the land by the high canal banks on either hand. 

Until September 2 the larger boats did the towing up to El Magfar, 
the smaller ones beyond. Practically the actual towing never extended 
past Tel-el-Mahuta, on account of the lack of water in the upper part 
of the reach. From Tel-el-Mahuta to Kassassin the lighters and cargo 
boats were hauled by mules or horses. 

It was on this section that Commander Moore's service was supple- 
mented by the Royal Engineers with their pontoons and special rafts, 
freight being shifted to them at Tel-el-Mahuta when necessary. 

A second dam was found at Tel-el-Mahuta, larger but less carefully 
constructed than that at El Magfar. 

| |The continued lowering of water in the canal rendered useless the 
heavy native boats and the lighters, the former requiring 3 feet of water 
to carry a paying load. It had now come to a point when every inch 
lost was of vast importance. As a substitute for the heavier craft, 
Commander Moore obtained eight ship's pulling-boats belonging to the 
hired transports in Lake Timsah. Being of lighter draught and carry- 
ing small loads, these boats were handier than the lighters and more 
easily gotten afloat after grounding. Their employment began on Sep- 
tember 5. By exercising great care they could be worked to within a 
mile of the cavalry camp near Kassassin. 

Between Ismailia and Kassassin the water shoals 3 feet and 4 inches. 
Thus, on August 28 there was a depth of 5 feet 2 inches at the former, 
and on September 2 but 4 feet 8 inches, with corresponding depths of 1 
foot 10 inches and 1 foot 6 inches at the latter place. The average 
depth between Kassassin and Tel-el-Mahuta was 2 feet 4 inches, and 
below Tel-el-Mahuta 3 feet 4 inches. This loss of 6 inches threw out 
the heavier boats, as before mentioned, and materially reduced the 
traffic. Before then from 60 to 70 tons of supplies went daily by the 
canal, and the boats in returning brought back sick and.wounded, for 
whom this mode of transit was especially desirable. 

* The old engines were similar to those used in our service. 
948 EG 13 



194 

By September 6 there had been sent by the canal from Ismailia to 
Tel- el-Malm ta 550 tons of provisions. The boat service then stood as 
follows: Steam launch and pinnace of the Orient; steam pinnaces of the 
Orion, Falcon, Oarysfort, Thalia, and Euphrates. Three large boats 
were thrown out of use by the lack of water. 

With this diminished fleet, aided by the pontoons of the Royal Engi- 
neers, the work was urged ahead, in the feeling that the more done the 
quicker ended. The result reached may be gauged by the fact of the 
delivery at Kassassin of 48 tons of stores on September 7 and 45 tons 
on September 8 — a great falling off from the original 60 to 70 tons daily 
but still yielding an addition of supplies to the reserve depot well worth 
the trouble and vexation incurred. In this way the canal service was 
maintained, the army co-operating with the navy until the march on 
Tel-el-Kebir. 

On September 10 Commander Moore began to prepare some of his 
boats for the special transportation of the wounded from the field of the 
impending battle. 

Water transport for men suffering either from painful wounds or 
diseases involving local inflammations or ulcerated tissues is far pref- 
erable, there being no noise or jolting; on the contrary, steady, abso- 
lute motion, with relative rest. It was presumed that the losses in the 
next encounter with the Egyptians would be heavy, and it was deter- 
mined that there should be no ground for complaint as to the treatment 
of the wounded in particular or any branch of the army medical depart- 
ment in general. In consequence the arrangements were on a liberal 
scale and the details carefully worked out. 

The boats selected for the purpose were two horse and seven ship's 
boats, ordinary clinker-built cutters, belonging to the hired-transport 
fleet. These were taken through the lock at Kassassin into the upper 
reach of the canal, where they were fitted. Pine boards 1 inch thick 
and 12 inches wide were laid fore and aft upon the thwarts, to form an 
even platform the whole length of the boat. Upon this platform a thick 
bedding of loose hay was spread. Awnings were rigged and awning 
curtains were gotten up. Each boat was provided with two breakers 
of water and tin cups, and had a blue-jacket to steer it. A nurse was 
detailed for the care of the wounded. 

On September 13 the boats were divided into four sections, three of two 
boats each and one of three boats, each section being an independent 
tow, with a naval lieutenant in charge of every two sections. The 
tracking was done by sixteen mules, accompanied by the necessary 
drivers. The boats followed in rear of the Indian Contingent, laden 
with the appliances for the establishment of field stations for the tem- 
porary dressing of wounds. The latter were located on the canal bank 
near the Egyptian intrenchments. The work began at 9 a. m. From 
the dressing stations the wounded were put into the boats. As soon 
as a section was filled it was sent off to Kassassin, todeliver the patients 



195 

to the general field hospital. These disposed of, the section would re- 
turn as rapidly as possible to Tel-el-Kebir for another load. 

At first it might appear that nine boats were insufficient for the work, 
but it must be remembered that each case had to be examined and the 
wound bound before the sufferer could be safely transported over even 
so slight a distance as that which intervened between Tel-el-Kebir and 
Kassassin. Owing to this circumstance, and to Commander Moore's 
organization and superintendence, the provision proved ample. Deputy 
Surgeon-General Marston, who had charge of the work at the dressing 
station, states that "the transport down the canal was excellent." 

The lightest cases were, as a rule, most quickly disposed of, the more 
serious needing longer time and greater attention ; and in the first trips 
of the boats the majority of the wounded conveyed were but slightly 
hurt. The two horse-boats alone took down no less than fifty-seven. 
After this the number in each boat was decreased to about nine severe 
and six mild cases. 

Two trips were made by each section during the clay of the battle at 
Tel-el-Kebir. Commander Moore says that upwards of 200 men were 
brought down to Kassassin. The last embarked at 9 p. m., twelve 
hours after the beginning of the work. The embarking and landing 
of these sufferers was very distressing, the steep muddy banks of the 
canal rendering the operation most painful in spite of every care. 

The military events of this day, resulting in the completion of the 
campaign and the distribution of the British troops over new lines, ren- 
dered the breaking up of alJ stations in the desert possible and desira- 
ble. The emptying of the field hospital at Kassassin was therefore im. 
mediately begun. During the two days following, Commander Moore's 
fleet was employed in removing the wounded from Kassassin. The seri- 
ous cases, for whom water transport was so essential, were all moved in 
this way. The boats were passed through the Ismailia locks into Lake 
Timsah and taken alongside the hospital ship Carthage without change. 
Twenty-six cases on September 14 and twenty on the 15th profited by 
this comfortable mode of conveyance. 

The water had not yet come down from above to raise the level in the 
canal. There were still but 14 inches at Kassassin. To obtain a start 
at this point, when everything was in readiness, the lock-gates were 
slightly opened, giving a rush of the water into the lower reach, which 
carried the boats into deeper water, where the animals could tow them 
to Mahuta. At Mahuta the steam launches were in waiting to take 
them to Ismailia. 

This sad labor completed, the canal service, no longer embarrassed 
by deficiency of water, was continued for the purpose of aiding in clear- 
ing out the stations between Ismailia and Tel-el-Kebir, the two points 
at which the stores hitherto spread over the line across the desert were 
now being collected. This object was accomplished on September 22, 
when the men and boats were returned to their respective ships. 



196 

The Sweet Water Canal Service commanded the sympathy of those 
who were in a position to watch its hard and successful struggle against 
disheartening circumstances. It received the comraeudatiou of those 
in authority for having achieved all that was humanly possible at a 
time when comparatively small achievements were of great value. 



XVII. 



THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT TEL-EL-KEBIR. 

The equipment of men landed from British ships of war for military 
operations is not a matter of individual taste or caprice, but is uniform 
and efficient. As a consequence it is possible to assemble squads, compa- 
nies, or guns 1 crews from a number of vessels, meeting for even the first 
time, into a homogeneous military organization which is not open to criti- 
cism as a laughable combination of heterogeneous elements. 

The dress is always understood to be blue, unless otherwise directed. 
The white cap-cover is fitted behind, in warm climates, with a havelock 
or cape falling upon the shoulders and extending to the temple on each 
side. The men themselves prefer the straw hat, as lighter and cooler 
and affording shade to the eyes. In Egypt, after the occupation of Alex- 
andria, this was the head dress habitually worn. 

To carry his kit each man uses his blanket, which is made into a long 
roll of uniform pattern, containing shifts of clothes (as ordered), soap, 
towel, &c, and is carried with the bight over the left shoulder, the ends 
meeting under the right arm. The leggins are provided by Government. 
They are represented in Figs. 70, 71, and 72. They are of stout tanned 



Tiff. 70. 





JFi 9 . 72. 




canvas, bound with leather, and are strong and serviceable. The shaded 
parts are of leather. The holes for the loops are guarded by brass 
eyelets. The loops slip each over the one next above, the topmost 
being passed over the retaining strap, which is buckled. 



197 



The belt is of uncolored leather, and well designed for work. The 
workmanship is an honest specimen of the saddler's art. The metal 
parts are of brass. It may be best described as a waist-belt supported 
by straps whi 3h go over the shoulder and cross behind. Figs. 73 and 
74 give front and rear views of the belt in use. It appears at first 

Jfyr3. Ffy.74* 





sight to have an enormous number of buckles, but these serve the pur 
pose of adjustment in all directions, so that when once fitted the man 
may wear it with great comfort. The S hook in front permits ready 
unclasping. When even momentarily halted, the wearer may relieve 
the strain on the waist, the entire weight then swinging clear of the 
side by the shoulder-straps. On the latter, in front, are two studs to 
which the haversack may be attached, while behind they button to- 
gether at the cross. 

The ball-pouch is of soft black leather, carried behind, Fig. 74. Other 
stiff cartridge-boxes, similar to those in our own service, are strung on the 
belt as needed. 

The bayonet-frog is on the left side, as usual. Its only peculiarity is 
a short strap by which the bayonet may be buckled jPig.75. 

in.* 

The haversack, Fig. 75, is a simple flax canvas bag 
with a canvas strap to go over the shoulder. Two 
loops are stitched to the strap near the haversack. 
When worn by riflemen this is carried at the back, the 
loops passing over the shoulders and buttoning to the 
studs already mentioned on the supports of the waist- 
belt. If worn by a cutlass man, the haversack is un- 
der the left arm. 

The water-bottle is a small coopered barrel, shown 
in Figs. 77, 78, and 79. It is of Italian manufacture, 
supplied by Guglielminetti Brothers, Turin, and is 
carried by both branches of the military service. In the navy, riflemen 
carry it on the belt and cutlassmen under the right arm. The latest 

*Thi8 arrangement would hardly cost as much as the bayonets we lose annually 
overboard in manning boats. 




198 



Tip 78. 



Tig. 77. 




pattern is covered with gray felt. Its capacity is one quart. It is 
stout, withstands rough usage, and is cheap, but it is heavy in com- 
parison with the water it contains. The bands and stopper are of gal- 
vanized iron. The top view, Fig. 78, gives the shape of the section. 
The stopper is only removed for filling, the drinking-hole being in it 
and closed by a wooden plug. The sling is of soft brown leather, as 
shown in Fig. 77. 

The weight of a rifleman's equipment in full marching order is as 
follows : 

Lbs. oz. 

Martini-Henry rifle 9 

Bayonet 2 8 

Haversack, with 2 days' rations 4 8 

Water-bottle 2 8 

Belt, 3 cartridge-pouches, and bayonet-frog 6 

120 rounds of ammunition 13 

Blanket and kit from 3 pounds upwards, say as a maximum 7 8 



(Maximum) total 45 

It was decided to send a Naval Light Battery of six Gatling-guns to 
aid in the assault on Tel-el-Kebir. The organization and command were 
intrusted to Captain Fitz Roy, R. N., of H. M. S. Orion, the same officer 
who had occupied Isrnailia. Commander Kane, of the Alexandra, was 
second in command. 



199 




200 



Fiff.81. 



On September 8. two Gatling-gun limbers were taken ashore at 
Ismailia and fitted for mule draught. It may be remarked here that 

the howitzers and machine guns in the Brit- 
ish navy which are sent on board ship for 
contingent use on shore are all provided with 
Umbers. Fig. 80 is a view of the Gatling gun 
and its limber as ordinarily furnished, while 
Fig. 81 shows how single-trees, &c, were 
adapted to the ones in question to enable four 
mules to be hitched to each gun. 

Arrangements were made for the neces- 
sary animals and the transport for the bat 
tery. 

On September 9 the Humber arrived in 
Lake Timsah with four more Gatlings and their crews, drawn from the 
Mediterranean fleet. The folowing table gives the composition of the 
battery j each ship sent its own Gatling : 






Officer commanding. 


Other officers. 


n 

a 

~© 

d 


Tents.* 


Ships. 


Men. 


Offi- 
cers. 


Alexandra 


Lieut. J. E. Bloxland 


1 surgeon, 1 midship- 
man . , 


30 

36 
30 
39 
30 
30 


3 

4 
3 
4 
3 
3 


1 
1 


Monarch 

Orion 


Lieut. W. C. Eeid 


1 sub-lieutenant 


1 
1 


Superb 


1 ieut. T. Gc. Fraser 


1 snb-lieutenant 

1 sub-lieutenant 


1 




1 








Total 


195 


26 a 













*Also 1 hospital tent and 1 tent for headquarters; total, 28. 

The actual crews were each of 24 men. The remainder were stretch- 
ermen, mule and baggage guards, &c, usually four of the former and two 
of the latter. In the Orion's detachment were four men as a body-guard 
to Captain Fitz Roy, his servant, a gunner's mate, and a signal man. 
The Carysfort's additional men were artificers. 

Fourteen of the men in the gun's crew were armed with rifles, the 
rest of each detachment with cutlasses and revolvers. The small-arm 
men carried 90 rounds of ammunition, the others 36 rounds. Each man 
carried his own tin pot and spoon. A mess-kettle was sent for every ten 
men, and one of the crew detailed as cook. To each gun were attached 
two mule- drivers from the army Commissariat and Transport Corps. 
The mules were 54 in number, distributed thus : 

4 gun-mules to each Gatling 24 

3 spare-ammuuition mules for each gun 18 

2 pack-mules to carry officers' luggage, mess-kettles, &c, to each gun 12 

Total 54 



201 

Id. addition to these pack and draught animals were three horses, one 
for the commanding officer, one for Commander Kane, and one for the 
adjutant. 

The guns and men were landed at 6.15 a. m. on September 10 at Is- 
mailia. Proceeding to the railway station they were conveyed by train 
to Kassassin, arriving at 6 p. m. Here the tents, mules, &c, which 
had been supplied by the aimy were in readiness. Camp was at once 
pitched between the railway and the canal, according to the plan in 
the accompanying diagram, Fig. 82: 

Gaflings JFar7ie3 



A, 
A. 



JSStchen 



A. 



{fficerfS Tents 



&>&JL A.A.&. 



Xatrincs 



3 Quarter* 



D3x>spiiaZ 
Latrines 



Plan of encampment of naval battei'y at Kassassin. 

The latrines were simple trenches 12 feet long and 3 feet deep, 3 feet 
wide at the top and 18 inches wide at the bottom, Fig. 76 a and b. 



202 



For the officers the more elaborate accommodation was supplied which 
is sketched in Fig. 76 c. Into these latrines loose earth and sand were 
shoveled twice a day by men detailed for the purpose. 






M#. 76 c. 



w 





The guns' crews took turns in forming guard and in doing fatigue 
duty, one crew being told off every day for each of these tasks. They 
were thus, so to speak, in three watches. 

The following routine was established: 

ROUTINE OF THE NAVAL BATTERY. 

3.30 a. m. Cooks called by the camp-sentry; fires lighted. 
4.30 a. m. Reveille by bugle. 
4.45 a. m. Bugle-call "cooks." 
5.00 a. m. Breakfast. 

5.45 a m. Latrine party fall in. « 

7.30 a. m. Relief guard ; fall in fatigue party ; old guard wash and clean up. 
8.00 a. m. Clean arms and guns. 

8.30 a. m. Dress bugle ; clean up camp ; trice up tent curtains ; put on belts. 
9.00 a. m. Bugle-call " advance; " parade ; crews fall in in front of guns; arms are 
inspected; prayers; dismiss. 
11.45 a. m. Bugle-call "cooks." 
12. m. Dinner. 

3.15 p. m. Fatigue party to draw provisions. 
5.00 p. m. Supper; shift into night clothing. 
6.00 p. m. Evening parade ; exercise as mule artillery. 
6.30 p. m. Latrine party fall in. 
7.00 p. m. Bugle-call "grog." 
8.15 p. m. First bugle. 
8.30 p. m. Second bugle; out all lights in camp. 

A packing-drill was improvised, as shown in the next paragraph. 



Gun numbers. 


Duty. 


1 to 5 




6 to 8 


Prepare the limbers. 


9 to 14 


15 


Provide and pack three pieketing-poles. 

Provide and pack one picketing-pole. 

Provide an 8-ga)lon breaker of water and lash it in rear of limber. 

Pack sand-bags on top of limber. 


16 


17,18 


24 





Stretchermen provide their stretchers and then assist generally in packing the mules. 

On September 11 the battery was inspected by Major-General Mac- 
phersou, the commander of the Indian Contingent, who expressed him- 
self as much pleased with the good order of the camp and the condition 
of the battery and men. 



203 

On September 12 camp was struck at 6.30 p. m., and all preparations 
made for the march. Four men were detailed to look out for the tents 
and baggage that were to be left behind at Kassassin. Two days' 
rations were carried in the haversacks, and 90 rounds of small-arm 
ammunition in the pouches. Everything not essential to actual fighting 
was discarded. 

On the 13th, at 1.30 a. m., the battery limbered up and formed on the 
canal bank in column of sections. At 2 a. m. it started towards Tel-el- 
Kebir. The Egyptians opened fire at 4.55 a. m. with shell all along the 
line, followed by heavy musketry fire on the right of the battery. The 
rear Gatlings were deployed and a brisk fire begun at once; first, on 
some Egyptian cavalry who wers in front of the works, and then on the 
intrenchments themselves. On reaching the lines they were found de- 
serted; the enemy had fled. 

The Gatlings' crews suffered no losses, being, in fact, little exposed, 
except to shell-fire, which was ordinarily in this campaign comparatively 
harmless. The enemy seemed to have concentrated his guns on certain 
predetermined points on the line of the advance, for in places the shells 
fell thick and fast. By exercising a little care in avoiding these zones 
of danger much loss was spared. 

The Naval Battery spent the day at Tel-el-Kebir bringing in the 
wounded and burying the dead. Late in the afternoon it started for 
Zagazig, bivouacking on the road. On the 17th it returned by rail to 
Ismailia, where it re-embarked. 

The commissariat was particularly well cared for. It must be borne 
in mind that when the battery joined the army this branch of the serv- 
ice had assumed such a development as to enable Captain Fitz Koy to 
draw upon it for supplies. A change was made in the hour for serving 
out grog, habitual on board ship. The earlier parties had adhered to 
the naval practice, and had received their tot at noon. The men under 
Captain Fitz Roy drew it after supper, when the work of the day was 
entirely completed. The wisdom of this arrangement was evident in 
the increased enjoyment it yielded the men, as well as in a marked 
improvement in the afternoon's work. 

The health of the battery during their short term of service on shore 
was excellent. But one serious case of illness occurred. On the march 
only three men were obliged to fall out. 

The wheels of the Gatling carriage and limber were too small and the 
tread too narrow for efficient use in such a sandy country. In many 
places the entire gun's crew had to assist the draught mules. 

The organization and the morale of the battery were more than satis- 
facto^. Its work at Tel-el-Kebir was of little real importance, as its 
attack followed after that of the Highlanders at a sufficiently great in- 
terval to allow it to profit by the general demoralization of the defense. 
No doubt can be entertained that it would have rendered a good account 
of itself had the defense beeu more stubborn. 



204 



XVIII. 

the marine battalions. 
1. The royal marine light infantry. 

Several reasons combined to attract special attention to this body of 
men, the largest single battalion in the expeditionary force. They were 
" long-service r men; they were neither of the army entirely nor yet were 
they sailors. Their record during the campaign was not only irreproach- 
able but in every way honorable, and it was known that a royal duke 
had asked to have them placed under his command with the Guards bri- 
gade. Their connection with the naval branch of the service is suffi- 
cient warrant for the separate mention they receive in this report. 

The minimum stature of recruits is 5 feet 6J inches, and the term of 
enlistment twelve years. At the expiration of this period, the marine, 
if a desirable person, is offered the opportunity of re-engaging for nine 
years more. In the majority of instances this opportunity is accepted, 
the full length of twenty-one years completed, and the good-service pen- 
sion secured. The men who served in Egypt averaged between eight 
and nine years' service and twenty-seven years of age. 

The battalion was composed, at the outset, of five companies taken 
from the principal barracks in England. Portsmouth and Chatham 
each furnished 150 privates, and Plymouth 250. These men were not 
formed into a battalion at home, but were hastily collected on board H. 
M. transport Orontes, which took on board the first two detachments 
at Portsmouth on June 27, and sailed at once for Plymouth, where 
she stopped two hours to receive the remainder. She then went to 
Gibraltar. The command of the battalion (now about 600 of all ranks) 
was given to Lieu tenant- Colon el Ley. 

The haste which characterized the setting out therefore was in unison 
with the necessities of the case. It is greatly to be regretted that its 
subsequent movements were so much more deliberate, and that it was 
not on hand to seize Alexandria the day following the bombardment. 

At Gibraltar the battalion was shifted into another transport, the 
Tamar, for the passage to Malta, where it arrived on July 6. It was 
not even yet too late to reach Alexandria in time, and prudence would, 
it seems, have dictated their presence there, if merely as a precau- 
tionary measure. Several days were lost in waitiug at Malta. The 
Tamar then started under easy steam, not exceeding 6 knots speed, 
with orders to join the Channel squadron at Limasol in the island of 
Cyprus. 



205 

On reaching her destination, the Tamar found pressing orders to come 
at once to Alexandria, where she arrived at 2 a. m. of July 7. At day- 
light she went alongside the mole in the inner harbor, and, after noon, 
the marines were disembarked. The latter marched on immediately to 
Gabarri (see Plate 1), broke open some warehouses, in which the men 
were billeted, and, without delay, began the guarding of that portion 
of the city where the existing defenses were weakest. 

The combined marine battalions, the Royal Marine Light Infantry 
and the Eoyal Marine Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson of the 
latter corps, took a prominent and honorable part in the reconnaissance 
in force of August 5, described on page 93 et seq., their behavior receiv- 
ing official praise. 

A second detachment of four companies came out in the Dacca, which 
touched at Alexandria on August 8, landing Lieutenant-Colonel Howard 
S. Jones, who relieved Lieutenant-Colonel Ley, invalided. The Dacca 
then kept on to Port Said, the detachment under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel S. J. Graham being there transferred to H. M. S. 
Northumberland. Two of these companies were landed at Port Said 
on August 20, under Major J. W. Scott, to seize the place as described on 
page 107, while the balance, under Colonel Graham, were sent to Ismailia 
in H. M. S. Ready and Dace, and were the first troops to arrive at the 
new base, by that time in the possession of the navy. The following day 
the main body, under Colonel Jones, reached Ismailia from Alexandria 
in the Rhosina, and later Major Scott's detachment was brought up from 
Port Said, making a strong battalion of nine companies. 

On August 25 Compauy D, under Captain R. W. Heathcote, was de- 
tailed as General Wolseley's body-guard. 

The Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion did good work in the ac- 
tion of August 25, at Tel-el-Mahuta and Mahsameh, after a hard night 
march. In this engagement the two marine battalions were the only 
corps that kept up with the cavalry and reached the Egyptian camp 
at Mahsameh. 

On the 28th the Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion was called up to 
Kassassin from its camp at Mahsameh, but too late to be of real service. 
It was actively engaged on September 9, capturing two Egyptian field 
pieces by a brilliant charge. In this affair it lost 27 men wounded, some 
mortally. 

At Tel-el-Kebir the battalion was on the left of Graham's brigade, in 
the front line of the attack. Its behavior on this occasion, characterized 
by its accustomed coolness and steadiness, received well-earned praise. 
Its loss in this battle was only exceeded by those of two other battalions 
(see page 153). 



206 

The following table exhibits the strength of the two detachments as 
originally sent ont : 



Rank, &c. 



Steamer or transport 

Date of sailing 

Date of arrival in Egypt 

Lieutenant-colonels 

Majors 

Captains (of companies) . 

Adjutant (captain) 

Paymaster 

Quartermaster (captain) . 

Staff (captain) 

Lieutenants 

Surgeons 

Staff sergeants 

Color (orderly) sergeants 

Sergeants 

Corporals 

Buglers 

Privates 



Total rank and file 
Grand total sent. . . 



First de- 


Second de- 


tachment. 


tachment. 


C Orontes, 
I Tamar. 


> Dacca. 


June 26 


July 


27 


July 17 


Aug. 


8 
2 
1 


2 




5 




4 


1 







1 







1 












1 


10 




8 


2 




1 


9 







5 




4 


20 




16 


25 




20 


20 




8 


500 




386 


592 


451 




] 


L, 043 







The entire loss during the campaign from all causes, death, wounds r 
and disease, up to October 14, was 13 officers and 220 men. The invalided 
are stated by the adjutant, Captain A. St. Leger Burro wes, to have been 
chiefly from among the younger members of the battalion, both officers 
and men. 

No regular transport was furnished the marines, but 67 mules and 8 
Maltese carts were "picked up" at Ismailia. These were not enough 
to carry one-quarter of the equipment. The water-carts were lost in 
the sand near ^Tefiche early in the march, but this mishap was remedied 
to some extent by the fortunate capture of seven camels each carrying 
two large tin water-tanks. 

So much has been said in commendation of this battalion that it is 
impossible not to believe it to have been second to no other body of 
troops in the field in organization, discipline, and performance. The 
greater average age of its members, as compared with that of the army 
proper, doubtless gave them the steadiness often urged in their praise, 
while to their experience afloat is due that " handiness v which is the 
characteristic of the sailor, and a most desirable habit on the part of 
the soldier. In physique, bearing, and military qualities generally the 
marines ranked very high, and they may point to the favorable notices 
of their work in official dispatches with honest pride. 



2. The royal marine artillery. 

This detachment was drawn from a corps of trained artillerymen 
who man a portion of the batteries of Her Majesty's ships of war. They 
date back in organization to the time when the sailor had nothing to 



207 

do with the fighting of the ship. They have been gradually replaced 
by seamen, whose increased intelligence and careful training have ren- 
dered them competent to handle with skill the various kinds of ord- 
nance in the British fleet. That the Royal Marine Artillery is not yet 
a thing of the past is seen in the fact that to-day it mans one-half of 
the Inflexible's 81-tou guns. These artillerists are, in addition, thor- 
oughly drilled as infantry. 

In the same transports with the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry bat- 
talion, the Orontes and Tamar, a detachment of Royal Marine Artillery, 
300 in number, was sent to Egypt. It was organized as an infantry 
battalion and was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Tuson. At 
Alexandria it was associated with the Royal Marine Light Infantry. 
On August 5 the two battalions were combined under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Tuson, and did the extremely good service already narrated. 

On August 19, when the base was changed, this battalion was em- 
barked in the Nerissa, the first of the hired transports to arrive at Is- 
mailia. The force was strengthened at Port Said by 100 men who had 
been sent from England in the Dacca to fill vacancies. Landing at 
Ismailia at 2 a. m. of August 21, the battalion, now numbering between 
300 and 400 men, took part in the first advance, that in which Nefiche 
was occupied, marching out with two days' rations in their haversacks 
and 100 rounds of ammunition in their pouches. It took part in the 
affair of the of August 24 at El Magfar, when a small party relieved the 
worn-out Royal Artillerymen at their 13-pdrs., rendering highly efficient 
and welcome assistance. The following day it did further good service, 
advancing with the whole line. At 4 p. m. it pushed on to Mahsameh 
where it occupied the enemy's deserted camp, and found much-needed 
provisions. The battalion had been without food all day. 

The few days immediately succeeding were marked rather by inad- 
equacy of rations than by the perilous nature of the work on hand. The 
men lived, for the time being, mostly on biscuits and such provender as 
the Egyptians had left behind in their retreat. 

On the 26th the battalion reached Kassassin. It took an honorable 
part in the engagement of August 28, and was complimented by the gen- 
eral in command, Major-General Graham, for its gallant behavior under 
simultaneous direct and enfilading fire. It operated on the southern 
bank of the Sweet Water Canal in an exposed and important position. 
As has been already mentioned, a detachment under Captain Tucker 
had mounted a captured 8 cm Krupp gun on a railway truck and they 
worked it skillfully throughout the day* This gun subsequently pushed 
on with the naval 40-pdr. to Tel-el-Kebir, and then to Zagazig, Benha, 
and Tantah. 

On September 9 the Royal Marine Artillery was again on the extreme 
left. It repelled a slight attack on the southern side of the canal, de- 
fending the bridge at Kassassin. 



208 

At Tel-el-Kebir the battalion started off 600 yards in rear of the Rifles 
(in the 4th brigade), but during the night was ordered to form General 
Wolseley's escort. It took, therefore, no active part in the assault, 
although subjected to distant shell-fire, principally from the advanced 
redoubt. (M, Plate 50.) 

The Royal Marine Artillery, being less numerous, was less subjected 
to comment than the Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion; iudeed, 
the majority of casual readers of accounts of the campaign hardly knew 
of the existence of such a corps, but its work was characterized by the 
same quiet efficiency, and it received a proportionate and gratifying 
meed of praise. 



XIX. 

THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. 

The British army has been so often engaged in operations conducted 
"beyond the seas" that its practice has developed a regular system, 
governing every step of the work of embarking, transporting to the 
base, disembarking, and forwardiug to the front of troops, and animals 
and supplies of every sort. An important link in this chain is termed 
officially the "Base and Lines of Communication," which are united 
and made a separate command, under an officer clothed with ample 
authority. The proper performance of this arduous and unremuuera- 
tive service, as may be presupposed, calls for great energy and force 
of character, coupled with administrative ability of a very high order. 

The province of this officer includes the base and what is called the 
u advanced depot," together with all the means of transportation and 
exchange of intelligence employed between the two. Thus he controls 
the immediate disposition of arriving troops and stores, exercises mili- 
tary command over the base depot and garrison, directs the starting 
and other movements of convoys of men and of supply wagons, estab- 
lishes the train service on the railways, if there be any within his de- 
partment, regulates the use of the telegraph, provides for the defense 
of the base and the lines for all transport, including that of the wounded ; 
in a word, is responsible for everything that reaches the base until it 
passes out of his care into the camp at the front or is re-embarked on 
board the transports. * 

The Base and Lines of Communication during the late campaign in 
Egypt were commanded by Major-General W. Earle, C. S. I., and no 
officer in the expedition was more unremittingly occupied or had greater 
difficulties to contend against. 

The preliminary work at Alexandria, which General Earle reached 
on August 9, was of no particular moment. The troops from England 
began arriving on the following day, the Orient leading the van of the 
hired-transport fleet with the Scots Guards on board. The handliug 



209 

of these bodies of men, their outfits and supplies, was very simple. 
The spacious docks at Alexandria were an admirable landing place, 
whence the troops were marched at once over good roads to their camps, 
the most remote of which was only a few miles distant. For the men's 
kits and camp equipage and the officers 7 baggage the regimental and 
other army transport either sufficed or found ready supplement in hired 
carts and the local railways. The principal of the latter has a branch 
leading to the wharves, while another, the Kamleh Railway (owned by 
a private corporation), leads directly to the position of the main camp 
at Ramleh. The latter railway was used for the conveyance of both 
troops and stores. 

General Earle's labors began in earnest with the change of base from 
Alexandria to Ismailia. He reached the latter place at 10 p. m. of 
August 20, and instituted his preparations and arrangements at once. 
On the day following, August 21, Major-General Graham was atNefiche, 
in command of the advance of the army, a small body of about 800 men. 
Although very near Ismailia in point of distauce, the break in the rail- 
way prevented the use of trucks for hauling stores to Nefiche, while the 
sand of the desert intervening, heavier here than anywhere else on the 
whole line of march, rendered the very small amount of transport then 
at hand totally inadequate. To supply this deficiency a boat service on 
the Sweet Water Canal was immediately started by Admiral Seymour, 
four boat-loads of provisions being sent to General Graham on the first 
or opening trip. This organization, which is detailed in Section XVI, 
worked in conjunction with the other means of transport as developed, 
all being subject to the control of the General commanding the Line 
of Communications. 

During this and the next two days, August 21, 22, and 23, the base 
assumed its characteristic appearance. The different battalions and 
corps, now landing with all practicable speed, were assigned their re- 
spective camping grounds, and were given a place to store such articles 
of their kits, baggage, and stores as would not be immediately required 
on the march across the desert. The best methods of landing horses, 
mules, men, and materials were being worked out practically, and means 
sought to increase the landing facilities. The post and telegraph offices 
were established (operated by volunteers until the regular army troops 
charged with these duties could arrive), and preparations were made 
for working the railway by means of horsed trucks. The Khedive's 
palace, a large airy building, was occupied as the base hospital, and 
the Governor's house as the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. 
The various base stores of supplies, the sick-horse hospital, and re- 
mount depot were organized under the Royal Engineer, Ordnance-Store, 
and Commissariat Officers, the Surgeon and Veterinary Surgeon on the 
staff of the "Commandant of the Bases." 

The plan of Ismailia. Plate 48, gives the general features of the base. 
When first seized the only landing facilities it possessed were at the 
- 918 EG 14 



210 



Central Wharf, a rectangular pier-head, with about 60 feet of water front, 
and 25 feet wide, built on piles out into 2 fathoms of water. A short, 
narrow gangway connected this pierhead with a stone wharf, the con- 
tinuation of the broad avenue which leads directly from the railway sta- 
tion. This avenue is a fine specimen of macadam. It withstood the 
continued heavy traffic thrown upon it by its selection as the terminus 
of a military route without signs of deterioration, and it proved a real 
blessing to the British. 

The harbor of Ismailia was formed, as is well known, by dredging 
out the shallow bed of Lake Timsah, and navigable water approach to 
the town was only secured at this one point, the Central Wharf. In 
consequence, the greater part of all heavy articles and stores, men and 
horses, were landed from here from lighters or from tugs, which the 
depth of water permitted alongside the pier. To relieve the strain on 
this sole place of disembarkation, additional accommodation was ob- 
tained west of the Central W T harf. The South Wharf, on piles, is low 
and well built. The pier-head is 22 feet long and 14 feet wide, and the 
pier itself a straight jetty 156 feet long and 9 feet wide. The water 
here is too shallow to allow the presence of tugs, but native boats, 
ships' cutters, and lighters can run alongside with ease. On the beach 
near by the greater part of the field pieces were landed. 

At the South Wharf, the commissariat began also the work of dis- 
embarking their stores until the branch railway from the station to 
the mouth of the Sweet Water Canal was sufficiently advanced. They 
shifted their operations to this more convenient locality on September 9. 
The dock they made use of was a platform about 2 feet above the level 
of the water, 6 feet wide, and 75 feet long, built of wood and resting on 
piles, in two parts, separated by a balcony, which had been erected here 
long before by the Suez Canal Company. The railway was laid on the 
embankment 12 feet above the landing stage, the slope being mounted 
by steps and inclined planes, the latter for parbuckling heavy packages, 
and very useful in breaking up the base. Fig. 83. While the con- 

Ztg.83. 




venience of this wharf was of much importance, a further and very great 
advantage was found in the transfer of such large quantities of bulky 
stores, all coming under one department, to a place by themselves, leav- 
ing the other landing facilities to he undisturbed possession of other 
corps. 



211 



When the Indian Contingent arrived, it began at once, with that in- 
dependence of action which marked all its operations to provide for 
its own disembarkation, the Madras Sappers constructing a separate 
pier. The spot selected was between the Central and South Wharves. 
A number of low four-wheeled trucks were used as the support of a 
superstructure, shown in plan in the accompanying diagram, Fig. 84. 

Fig. 84* 



=3?ft. » 



JTft. 



-33f6, 

¥~ 



66ft. 



-ttjt, 



Temporary landing pier of the Indian Contingent at Ismailia. 

The platform was roughly made of planks, resting on fore-and-aft scant- 
ling. The depth of water secured was only a little less than 3 feet. 
The pier was certainly light ; indeed, everything connected with the 
Indian Contingent was light, but it served the purpose of its design, 
dry footing. 

Each wharf was under the charge of an officer of General Earless 
staff, whose duty it was to superintend the work and start everything 
in the right direction as soon as landed. This officer bore the title of 
" Military Landing Officer." That this duty was well performed is shown 
by the fact that blocks never occurred, even on the Central Wharf, which 
was always the most crowded. A regular system was adopted and 
adhered to, so that the disembarkation was effected with a minimum of 
confusion. The cattle and many of the mules were put into the water 
from the transports and made to swim ashore, while the horses were 
all landed in the boats described on page 175, or on flats, each horse 
being accompanied by his own harness or saddlery and other equip- 
ments. The latter being landed first and carried well up the wharf by 
fatigue parties, the horses were run ashore to their trappings, were har- 
nessed or saddled, and led at once to their appropriate places in camp. 



212 

The value of making haste slowly was shown in the matter of get- 
ting wheeled vehicles ashore. These, at the outset, were put together 
on board of the transports, and were often loaded in the lighters along- 
side, but it was quickly found that the speed sought was really lost, and 
the process resorted to of landing the carts and wagons empty, or even 
in cases taken to pieces. 

The work at the Central Wharf was superintended by Major H. G. 
MacGregor until September 1, when he was relieved by Major E. H. 
Sartorius, of the East Lancashire Eegiment. The diligence and abil- 
ity of these officers received well-merited commendation in official dis- 
patches. 

To help matters at the main landing place, a branch railway was laid 
to it direct from the railway station, so that the stores needed at the 
front could be put at once into cars and sent off, thus saving one hand- 
ling, much time, and what was at least as important, avoiding the piling 
up of material in the very restricted space on the wharf. 

The scarcity, amounting almost to a dearth, of native labor threw, 
practically, the entire work of moving the stores upon fatigue parties 
detailed from the different battalions. These fatigue parties were many 
and large, and kept every one busily employed, with little rest or inter- 
mission. It is satisfactory to hear, in the words of General Earle, the 
officer most interested, that " the troops worked well." 

The base at Ismailia was under the immediate command of Colonel 
Sir W. O. Lanyon, K. C. M. G., C. B., 2d West India Eegiment, with 
the title of " Commandant of the Base." The order which prevailed 
here after affairs had had a chance to settle down to a somewhat per- 
manent status was admirable. The 1st battalion of the Manchester 
Eegiment (late 63d foot) had come from India, and had been detailed 
for duty at the base, where it remained until the end of the campaign. 
That some should remain and guard the rear while others push ahead 
to fight is inevitable, but none the less is staying behind a fate hard 
to bear. It is a duty to testify to the soldierly bearing, neat appear- 
ance, and cheerfulness of this body of men. To see a fatigue party of 
them returning to camp at night after many hours' hard work landing 
and shipping stores was to realize the value of discipline and esprit de 
corps. One could not avoid the regret that this battalion had no chance 
to distinguish itself in a more martial way. 

At the other extremity of the Line of Communication was the " Ad- 
vanced Depot," under Captain J. H. Sandwith, E. M. L. I., where were 
kept the stores needed for present consumption. At first this depot was 
established at Tel el-Mahuta, but afterwards it was moved to Kassas- 
sin. Other stations were at intermediate points, each being in charge 
of a "Station Commandant," responsible for the transmission of every- 
thing going to or coming from the army, and for the security of the 
roads and telegraphs within his district. The Station Commandant is 
never interfered with by his seniors except in case of actual attack. 



213 

He keeps the Station Commandants next to him on either side informed 
of the movements of troops and convoys, so that men, animals, and ma- 
terial cannot arrive without finding everything in readiness for their 
reception. He has a staff to aid him in executing his duty, as, for in- 
stance, a Railway Officer, an Engineer Officer, a Commissariat and Trans- 
port Officer, an Ordnance -Store Officer, a Surgeon, and a Veterinary Sur- 
geon, or as many of them as the circumstances of the case may require. 
He must prevent disorders and excesses in his district, and hear and 
investigate all complaints made by natives. He regulates the depart- 
ure of all convoys or detachments, giving written orders to the officer 
or non-commissioned officer in charge. 

The work at these stations, and particularly at the advanced depot, 
was very heavy. The manual part was performed, as at the base, by 
fatigue parties of soldiers, often numbering upwards of 200. The limited 
amount of rolling stock and the rarity of railway sidings rendered it 
necessary to lose no time in unloading stores sent by train. The quan- 
tity and nature of the shipment being telegraphed ahead in every in- 
stance, men and animals in sufficient numbers were always in waiting 
to clear the cars without delay. The cars with stores for the cavalry 
were uncoupled at Mahsameh and left by the trains on their way out 
to Kassassin, to be picked up on the return trip. 

The push of the advance along the railway to the westward, which 
began immediately after the seizure of Ismailia, continued, with insig- 
nificant halts, until Kassassin was occupied, on August 26. Each move, 
increasing the distance from the base and involving the establishment 
of additional camps to be maintained, rendered the distribution of sup- 
plies more complex. General Earle, speaking of affairs at this period, 
says : " The transport of provisions was the difficulty of the moment." 
The regimental transport had completely broken down. The railway 
lacked locomotives. The boat service in the Sweet Water Canal was 
the main dependence, and that was threatened by the steady lowering 
of the water-level. Luckily, the capture of a large stock of provisions 
at Mahsameh #ave the sadly strained lines of communication a slight 
respite, and relieved temporarily the pressing needs of the troops of 
the advance. The telegraph was repaired and operated by volunteers 
as far as Tel-el Mahuta. The tide did not fairly turn, however, until 
regular trains w r ere established on the railway, after the receipt of the 
first engine, on August 27. It was a critical time, for the rapid falling 
of the water in the Sweet Water Canal had reduced the boat traffic by 
nearly one-half, the slower process of tracking having to be resorted to, 
and rafts and pontoons substituted for the quicker but deeper boats, 
while it was not until September 3 that the Commissariat and Trans- 
port Corps scored its first piece of work on the Lines of Communication. 
At 5 p. m. of that date, 150 mules, with oats, badly loaded from want 
of experience, started from Ismailia, reaching Tel-el-Mahut the follow- 
ing day. 

The steady increase in the railway service after August 28 began to 



214 

encourage the hopes of those in authority, and on September 5 Gen- 
eral Earle caused calculations to be made of the supplies needed to 
form a working reserve at Kassassin for 16,000 men and 7,000 animals. 
It was found that at least forty railway trucks daily would be required, 
each truck carrying five tons net. The distribution of these trucks 
would be as follows : 

Imperial troops : Trucks. 

To provide for daily consumption 13 

To create a reserve 16 

Indian Contingent: 

To provide for daily consumption 3 

To create a reserve 3 

Ordnance-Store Department 1 

Army Medical Department 1 

Eoyal Artillery 1 

Royal Engineers 1 

Regimental and staff ] uggage, &c 1 

Total 40 

On September 6 General Earle issued an order to his staff covering 
the point. He directed that "the canal traffic and all transport by 
animals will be exclusively devoted to the reserve, and the railway will 
supply the current wants aud do as much as it can for the reserve as well. 7 ' 

The object of these calculations and instructions was to accumulate 
at Kassassin rations for 10,000 men for thirty days. 

A second estimate was made of the carriage required for tents and 
other camp equipage, men's valises, officers' light baggage, &c, when the 
force should move forward. As throwing light on the liberal scale of 
transport allowed in the British army, this estimate is given at length : 

Trucks. 

15 battalions of infantry, 3 each 45 

4 regiments of cavalry, 2 each 8 

9 batteries of artillery, 1 each 9 

4 companies and troops Royal Engineers, 1 each 4 

Field hospital and bearer companies '. 8 

Staff, &c 3 

Total 77 

That is to say, seven railway trains, averaging eleven cars each. 
In addition to these, provision would have to be made for replacing the 
ammunition expended in action. 

The end aimed at began to be approached immediately, but it was 
only on September 9 that it seemed to be reasonably close at hand. 
On that day no less than 230 tons of stores went by rail to Kassassin, 
an excess of 30 tons over the desired amount estimated for on the 
5th, and in addition to the delivery by the canal and by pack ani- 
mals. The work, thus pushed ahead, bore speedy fruit, rendering pos- 
sible the advance of September 13, which terminated the campaign. 
At that time 70,000 of the 300,000 reserve rations had been collected at 
Kassassin for the Imperial Troops, and the Indian Contingent had built 
up at about the same rate. 



215 

The seizure of Cairo and the intervening railway systems extended 
the scope of the Line of Communications without materially increasing 
the labor. The whole Egyptian equipment of rolling stock now became 
available, so that the supply of stores and provisions for the various 
garrisons could be readily maintained unmolested by rail. 

The base was changed as rapidly as possible to Alexandria, and by 
October 1 hardly any signs of its temporary warlike importance were 
visible at Ismailia. 



XX. 

THE COMMISSARIAT AND TRANSPORT CORPS. 

The important question, in the military art, of land transport, has re- 
ceived in England a solution which must be regarded as abnormal. The 
furnishing of food and transportation is the duty of the Commissariat 
and the Transport Corps, a civil branch of the army. The latter service 
is planned, to all appearances, for contemplated operations in Europe or 
in other highly civilized parts of the world which are traversed by ample 
roads of excellent cous traction. 

If this anticipation had been realized, the value of the transport scheme 
would have been tested long ago, under the conditions for which it was 
devised, but as England has had no troops on the Continent either dur- 
ing the forty years intervening between Waterloo and Sebastopol or the 
thirty years, nearly, that have elapsed since the Crimean War, and, with 
this one exception, has conducted her military operations of the last 
three-quarters of a century in remoteand generally savage countries, the 
inference is inevitable that the wish to be prepared for a serious although 
remote contingency has involved the sacrifice of many important and 
ever-present considerations, and has prevented her army from having 
a suitable transport service ready at the outset of her numerous and 
varied expeditions. 

The organization of the corps is good. The plan of its equipment is, 
however, entirely lacking in elasticity, in adaptability to the different 
conditions under which it is constantly called upon to work; while its 
parts are heavy and cumbersome to such an extent as to seriously im- 
pair its efficiency. 

For convenience the wagons are considered first. 

The general-service wagon is strong and solidly constructed ; it weighs, 
empty, about a ton. When carrying its full allowance of a ton and a 
half of load it requires an extremely good road and six powerful horses 
in excellent condition for its locomotion. Yet upon these wagons de- 
pend the carefully worked out system of regimental transport and the 
important packing drill. The moment other modes of conveyance are 
resorted to, a new distribution of the mess equipmeut, &c, must be 
devised, introducing general confusion and discontent. In spite of the 
lessons of the campaign just concluded, it may be safely predicted that 



216 




^y. 63. 



the transport corps will continue to adhere to this impracticable and 
imperishable vehicle. 

The two-wheeled carts upon which most reliance was placed were of 
Fig.84> the Maltese pattern, Fig. 84. 

The principal dimensions are 
as follows: Diameter of 
wheels, 5 feet ; length of shaft, 
lOfeet; size of shaft, 2J inches 
square; width of platform at 
back, 3 feet; width between 
shafts, 18 inches; net load, 
about 8 cwt. 

Somewhat different from 
the foregoing, was a small 
hand-cart which could be fitted for mule or donkey draught by the addi- 
tion of removable shafts of bamboo. The ends and sides of 
this cart can be lifted off either for stowage or use. The 
principal peculiarity was the wheel, the spokes being f -inch 
iron rods radiating from a heavy cylindrical hub terminat- 
ing in iron plates. The spokes pass through these plates 
and are set up with a nut inside. Fig. 85 gives one spoke 
and shows the hub of this wheel. 

The water-cart is simply a large cask capable of holding 
109 gallons, mounted on wheels, and drawn ordinarily by 

Tip-cart, hub and f ' - , ' , , « JL 

spoke. one horse. It may be broadly stated that none ot these 
wagons were of use except for the local distribution of supplies. 

In general terms, the transport of the British force in Egypt was as 
follows : 

Each battalion had the Maltese carts, two water-carts, 26 draught 
horses, and 21 pack animals, with a driver to every two horses. 
Each cavalry regiment had six carts, an ammunition-wagon, a forge- 
wagon, and two water-carts. All this on starting; but what amount of 
transport each corps possessed at the close of the campaign it is impos- 
sible to say; the greater part had been lost in the sand or left behind at 
the base. 

This transport, as thus detailed, was a part of the permanent organi- 
zation of the battalion, and was intended on the march to carry rations 
for one day, together with all the regimental baggage except the tents. 
It was known as the " regimental transport," a term applied to the regular 
transport equipment supplied to every battalion of infantry or regiment 
of cavalry when mobilized. The equipment adopted in Egypt differed 
mainly from the regulation equipment in the substitution of small carts 
for large wagons. 

To each division of the army corps was attached a company of the 
Commissariat and Transport Corps, consisting of 4 officers and 210 non- 
commissioned officers and men (see details, page 100 and 101 ). The stand- 




217 

ard equipment comprised 14 riding horses, 180 draught horses, 74 wagons 
and carts, 4 water-carts, and 3 forge-carts. This, technically known as 
the "Divisional or Departmental Transport," was designed to carry the 
equipage of the divisional and brigade staffs, the butcheries and baker- 
ies of the two brigades, and one day's supply of groceries, provisions, and 
oats for the whole division. With the exception of certain modifications 
intended to better suit the needs of this particular case, this is the trans- 
port habitually assigned to a division on a war footing. A similar com - 
pany was attached to the Cavalry brigade. 

Except during an advance, the Departmental Transport is supposed 
to be employed in bringing up supplies from the base to the advance 
depot. 

Besides these Commissariat and Transport Companies there were three 
"Auxiliary Companies," whose duty during an advance was to carry the 
tents, kits, &c, of the two divisions, and during a halt to operate along 
the line of communications. As a permanent force engaged on the lat- 
ter special work two strong companies were sent out, supplemented by 
hired teams and pack animals. The majority of the teamsters were 
Maltese, and are described as "a very bad lot." 

The composition of an Auxiliary Company, as authorized for the cam- 
paign in Egypt, is given below. 



Rank, &c. 



Commissariat and Transport Corps : ' 

Captain 

Quartermaster . 

Subalterns 

Staff sergeants I . 

Sergeants 

Corporals 

Wheelers 

Collar-maker 

Farrier and carriage smith 

Buglers 

Privates 

Artificers : 

Saddlers 

Shoeing and carriage smiths . 
Natives : 

Interpreters , 

Superintendents 

Drivers 



Total all ranks. 



Animals : 
Riding... 
Pack . . 
Draught 
Spare . . . 



4 

8 
216 



*6 24 
40 | 160 



Total 116 



10 



240 
40 



1 
1 

4 
2 
5 
5 

I 

1 

20 

12 | 

5 
8 

222 



12 



300 



32 
160 
244 

40 I 

476 I 



*One riding horse each for the subaltern, sergeant, corporal, and interpreter ; two riding horses for 
the superintendents ; total, six. 

t Two riding horses for the captain ; one each for the quartermaster, sergeant-major, quartermaster 
sergeant, farrier sergeant, and interpreter, and one spare horse ; total, eight. 



218 



The company equipment was as follows : 



Equipments. 



Vehicles : 

Carts 

Forge carts 

Water carts 

Saddlery : 

Riding 

Pack 

Breast harness (single sets) 

Tool-chests : 

Shoeing and carriage smiths 

Collar and harness makers 

Wheelers 

Implements for carts : 

Axes 

Spades 

Picks 

Lifting-jacks 





to 




>> 








a 
















Cn 




0> 




a 








o 


o 






o 




B 




;_, 


o 


£ 




=2 


<D 


•a 


S 


cS 


a 


o 


O 


o 


H 


CO 


H 


28 


112 


2 


114 


1 


4 




4 


1 


4 




4 


6 


24 


6 


30 


40 


160 




160 


65 


260 


4 


264 


3 


12 


1 


13 


1 


4 


1 


5 


1 


4 


1 


5 


6 


24 




24 


6 


24 




24 


6 


24 




24 


3 


12 




12 



The forge and water carts and one cart were for the use of the section 
to which they were assigned, leaving, as the working strength of each 
section, 40 pack animals and 27 two-wheeled carts, and of the entire 
company 160 pack animals and 108 two- wheeled carts. It is to these 
Auxiliary Companies tbat the bulk of the work on the Line of Com- 
munications should have fallen until the establishment of the railway 
service. 

As will be seen from the above table the company was divided into 
four parts, each of which could be used as an independent unit, and 
this rule, it may be observed, characterizes the composition of all the 
commissariat and Transport Companies. 

The foregoing indicates the theoretical plan. In practice it was found 
that even the small Maltese cart was immovable with less than four 
draught animals, so that one-half of the regimental wheeled transport 
was ineffective at the outset, while the pack animals supplied failed to 
make up the deficiency. In consequence, the troops were dependent 
for shelter upon captured Egyptian camps until the railway could bring 
the tents up. The Commissariat and Transport Corps was utterly unable 
to perform this portion of its duty. 

In anticipation of difficulty in connection with wheeled transport, 700 
mules had been bought in Smyrna and 800 in Beyrout, in ample time 
to meet the troops at Ismailia, but the Turkish Government had refused 
to allow them to be shipped. Others were purchased elsewhere, in Italy, 
Spain, South Africa, the United States, &c, but the three weeks' delay 
occasioned- by the latent hostility of Turkey, and the inability to pro- 
cure camels, or other substitutes, on the spot, were fatal to the success- 
ful working of the army transport over the desert that borders on Is- 
mailia. The wagons and carts were discarded and the draught ani- 



219 

mals utilized by the Eoyal Engineers in hauling trucks on the railway 
and pontoons and boats on the Sweet Water Canal. Although the 
army began landing at Ismailia on August 21, it was not until Septem- 
ber 3 that the Commissariat and Transport began conveying supplies 
to the front (see page 213), and it only assumed its legitimate functions 
after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. 

To this department ordinarily falls the task of handling the stores 
landed at the base, in order that the troops may be fresh for active mili- 
tary operations. Here again it failed. Numbering in all about 1,400 
men, distributed wherever there were camps, from Alexandria to Kas- 
sassin, too small a force remained at Ismailia to execute this part of its 
work. Commissary-General Morris, the Senior Commissariat Officer of 
the expedition, having in vain asked in advance for a corps of hired 
laborers, 400 strong, to supply this deficiency, was obliged to seek relief 
in large fatigue parties of soldiers, who were thus diverted from their 
proper sphere of usefulness. 

Another responsibility of this department is the feeding of the army. 

The following table is of interest as giving the composition of the 
daily ration at three different periods. The first column contains the 
ration as usually supplied; the second, that ordered after reaching Is- 
mailia; and the third, that issued after reaching Cairo. 



Eation. 



Lb. Oz. 



Bread 

Biscuit 

Fresh meat 

Preserved meat 

Tea 

j Coffee 

I Sugar 

j Salt 

I Pepper j 

i Lime-juice *0 

! Fresh vegetables | 

| Compressed vegetables I 

Soap, on payment 

Tobacco, on payment 

Rice 

Potatoes 

Rum 







Oh 

oi 

2 
0^ 

? 

1 



igill. 



II. 



m. 



Lb. Oz. 

1 4 



OJ 

0i 

2i 

0i 

Hs 



Oi 



ti gill. 



Lb. Oz. 
12 



1 00 



0i 
Oi 

H 

0i 

o* 

0i 
4 

1 



A 

i 

None. 



* Issued with \ ounce sugar when fresh vegetables cannot be cured. In IT and III the lime-juice 
formed a part of the daily ration, irrespective of the issue of vegetables. 
\ Issued bn t twice a week. 



The principal changes are in the amount of bread or the equivalent 
biscuit, less being required after the hard work of the campaign was 
over; in the tea, of which the allowance was trebled ; in the lime-juice, 
which was made a steady instead of an alternative issue ; in the fresh 
vegetables, of which half was curtailed and liberal weights of rice and 
potatoes substituted; and in the rum, the ration being first greatly re- 
duced and then stopped entirely. 

The hygienic value of these modifications is self-evident. In the 



220 

case of the grog, it was found that the troops not only needed no stim- 
ulant in that hot climate, but were actually better off without it. 

The ration was changed by the Commander-in-Chief's order, based on 
the recommendation of the Principal Medical Officer. 

The component parts of the ration are put up as follows, viz: The 
preserved meat in boxes of 50 pounds ; the bread in bags of 100 pounds ; 
the tea in 14-pound tin canisters ; the coffee in square tins, two in a box, 
whose gross weight is 100 pounds ; the sugar, packed like the coffee, 
in 60-pound cases ; the salt in 13-pound canisters ; the rum in 10-gallon 
kegs, weighing 119 pounds; the pepper in cases of six 20-pound canis- 
ters, weighing 133 pounds gross. 

The packages vary immensely in weight, and hence introduce great 
complexity in the operation of packing for transport on the backs of 
animals, whose loads on both sides must, of course, balance. Two uni- 
form gross weights for all commissariat parcels, one of 50 and the other 
of 100 pounds, would yield much convenience and save time and labor 
in the field. 

The commissariat animals stood the work very well in the main, very 
few being used up by the heat and heavy labor, and no special diseases 
being developed. This result is attributed to liberal feeding, the usual 
ration being supplemented by extra allowances. Eoughly speaking, 
when actively employed these animals were given all the forage they 
could consume. It must be remembered, however, that, unlike the cav- 
alry, they were never beyond the reach of abundant supplies, and the 
campaign was very short. 

Not only was the transport service the weakest point in the expe- 
ditionary force, but it is not an exaggeration to say that it failed com- 
pletely. In the rapid advance to Kassassin the troops were on several 
occasions entirely without adequate supplies. The opportune capture 
of a stock of provisions at Mahsameh alone enabled them to hold the 
ground they had seized, and saved the cavalry and artillery horses 
from actual want. The army is stated by its commander to have en- 
tirely "outrun its transport," but such a state of affairs ought not to 
have existed at 20 miles from the base. Upon the proper placing of 
the responsibility for this failure depends the chance of guarding against 
its recurrence in the future. For a report of this nature it is impossi- 
ble to obtain the facts necessary to a complete determination of the 
causes that produced so lamentable a result. Certain considerations, 
however, are not out of place. 

The wagon must be light and strong, and be fitted with brakes. Com- 
missary-General Morris prefers the American type, which, with eight 
mules, can haul a load of from one to two tons. This wagon was much 
used at the Cape of Good Hope, and gave satisfaction. Teamsters 
should never ride, but should walk beside their horses. 

As to harness, General Wolseley advocates the use of both breast 
straps and collars, so that a chafed animal may be shifted from one to 
the other, and his services not lost during convalescence. 



221 

The possibility that wheeled transport may be impracticable should 
be met, proper forms of pack-saddles should be adopted, and a well- 
digested packing drill devised in connection with their use. 

The chief reason for the break-down in the transport was undoubtedly 
the attempted adherence to a rigid system, absolutely unsuited to the 
country in which the operations were to be conducted. The native in- 
habitants may be generally assumed to understand fairly well their own 
needs in this particular. In Egypt from time immemorial they have 
used pack animals exclusively. Had the British transport corps landed 
at Ismailia with an adequate and well-organized mule train, the heavy 
desert and the interruptions in the railways would have failed to check 
the flow of supplies to the front, and the army would have been spared 
the annoyance of seeming to suffer almost within sight of the base. 

When the frequency of England's wars is remembered, it seems hard 
to believe that the outbreak of each should find this important depart- 
ment without the animals and drivers necessary to the proper placing 
of at least one army corps in the field. 

The railways in England are so much more economical carriers of 
stores that the transport companies exist during peace mainly as cadres. 
The call to active military preparation means the hurried purchase of 
thousands of animals at exorbitant prices, and the engaging of hundreds. 
of unknown teamsters at high wages. The money which would be 
needed for the maintenance, on a .war footing, of the eight Commissariat 
and Transport Companies that ordinarily accompany an army corps is 
consumed in the enforced haste of mobilization, while the result is seen 
in an undrilled mob, often quite as capable of harm as good. 

During the Egyptian campaign, the Government purchased 10,000' 
mules. A large proportion of these animals were sold immediately after- 
wards at but a fraction of their cost. The loss incurred by the differ- 
ence between the selling and the buying prices would have maintained 
the beasts for many months, and in some cases years. 

War is expensive at the best, and nations that are liable to be called 
upon to take part in it find it cheapest in the end, as it is wisest, to be 
well prepared. 



XXI. 

THE TROOPS. 
I. — THE CAVALRY. 

A squadron from each of the three regiments, the 1st Life Guards y 
the 2d Life Guards, and the Koyal Horse Guards (" the Blues"), which 
together comprise the Household Cavalry, was sent to Egypt and formed 
into a regiment about 450 strong. 

At home, these men, none less than six feet in height, wear a steel 
cuirass and steel helmet, long cavalry boots, &c, but the exigencies 



222 



of the climate caused the abandoning of this heav-y equipment, to the 
great comfort of the wearers. The cuirass was laid aside, a cork hel- 
met was substituted for the steel helmet, and, instead of boots, strips of 
serge (technically known by the Indian name of puttees) were wrapped 
about the calves of the legs. 

The other cavalry regiments, the 4th Dragoon Guards, the 7th Dragoon 
Guards, and the 19th Hussars, each about 600 strong, were similarly 
dressed. 

The organization of a British cavalry regiment on a war footing is 
given in the following table : 



Officers, non-commissioned officers 
and men. 



Lieutenant-colonels 

\Tajons 

Captains 

Subalterns 

Adjutant 

Paymaster 

Quartermaster 

Medical Officer 

Veterinary Surgeon. 



Total 



Sergeant major ,. 

Quartermaster sergeant 

Band sergeantj 

Paymaster sergeant 

Armor sergeant 

Saddler sergeant 

Parrier sergeant 

Sergeant cook 

Trumpet major 

Orderly room clerk 

Transport sergeant 

Troop sergeant-majors 

Sergeants 

Farriers 

Saddlers 

Shoeing smiths 

Wheelers and saddletree maker . . 

Trumpeters , 

Corporals 

Bandsmen 

Privates 

Drivers (transport) 



Total 



32 
15 

480 
22 



622 



Horses. 



94 



94 



480 



480 



44 



44 



* Officers' private horses. 

The ammunition carried by a regiment of cavalry is as follows : 

Carbine : 

Bounds. 

30 rounds per carbine 16, 500 

In reserve 10,080 



Total carbine ammunition 26, 580 



Pistol: 

36 rounds per pistol f 936 

In reserve 1, 200 



Total pistol ammunition 2, 136 



223 



The regiment is divided into four squadrons, three of which are com- 
manded by majors, the fourth by a captain. The establishment of the 
squadron is given in the following table : 



Bank. 


Numbers. 


Horses. 


Chargers. 


P. 

o 
o 

EH 


P 


Major 

Captain .. 


1 

2 
6 
8 
4 
2 
120 
2 


4 
3 

12 

1- 
















120 


4 






Artificers 






Total 






150 19 


120 


4 









The equipment of the trooper consisted of sword and Martini-Henry 
carbine. The latter is carried in a leather bucket at the right side of 
the saddle. The Household Cavalry carried revolvers in addition and 
a heavier pattern of sword. All the metal trappings were allowed to 
rust, in order to avoid reflecting the sunlight. 

The following tables give the weights carried by the cavalry soldier 
in marching order : 



ARTICLES WORN. 

Lbs. Oz. 

Helmet 15 



Tunic 3 

Flannel shirt 1 



Drawers 12£ 

Trousers 2 6 

Braces 4 

Socks 4£ 

Shoes 3 3 

Spurs 13| 

Puttees 6 

Gloves 3i 



Total 13 5i 

SADDLERY. 

Saddle 22 

Bridle 4 

Breast-plate 1 3 

Crupper 12 

Pair of saddle-bags 2 12£ 

Head rope 15 

2 shoe-cases and 4 shoes 5 13 

Saddlecloth 2 12 



Total 40 3* 



ON THE SADDLE. 



Lbs. Oz. 

Hoof-pick 2 

Nose-bag 1 1 

Heel rope and shackle 1 2 

Picketing peg 12£ 

Mess-tin 1 3| 

Carbine bucket 2 

Total 6 5 



IN FRONT OF THE SADDLE. 

Pair ankle boots 4 

Forage cap 5 

Cape 2 12 



Total 



ARMS, ETC. 



Sword and belt, &c 5 

Haversack 

Water bottle 2 

Pocket-knife 

Pouch-belt 



12 

9 
5 
9 



224 



Arms, etc. — Continued. 



Pouch and 30 rounds 
Carbine 



Add revolver for Household Cav- 
alry 



Lbs. Oz. 
3 13* 

7 8 

21 2 



In saddle-bags— Continued. 



Lbs. Oz. 



Total 23 



IN SADDLE-BAGS. 



1 tin of grease 

1 horse-brush 

1 curry-comb 

1 horse-rubber 

1 stable-sponge 

1 oil-bottle 

Pipeclay, &c 



Total 



10 

9 

12 

9 
1 
4 
9 

41 



1 flannel shirt 

1 pair drawers 

1 hold-all, containing 

comb, &c 

1 pair socks 

1 towel 

1 brush 



spoon, 



1 


H 





12* 


1 








4* 





8 





4 



BEHIND THE SADDLE. 

Cloak 7 1 

Trousers 1 9 

Corn-sack 1 13 

Picketing peg 12* 



Total 11 3* 



Weight of trooper's entire equipment 106 9 

If in Household Cavalry 108 13 

The equipment of camp utensils, &c, intrenching tools and imple- 
ments, signaling instruments, &c , varied, from the regular establish- 
ment in but insignificant particulars, occasioned by the exigencies of 
the climate and the desire to have no more impedimenta than was 
necessary. 

The helmets, ordinarily white, were stained a light broivn with tea or 
umber to render them less visible in the bright light. Blue goggles and 
veils were issued for the men and eye-fringes for the horses. The latter 
were most useful on account of the flies that swarm in Egypt, but the 
former were very generally discarded by the men, the veils only being 
habitually used during sleep. 

The forage ration is 12 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of oats. It was 
not very strictly adhered to, the supply being too scant at first. After- 
wards forage was issued very liberally and the horses allowed as much 
as they could eat. 

A compressed grain cake, composed mainly of oats, with small pro- 
portions of beans, hay, and crushed linseed, was tried and found to an- 
swer the purpose very well. 

It is proper to state that the veterinary arrangements were carefully 
ordered and the veterinary staff efficient, everything being done for the 
animals which the circumstances permitted. 

The cavalry did excellent service all through the campaign, as detailed 
elsewhere in official reports. The horses stood the work well, only 210 
being lost from all causes up to the end of September, notwithstanding 
that they were sent out from Ismailia immediately after landing from a 
long sea voyage, and that they were at times almost starved. Major- 
General Drurv-Lowe attributes this record to the fact that the horses 



225 

were all very carefully selected and none were underbred. He thinks 
underbred horses would not have pulled through. 

The relative value of light and heavy cavalry was not tested during 
the war. The country was not adapted to rapid movements, and the 
Egyptians were always indisposed to allow the British to approach near 
enough to charge. On the other hand, the Household Cavalry, in spite 
of their weight, held their own in all combined movements, and lost noth- 
ing in comparison with their lighter colleagues. 

This arm of the service achieved the two most brilliant and dramatic 
strokes of the campaign — the moonlight charge of August 28, and the 
seizure of Cairo. As to the first episode, it maybe fairly doubted whether 
the Egyptians would have stood to their guns in broad daylight. The 
value of their presence on September 9, on the extreme right of the 
British line was shown in the failure of Arabi to attempt a turning 
movement by the Tel el-Kebir force. After the experience of the pre- 
ceding engagement his men conceived a real dread of the British cavalry, 
whose physical efficiency was proportionately enhanced by this increased 
moral prestige. 

Judged by its record, the efficiency of the British cavalry in Egypt 
seems to leave little to be desired. That the result was reached by a 
general departure, in some cases, from the standard equipment is a fact 
which should be full of meaning. 

II.— THE MOUNTED INFANTRY. 

This corps was organized by Captain H. Hallam-Parr, C. M. G-. T 
Somersetshire Light Infantry, from volunteers from different regiments, 
mostly those in the field. It was actively employed at Alexandria, where 
no regular cavalry was present, and in all the engagements of the cam- 
paign from Ismailia to Cairo. 

At the outset it was composed of 100 men selected mainly with ref- 
erence to their skill as marksmen. The other conditions were good 
conduct and fair horsemanship. These men were provided with horses, 
and whatever was necessary to their maintenance as a mounted corps, 
but great exactness of cavalry drill was avoided, and they were strictly 
kept to the original idea of being mobile sharpshooters. They were 
engaged in the reconnaissance in force of August 5, leading the left 
attack with vigor, being honorably mentioned by General Alison in his 
official dispatch on that occasion. 

They were brigaded with the cavalry after reaching Ismailia. By 
wounds or disease they had fallen off to about 40 in number at El Mag- 
far and Tel-el-Mahuta. Prior to Tel-el- Kebir their ranks were increased 
to 150. 

Their services throughout the campaign are constantly spoken of in 

reports in terms of commendation. Their riding was criticised to their 

disadvantage, for the average Englishman is exacting in this respect, 

but the fact that they managed to keep up at all with the cavalry in the 

948 eg 15 



226 

two days' forced march from Mahsameh to Cairo proved their endur- 
ance on horseback, although it must be confessed they arrived somewhat 
the worse for the journey. 

The sharpness of their work is seen in the disproportionately heavy 
loss they sustained. As an instance it may be noted that every officer, 
with one exception, was either killed or wounded before September 12. 

Their value was conceded on every hand, and the desirability of 
such a force in all military operations universally acknowledged. As 
discussed by those interested, the question assumed the following shape : 
Is it advisable to crystallize the corps into a permanent organization? 
The opinion seemed to be general that it would best serve the purpose 
of its creation by retaining its quasi volunteer character, and by offer- 
ing to men in regiments serving at home, as a species of reward for 
good conduct and marksmanship, the opportunity of active service in the 
field. The friends of the troop were v T ery positive in the expression of 
their belief that the main object of its formation would be lost if per- 
manently organized, and that it would inevitably grow into a cavalry 
company, peculiarly armed, to be sure, but still a cavalry company 
strictly speaking, the time and thought of the men being diverted from 
sharpshooting to precision of mounted maneuvers and over-careful 
maintenance of horse trappings. 

It may be safely taken for granted that, in her next war, England 
will not fail to have a comparatively large force of mounted infantry to 
supplement her cavalry, its general plan being as simple as that of the 
hundred or so who did such satisfactory work in Egypt. 

III. — THE INFANTRY. 

The basis of organization in this branch is the battalion, and, in gen- 
eral terms, the scheme is as follows: 

The battalions are assembled into regiments, bearing, as a rule, some 
name peculiar to the county where the headquarters are established and 
from which recruits are meant to be drawn. Two battalions are regu- 
lars, and two belong to the county militia. In addition are such volun- 
teer infantry corps as the district possesses. The whole is under one 
or more titular colonels, who never serve in the capacity of regimental 
commanders, but whose position is ordinarily that of a general officer. 
A colonelcy, by the way, is a substantial reward for a distinguished 
military record or an honor accorded to persons high in court circles. 
That the honor is considered mutual is shown by the fact that H. E.H. 
the Duke of Cambridge, the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief, is titu- 
lar colonel of two cavalry regiments, of three infantry regiments, and of 
the regiments of Royal Artillery and the corps of Royal Engineers, 
while H. R. H. the Prince of Wales is colonel of the three regiments of 
the Household Cavalry, of the Tenth Hussars, and the Rifle brigade. 

Of the regular infantry battalions one is supposed to serve at home, 



227 

while the other is abroad. The introduction of this plan with its "ter- 
ritorial designations," some twelve years since, was attended by the 
breaking up of the old regimental system, and the suppression of 
numerical titles. 

Each battalion, the practical working unit (for the regiment as a 
whole is never united), is under a lieutenant-colonel. The war estab- 
lishment is as follows: 



Bank. 



Lieutenant-colonels 

Majors 

Captains 

Lieutenants, &c 

Adjutant 

Paymaster 

Q uartermaster 

Surgeon 

Sergeant-major 

Quartermaster sergeant . . 

Band sergeant 

Drum-major 

Orderly room-clerk 

Armorer sergeant 

Paymaster sergeant 

Transport sergeant 

Sergeant cook 

Pioneer sergeant 

Color sergeants (orderly) . 

Sergeants 

Buglers 

Corporals 

Pioneers and artificers . . . 

Band 

Privates 

Drivers 



Total 1,096 



32 
16 
41 
13 

20 

904 

22 



10 



1, 000 



Horses. 



3 I ^ i 

& i 2 



( i 



44 



The personal equipment of the foot soldier is shown in the table sub- 
joined : 



Arms and accouterments. 


'3 


Articles worn by tbe 
soldier. 


'3 


Valise, and articles car- 
ried in it. 


■a 
I 


Pouches 

Waist-belt and frog 


Lb. Oz. 
1 00 

13 

7 13 

8 14 

1 8 
9 

6 

2 9 

1 H 
8| 


Helmet 

Frock 


Lb. Oz. 

15 
2 6 

1 2 

2 4 
3J 
4* 
13 

3 3 

11 2| 


Overcoat and cape 

Sbirt 


Lb. Oz. 
6 10 
1 2 
^ 
8 
Oh 
1$ 
4£ 
6£ 

4 




70 rounds of ammunition. 


Flannel sbirt 


Socks'. 


Rifle. 




Towel 




Braces 

Socks 




Scabbard • 




Knife and lanyard 

Water-bottle, full 




Polishing brush 


Boots 


Mess-tin 


Total 












2 4 


Total 


25 7 


Boots 


3 3 




Glengarry cap 


4 




Pocket ledger 


2 




Valise and straps 

Total 


4 4 




20 11| 







The waist-belt and braces of the foot soldier differ materially from 
those of seamen landed for operations ashore. In appearance they seem. 



228 



an unnecessarily complicated arrangement of straps and buckles, but 
upon analysis they are found to be a well-considered scheme having for 
its aim the attaching of the weights carried in marching so as to throw 
the strain upon the shoulders and to relieve the hips. The old-fash- 
ioned knapsack has given place to a soft leather "valise," which is worn 
at the back below the waist. 

All parts of the belt and suspension are provided with buckles for 
the purpose of adjustment to the size and shape of the man. The metal 
fittings are of brass, and the leather is undressed. In garrison the lat- 
ter is pipeclayed. 

The waist-belt, Fig. 86, has staples on either side of the clasp, to which 



Fig. 86. 



Fig.8P. 





Front of a private in drill order; one pouch only. 



Valise without the overcoat. 



On 



may be buckled the suspension straps from the shoulder-braces, 
this are slipped the ball-bag and cartridge-pouch. 

The braces are broad straps passing over each shoulder from the 
opposite upper corner of the valise. From the ring at the front end of 
each brace are three straps, Fig. 87, one going to the bottom and one 
to the top of the valise, which is thus prevented from flapping. The 
third takes the weight of the articles strung on the belt. The front 
and back loads are thus made to balance, roughly. Another strap is 
attached at will to each brace by a loop, and is for the purpose of carry- 
ing the overcoat, properly rolled up, between the shoulders. 




British foot soldier in heavy order 
Tiff. 92. 




230 

The mess equipment is worn on top of the valise in a water-proof 
cover. When in heavy marching order the soldier presents the appear- 
ance indicated in Figs. 88, 89, 90. 

In Egypt, the cork helmet was the head dress for all corps. 

The mess-tin is shown in Fig. 91. .Its principal dimensions are 6£ 
inches by 4 inches by 4 inches. The handle is of brass. The cover 
serves as a coffee-pot, and has a brass handle which folds down inside 
of the cover. Its appearance is given in Fig. 92. 

It may be remarked that, practically, all the battalions were armed 
and equipped alike, the designations " light infantry,"" rifles," "fusil- 
iers," &c, being distinctions without differences. 

The service arm is the Martini-Henry rifle, caliber 0.45 inch. It has 
seven grooves. The ball weighs 480 grains, and the powder charge is 
85 grains. The piece is sighted up to 1,450 yards, but has an effective 
range twice as great. 



XXII. 

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY. 

The field artillery of the British army is known as "Mountain Artil- 
lery " when the pieces and carriages are transported on the backs of 
pack animals ; as "Field Artillery" when the pieces are hauled by horses, 
the crew being for the most part on foot ; and as " Horse Artillery" when 
the pieces are hauled by horses and none of the crew are on foot. 

All three classes of this branch of the service were represented in the 
Egyptian campaign, as will be seen from inspection of the following table, 
which gives the general details of each battery of six guns. 

The nature of any battery is sufficiently indicated by its abbreviated 
title, the brigades of horse artillery being lettered, and those of field 
and garrison artillery being numbered, while the individual batteries 
of both horse and field artillery are lettered, and those of garrison ar- 
tillery are numbered. (Garrison artillery is also distributed territori- 
ally into Northern, Scottish, London, &c, divisions.) In consequence, 
a battery spoken of by two letters, as N.A, is of horse artillery ; by a 
letter and a number, as J.3, is of field artillery; and by two numbers, as 
5.1, Scottish, is of garrison artillery. No matter the corps to which 
temporarily assigned, the batteries always retain their designations as 
such a battery of such an artillery brigade. 



231 



Corps to which 
assigned. 



Nature of bat- 
tery. 



1st division. ... I Field artillery . 

Do ....do 

2d division do 

Do ....do 

Cavalry I Horse artillery 

Corps troops . . . | do 

Do i Field artillery . 

Do I do 

Do Ammunition 

reserve. 



Title. 



Kind of gun. 



M.I.R.16-pdr. 

do 

....do 

...do 

M. L. R. 13-pdr. 

do 

....do 

do 

None 



Established per 
sonnel. 



O' a 
rift S 

S O hJ 

W 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 

1 3 

1 3 

1 3 

1 3 



1 1 
li 1 

1 1 



P m 

© f- 
© <p 

°£ 



CO 



153 
153| . . . 
153 ... 
153 .... 
176.... 
176.... 
127.... 
127|.... 
2071 42 



© fcc 

£ "_ 



a : s 

s,a 

<1 H 



1! 1 6 

1 lj 6 

1 li 4 



I ©I § 

"I- 

28 17 
2817 
2817 
2817 
26 16 
2616 
2517 
25 17 
2818 



The foregoing are " Imperial Troops." There came from India with 
the Indian Contingent two batteries, viz, H.l, field artillery, with the 
now obsolete 9-pdr. gun ; and the 7.1, Northern division of garrison ar- 
tillery, equipped as a mountain battery and carrying the 7-pdr. screw- 
jointed guns which will be found described at length in the section treat- 
ing of the Indian Contingent. 

It will be observed that here were four distinct calibers to be sup- 
plied. It may also be remarked that all the pieces, without exception, 
were of the muzzle-loading type. 

In addition to the batteries mentioned above, a siege train, based on 
what is known as the "light unit," was sent to Ismailia, arriving on the 
September 6. It was partially landed but not used. Its composition 
was ten 40 pdr. M. L. R. of 35 cwt.; ten 25-pdr. M. L. R. of 18 cwt.; ten 
6.3 inch M. L. R. howitzers of 18 cwt. With it, to work the guns, were 
four batteries, numbering 16 officers and 550 men, drawn from the 1st 
London and 1st Scottish divisions of garrison artillery, and enumerated 
in the table on p. 102. It was brought out for contingent use against 
Cairo. The gunners, however, remained on board the transport Teviot, 
at Ismailia, returning to England after the issue of the war was decided, 
their services happily uot being required in Egypt. 

Six 25-pdr. siege guns, sent from Malta, were planted on the Is- 
mailia line : three at Kassassin, one at Tel-el-Mahuta, one at Mahsameh, 
and one at Nefiche, for the defense of the camps at these points. Those 
at Kassassin were the only ones used, and they to but a slight extent, 
on September 9, when they were manned by the 5.1 Scottish division. 

It is thought well to describe briefly the 16 and 13-pdr. guns, as they 
were chiefly employed during the campaign, and represent the stand- 
ard arm of the British field batteries of to-day. The former is repre- 
sented in Figs. 93, 94, 95, and 96. 



232 






233 
Its technical description is as follows : 

Material : 

Exterior Wrought iron. 

Tube Steel. 

Length, total ^ Inches, 78. 

Weight Pounds, 1,344. 

Preponderance Pounds, 7.5. 

Bore: 

Caliber Inches, 3.6. 

Length Inches, 68.4. 

Capacity Cubic inches, 706. 

Rifling: 

System Woolwich. 

Length Inches, 58.04. 

Grooves : 

Number 3. 

Depth Inch, 0.11. 

Width Inch, 0.80 

Vent, hardened copper Inch, 0.6 from the bottom of the bore. 

The gun is side-sighted only. The sights are set at a permanent angle 
of 1° 50' to the left to correct drift. The tangent scale is four sided and 
has a sliding leaf for deflection arising from the wind or other irregu- 
larity. The sides are marked as follows : 1st, in degrees ; 2d, in tenths of 
fuze at corresponding ranges ; 3d, in yards ; 4th, blank. A table contain- 
ing the same data is attached to the top of the right carriage bracket. 

The projectiles used with the 16-pdr. are shell, shrapnel, and can- 
ister. The shell weighs 15 pounds empty, and 16 pounds 3 ounces when 
filled and fuzed. It is shown in section in Figs. 97 and 98. 

The shrapnel contain 72 iron bullets of 18 to the pound, and 56 of 84 
to the pound; 128 in all. The bursting charge is 1J ounces of powder, 
and the total weight of the projectile when ready for firing is 17 pounds 
14J ounces. Figs. 99 and 100. 

The canister contains 176 iron balls of 16J to the pound, filled in with 
clay and sand. It weighs 15 pounds 3 ounces. Figs. 101 and 102. 

The service charge for the gun is three pounds R. L. G. powder, giving 
an initial velocity of 1,355 feet per second. 

The fuzes are either R. L. percussion or the usual Boxer time-fuze. 
The two types of the former are shown in Figs. 103 and 104, and re- 
quire no explanation. 



234 



JFVg: 97. 



Weight 

Tbs. ozs. 
CastJron.U:!. ' 



J6.3±l S-p^r.cent 




235 



Weigffl j7-13±\lfper cent. 

JBur sting Charge ljot. 
Total Weight 'JF-lirl^oX. 




■ ltur»inl(f& 



iS pOr. Shrapnel. 



236 



The Boxer fuze is now always supplied of the 15-seconds length, 
shown in Fig. 105, and, like the percussion fuzes, is too well known to 
need description. 

These time and percussion fuzes are common to all calibers, the shells 
being tapped to a uniform gauge. 

IYy. 101 . 

Average Weight- 15 lbs. 3oz. ±8oH. 
r* IT°- 12WTM.or.109" 

B 

A" 




Royal laboratory percussion fuzes I and II. 



237 



The carriage of the 16-pdr. is of iron, mounted on composite wheels. 
The axletree boxes have guard-irons and foot rests, so that they may 
serve for seats. Each box contains two rounds of ammunition. 

The limber is also of iron and of the usual form. The shafts are 
"near and off; " (that is, the near shaft is in the center of the limber), 
and are fitted for single, double, treble, or bullock draught. There are 
three limber-boxes, the near and off, each carrying 12 projectiles and 
as many cartridges. The projectiles are packed on end around the 




Boxer 15-seconds time-fuze. 

sides of the box, the space within being reserved for the cartridges, an 
arrangement designed to protect the latter in the event of the limber 
being hit in action. 

The center box, which is smaller than the others, contains an assort- 
ment of fuzes, friction primers, tools, grease, &c. 

The working limit of this gun is at about 4,000 yards. At that range 
the projectile has an angle of descent of 15° 40' and a remaining veloc- 
ity of 693 feet per second. The time of flight is 14 seconds. 



238 

The 16-pdr. presents some points well worthy of analysis. Its weight 
is 84 times that of the projectile, its length of bore 19 calibers, 
its system of rifling is antiquated, its powder charge less than one-fifth 
the weight of the shell, its range small, and its remaining velocity low. 
These particulars are not in accord with the tendency of modern ord- 
nance, and in consequence the gun is being replaced by the newer 13- 
pdr., .an excellent weapon of its type. On account of its being the 
latest outcome of British experience and thought, a rather detailed ac- 
count of the gun and its appurtenances is deemed in place. 

The general appearance of the 13 pdr., Plate 73, is not unlike that of 
its predecessor, and its mode of construction is the same — a steel tube 
and wrought-iron breech coil. It varies, however, mainly in the rifling, 
in being longer and narrower, and in having a chamber. 

The principal dimensions, &c, are as follows: 

Material : 

Exterior Wrought iron. 

Tube Steel. 

Length, total Inches, 92. 

Weight Pounds, 896. 

Bore : 

Caliber Inches, 3. 

Length Inches, 84. 

Total capacity Cubic inches, 617.8. 

Total area of section Square inches, 7.29. 

Diameter Inches, 3.15. 

Chamber : 

Length Inches, 14.13. 

Capacity Cubic inches, 110.38. 

Rifling: 

System Modern polygroove. 

Twist Uniformly increasing from one turn in 100 calibers to one turn in 30 

calibers at 9 inches from the muzzle, thence uniform. 

Length Inches, 69. 

Grooves : 

Number 10. 

Depth Inch, 0.05. 

Width Inch, 0.509. 

Means of rotation Copper base expansion ring. 

Vent, hardened copper 7 inches from the bottom of the bore. 

The gun is center-sighted only. The sights are set at a permanent 
angle of 1° 30' to the left to correct drift. The breech sight has a slid- 
ing leaf. In the upper edge of this leaf is a notch 0.06 inch deep and 
jFtg.ioe. below it a hole 0.05 inch in diameter. 

Figs. 106 and 107. These correspond to 
the conical point and the sighting win- 
dow, fitted with cross-hairs of the muzzle 

Bear and front sights, U-pounder si S ht > and are USed for r0U S h and fine 

M. L. B. sighting respectively. The front sight is 

a removable block of bronze retained in its seat (a sight mass on the 
muzzle) by means of a key. 




239 

The breecb sight is marked to degrees only, a brass range table on 
the bracket giving other information as desired. 

In front of the chamber the bore of the gun is reduced by a choke to 
a diameter of 2.93 inches. This choke prevents the projectiles from 
entering the chamber and seats them all uniformly. 

The projectiles used w th this gun are of the usual three types, shell, 
shrapnel, and canister. In design they are similar to those for the 16- 
pdr. shown in Figs. 90 to 95, but differ from them in the substitution 
of a base ring called the " gas check," which is made of 100 parts of 
copper to 3 of zinc, and which presents no peculiarity. The service 
charge is 3 pounds 2 ounces of R. L. G. 2 powder, giving an initial 
velocity of 1,595 feet per second. The fuzes are identical with those 
described already. The shell is of cast iron. The base for half an inch 
is reduced to 1.87 inches in diameter and cast with a circular groove for 
attaching the gas check, and with twenty radial grooves by which the 
ring imparts rotation to the shell. The head is struck with a radius of 
one and a half diameters, the point truncated, bored out, and tapped to 
receive the fuze. The interior is lacquered with a composition of 12 
parts of resin, 2 of Spanish brown, and 1 of plaster of Paris thinned with 
turpentine. The length of the shell is 10.57 inches. The bursting charge 
is 10 ounces. When empty the shell weighs 12 pounds, and when filled 
and fuzed 13 pounds 6 ounces. 

The shrapnel is in two parts, the body and the head. The former is 
a cylinder of cast iron, fitted like the shell with a base ring. The head 
is of thin charcoal iron 0.148 inch thick, struck with a radius of 1.2 diam- 
eters, the point being truncated to receive a gun-metal bouching tapped 
to the fuze-gauge and soldered to the head. Within the head is a wooden 
block or former. The head is attached to the body by four steel screws. 
It contains 116 bullets at 34 to the pound, the interstices being filled in 
with resin. The total weight when ready for use is 13 pounds 2 ounces. 
A reference to Fig. 94 will make this description clear. 

The side of tbe case shot is made of heavy tin. The top is of sheet- 
iron, No. 18 B. W. G., and is fixed to the case by turning over and sol- 
dering the notched ends of the case. A base ring of sheet-iron, No. 12 
B. W. G., is riveted to the bottom of the case. There is an inside lin- 
ing of sheet-iron, No. 14 B. W. G. The contents are 340 mixed metal 
bullets of 34 to the pound. The length is 9 inches, and the total weight 
13 pounds 7 ounces. (See Fig. 92.) 

The carriage is of steel. Its general design is made evident in Plate 
73. The elevating apparatus (see Plates 73 and 77), Fig. 109, is worthy 
of especial attention. There are no axletree boxes. The bed on each 
side is fitted as a seat (see Plate 77, Fig. 108), mounted on springs and 
having guard-irons and a sliding foot-rest. Leather cases (see Plate 73) 
are fitted outside each bracket to carry two case-shot and two cartridges. 
An especial feature is the grease chamber in the front flange of the 
wheel. (See Plate 79, Figs. 107, 108.) 



240 

Both steel and iron enter into the construction of the limber (see Plate 
75), which has but two boxes. The projectiles, assorted, are carried 
in steel trays (see Plate 78), which are placed at the sides of the boxes, 
near the wheels, the inside compartment of each box serving as a recep- 
tacle for cartridges. These trays are too light. They have a tendency 
to pound out of shape in a hard march, and give much trouble in with- 
drawal. The artillery officers prefer the old plan adopted in the limber- 
boxes of the 16-pdrs. 

The shafts are "near and off," and the limber is fitted for single, 
double, or treble draught. 

The general dimensions of the carriage and limber are as follows : 

Height of center of gun ^ 43 inches. 

Length : 

Carriage : 

With wheels 8 feet 4 inches. 

Without wheels 7 feet 3 inches. 

Axletrees 6 feet 2£ inches. 

Angle of trail 30°. 

Maximum elevation 16°. 

Maximum depression 5°. 

Wheels : 

Track 5 feet 2 inches. 

Diameter 5 feet. 

Plate 76 represents the ammunition wagon. The front boxes carry 
seventeen assorted projectiles stowed vertically about a canvas pocket 
containing as many filled cartridges. The other wagon boxes hold 
eighteen projectiles and their charges. 

The following diagrams give the distribution of the ammunition 
which habitually accompanies the guns, together with the tools and 
stores. 



2li 



1st G-TTJST J±TSTT> LIMBER. 



LIMBER. 

ON FOOTBOARD. 

1 cartouche, leather, large. 1 pair drag ropes. 
1 swinglctrec. .short traces. 

traces for brca.st harness, hamesi 

2 mallets. 



1 sjtovcl, under. 



1 felling axe. 
1 pickaxe, under. 



NEAR BOX 

2 swords and 



1 spaae. } 

1 bill hook. > under. 

1 wetter carriage brush. S 

OFF BOX 



carbines I ( in cases ) in front of boxes. 



on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 corn sack. 
1 waterproof 
cover. 



A 


/8 

filled cartridges 
in 

cartouch. 


3 shrapnel, 

15 fuzes, time, 

irood with 

deton atorsl5secs. 


5 shrapnel 


4 shell*. 
1 case shot. 


5 shrapnel. 



1 camp kettle, under. Knapsack Knapsack 

1 half round tin grease box { 
1 oil can. Slbs. 5 



18 

filled cartridges 

in 

cartouch. 


B 


3 shrapnel, 

15 fuzes, time,- 

wood with 

dctonatorsldsecs 


5 shrapnel. 


5 shrapnel. 


4 shells. 
1 case shot. 



TRAY CONTAINING 
18 percussion fuzes It. L. in tin box. 
SO fuzes, time, wood, with detonators 15 seccs 
50 friction, tubes. 
1 hook borers. gj 

1 cylinder with. 6 bits. d 

2 sponge cloths. 1 
2 trace couples. "*. 

1 spring spike, 

2 common spikes. 
1 fuse extractor. 
1 key plug G. >S. 
1 lanyard. 

1 instructions printed, 1 filled cartridge 
1 tube, drill, dummy, in leather case. 

1 case shot in 
leather case. 

GUN 

Deflector, under. 



ON TOP OF SEAT. 

1 blanket. 

1 waterproof cover. 




on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 corn sack. 
1 waterproof 
cover. 



2 leather buckets, under, 
in leather 
case under. 

B 

TRAY CONTAINING 

18 percussion fuses R. L. in tin box. 
20 fuzes, time, wood, with detonators 15 , 
25 friction tubes. 
1 short tangent sight '■"■ 
1 foresight ■■ 

1 linchpin. 1 drag washer. 
3 spring kegs for linch pins. 
1 bolt, elevating, ( 1 per battery). 
1 keep pin. for bolt, elevating. 
3 short ( springs for 
3 long ) axlctrce seats. 
1 wrench, fore site. (2 per battery). 
1 filled cartridge in 

leather case * : - : 
1 case shot in 
leather case. '■'■'■■'■'■ 



CARRIAGE. 



Drag shoe under. 



NEA R' 
SEAT 



"OFF" 
SEAT 



wadhook worm under. : - : 1 tompion tvith lanyard. 



ON TOP OF SEAT. 

1 blanket. 

1 waterproof cover. 



M pair on Nos. 1 3 <£• 5 gun limbers. 1 per division. § with No. 1 gun. 
X M. H. carbines are carried in leather buckets attached, to the boxes. 
** Carried on the carriage only when going into action. §§ when not in use in gun. 
NOTE. The packing of the gun and wagon limbers is made nearly identical to 
facilitate the supply of ammunition in action by replacing one by the other. 
Valises are carried on two of the ammunition boxes of horse batteries, at- 
tached to the guard irons. 

Water-proof covers are issued additional for camp equipment, and for 
batteries on a war, estdbliskme 't. 

cwts. qrs. 
Weight packed, without personal equipment, | £?^2r e "* d . f^" i? 3 



Total . 



37 3 



948 eg- 



16 



242 



2d W-AX3-OIN" J^NJD LIMBER. 
LIMBER. 

ON FOOTBOARD. 



J pair drag ropes. 

1 swingletree. 
1 shovel, under. 



NEAR BOX 



1 lifting jack. 1 picket rope 

1 marline. kicking straps. 
1 spade. 
1 bill hook. 
1 felling axe. 1 water carriage brush 

1 pick axe, under. OFF BOX 

swords in front of boxes. \ 



> under. 



on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 corn sack. 
1 waterproof 
cover. 



c 


18 

filled cartridges 

in 

cartouch. 


3 shrapnel, 

15 fuzes, time, 

wood with 

detonator sl5secs. 


5 shrapnel. 


4 shells. 
1 case shot. 


5 shrapnel. 



18 

filled cartridges 

in 

cartouch. 


D 


3 sh rapnel, 

15 fuzes, time., 

wood with 

detonatorsl5secs. 


5 shrapnel. 


5 shrapnel. 


4 shells. 
1 case shot. 



on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 corn sack. 
1 waterproof 



1 camp kettle, under. Knapsack. Knapsack. 2 leather buckets, (under). 
1 half round tin grease box, 3 lbs. 
.— ' in leather case under. _ 

C D 



TRAY CONTAINING 

18 percussion fuzes R. L. in tin boxes. 

20 fuzes, time, wood, with detonators, 15 sees. 

50 friction tubes. 

1 hook borer, 1 cylinder with 6 bits. 

2 sponge cloths. 2 lanyards. 

2 trace couples. 1 key plug, O. S. 
1 instructions, printed. 



TRAY CONTAINING 

J I 18 percussion fuzes K.L. in tin box. 

ZflZ f^.t.7 2G fuzes, time., wood, detonators. 15 s 
1«r*"*e** 50 friction tubes. 

1 short tangent siglit. 

1 linch pin. 1 drag washer. 

3 spring keys for linch pins. 

1 keep pin. elevating bolt. 



2 port- fires on inside of lid. 
Knapsack and 2 swords. 



WAGON BODY 



1 water carriage brush (under). 
2 port-fires on inside of lid. 
Knapsack and 2 swords. 



~1 

-§1 



on top of * r - 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 waterproof 
cover. 



7 shrapnel. 



17 filled cartridges 
in cartouch. 



7 shrapnel. 



7 shrapnel. 



17 filled cartridges 
in cartouch. 



7 shrapnel. 



1 camp kettle under. 4 reaping hooks. 1 camp kettle under. 

2 spare lashings under. 



on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket. 
1 waterjjroof 
cover. . 



E 


18 

filled cartridges 
in 
cartouch . 


3 shrapnel. 


5 shrapnel. 


4 shells. 
1 shrapnel. 


5 shrapnel. 



18 

filled cartridges 
vn 
cartouch. 


F 


3 shrajmrl. 


5 shrapnel. 


5 shrapnel. 


4 shells. 
1 shrapnel. 



* on top of 
1 lid of box. 
a, 1 blanket. 
"S 1 waterproof 
% cover. 



on top of 
lid of box. 
1 blanket, 
1 waterproof 
cover. 



Knapsack. 
28 lbs. of grease, in two tin magazine boxes under. 

1 maul under. C ,. ., ... „ , 
shafts, spare, under \ t n ^ r «£* £?• \ wa O on - 
' r I off with No. 2 wagon. 



Knapsack. 
1 catridge and 1 shell ivith lanyard ( driU). 
lib. torv, 1 tin for horseshoe nails, 
in box under 



TRAY CONTAINING 
1 lb. slow match. 1 skein Hambro line. 
1 tube pocket with strap. 1 fuze pocket ivith hook borer 



TRAY CONTAINING 

1 funnel, leather. 1 knife, clasp, 1 port-fire clipper. 
1 screw driver, 1 drift, wood. 1 pair scissors. 
1 hold-all with 2 needles and 2 ozs. of silk. 



lper division, ivith 1, 3, and 5 wagons. 



Weight packed without personal equipment. 



cwts. qrs. 

\ Wagon 26 2 

(Limber 18 1 



Total 44 



243 

The total supply of ammunition with each gun is therefore — 

Shrapnel 108 

Shell 30 

Canister 4 

Total 142 

Cartridges 142 

Friction tubes 175 

Total 317 

Time fuzes 140 

Percussion fuzes 72 

Total 212 

The carriages of G.3 were of a different design and had longer trails, 
while the ammunition was carried on end in top-lid boxes as with the 
16pdr. 

The other batteries found that the short trail and its great angle were 
attended bf the disadvantage that in soft soil the trail buries itself at 
each discharge, necessitating constant change of elevations, and threat- 
ening accident in some cases by excessive jumping. 

The 13-pdr. has a working range of about 6,000 yards. For use at 
that distance the gun has an elevation of 19° 06'; the time of flight of 
the projectile is 23.7 seconds; its angle of descent 30° 42'; its remaining 
velocity 644 feet per second. 

A comparison of the new and the old field pieces shows decreased 
proportional weight of gun to projectile, with greater velocity. Their 
relative accuracy may be gathered from the following figures which 
hold good at the distance of 4,000 yards : 



Ten per cent, of rounds should fall within - 

A length of 

A width of 

A height of 



With the 
16-pounder 



Yards. 

48.4 
5.22 
13.54 



With the 
13-pounder. 



Yards. 
38.4 
2.28 
10.40 



These results are obtained by greater length of bore, 68.4 inches in 
the 16-pdr. and 84 inches in the 13 pdr., an increase of 9 calibers; by 
the use of a chamber, by the adoption of a gas check or expansion 
ring, and by the heavier rates of charge to projectile. In the new gun 
the charge is nearly one-quarter of the weight of the projectile. 

It is worthy of remark that the use of wet sponges is forbidden with 
this gun on the ground of increased residuum in the chamber, after fir- 
ing, which is difficult to remove on account of the " choke." Great care 
in sponging is, however, strongly urged. It would strike one accus- 
tomed to liberal amounts of water in this connection that the care rec- 



244 

ommended would be more in place in the subsequent loading. It is 
but fair to say that no ill effects were experienced through the adoption 
of this rule. 

As was the case with everything else on wheels, the country proved 
too heavy for the guns, or the guns too heavy for the country, reducing 
all movements to a slow and painful drag. Six horses were originally 
assigned to each gun, but it was found necessary to increase the num- 
ber to ten, fourteen, in fact, indefinitely, the war schedule of allowance 
being a mere estimate of probable needs. 

The battery drivers carried revolvers only, a special issue for the cam- 
paign, the other men being armed for the most part with cavalry sa- 
bers or sword-bayonets, according to the nature of the battery, whether 
horse or field. Each battery has 24 Martini-Henry carbines. Two are 
■slung on each limber (gun and wagon), on the ammunition boxes above 
the foot board. 

The ammunition column, F.I, was designed to convey 30 spare rounds 
per gun in addition to the assorted projectiles and charges in the limbers 
and wagons, besides 360,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 40,000 rounds 
of carbine ammunition. &c. It was a reserve in all respects except that 
it brought out no guns. Four spare gun carriages were among its stores. 
It was expected that the column would serve as a distributor of ammu- 
nition of all kinds from the advance depot to the batteries and battal- 
ions at the front, the advance depot being in its turn supplied by the 
railway. The men and horses received the same special issues as those 
mentioned apropos of the cavalry. 

As regards mess arrangements, each battery has one cook, who is 
rarely changed. Each subdivision (gun's crew) is served by an orderly 
detailed for the day. This man draws the rations and gives them to 
the battery cook, receives the cooked food when ready, and attends 
generally to all the mess interests. 

The various detachments of the Eoyal Artillery embarked between 
August 3 and 9 at Portsmouth, Southampton, and London. The first 
to arrive at Alexandria was the field battery A.l, by the Palmyra, on 
the 14th, and the last, the ammunition column, by the Texas, on the 
25th of the same month. 

The artillery of the expedition was under the general command of 
Colonel W. H. Goodenough, E. A., who was given the local rank of Briga- 
dier-General. The artillery of the 1st division was commanded by Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel B. F. Schreiber, E. A., that of the 2d by Lieutenant-Col- 
onel F. C. Elton, E. A., and the Horse Artillery by Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. E. Kairnes, E. A. 

The artillery took no part in the preliminary operations about Alex- 
andria. 

The disembarkation was begun at Ismailia on August 22, and was 
pushed with all speed. 

The first engagement with the Egyptians in which the artillery took 



245 

part was that of August 24, uear El Magfar. At 5 a. in. of that day 
two 13 pdrs. of N.A, Boyal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant S. 0. 
Hickman, started from Ismailia to join General Graham's force, then 
ordered to advance from Nefiche. They pushed on at once past Xefiche 
to El Magfar, and came into action on the right of the infantry, behind 
some low mounds, keeping up an unequal artillery duel all day, the 
Egyptians having twelve guns to assist this attack. At 5.45 p. m. the 
remaining four guns of the battery arrived from Ismailia, which they 
had left at 3 p. m., and the united battery soon silenced the Egyptian 
artillery, the range being from 2,000 to 2,600 yards. It was then shifted 
to the other flank near the canal, and an interchange of shell begun 
with the pieces on the Egyptian right, which lasted until dark. By 
this time Lieutenant Hickman's division had expended abuot one hun- 
dred rounds each, mostly shrapnel. 

It is difficult to obtain minute details of the effect of the British shell 
either during this or tlie subsequent engagements of the campaign. 
Under the circumstances, it is necessary to accept the main fact, that the 
enemy's guns were silenced in twenty minutes. On the other hand 
begins the testimony, which is repeated on every occasion, that the 
Egyptians served their own guns with unexpected skill. "The enemy 
had the range, and burst his shells, as a rule, fairly well." It must be 
borne in mind that the atmospheric phenomena peculiar to that region 
are Mown and understood by the native, ivhile distressing and misleading 
to the foreigner, ivho, on this occasion, had the sun fairly in his eyes after 
midday. 

One result of the operations of August 24 was the demonstration that 
the wheeled vehicles supplied were almost useless in the desert across 
which the army was now to advance. Except in Lieutenant Hickman's 
division, all the ammunition wagons had been left behind, " having stuck 
on the road, where they remained over the following day." To get the 
guns and limbers nlong was about all the battery horses could accom- 
plish even when exerting their greatest efforts. 

The advance was strengthened during the night of August 24 and 
25 by the arrival, among other corps, of battery, A.L and, somewhat 
later, by two guns each of battery N.2, and battery G.B. In the march 
to the westward a ridge overlooking Tel-el-Mahuta was reached from 
whence the Egyptians could be seen at work on their intrenchments. 
At this point the artillery on both sides began firing, but the duel was 
of short duration, as the cavalry and horse artilleryand two guns of A.l 
turned the left flank of the Egyptians, who retreated to Mahsameh, 
throwing away arms, accouterments, and everything in their flight. The 
good work done by the cavalry and artillery did not cease here, but was 
repeated on beyond at Mahsameh. When within range of the camp 
there the guns which had accompanied the cavalry opened on the camp 
and railway station, which were speedily evacuated, the mounted troops 
then dashing in and capturing the place. 



246 

The artillery work on the August 28 is described from notes of that 
engagement by Captain G. B. Martin, E. A. (aid-de-camp to General 
Goodenough), to whom nearly everything that is of interest in this 
section is due. 

Two guns of N.A arrived from Mahsameh at Kassassin about 11 a. m. (An 8* m 
Krupp gun had been mounted on a truck and protected by sand-bags and dragged up 
from Mahsameh. This gun continued in action throughout the day, and as soon as 
the men, the Royal Marine Artillery, became acquainted with the division on the 
tangent scale it rendered effective service.) The two guns N.A were in action on the 
right of the railway for an hour and then had to retire for want of ammunition. An 
ammunition-wagon, which had been sent after the two guns stuck in the sand, did 
not arrive until late in the day. 

The remaining four guns of N.A advanced from Mahsameh with the cavalry in the 
afternoon, and reached the plateau north of Kassassin about 5 p. m. 

These guns began the firing, which was succeeded by the moonlight 
charge of the Household Cavalry. 

The artillery engaged in the affair of September 9, at Kassassin, was 
as follows : 

N.A, Eoyal Horse Artillery. 

G.B, Eoyal Horse Artillery. 

A.l, Eoyal Artillery. 

D.l, Eoyal Artillery. 

7.1, Northern division, mule battery. 

5.1, Scottish division, 3 25-pdr. M. L. E. 

Eoyal Marine Artillery, 1 8 cm Krupp B. L. E. 

Eoyal Navy, 1 40-pdr. B. L. E. 

The last two were mounted on railway trucks. 

Captain Martin goes on to say : . 

The 8 cm Krupp was in front of the 40-pdr. There being no siding at Kassassin, 
this could not be remedied. The 8 cm gun made good practice at trains bringing on 
the enemy's troops. The 40-pdr. being masked could only fire occasionally. Both 
these guns had no motive power. Had there been any they would have been ex- 
tremely useful. The Krupp opened fire at 7.30 a. m. in reply to some desultory firing 
of the enemy. 

Of A.l and D.l he says : 

These batteries were north of the camp, and fired at the enemy's guns (2,000 yards 
off) and at infantry (about 1,200 yards off). The enemy's guns were placed on Ninth 
Hill, their left extending beyond the British front and their right resting on the 
canal, with a few troops south of the canal. The Egyptian fire on the gun-pits was very 
good. * * * A.l and D.l left the gun-pits and advanced about 100 yards. D.l fired 
from here at an Egyptian battery, A.l at two batteries and infantry in right center. 
About 8.30 a. m., A.l and D.l advanced again, this time 1,000 yards to the right 
front, and continued firing for an hour or so. The enemy's infantry fire continued, 
but at this time their gun-fire became slacker. * * * Our troops were ordered to 
advance and drive back the Egyptians. A.l and D.l therefore advanced independ- 
ently for two miles and a half or so, firing at various ranges. They shot down the 
detachments of two Egyptian guns, which were taken possession of by our line as it 
advanced. About 3 miles from Tel-el-Kebir a halt was made, all our artillery keep- 
ing much the same relative distance as they formed with originally. The Egyptians 



247 

retired into their entrenchments. A final advance of 1,000 yards or so was made by 
our side to see the entrenchments and get an idea of them. At that time we were 
5,000 yards or so from them. The action ended at 12.30, and the troops returned to 
Kassassin. 

N. A was with the cavalry division on plateau north of camp. * * * This flank 
was kept refused throughout the day. 

G.B about 7.30 a. m. was formed up some 1,500 yards to the right of A.l on the 
north side of the camp. Their fire was directed chiefly towards the enemy's center. 
They advanced about 9.30 a. m. when A.l andD.l did, their movements conforming 
generally to those of the troops in our ceuter. 

7.1 came into the space between A.l and G.B about 8.30 a. m. * * * They 
were also directed by the movements from our center. 

Additional technical notes on this action, the principal artillery affair 
of the campaign, are quoted as of extreme interest. They were made 
by Lieutenant Apsley Smith, R. A., aid-de-camp to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Nairnes, R A., who directed the artillery on this occasion. 

The enemy stuck to their guns, and both their elevation and direction were good, 
but they used chiefly common shell, and with so small a charge (about one pound) 
the shells dropped at a very high angle, sinking deep, and, though exploding, doing 
hardly any damage. Except at first against the camp and gun-pits, their fire was not 
concentrated, but seemed to be directed against whatever battery of ours happened 
to be firing at or near them. They appeared to make good use of any cover afforded 
by the ground, and, in one case, the position of a battery, as shown by the wheel 
tracks, was remarkably good. I believe their ammunition-wagons were kept well in 
rear, more so than is usual in our own service. One or two of their shrapnel burst on 
graze, the bullets ricochettiDg harmlessly along the ground, but I do not remember 
seeing any time-shrapnel bursts in air. 

On our side the batteries worked independently as far as the nature of ammunition, 
range, and object aimed at permitted, though no advance of any extent was made 
without orders. 

At first our shells, especially the 7* and 13 pdrs., burst short and high, but for 
some time previous to the advance one could see the time-shrapnel, especially on our 
left front, causing considerable disturbance among the enemy. 

Although the batteries fired independently, each battery of six guns fired at the 
same or about the same object. 

When once our artillery was fairly in action, and our infantry in position, the 
enemy never advanced another yard, and soon showed signs of wavering. But just 
at first, his fire was so quick and accurate that I thought personally we had more 
guns opposing us than we really had. The light was good, the sun being behind us, 
but, probably from want of a well-defined object to lay on, I did not hear, except in 
one case, of any Watkins range-finders being of use. 

The wagons of our field batteries remained near them and were a good deal exposed. 

In the advance the batteries hardly worked together sufficiently, the ones in front 
taking up their position without much regard to a battery perhaps still in action 
behind and to their flank. 

I heard it remarked, with reference to this and other actions, that in ground like 
the desert it was a mistake to come into action just behind the crests of ridges, on 
.account of the labor and delay of running up after each round. 

The two guns on the railway, and the three 25-pdrs., I saw nothing of, but they ex- 
pended a lot of ammunition, and I heard made good practice. The 25-pdrs. fired over 
the heads of our infantry advancing along the railway and canal banks. The 40-pdr. 
was handicapped by the Krupp in front, and could only fire to its right front. 



* Of the mule battery, 7.1, Northern division. 



248 

The performance of the artillery at Tel-el-Kebir, being but a phase 
of the battle and not the principal part of it, is given in the section 
treating of that action. 

The experience in Egypt with even the light 13-pdr. shows the car- 
riage (or indeed any carriage) too heavy for use in such a country. It 
would seem desirable, for service over light sandy soils, to devise some 
sort of broad tire capable of ready application to the wheels of all vehicles. 
There were no instances of breakdowns from slightness of construction ; 
all the mishaps arose from sheer inability to get the weights across the 
desert with any speed approaching satisfaction. Such a tire would, have 
proved of value, and its design appears to present no insuperable diffi- 
culty. An alternate solution of the question might be found in a wooden 
track in pieces which could be "Shifted from rear to front by hand, as the 
wheels left them. Under the actual circumstances the draught power 
had to be increased enormously to obtain even the snail-like speed 
achieved. 

It is impossible to avoid instituting a comparison between the wheeled 
and the mountain batteries employed during the campaign, to the ad- 
vantage of the latter. The former threw heavier shell, but in range 
the latter was at least equal to the 16-pdr., while its greater mobility, 
the facility with which it could go anywhere and everywhere, across 
the desert or even along the narrow banks of the irrigation canals which 
cover the cultivated portion of Egypt as with a net-work, rendered it 
most valuable, and in the event of operations in the interior of the delta 
would have made it invaluable. The gist of this criticism is merely 
that Egypt is best suited to the employment of mule batteries. 

The testimony is unanimous as to the value of shrapnel when the 
fuze is properly cut. The Egyptians did not use this projectile, as a 
rule, and their shell-fire occasioned more contempt than wounds, the 
British becoming accustomed to it and ceasing to dread it. The Brit- 
ish artillery, employing shrapnel almost exclusively, was more effective both 
physically and morally. The part the two 13-pdrs. took at El Magfar in 
repelling the attack was as much due to superiority projectile as to more 
able management. 

No step was made in this campaign towards solving the question of 
the muzzle-loader versus the breech-loader for a field piece. The Brit- 
ish had none of the latter type to pit in technical rivalry against their 
ne^v and admirable 13-pdr., while the Krupp guns of the Egyptians were 
of the old pattern of 1868, burning too little powder to make them equal 
to their British competitors at any but short ranges. 

The skill, intelligence, and vigor which official dispatches attribute to 
the artillery operations of the campaign testify to admirable organiza- 
tion, careful equipment, and thorough training, and reflect credit on 
those immediately charged in the field with the direction of this branch 
of the British military service. 



249 

XXI II. 

THE ROYAL ENGINEERS. 

The engineer detachment in the British expeditionary force in Egypt 
was composed of six companies, two troops and a field park, the whole 
under the command of Colonel C. B. P. N. H. Nugent, 0. B., R. E., to 
whom was given the local rank of Brigadier-General. 

The companies according to their corps numbers were the 8th, 17th, 
18th, 21st, 24th, and 26th, and the troops were A and 0. 

The 8th company receives special mention in Section XXIV of this 
report, under the title of "the Railway Company," and C troop in Sec- 
tion XXY, which treats of "the Telegraph Troop." 

The 17th company, under Captain Elliott Wood, R. E., appears to have 
been a sort of maid of all work. Its personnel was composed of 2 cap- 
tains, 2 lieutenants, 85 non-commissioned officers and men, a total of 89. 

The company was armed with Martini- Henry rifles and sword-bayo- 
nets. It came from Malta in H. M. S. Northumberland, arriving at 
Alexandria on July 17, and was the pioneer of its corps in Egypt. It 
marched at once to Gabarri, each man carrying a tool of some kind 
ready to repair the defenses of the place. The men and officers slept in 
a large cotton storehouse during their stay in Alexandria. 

The following paragraphs are taken from notes kindly furnished by 
Captain Wood: 

Large quantities of stores, including 50,000 sand-bags and 1,300 shovels, had been 
brought with the company and were far in excess of what would accompany it in the 
field. 

The company had started at a few hours' notice from Malta, and its transport had 
to be entirely organized, as drivers, even, did not exist. This was at once taken in- 
hand, while defensive works were pushed with all dispatch. 

These consisted in repairing or retrenching old breaches in the enceinte, one being of 
great extent; putting the draw-bridges in working order, laying fongasses, erecting 
heavy stone barricades, &c, on which working parties of other corps and Arabs were 
also employed under the Eoyal Engineers. 

The hours for the Sappers were as follows: After breakfast of coffee aud biscuit^ 
parade for work at 4.30 a. m. ; 12 to 2 p. m. dinner, cooked at the works; return to 
quarters at from 5 to 6.30 p. m. 

On July 22, Lieutenant Heath and a detachment of Royal Engineers removed part 
of the railway beyond Mellaha Junction. (See Plates 44 and 45.) 

This operation was conducted under fire from the enemy. 

On July 24, half the company under Captain Wood accompanied the 
South Staffordshire Regiment and the 3d battalion of the Rifles in the 
advance to Ramleh, and- began at once putting the water- works and 
water-tower in a state of defense, as detailed on p. 158. 

On August 7, the 21st company, Eoyal Engineers, landed, so that the half company 
of the 17th left at Alexandria marched to Ramleh, having been in the meanwhile occu- 
pied as before on the defenses, constructing stone block-houses, sinking wells, &c. 



250 

The special services rendered by this company may be briefly men- 
tioned thus : 

On July 20, Captain Hyslop and 20 sappers with a strong covering 
party left, by night, in a train from Gabarri, while Lieutenant Thomson 
started with a similar party from Eamleh. The two detachments met 
at Mell ah a Junction, repaired the lines at that point, and brought some 
rolling-stock around from Gabarri to the Moharem Bey Line, where it 
was much needed. 

On another occasion, reports of an intended flank attack by Arabi caused the half 
company at Eamleh to be suddenly ordered out at miduight to throw up a gun breast- 
work across the line towards Mellaha Junction. 

A covering party was thrown forwards as far as the Junction, and a 
working party from a line battalion assisted on the breastwork, so that 
a parapet revetted solidly with railway iron and sand- bags was thrown 
up and the party quietly withdrawn. 

Other technical operations were conducted at Eamleh, some of them 
in exposed situations almost inviting attack. 

On the afternoon of August 17, an order was given to embark at Alexandria, and that 
even iug half the company, with 24 carts and six pack animals carrying equipment, 
started, while the remainder made an early march next day, and the surplus stores 
came in by train. These consisted of large quantities of sand-bags, tools, and pumps 
(tripod and Abyssinian or "Nortons"). 

The transport Nerissa, carrying the 17th company and the Royal Marine Artillery, 
was the first in the Suez Canal, but eventually stuck hard and fast about three miles 
from the pier at Ismailia, so that it was not until 2 a. m. on the 21st that a landing 
was effected in support of the small force holding the place. The Royal Engineers 
bivouacked in a street, and were early at work landing stores, improving roads (for 
each man landed with a tool), and making arrangements for watering-places. 

A Royal Engineer park was started; the railway towards Nefiche repaired; the 
extension of the line from the station to the pier commenced, and the telegraph staff 
assisted. 

The water in the Fresh Water Canal was husbanded by stopping the leaks in the 
locks and raising the overflow of the lower lock. This had to be done afresh when- 
ever boats were passed up into the canal for water transport. 

August 24, Lieutenant Heath with six sappers, three carts, and a working party of 18 
of the York and Lancaster Regiment, accompanied the advance of General Graham's 
force beyond Nefiche, repaired the railway under distant shell-fire, reached the dam 
on the canal at El Magfar, and commenced hasty defenses. 

The carts carrying two of the pontoons brought from Ramleh, drew a heavy shell- 
fire, but the shells, as usual, being badly fuzed, did no damage. These pontoons were 
rafted on the canal above the dam and carried rations on to the cavalry when land 
transport could not keep up owing to deep sands. 

On August 25, the removal of the dam was commenced, and about midnight on the 
26th Captain Wood and 30 sappers arrived by boat and set to work, so that by 4.30 
a. m.. the 27th, a passage for steam cutters was just practicable. 

This dam is met with in all accounts of the advance to Kassassin. 
It received the united attention of both arms of the service, for Lieu- 
tenant King-Harman, E. N., was left behind from the Naval Battery, 
in its march of the 25tb, and was told to do his best to blow up the ob- 
struction. He had with him a small party of skilled men, charges of 
gun-cotton, fuzes, &c. He tried the effect of this explosive on the dam, 



251 

varying the conditions each time, in the hope of success. The heaviest 
explosion was of a series of charges planted in two parallel lines 8 feet 6 
inches apart, 33 pounds of gun-cotton in all. The effect was to cut a 
trench through the dam and pile up the mud which had been displaced 
at each end of the trench. Lieutenant King-Harmer calls it " a vile 
job," and says that the means adopted proved inadequate. It was 
finally necessary to resort to the slower process of removal by hand, 
and strong parties of the Guards brigade kept at work on it until a 
sufficient channel was made through it. Captain Wood continues: 

A disabled dredge was got into working order and pushed through next day for 
the dam at Tel-el-Mahuta with Lieutenant Heath's party. 

This dam was constructed of sand only, about 50 feet thick and 12 feet high, above 
the water, which was here about 70 feet wide. The dam at El Magfar, however, 
was far more formidable ; it was formed of long, strong reeds, tied and matted to- 
gether and solidly compressed by the superiucumbent weight, so that neither picks, 
shovels, specially made hoes, nor rakes could make any impression on the part below 
water. Telegraph posts, tied together with wire, were bedded in it and piles also 
driven. Gun-cotton in coffee and biscuit tins, holding from 3 to 10 pounds, was re- 
sn-ted to, but the work was continually interrupted in order to haul boats through, 
and the level of the water was continually falling, so that the work was heavy and 
continuous. 

On the evening of August 31 the company started for Kassassin, marching nine 
miles across the desert in three hours, the small pack-mules carrying 160 pounds, the 
large mules drawing 400 pounds, and a couple of spare mules, with lead traces, being 
ready to hook on in case of a difficulty ; the heaviest stores, such as smith's forge, 
coal, ten tents, &c, coming by water on the ponton rafts. 

Bivouac was formed with carts around, as an attack by Bedouins had been reported 
probable ; and the next morning Kassassin was reached. Here defensive and other 
works were at once commeuced. Millet was formed into fascines, and strong revet- 
ments formed by driving the butts of stalks into each row and bending the tops over 
into the parapet by which the fascines were securely anchored. The falling of the 
water in the canal rendered it necessary to send both subalterns back, each with 
twenty sappers, to the two dams to widen and deepen the channels. 

This repeated labor on the obstructions in the Sweet Water Canal 
earned for Captain Wood's command the equivocal title of " the dam 
company." 

The company was exposed on September 9 to the shell-fire of the 
Egyptian attack, and lost some of its animals. 

On the 13th of September the company struck camp at 2 a. m., had coffee, and 
started with the following equipment, having orders to conform to the movements 
of the army and to open a passage through the dam near Tel-el-Kebir : 

Eight pack-mules, carrying tool-chests and shovels (30 in a load weigh 160 pounds), 
and 15 carts, carrying, as usual, two days' forage, rations, valises, tools, demolition 
stores, rope, wire, sand-bags, reserve ammunition, stretchers, <fcc. One raft was made 
of 48 wheeling planks, carrying on it the composite beams and wheelbarrows. Two 
rafts, formed each of two pontons, and one single ponton, carrying pumps and hose, 
forge, 2| cwt. anvil, smith's tools, scaling ladders, sand-bags, gun-cotton, crowbars, 
shovels, and other stores. Total number of shovels, 200, of sand-bags, 3,000. Abun- 
dance of bill-hooks, gabion knives, tine wire and spunyarn for cutting and making 
millet into fascines was carried. Tbe rafts were attached one in rear of the other, and 
a couple of mules harnessed on either bank so as to keep tbe rafts more easily in the 



252 

middle of the stream and to keep them going when reeds or anything else interfered 
with the fraction on one side. 

The company came under shell-fire, pitched camp at the dam, which was in the lines 
of Tel-el-Kebir, aud commenced to remove it forthwith. It was 50 feet thick at the 
water line, but of small height, and was only constructed with sand, so that in twenty- 
four hours it was practically removed, the 17th company being relieved by the 24th 
and 26th companies, Royal Engineers. 

Next day the 17th company left its camp for Cairo, the transport, with light loads, 
marching along the railway, reached Benha (42 miles) in two days. 

This company still remains in Egypt and is stationed at Cairo. The 
rather lengthy account of its work is warranted by the prominent part 
it took in all the operations of the campaign and by the light it throws 
on the difficulties encountered in Egypt and the measures chosen to 
overcome them. 

The 18th company of Sappers, 100 strong, under Major W. Salmond, 
R. E., remained at Ismailia as a reserve at the base, establishing the 
engineer park, and handling and forwarding as necessary the stores 
coming under that department. 

The 21st company, under Captain A. R. Puzy, came from Cyprus to 
Alexandria on August 8. It numbered a subaltern and 54 men. It con- 
tinued and concluded the work begun by its predecessor as well as con- 
tributing to the defense of the place in other ways. It remains in 
Egypt as part of the garrison of Alexandria. 

The 24th company, under Captain C. de B. Carey, R. E., was attached 
to the 1st division, forming a portion of the divisional troops. Its per- 
sonnel was 2 captains, 3 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, and 185 non-commis- 
sioned officers and men, a total of 191 . It had 37 horses and 10 carts. It 
joined the 1st division, under General Willis, at Tel-el-Mahuta, on August 
26. At this point, aided by fatigue parties from various line battalions, 
it shared with the 17th company the labor of removing the dam in the 
Sweet Water Canal. 

On September 4 this company made an attempt to obtain a supply of 
drinking water by sinking tube wells. The blocking of the water above, 
and its enforced retention between the locks at Kassassin and Ismailia, 
had made it stagnant, the constant traffic through the canal had kept 
the mud stirred up, while the dead bodies in the canal, whether there 
by accident or design, had vitiated the water to an alarming extent. 
The attempt to obtain potable water elsewhere was not crowned with 
success. Brackish water was found at five feet below the surface, and 
although the tubes were driven ten feet further, no improvement in the 
quality of the water was detected. The army therefore continued to 
make use of the canal water, and, happily, without experiencing ill re- 
sults. In other respects the history of this company is the history of 
the 1st division. 

The 26th company, under the command of Major B. Blood, R. E., was 
attached to the 2d division as a field company. In organization, number, 
anil equipment it was similar to the 24th company. For the sake of 



253 



clearness the following table is added as giving the established organ- 
ization of a field company of Royal Engineers: 



i 

Rank. 


"2 

3 
O 


•6 

"3 

o 

1 

p 


Horses. 


.2 


Draught. 
Pack. 



u 

& 


Major 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Surgeon 

Total 


i 
i 

3 

1 




2 

5i 


! 




::::::::::: 




1 












6 




"I 


..1 




Sergeants 




4 


2 
1 

1 
1 


6 
6 
6 

"134" 

..... 

12 


J 


24 


3 










26 
1 










Total 




38 


165 


4 

1 


24 


3 


4 





Total personnel, 203 ; animals, 46 ; wagons, 6. 

It was even later in reaching the front than its colleagues in the 1st 
division, only arriving at Kassassiu a few days before the battle of Tel- 
<sl-Kebir. It took part in this action, being exposed to heavy fire on the 
extreme left near the canal bank. After the works were ^carried, the 
company was sent to remove a barrier which had been built across the 
railway as part of the general lines of Tel-el-Kebir, and to dig away the 
dam in the Sweet Water Canal. These proved no very serious obsta- 
cles, and disappeared after two or three hours' work. The company 
then pushed on to Benha. It is now in Cairo as part of the army of 
occupation. 

The Pontoon Troop A, commanded by Major E. J. Bond, was not np 
to the standard organization in either men or equipment. Its personnel 
was 1 major, 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 1 veterinary fa surgeon, 7 
officers, and 194 non-commissioned officers and men, instead of 1 major, 



1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 



1 veterinary surgeon, 1 quarterinas 



ter, 9 officers, and 320 non commissioned officers and men. 

Its equipment was 61 horses, 10 pontoon wagons, and 20 carts (instead 
of 243 horses, 20Jpontoon wagons, 4 trestle wagons, 6 store wagons), and 
1] forge-cart, besides Berthon's collapsible boats and Blanchard's pon- 
toons'for three bridges each. 

The pontoon bridge is formed of pontoons kept at 15 feet central in- 
tervals by balks fitting on to saddles resting on central saddle-beams. 

The number of balks used is five for the advanced bridge and nine 
for the heavy bridge for siege artillery ; they support chesses, which 
are kept in position by a riband on each side, racked down by rack- 
lashings to the outer balk, and leaving a clear roadway of 9 feet. 

It was calculated that the pontoons should not be immersed to within 



254 



1 foot from the tops of their coamings when carrying their ordinary 
loads of infantry in marching order in fours crowded at a check, or car- 

Ity.llS. 



2l'.T 




Inches 



Weight 7cwt. 




cTO 



Details of Superstructure 
BauLTC. 



\ 



Fiq.119 \ Weight 73 Us. ® ^ 

- IS' 9»- «-l — -i 



Toy 



Hibarut. 



e 



~\FLg.l20 I Bottom JUdge 






r r-^ri * ji ix |> - M . | ; [| 



" H 4%' 



Chess. 



i_ 



Fig. 121. l^Ins.ThicK. *'!! 
WezgrTit so Us. 



i»i l 



Feet. 



Tdntoon Saddle. 



Plan,. 



B 



Fig.. 122. : 

""a 



13 



£%g 



Weight 41 Us. 
Side TJlevcdion Fiq. 123. 



riages equal in weight to the 16-pdr. gun, weighing 43 cwt.; and 
that the pontoons should not be immersed to within 6 inches of the tops. 



255 

of their coamings when carrying extraordinary loads, such as disorgan- 
zed infantry, or weights such as the (34-pdr. gun, weighing 99J cwt. 

The pontoon (Fig. 115 et s c q.) is a boat with similar decked ends, and 
is partly decked at the sides, where eight rowlock blocks are fixed; 
there is also a rowlock at each end for a steering oar. The undecked 
portion of the pontoon is 14 feet 8£ inches by 4 feet 1^ inches, and is 
surrounded by coamings 5 inches high above the deck. The extreme 
length of the boat is 21 feet 7 inches ; its extreme breadth is 5 feet 3 
inches, and its depth amidships, including the coamings, is 2 feet 8 
inches. The pontoon weighs (dry) from 750 to 800 pounds (say 7 cwt.), 
and draws when floating empty 2J inches, and when in bridge 6 inches. 
Eoughly speaking, every inch of immersion gives 500 pounds of buoy- 
ancy. 

The pontoon consists of six sets of framed ribs connected by a deep 
kelson, two side-streaks, and three bottom-streaks. The sides and 
bottom are of thin yellow pine, with canvas secured ,to both surfaces 
by India-rubber solution ; the canvas is coated outside with two coats 
of marine glue. 

An iron ring is attached to the framework at each end, and connected 
with the kelson by an iron rod. There is a cleat for securing the cables 
on the deck at each end. 

The bottom is provided with two plug-holes to let water out; it is 
protected outside by five longitudinal battens. On each side of the 
boat there is a side-rail, to which are secured eight handles by which 
the pontoon can be carried by hand. The second handle from each 
end is attached by wire rope, the remainder by hemp rope. 

There are four thwarts which support a saddle-beam, which can be 
moved when the pontoon is to be used for ferrying troops; the saddle- 
beam is secured to the thwarts by iron pins going through the seat and 
keyed under it. 

The saddle-beam is hollow, 10 feet 1 inch long at bottom and 9 feet 
9 inches long at top, 8 inches deep, and 4 inches wide; it can be easily 
removed, being merely secured by the four iron pins before described. 
The top is beech, the rest of Baltic fir. The weight of the saddle-beam 
is 44 pounds. Shore transoms are also required for the far and near 

Fig. 124. 

-y- Share Trans am, (front view). 

Shore l^ansom ^W^m^^m^^R 




=-: ^^-~:-^r-^^3 JjottffmView- 



bridge-ends (Fig. 124), failing which they can be improvised from a 
plank 11 feet 5 J inches by 4f inches by 3 inches, laid flat, and with nine 
pairs of cleats 4 inches high aud 1J inches apart for the five ordinary 
and four extra balks. 

A pontoon saddle is a framing of 10 feet 7 inches long, 8J inches broad, 
and 4J inches in depth, which fits over the saddle-beam. The saddle 



256 



has five sets of curved cleats 10J inches by 2 inches, at equal distances, 
to receive the ends of the balks. There are four other sets of cleats 



58 

N 




British pontoon-wagon, packed. 

with square ends placed intermediately to receive the ends of the addi- 
tional balks necessary for the passage of siege guns over the bridge. 



257 

There are handles at each end to enable the saddle to be lifced. The 
side-rails, 10 feet 7 inches by 2J inches by 2J inches, are of Baltic fir, 
and the remainder of American elm. The saddle weighs 41 pounds. 

The balks are of Canada red or Kawrie pine, the length being 15 
feet 9 inches, breadth 3J inches, and depth G inches. The ends of the 
balks are halved, but they are there strengthened by iron plates at 
top and bottom; the bottom plates are made with two claws to prevent 
the balk slipping off its saddle. A balk weighs, dry, 73 ponuds ; wet, 
75 pounds. 

The chesses are single planks of Kawrie pine, the length being 10 
feet, the breadth 1 foot, and the depth 1£ inches; the bretdth at each 
end is diminished to enable the rack-lashing to be passed between two 
adjoining chesses. A chess weighs, dry, 50 J {)Ounds ; wet, 52J pounds, 

The ribands are of Canada red pine, 15 feet 9 inches by 3| inches by 
6 inches, halved at each end, with 14 buttons, the first 1 foot 4 J inches 
from the end, and the remainder 12 inches from center to center. The 
distances from center to center of the buttons are painted alternately 
black and white. 

The buoyancy of the pontoon bridge is sufficient to admit of the pas- 
sage of siege artillery and steam sappers. 

Berthon's collapsible boats are of waterproofed canvas over a folding 
frame of wood, the gunwales doubling down in the plane of the keel. 
The length is 9 feet and the width 4 feet; when opened the boat is retained 
in shape by the thwarts. When used in building bridges, a saddle or 
two-legged trestle is placed in cleats on the bottom boards of the boat 
and held in position by wire guys, extending from the gunwales of the 
boat to the saddle. On these saddles the superstructure is laid. It is 
made of four longitudinals, tapering from 3 inches in depth in the cen- 
ter to 1£ inches at each end, placed on edge, and connected by wooden 
pins. On top of this girder is laid a platform 18 inches wide and 8 feet 
long. 

Two men can carry a boat, 109 pounds, slung on a pole, and two more 
the trestle, superstructure, anchor, and guys, 97 pounds, or a complete 
unit may be conveyed on one horse or mule. 

The pontoon troop also had Blanchard pontoons, cylinders of tin with 
hemispherical ends, 22 feet 3 inches in length and 2 feet 8 inches in 
diameter, weighing 476 pounds, and having a displacement of 0,735 
pounds. Two pontoons with their superstructure form one raft, which, 
with the ro id way between it and the next raft, is carried on one wagon. 

The troop was landed at Ismailia on August 29, and the pontoons at 
once utilized for transport on the Sweet Water Canal. The service 
pontoons, drawing but 18 inches of water when supporting two tons of 
load in pairs, were, as may be supposed, very useful in this connection. 

On September 2 the troop was placed temporarily at the disposal 
of the general commanding the line of communications, for the pur- 
pose of working between Tel-el-Mahuta and Kassassin, receiving and 
948 eg 17 



258 

forwarding at the former point the stores brought up by the canal 
boat-service under Commander Moore. 

In addition to the pontoon equipment, a simple flat-bottomed boat 
devised by Captain Wood, E. E., was tried in the canal. (Figs. 127 
and 128. 

The gun- wale and bilge pieces are identical in form, and are connected 
by stanchions, all being sawed out of inch stuff. The frame is then 
covered with two thicknesses of well-paiuted canvas. 



Fig.32?. 





-10ft.- 



Fig.128. 




P 



iiiiffliumri 



iiiiiiiimiiii|i|i|ii f 
Jniiiii.iiunfa -v 



Improvised scoiv. 

The only real pontoon work done by the troop was the construction 
of pontoon bridges at Tel-el-Mahuta and Kassassin to connect the 
camps established on opposite sides of the Sweet Water Canal. 

The Field Park, under Captain C. A. Eochfort-Boyd, was composed 
of 33 non-commissioned officers and men, and had as its equipment 26 
horses, 9 carts, and a printing wagon. It followed in rear of the army 
as far as Kassassin, carrying supplies of tools and material for all pos- 
sible wants in the way of intrenching, &c. Its province was to act as a 
reserve to the other companies regularly attached to the fighting line. 



XXIV. 

THE RAILWAY COMPANY. 



Of the six companies of the Eoyal Engineers, one, numbered the 
8th, was organized and prepared for the work of building and oper- 
ating railways. It is not, however, a permanent railway company. 
Indeed, there seems to be no such corps. The art of railway construe- 



259 

tion and management is taught at the School of Military Engineering, 
and a limited amount of practice is had with the railways about the 
Government workshops at Chatham and Woolwich. 

The Government does not own the railways in Great Britain, and 
hence is debarred from utilizing them as a school of exercise for sap- 
pers. As might have been expected, the latter displayed occasionally 
in the field a lack of familiarity with the minor details of railway work, 
which showed them to be amateurs as was further proved by the im- 
provement in the running of the railway out of Ismailia as time elapsed 
and experience increased. 

When the sending of a force to Egypt became probable, No. 8 com- 
pany was filled up by mechanics of the various kinds deemed desir- 
able for railway work. Brought together early in July, they gained 
what acquaintance was feasible with the duties before them by volun- 
teer lao"or on the lines of the Southwestern and the London, Chatham 
and Dover Bail ways, these corporations affording them every facility 
compatible with their regular train services. In this way they gained 
excellent practice in laying lines, putting down points and crossings, 
erecting signals, &c. The sappers especially selected as engine-drivers 
were permitted by the London, Chatham and Dover Bailway to ride on 
the locomotives and occasionally to handle them, while the facilities of 
the Chatham station were secured for the experience of guards (conduct- 
ors), station masters, shunters, pointsmen, signal-men, &c. A very 
hurried and inadequate training, certainly, but better than none at all. 

The organization of the company consisted of 3 lieutenants, 1 sur- 
geon, 1 warrant officer, and 103 non commissioned officers and men, 
under the command of Captain Sidney Smith, B. E. In addition, Major 
W. A. J. Wallace, B. E., went out as director of railways, with a staff 
of two officers and three men. Afterwards, Major J. C. Ardagh, C. B., 
B. E., was temporarily associated with Major Wallace. 

The outfit comprised enough 72-pound steel rails for 5 miles of road, 
besides a small quantity of light 36-pound rails, with the requisite 
sleepers, ten points and crossings, four tank-engines, with complete sets 
of tools, two heavy cranes mounted on railway carriages, two break- 
down vans containing all possible appliances for clearing away wrecked 
trains, such as jacks, bars, chains, shoes for getting cars back on the 
rails, three or four passenger carriages of each class (first, second, and 
third), cattle-cars and trucks, and brake-vans. All the rolling stock 
was of the usual English pattern. 

It may be superfluous to mention that in England a locomotive is 
called an engine; passenger cars, carriages; covered freight cars are 
goods vans, and platform cars are trucks. 

The light rail was designed for temporary repairs only. The experi- 
ence had with it showed that it was totally unfitted for the purpose, 
and that time would have been saved by at once resorting to the heav- 
ier rail. 



260 



The sleepers, represented in the accompanying sketches not to scale, 
are simply iron plates about 8 feet long by 18 inches in width, dished in 
the center. The chairs, of the usual form, are bolted to the convex side 
of the sleeper. 



JPtg.129. 




Wrought-iron sleepers and chair 

In laying the rails the sleeper is worked down into the sand to the 
proper level, and the rail slipped in and keyed. Intended for use in 
light soils and in dry climates, the sleepers proved both convenient and 
efficient. Their natural tendency is to settle steadily and rapidly to a 
permanent bed. After this is reached the line is as solid as can be 
desired. 

This sleeper is lighter than the wooden sleeper, and if separated from 
the chairs is much less bulky, stowing spoon-fashion. With the chairs 
attached it makes rather awkward stowage. 

The key employed has long been in use in India, where the ravages of 

the white ant are the occasion of the substitution of metal for wood 

wherever economically possible. This key, therefore, while no novelty 

abroad, may be of interest at home. It is made of steel ribbon about a 

ztyijz. jFig.ji33. quarter of an incli square, wound 

on a tapered former, all of whose 





Railway key. 



sections are rectangular, with the 
corners rounded off. The key is 8 
inches long, 3 inches by 2 inches at 
the base, and 2 inches by 1 inch at 
the point. It is supposed to be 
driven between the rail and the 
chair over a wooden mandrel which is afterwards backed out. The turns 
of the spring towards the smaller end pass beyond the chair and serve 
to clinch the key, so to speak, in place. When properly driven it is said 
never to work out, although this tendency was complained of at Isma- 
ilia. The mishap appears to have arisen from the inexperience of those 
using it. 

The locomotives were of a well-known type, light, four-coupled tank 
engines without tenders, having a coal-box in the cab and a water-tank 
over the boiler. Weighing less than 20 tons, they were not heavy enough 
for the traffic which the needs of the army subsequently developed. 



261 

Their water capacity, originally small, was increased by the improvis- 
ing of a tender, a platform car or truck with four small tanks capable 
of holding 400 to 500 gallons each. A hand pump was rigged in the 
tender to deliver the extra water through a hose into the engine tank 
for feeding the boiler. The fireman assistant had, as a rule and without 
exaggeration, to work his passage every trip, so constant was the ma- 
nipulation of this pump. 

The selection of this light type was governed by the probable diffi- 
culty of getting the engines ashore in Ismailia; but, judged by the 
event, it was regrettable. All the engines used between the base and 
the front prior to the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, that is, during the whole of 
the actual campaign, were landed at Suez, where the facilities were so 
great as to permit the landing of large as well as small engines. There 
was, moreover, never any railway demand for the latter in preference 
to the former, as the traffic was always heavy, and the light engines 
with their meager trains blocked the single track to the front as com- 
pletely as the larger ones. The hauling capacity of these small engines 
was in the neighborhood of ten trucks, carrying each from 5 to 6 tons 
net, while that of the larger engines usually working on the Egyptian 
railways is at least 50 per cent, greater. 

The railway company embarked at Woolwich ou board of the trans- 
port Canadian on August 8. On the way out from England the men 
were told off for, and instructed theoretically in, the various duties 
they would have to perform, as station-masters, assistant station-mast- 
ers, storekeepers, engine drivers, guards, plate-layers, gaugers, &c, 
so that each knew what his own work was to be before arriving in the 
field. 

The steamer arrived at Ismailia on August 23, and the company began 
landing at once. 

There were two breaks in the line held at this moment by the British 
troops, an insignificant gap of two pairs of rails, which had been blown 
out by Lieutenant King-Harman, E. K., on the 21st, between Ismailia 
and Nefiche, the other a more serious interruption, 220 yards in length, 
near El Magfar, made by the Egyptians in their retreat. Near by the 
latter a second and very annoyifcg obstacle was discovered, where a 
railway cutting from ten to fifteen feet deep had been filled in with 
sand for the distance of twenty-five yards. The removal of this ob- 
struction consumed the greater part of four days, owing to the lightness 
of the soil and the impossibility of increasing the force at work beyond 
a certain limited number of men. 

The small break near Nefiche was immediately repaired and traffic 
begun by means of half a dozen of some thirty trucks that had been 
secured at Nefiche by General Graham on August 21. Horses were em- 
ployed to haul the cars as far as the gap at El Magfar, Arabi having run 
off all the locomotives on this part of the Egyptian railway system. In 
the mean time parties of the Eailway Company went down to Suez to land 



262 

some Egyptian locomotives from lighters towed around from Alexan- 
dria, as well as the English locomotives already mentioned. 

At Suez, there being deep water close to the docks, the operation of 
getting the engines ashore was comparatively simple, while at Ismailia 
it would have been extremely difficult and attended with great risk. 
Work was also being pushed ahead at Ismailia, and a branch line laid 
with light rails from the station to the Central Wharf (see Plate 48). 
The Arab labor for this most valuable adjunct was secured by contract 
at heavy rates. This line was completed by August 26. By the same 
day the gap at El Magfar had been repaired. 

The railway was now in good condition as far as the advance at Mah- 
sameh and Kassassin, only lacking locomotives to begin a steam service 
at once, the amount of rolling stock having been increased by the cap- 
ture of forjty-five trucks, in the engagement of the previous day, at 
Mahsameh. The engines with them had uncoupled and escaped up the 
line, to the great chagrin of the British. 

The wheeled and other land transports had not been able to keep up 
with the rapid advance of the fighting line, and the latter had already 
begun to suffer through want of supplies. 

The first locomotive arrived from Suez in charge of Major Wallace at 
3.30 p. m. August 27, and was received with a greeting which bordered 
on joy. A train service was begun on the following day. This engine 
belonged to the Egyptian State Bail ways, and had come around from 
Alexandria. 

The speed attained between Ismailia and Kassassin, the point now 
occupied by the advance, was always, and of necessity, slow. The 
heavy engines brought up from Suez were in indifferent order, as might 
have been expected of complex mechanism which had been in the hands 
of semi-civilized people. In addition, the permanent way had been 
injured by the constant passage over it of animals and wheeled vehicles, 
for it must be remembered that such a thing as a road is unknown in 
this part of the world. The Egyptian lines are laid on large cast-iron 
chairs, better known as "pot-sleepers," connected by wrought-iron tie- 
rods, Eigs. 134, 135. The effect of this heavy extraneous traffic was to 
bend the tie-rods and drag the rails together, and thus to produce the 
phenomenon known among engine-drivers as "grinding." 

The schedule at this time was limited to one train a day each way. 
The train went to Kassassin in the morning and returned in the after 
noon to Ismailia. 

A second branch line about a mile long was laid by the Indian sap- 
pers from the station at Ismailia (see Plate 48) to the base hospi- 
tal and thence to the commissariat landing place at the mouth of the 
Sweet Water Canal. This branch proved of great value in bringing 
the wounded and sick from the front direct to the hospital, while it was 
also used for all commissariat stores which were loaded on the trucks and 
hauled by draught animals to the station ready for forwarding. This 







J3 

Pot-sleepers, Egyptian permanent way. 

particular service was in the hands of the Commissariat and Transport 
Corps. 

On August 3L two more Egyptian locomotives -arrived from Suez, 
making three in all. Of these, one was large, capable of hauling 
from fifteen to twenty trucks loaded to five tons each, and two were 
smaller ones, only able to haul from ten to twelve trucks each. The 
number of trains was at once doubled. The time table was by no means 
fixed, but was subject to daily modifications according to necessity, 
and was established by the general in command of the Line of Communi- 
cations. As a rule at eight o'clock in the morning a train left Ismailia 
for Kassassin direct with supplies for this advanced post, followed at 
eleven o'clock by a mixed train which stopped wherever needed. Both 
returned in the evening. The round trips usually occupied about eleven 
hours. 

With this increased traffic, the want of additional sidiugs became more 
apparent, there being but one turn-out, that at Mahsameh, between JSe- 
fiche and Kassassin, and originally none at all at the latter place. As 
soon as the concentration of the army at this position was determined 
upon, a siding was constructed 230 yards in length, with points having 
a lead of one in ten. Watering stations were improvised at Tel-el-Mahuta 
and Kassassin, using tanks similar to those fitted in the jury tenders. 
To keep up the supply of water for the locomotives the regimental water- 
carts were employed, being filled at the Sweet Water Canal and emptied 
into the tanks. It required the constant services of at least two of these 
carts at each station, with large fatigue parties from the camps, to meet 
the demand for steaming water. From the tanks it was pumped by 
hand into the tender. The railway further needed the daily labors of 
other detachments of men to clear the sand away from the rails as it 
gradually accumulated, driven by the prevailing northerly wind and 



264 

kicked up by the men and animals that used the railroad habitually as 
a highway. 

Each train had an engine-driver and fireman on the engine and a 
guard or conductor in charge of the train, besides a brakesman and an 
armed escort. The trucks and vans carrying stores bore written lists 
of their contents and destinations, the guard being furnished with a way- 
bill. No one, officer or man, was allowed to ride on the train without a 
pass from the Railway Staff Officer at the station of departure, aDd no 
animals were ever transported by rail. 

The history of the railway during the early days of September is 
made up of a series of small mishaps : sand piled up on the rails by 
foot travel high enough to throw trains off the track ; petty accidents 
to locomotives; blocks on the line; insufficient water, and that very 
dirty; trucks left at the wrong place or carried past their destination; 
trains not properly made up, &c. ; none serious, but some of sufficient 
importance to interfere with and retard the traffic. On September 3, 
for instance, the number of trains each way was reduced to one. 

So insufficient was the motive power, that barely enough stores for 
daily consumption could be hauled to the front. The inability to accu- 
mulate supplies involved the consequent inability to make an advance 
It was at this time and for this reason that the prospects of the expedi- 
tion seemed least bright. 

The accession of two more English engines from Suez, on September 
9, relieved the pressure, particularly in permitting the extensive use of 
steam power in shunting. The next day two more engines came up 
and the railway was now fairly well equipped. In all there were seven 
locomotives in use, the eighth, a large one, not arriving until September 
9. The larger engines were in very indifferent condition, however, 
and the smaller ones were too weak, so that a full development was 
not obtained ; still it became possible to run three trains to the front 
every day and to begin the accumulation of provisions and forage at 
Kassassin, in addition to keeping pace with the current demands. 

Every effort was made by Major Wallace and his colleagues to ex- 
pedite the work. The actual dispatching of trains was simple enough, 
but the railway company was deficient in one essential point. It had 
no man familiar with "yard work" ; that is, the making up of trains and 
the distributing of cars, that ceaseless backing and filling of the switch- 
ing engine at every important station which seems to the looker-on such 
a misdirection of energy. The ability to carry on this operation, if on a 
large scale, without undue loss of time, involves an extremely quick 
intelligence, sharpened by long experience. The result is the proper 
composition of the train, so that the cars destined to go to the most 
distant point are nearest the locomotive, those for the nearest bring- 
ing up the rear, where they can be readily dropped. With English cars, 
that have, as a rule, no brakes, each train concludes with a covered 
car fitted with brakes, and called a brake van. In a mixed train, the 



265 

proper placing of these brake vans, whether one, or more than one, in 
number, introduces further complication into yard work. 

Good results were, of course, reached at Ismailia, but at the expend- 
iture of more time and trouble than could well be afforded at the mo- 
ment. The engine-drivers, too, were unskillful at first, although zealous 
and untiring. In the words of an officer dependent upon the rail- 
way for the efficient discharge of his own duty, "The sappers did ex- 
tremely well, but were not professional drivers." In fact all the rail- 
way duties were performed with great zeal and in a manner generally 
satisfactory, regard being had to the circumstances of the case. The 
work was not always free from risk, although the Egyptians never mo- 
lested the trains. No complaint was heard against their faithfulness and 
energy in all branches of their never-ending duty. 

With the seizure of the Egyptian systems between Tel-el-Kebir and 
Zagazig, Zagazig and Benha, Benha and Cairo, Benha and Alexandria, 
after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, the responsibilities of the railway com- 
pany were suddenly enormously increased for a brief time. The Egyp- 
tian railway officials were, however, at once restored to their old positions 
and the service and material turned over to them with all possible speed. 
For the first few days the British Bail way Staff Officers exercised a gen- 
eral control over the arrival and departure of trains, but even this 
management was soon abandoned, the Egyptians resuming full sway, 
subject only to occasional requisitions for special or extra service from 
the British military authorities. 

In considering the labors of the 8th company, Koyal Engineers, it is 
imposble to avoid being struck by the very slight nature of the dam- 
age done to the railway by the retreating Egyptians. The explana- 
tion may possibly be found in the fact that the war was seen to assume 
from point to point a character very different from that which their in- 
flated ideas had caused them to expect. Their leaders must have known, 
supposing them to have possessed a modicum of intelligence, and some 
of them were really clever men, that resistance to the British force would 
necessarily involve hard work and hotly contested engagements, with a 
chance, remote if they would, yet still a chance worth considering, of 
having to retreat. It was this chance which crystallized into the event, 
but, even then, to have inflicted serious injury to the railway would have 
given tangible proof to the rank and file that the issue of the war was 
inclining strongly against them, and have tended to weaken that belief 
in their own invincibility which alone held them together. 

This blind belief acted in the matter of the railway, as it did in others, 
as a positive help to the British. A civilized enemy in the position of 
the Egyptians would have torn up the railway as he retreated, and dur- 
ing his halts have bent his energies to cutting the communication with 
the base by raiding in rear of the attacking force. The severing of this 
main artery of supplies might have been effected with comparative ease, 
and mere attempts at it would have proved fruitful in embarrassment. 



266 

The stupidity of the defense is nowhere more clearly shown than in this 
neglect. As elsewhere, this stupidity was recognized in advance, and 
was relied upon with perfect reason as a factor in the general product. 
The tactics of the campaign would have been very different if both sides 
had possessed fairly equal intelligence. 



XXV. 

THE TELEGRAPH TROOP. 

The importance of rapid and trustworthy communication between the 
headquarters of the Commander-in-chief and the various subsidiary cen- 
ters of an army in the field is so great that, in every military service, 
the development of means to this end has received careful thought and 
elaborate experiment. The oldest mode of conveying intelligence is by 
messages, verbal or written, carried by men either mounted or on foot. 
A second method is by visual signals, considered elsewhere $ and a third 
is by the use of the electric telegraph. The advantages of the latter 
are rapid, unobserved, and accurate working, yielding, if desired, a per- 
manent record. Although requiring, when once laid, a comparatively 
small working staff, it still involves a costly and rather cumbersome 
plant, and hence its use is generally restricted to maintaining com- 
munication with the base of operations, and between the wings and head- 
quarters. Being wholly within the lines, all its delicate parts raceive 
the benefits of the general'defense. 

During the campaign in Egypt the field telegraph was comparatively 
little used, owing to the fact that the advance of the army was along a 
route supplied with three permanent telegraph lines, which had been 
merely damaged but not destroyed by the retreating enemy, and which 
were utilized for keeping up communication between Tsmailia and the 
advanced depot. An account of the history and organization of the 
telegraph companies and of what is known as troop, Royal Engi- 
neers, will not be without interest. 

It should be borne in mind that in England, the entire telegraph 
system, being part of the Post-Office Department, offers facilities, in the 
way of instruction and practice to other branches of the Government re- 
quiring them, which are not attainable in a country like our own, where 
the telegraphs are in the hands of private individuals or corporations. 
Even in England much opposition was experienced by the Royal En- 
gineers in obtaining access to the telegraph offices of the kingdom. 
It is due to the long-continued exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. 
Webber, R. E., an electrician of high standing, now president of the 
Society of Telegraph Engineers, that the post-orfice authorities were 
induced to agree to the plan in operation at present. By this plan 
the members of the two Telegraph Companies, the 22d and 34th Royal En- 



267 

gineers, are admitted into the postal telegraph department, where they 
are permanently employed during peace in the construction and main- 
tenance of all the lines in the southern counties of England. 

The recruits for these companies are enlisted not under eighteen 
years of age. In addition to the usual qualifications they must be ap- 
proved by the Postmaster-General, through his inspectors, as thorough 
telegraph operators. They are at once sent to the School of Military 
Engineering at Chatham, where they pass eighteen months under in- 
struction as soldiers and sappers. From the school the recruit is sent 
to one or other of the two Telegraph Companies, rated as " Indoor Tele- 
graphist" or " Outdoor Telegraphist" according to his proficiency. It 
will be noted that the latter position calls for \*ider knowledge of the 
art, including, as it does, an acquaintance with all that relates to batter- 
ies and office instruments in addition to experience in line work, with its 
peculiar functions in the matter of faults of all kinds, and the practical 
erection of wires. 

The soldier telegraphist, then, usually settles into the place of " line- 
man," senior telegraph clerk (operator), or other position of responsibility 
in the Post-Office. For six years he is credited with active service, and 
indeed is in the first line of the army. After that time he passes into 
the reserve, remaining, in most cases, in the Post-Office as a civil employe. 

There are now about 400 of these Military Telegraphists in the Active 
Line and Eeserves, liable to be called upon to join the Royal Engineer 
Telegraph Companies when war breaks out, and the number, through the 
operation of this admirable system, is constantly increasing. 

Another result is attained in the steady supply of telegraphists for 
Indian and colonial service, for the Persian Government telegraphs, 
military telegraphs at various home and foreign military stations, and 
for the torpedo service (submarine mining). 

As a body of men, subject to military discipline, and accustomed to 
unquestioning obedience, these engineer telegraphists are most valuable 
on occasions of sudden emergency. In 1872, when a strike arose among 
the civil employes of the Postal Telegraph, forty-five of these engineers 
went to Ireland at a few hours' notice and took entire charge of the lines 
at Dublin and Cork. The rapid restoration of the telegraph service at 
this juncture had a salutary influence upon the strikers. 

The Post-Office organization was first tested during the Ashantee war 
in 1873. At forty-eight hours' warning, a complete force of officers and 
men trained in the postal telegraph service was sent out, with stores, 
instruments, batteries, &c, all drawn from the Post-Office. The success 
which this body of experts achieved was signal, and it received well- 
merited approbation. 

Besides these two Telegraph Companies, there is a third corps of Royal 
Engineers, known as C troop, charged with the special work of teleg- 
raphy. The headquarters of this troop are ordinarily at Aldershott, 
where it is exercised in practical field work, laying ground cables, put- 
ting up overhead lines, &c. 



268 

For many years the equipment of C troop was in imitation of the 
German outfit, consisting mainly of a ground cable worked with polar- 
ized Morse recorders on a closed circuit. It seems to have been taken for 
granted that no better method of running a line could be found than by 
paying out an insulated cable on the ground. The fact that such a 
cable would be greatly exposed to accidental damage was recognized, 
and it was to reduce the ill-effects of this damage to a minimum that this 
type of receiving instrument was adopted. The polarized armature being 
worked by feeble currents permits considerable leakage without inter- 
ruption of the service, but the instrument is delicate and complex. As 
might have been foreseen, much difficulty was experienced in the prac- 
tical working of this equipment. The condition of the troop as a whole 
was not as satisfactory as its friends could have wished during a period 
of several years. 

In 1874 the dissatisfaction with the outfit bore fruit in the adoption 
of a new equipment, notably of an overhead air line in addition to the 
cable, and simpler forms of instruments. Since then the equipment has 
undergone constant improvement. 

The members of troop, while intelligent and well instructed, are not 
necessarily professional telegraphists. The backward condition of the 
troop for so many years was doubtless due to the fact that during this 
time no practical telegraphist, officer or man, was appointed to it. It is 
now, however, in more efficient condition, having abandoned with profit 
its rigid conservatism. 

The old organization was subjected to a severe trial during the Zulu 
war, when, strengthened by about twenty Post-Office clerks, troop 
went to the front. On arriving at Natal the equipment proved defective 
and the best work was by the Post-Office clerks, who took over the colo- 
nial telegraphs and worked them for military purposes. The field lines 
were at fault because too lightly put up. Altogether this expedition 
was not very successful. 

After the Natal experience a mixed personnel went out under a thor- 
oughly experienced officer, trained in the post-office. The equipment 
included a light overhead wire. The work was well done in every way. 
The combination of generally trained intelligence with special expert - 
ness could not fail to produce good results. 

The occurrences just referred to were among the causes which led to 
the forming in 1881 of a board of officers at Aldershott, presided over 
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Harrison, C. B., R. E., for the considera- 
tion of the subject of field -telegraph organization and equipment. This 
board recommended a complete amalgamation, in time of war, of troop 
and the two telegraph companies, 22d and 34th. In the mean time it 
secured marked improvements in poles, wire, insulators, and instru- 
ments. 

The outfit at present is chiefly as follows : 

The ground cable is manufactured by Messrs. Siemens Brothers, of 



269 

London. It consists of a core composed of seven wires No. 22 B. W. G» 
The central wire is of steel, the others of copper, tinned. The dielectric 
is of rubber, the first layer being soft, the outer layers semi-vulcanized 
and vulcanized. Over this is a wrapping of India-rubber tape, and the 
whole is inclosed in tarred jute braiding. The total diameter is .24 inch. 
The resistance of the conductor is 28.7 ohms at 75° Fahrenheit. The 
resistance of the dielectric is not uniform (the dielectric being so slight); 



&$. 166 




iScaZe of JFeet, 

2 " 3 t- 

J I 




JFig. 137 

Telegraph wagon. 



and is not guaranteed by the maker. The cable weighs 170 pounds per 
statute mile, and has a breaking strain of 270 pounds. It is carried on 
drums, each capable of holding five-sixths of a mile, which rest on a spe- 
cially designed wagon. (See Figs. 136 and 137.) Here they are secured by 
cap-squares and latches. An arrangement is fitted on either side of the- 



270 

wagon for winding up the wire on the rear reel. It consists of a wooden 
drum fixed upon the back of the hind wheel of the wagon and concen- 
tric with it. From this an India-rubber band passes over a small band- 
wheel held in an iron bracket on the side of the wagon. The ends of 
this band are fitted with clips, and may be disconnected at will. The 
axis of the band-wheel lies in the prolongation of the spindle of the 
wire-drum, and has upon its inner side a clutch. Corresponding to 
this is another clutch on the spindle of the drum. These clutches can 
be thrown in or out of gear as desired. When in gear, and when the 
carriage moves forward, the wire is wound up. 

The three boxes on the front part of the wagon frame may be opened 
and formed into a field office. Inside the near box are instruments 
and terminals with wires running to the bearings of the drum's spindles. 
The terminal on the drum is also connected with the spindle by means 
of a plate, so that the wire from each drum may be coupled as desired 
in the field office. "Earth" is obtained by wires running from the 
naves of the wheels along the spokes to the iron tires. 

The weight of the cable wagon when empty is 1,758 pounds. 

In the longitudinal space between the drums twenty light iron tele- 
scopic poles are generally carried. 




1 ii i -nrt 



Military Morse recorder. 



The overhead line is a strand of three galvanized-iron wires, each 
No. 18 B. W. Gr., having a resistance of 240 tons and weighing 120 pounds 
to the mile, very pliable and strong, carried on light poles (bamboo is 
the material selected), 14 feet long, capped with simple ebonite insula- 
tors. 



Fig.739. 



271 

The ins t rum eats employed were military Morse recorders, of which a 
top view, with the connections, is given in Fig. 138. This instrument 
can be used as a direct inker on a closed circuit, or as a local inker 
with either single or double current. This instrument is small, com- 
pact, simple, and efficient. It is made by Siemens Brothers. 

It has been proposed to use the telephone for hasty field work, and 

sets of receiving and transmitting instru- 
ments, based on this principle, were issued 
to C troop for experiment and trial. The 
transmitter is represented in Fig. 139. 
When the key is down the current passes 
through the coils of the electro-magnet 
and through the armature as well. The 
latter being attracted leaves a stop-screw 
on the standard and the current is broken. 
As the armature is carried by a spring, 
the making and breaking of the current, 
which now takes place, is very rapid, oc- 
casioning a buzzing sound that is transmitted through the line wire to 

Fit/340. 




Sin. 




JPig.141. 




JH 



the telephones of all the stations. The special form of telephone em- 
ployed is shown in Fig. 140, while Fig. 141 is a conventional diagram 
of the electrical connections of the stations in circuit. 



272 

Concerning the value of the apparatus, different opinions were en- 
countered. Lieutenant-Colonel Webber thinks the Tyler sounder a toy y 
and states that the contacts are very apt to foul, while Major Sir Ar- 
thur Mackworth experienced no fault in its working in the field, and 
found its behavior satisfactory even when sending messages over a 
leaky cable. 

The batteries that entered into the outfit of C troop were small 
Leclanche elements in square vulcanite jars, ten in a box, and coupled 
in series. They were all ready for use, except that water had to be 
added through a plugged hole when needed. The tops of the cells 
were sealed with a bituminous composition, which in the hot climate 
of Egypt melted and flooded the batteries, rendering many of them use- 
less. The Leclauche element is not adapted to continuous work on 
a closed circuit, and hence the advisability of its employment with the 
Morse recorders is open to question. 

For field work, the ordinary post-office detector galvanometer was 
issued. This has a vertical needle and two resistance coils, and is a 
good instrument for rough purposes. 

Each unit or section was provided with an "office box" containing a 
complete equipment of stationery, spare parts of instruments and bat- 
teries, tools, &c. These boxes were found to be too heavy for transpor- 
tation from Istnailia. They were therefore opened and the necessary 
articles taken out for use and forwarded to the front. 

A portion of the equipment was arranged for conveyance on pack 
saddles, suitable boxes being made to contain spare parts, tools, spun- 
yarn, gutta-percha, covered wire, &c. 

As an outcome of the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison's board,, 
when the expedition to Egypt was resolved upon, the mounted portion 
of C troop and sixty men from the Postal Telegraph Companies were 
formed into a Telegraph Corps under the old designation of C troop, the 
command being given to Major Sir Arthur Mackworth, R. E., a capable 
and energetic officer, not a post-office trained telegraphist. Associated 
with him were one captain and five lieutenants. The rank and file 
numbered 184 men. The transport consisted of 66 horses, 12 telegraph 
wagons, 14 Maltese carts, 4 water-carts, and a forge wagon, and was only 
meant to carry the stores needed at the front, other modes of convey- 
ance being looked for after landing, for the outfit comprised enough 
wire to reach from Ismailia to Cairo, and weighed between 300 and 400 
tons. It was found that the heaviness of the country prevented the use 
of all the vehicles brought out. The horses could never move more 
than 10 wagons and a few two-wheeled carts. The drivers and mounted 
men were armed with revolvers, and the others with carbines. 

The troop assembled at Aldershott and marched with horses and 
wagons to London, where it embarked on August 9 on board the hired 
transport Oxenholme lying in the south West India docks. In the mean 



273 

time the entire equipment, pioviding against every possible want, had 
been sent from the Woolwich Arsenal and put on board the ship. Un- 
fortunately, those most interested had not superintended the stowage 
of the cargo, and, as a natural consequence, what ought to have been 
on top was at the bottom, an arrangement very fertile in subsequent 
embarrassment. 

The importance of the prompt arrival of so valuable a corps as the 
Telegraph Troop would seem to have been obvious, and yet the Oxen- 
holme, selected to bring it out, together with the Pontoon Troop and the 
Field Park, was one of the slowest of the transport fleet. Sailing from 
London on August 9, she only reached Alexandria on the 26th, and 
Ismailia on the 28th of the month, when the advance of the army had 
already arrived at Kassassin. The inconvenience of stowage, already 
referred to, was experienced at once ; the whole equipment had to be 
broken out and reassorted in order to select the two or three tons re- 
quired for immediate use. The outfit of stores, material, tools, &c, was 
to have been divided into five portions, each article or set of articles 
being in quintuplicate. One portion was designed for a reserve at the 
base, and the others for use with the four independent sections which 
composed the troop. Owing to the Oxenholme's late arrival at Ismailia, 
and to the time taken in reassorting the ill-stowed cargo, the scheme 
could not be carried out. 

Men and wagons were landed and pushed on at once without proper material, tools 
&c. * * * It was fouud too late that the work on hand differed from the drill at 
Aldershott, and that, as practical telegraphists, the first thing to he done was to restore 
as quickly as possible the Egyptian system, which had been broken down. 

It has been mentioned that there were three wires along the railway 
from Ismailia to Zagazig. In addition to these were two through wires 
belonging to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and having no connection 
with the Egyptian office en route. The first three were Egyptian Govern- 
ment lines, with stations originally at Ismailia, Nefiche, and Mahsameh. 
All of these wires were more or less damaged, the Eastern Company's 
having especially suffered. Many of the latter's poles, which are of iron, 
were thrown down. This group of wires was not repaired or used by 
the Telegraph Troop. 

As General Graham, who commanded the advance post, had been 
beyond the reach of the telegraphs for four days prior to the arrival of 
the Oxenholme, Major Mack worth had at once to establish the desired 
communication as well as to get his men and material ashore. 

The disembarkation was completed, as far as necessary, by 11.30 p. m. 
of August 30, the troop marching at once to Tel-el-Mahuta, ten miles dis- 
tant from Ismailia, where it arrived at 4.30 a. m. of the 31st and rested 
for a short time. August 31 was spent in labor on the broken Egyptian 
system. By 4.30 p. m. the line was " through" from Kassassin to Tel-el- 
Mahuta, and by 9 a. m. of the following day was "through" to Ismailia. 
948 eg 18 



274 

This was effected by passing across the breaks from one to another, an 
expedient yielding temporary success, but much subsequent inconven- 
ience, the " leads" being badly intermingled. 

The next few days were occupied in repairing and re-establishing the 
old lines and in forming an advanced field- telegraph post at Kassassin. 
By the morning of September 7 Major Mackworth describes himself as 
"pretty well off." 

Of the three line* that had been restored, one was a through wire 
used mainly by General Wolseley for his dispatches to the base and 
to England ; the second passed through all stations; and the third was 
reserved exclusively for the railway management. On September 12 
there were two telegraph offices at Ismailia, one at the railway station 
and the other under a tent in the yard adjoining the headquarters 
of the base commandant. One station was at Nefiche, one at Mahsa- 
meh, besides the railway and staff offices at Kassassin. Before or at 
about this time Major Mackworth appears to have given up charge of 
the permanent lines from the front at Kassassin to the base at Ismailia 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, and to have confined his attention to 
the operations of the field telegraph. 

During a reconnaissance on September 8 a small detachment followed 
up General Graham, and maintained communication with General Wil- 
lis' headquarters at Kassassin by means of a ground cable. 

The Egyptians appearing in superior force, Graham was obliged to 
retire more rapidly than was compatible with reeling up the wire. Major 
Mackworth used every exertion, holding on until the enemy was within 
600 yards of him before cutting the cable, about half a drum of which 
was lost. This was the "torpedo wire" which Arabi speaks of as having 
captured. (See p. 144.) 

September 12 the plans for the general advance of the next day upon 
Arabi's position at Tel-el Kebir were elaborated. It was decided that 
a portion of C troop should run a ground cable from Kassassin to the 
Commander in-Chief 's headquarters in the field, ou the northern side of 
the canal, while General Macpherson, commanding the Indian Contin- 
gent, was to be kept in communication with the same point, and thence 
with General Wolseley, by means of an overhead line to be run by the 
Indian Sapper Telegraph Train. In addition, Major Mackworth planted 
a row of telegraph poles, 2 J miles long, at intervals of 150 yards, to mark 
the direction of the night march. Lieutenant-Colonel Webber and Lieu- 
tenant E. W. Anstruther, R. E., with another detachment of C troop, 
were to follow up and repair the Egyptian permanent wires along the 
railway. 

The army marched from Kassassin during the night of the Septem- 
ber 12-13, the two wings being in constant telegraphic communication 
until 2.30 a. m. of the 13th, when the Indian Contingent's line south of 
the canal was interrupted. It was afterwards ascertained that the break 



275 




was caused by a pontoon wagon, which accidentally struck and tore down 
the overhead wire. General Wolseley, however, was always in con- 
nection with Kassassin, although the actual telegraph work Fig.i4s 
involved stopping from time to time to make "earth." The : ^u 
dry, sandy nature of the soil necessitated a special apparatus 
for this operation-, a pointed and perforated galvanized-iron 
pipe, 3 feet long, which was driven into the ground. Water 
was then poured in, the end of the cable connected with the 
pipe, and "earth" obtained at once. 

During the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, General Wolseley sent 
three messages over the field cable, and received several in 
return. When thefight was ended Major Mack worth pushed 
on as rapidly as possible to Tel-el-Kebir railway station, pay- 
ing out his cable as he went. The last three miles were laid 
in thirty minutes, ten in all being run. At 8.30 a. m. he re- 
ceived messages to the Queen and to the Secretary of State 
for War. He got them off at 8.41, and at 9.15 Her Majesty's 
reply was received. 

The end of Major Mackworth's field cable was connected with one of 
the Egyptian wires two miles west of Kassassin. As tending to intro- 
duce confusion into the subsequent regular telegraph service this would 
appear to have been a mistaken economy of time and material. Not- 
withstanding the fact that men were immediately dispatched back along 
the railway to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, it was not until 6 p. 
m. that the latter was able to send word to Major Mackworth to shift on 
to the permanent lines and to pick up his cable. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, who, as has been stated, was to follow up 
the Egyptian wires along the railway, found Eos. 1 and 3 gone in sev- 
eral places, but No. 2 was still on the poles throughout, although dam- 
aged here and there. He passed the intrenchments with General Mac- 
pherson and reached Tel-el-Kebir railway and telegraph station at 7 
a. m., finding one wire "through" to Cairo. He was trying in vain 
to communicate in English, when in came the superintendent of Egyp- 
tian telegraphs, an Englishman named Clark, who immediately began 
conversing in Arabic, as if he were a friend in Arabi's camp, but not 
revealing the exact state of affairs. The consequent lack in Cairo of 
trustworthy information had doubtless something to do with the irres- 
olution of Arabi's party there, and may have helped to save the city. 
On the other hand, Mr. Clark sent the news of the battle to the opera- 
tor at Zagazig, assuring him that, if his behavior was satisfactory, the 
English would spare his life. In this way the integrity of the lines was 
secured from Tel-el-Kebir to Cairo, leaving the sole gap between the 
army and its base in the Tel-el-Kebir-Kassassin section. To restore 
this link to proper working order, two valuable days were consumed at 
a critical moment, the officer specially charged with the work being sud- 
denly ordered away and on to the front. 



276 

Details of linemen and operators were sent on with the advance in 
both directions. The office at Zagazig was seized that afternoon, and 
by 9.30 a. m., September 15, the other stations on the railway at Benha, 
Belbeis, Oalioub, and Cairo were occupied. They were held until the 
Egyptian Government official service was established — an operation rap- 
idly effected. 

The peculiar nature of the soil is a sufficient explanation of the im- 
munity from accident enjoyed by Major Mack worth's ground cable, over 
which numberless wagons of all kinds passed freely from midnight until 
sundown September 13. 

It is not out of place to record the general good conduct and perform- 
ance of troop. The office work was particularly severe and almost 
uuremittent, giving little rest to the operators, who were nearly worn 
t out by the constant strain. Their efforts to keep at their desks when 
.overcome by fatigue and loss of sleep were most creditable. 

A regular order of precedence in the forwarding of dispatches was 
maintained. The general features were as follows, viz : 

1st. Dispatches to or from the Commander-in-Chief. 

2d. Railway dispatches. 

3d. Official dispatches relating to the sick or wounded. 

1th. Other official dispatches in order of receipt, unless made " u rgent ? 
by proper authority. 

5th. Private dispatches relating to the sick or wounded. 

£th. Other private and press dispatches in the order of their receipt. 

For classes 5 and 6, payment was exacted according to a regular tariff. 

As might be presupposed, the loudest expressions of discontent with 
the telegraph service came from newspaper correspondents, who were 
not always reasonable in their demands, and who failed at times to< 
understand how official dispatches could be of greater importance than 
their own. It must be remembered, however, that even so conservative 
a body of men as army officers cannot be entirely exempt from the influ- 
ence of the tendency of to-day to substitute the telegram for the written 
letter, that a large proportion of the dispatches marked " official" need 
not necessarily have been urgent, and therefore the business they were 
designed to transact would have lost nothing by a slower process of 
transmission. From various causes, there arose at times heavy blocks 
in the telegraph lines in spite of the unusual advantage of three wires. 
It was during one of these blocks that a distinguished officer was able 
to say, humorously but truthfully, that he had sent three simultaneous 
dispatches from Ismailia to Kassassin : one by boat on the Sweet Water 
Canal, the second by railway, and the third by telegraph, and that 
they arrived at their destination in the exact order given. 

It is only fair to remark that the lateness of the arrival of the troop 
at the base and the extreme brevity of the campaign prevented a set- 
tling down to an organized routine and gave an appearance of confusion 
which was to some extent unavoidable. The work would, it is believed, 



277 

have been better done had the absolutely distinct parts of the troop 
been occasionally associated for joint practice prior to amalgamation. 

Military telegraphy cannot be an amateur's toy. It is valueless un- 
less trustworthy in its material and managed by capable persons. The 
simplest and best instruments are required in conjunction with a well- 
insulated line, either ground or overhead. If the latter, it is not enough 
to bring the ends of the wire into the terminal stations. The inter- 
mediate points must be out of the reach of accidental mechanical injury 
and reasonably free from electrical faults. A little more time and trouble 
spent in setting the poles, in making electrically sound joints, and in 
securing good insulation will, in the end, be found to be time saved. 

The result of the practical comparative experiment on September 13, 
with a ground cable on one hand and an overhead line on the other, 
only emphasizes the necessity of thorough work, without deciding the 
relative merits of the two methods. Each has its own province, the 
former in supplying, in a rapid advance, a communication which is only 
meant to be temporary, while the latter is more or less permanent accord- 
ing to the circumstances of the case. It follows that both kinds of 
conductor should enter into the outfit. But above and beyond mere 
mechanical appliances is the importance of a thoroughly-trained person- 
nel, one part familiar with the press of office work conducted amid noise 
and confusion, the other with the conditions and phenomena of engineer- 
ing and line work, and both parts accustomed to action in concert. The 
combination of these elements, directed by clever and energetic officers, 
will alone produce such results as will justify the heavy expenditure of 
men and money in making the army telegraph a valuable adjunct, not 
a delusion and a snare. 



XXVI. 

THE CORPS OF SIGNALERS. 

The earliest mode of transmitting intelligence, the written or ver- 
bal message, possesses certain great advantages. Written dispatches 
destroy all chance of error, and hence are resorted to when time per- 
mits and the importance of their contents demands this additional 
precaution. Besides being slow, the system presents the drawback of 
being excessively cumbersome, requiring a man and a horse, or a man 
alone, for each message, and, over great distances, for each stage of the 
journey accomplished. 

Visual signaling, the second method, historically speaking, possesses 
the merits of cheap and simple equipment, a personnel not very highly 
trained except in one direction, the ability to begin work the instant the 
stations are reached, while its great mobility enables it to be used at 
and among the extreme outposts. On the other hand, these stations 
must always be selected with reference to the facility of signaling from 



278 

one to the other, and not to the convenience of the Commander-in-Chief, 
while each obstacle intervening in the line of sight introduces a repeat- 
ing station with its consequent chance of error. Again, this method, 
depending for its successful employment upon an unobstructed view, is 
at the mercy of the weather. Five minutes of fog may imperil the suc- 
cess of an important military movement. It finds its most complete 
scope in hilly countries, where the sun is rarely obscured. Under these 
conditions, its range, so to speak, has almost no bounds. Thus, as an 
extreme ease, it is known that in the triangulation carried across the 
Eocky Mountains observations have been taken between peaks one 
hundred and fifty miles apart, mirrors being used to reflect the sunlight 
from one to the other. Messages might have been and possibly were 
exchanged between these points by flashing the reflected light. 

Visual signaling in the British army is based on "flashes," long and 
short. The code, composed of dots and dashes, and being what is known 
among telegraphers as the " Morse Continental," is given below. 

A— H N — - T — 

B I -- O U 

O J P V 

D K— — Q W 

E - L K X 

F M S--- Y 

G Z 

Comma — - — 

Period - 

Preparative and erasure , &c. 

Stop , &c. 

General answer — (T) 

Station sign (P) 

Repeat 

Bight -(ET) 

Cipher (C C) 

Numerical, - (Z) 

Signaler's indicator 

Obliterator 

This phase of the Morse code is universally employed in the telegraphs 
of Great Britain and the continent of Europe. By its adoption for the 
army and navy a long step is made towards rendering signalers tol- 
erably efficient substitutes for telegraphists in case of emergency. It 
differs from the Morse code in use in America by the suppression of the 
space as a code unit, which, it may be remembered, enters into several 
of the most important letters of the alphabet, viz, c, o, r, and y, and in 
containing no combination of more than four elements. The continental 
is, therefore, an improvement upon the earlier code. Its application to 
visual signals is very simple, any motions or exposures, which may be 



279 

made long and short, affording a means of transmitting intelligence. 
It involves but the one notion of time ; that is, of one thing lasting longer 
than another. As practiced, it is entirely devoid of direction of motion, 
the fundamental principle of the Myer code, as it is of the relative po- 
sition of objects, the key to the semaphore, that rapid method of sig- 
naling employed in the British navy. 

During the day army signals are made either by the heliograph or 
by flags. The latter are white or blue, according to the nature of the 
background, and are of two sizes, 3 feet square, mounted on a staff 5 feet 
6 inches long, 1 inch in diameter at the butt, tapering to £ inch at the 
top, and 2 feet square, mounted on a stick 3 feet 6 inches long. The 
signalman stands so that the motions of the flag are in a plane at right 
angles to the line of sight. The normal position of the staff is 25° from 
the vertical. If the wind serves the motions are made to windward. 

The dot, or short flash, is made by waving the flag from the nor mal 
position to a corresponding position on the opposite side of the vertical, 
and immediately back again to the normal position. The dash or long 
flash, equivalent in length to three dots, is made by waving the flag from 
the normal position until the pole almost touches the ground on the op- 
posite side of the vertical, then, after a short pause, back again to the 
normal position. The various letters and signs are made by combining 
the dots and dashes according to the code, a pause equal in length to a 
dash intervening after each letter of a word. At the end of the word 
the flag is lowered or gathered in, when the receiving station makes 
a. dash to indicate that the word is understood. " Eight" (E T) is the 
flnal answer at the end of a message. 

The station sign (P) followed by a letter calls the station to which 
that letter has been given, the called station responding by " right 7 ' 
and the letter of the calling station, as for instance P B and ETA 
when station A calls station B, and the latter signifies its readiness to 
proceed with the reception of the message. The station sign is also 
used to indicate the completion of the message. 

The digits are indicated by the first ten letters of the alphabet in 
order, J being omitted, and K substituted in its place. When the 
numeral sign (Z) is followed by a letter or series of letters the combi- 
nation is to be read as a number; thus ZOH would be 38. 

The " signalers' indicator" precedes directions intended solely for the 
signalers and not forming part of the message, abbreviated thus : 

Fresh reading G Q 

'Go on G 

Move to your right R 

.Move to your left L 

Move higher up H 

Move lower down O 

Stay where you are S R 

Separate your flags S F 

Special message SMS 



280 

Use blue flag B 

Use white flag W 

Use large flag L F 

Use small flag S 

Your light is bad LB 

Turn off extra light TEL 

Wait M Q 

L B and TEL have reference to the heliograph. The " obliterator n 
annuls what precedes and is answered by the obliterator. 

Time is signaled in code and is followed by a. m. or p. m. as the case 
may be. Fig. 143 is a clock-dial lettered according to the code. The 




twelve hours each bear a letter and the four individual minutes inter- 
vening between each hour-mark and its successor are known by the 
letters K S W X, respectively repeated around the dial. Thus 8.29 
p. m. is <H E X p. m. 

The second means of making signals during the day is the heliograph r 
an instrument for directing the reflected rays of the sun in any desired 
direction alternately on and off a distant station. 

A fairly correct idea of the principle and mode of use of the heliograph 
is given in Fig. 144. A small circular mirror is mounted on a U shaped 
frame. The frame, which can be turned in any direction, is supported 
by a tripod. The mirror is movable about a horizontal axis, and 
can be set at the necessary angle of inclination by a screw- rod at the 
back working inside a nut, a. The nut, which can be turned at will, 
is carried at the top of a small cylinder, into which the rod passes as 
the mirror is more and more inclined. The cylinder is fixed to the top of 



281 



JFip.244r. 



what, for clearness, may be called a telegraph key, by means of lugs 
and a pin. Depressing the key turns the mirror through a small angle, 
and, if the instrument is adjusted, throws the flash of light on the 
receiving station. This flash is a dot or dash of the Morse code, accord- 
ing to its duration. When the key is released, a spring returns the 
mirror to the original posi- , 

tion, and the light is no 
longer seen by the other 
station. A hole through 
the center of the mirror is 
for directing the helio- 
graph. The arm b carries 
a fore-sight in the shape 
of a very small white metal 
disk. When the distant 
station and this index are 
in one line, as seen by the 
eye placed at the back of 
the mirror, the instrument 
is properly pointed. The 
mirror is now moved un- 
til the sun's reflected ray 
fails full upon the disk 
when the key is down. In 
the very center of the mir- 
ror a small circle is left 
unglazed. The reflection 
from the mirror shows this as a black spot on a bright ground. 
This spot must be brought into the center of the fore-sight disk. The 
disk is then turned in its socket so as to present its edge to the beam of 
light, and the signaling may be proceeded with. As the sun shifts its 
position the heliograph must be constantly readjusted, but the opera- 
tion is merely a slight correction of the original adjustment. 

If the sun is behind the sending station as seen from the receiving 
station, a second circular mirror is substituted for the fore-sight. The 
course of the beam of light is then as seen in Fig. 145. 

The heliograph was invented by Mr. G. B. Mance of the Indian tel- 
egraph service, who received £1,000 sterling from the Indian Govern- 
ment as a reward. (Mr. Mance's name is identified with a well known 
and very clever method of measuring the internal resistance of an elec- 
trical battery.) It was first employed in the Kaffir campaign, in 1877. 
During the last Afghan war it was constantly used to great advantage 7 
the conditions mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this section 
finding a complete fulfillment. It may be remembered that the first 
intimation of the approach of the army under Major-General Sir F. S. 
Roberts, which marched to the relief of Kandahar in 1880, was by means 




282 



W 



i 



s 
* 



of this instrument, when at the distance of forty-eight miles from the town. 

As no previously concerted plan had been agreed upon, this fact suffi- 

e ciently indicates the ease with which one station may 

% ijf attract the attention of another, the brilliant spot of 

/ steady reflected light being unmistakable. 

/ The range of 58 miles between Kandahar and the 

/ station at the summit of the Maiwan Pass was habitu- 

/ ally covered, while, in the same country, it was occasion- 

/ ally employed between parties 70 miles apart. In the 

/ ^ Transvaal, in 1881, Lieutenant Davidson, of the King's 

Eoyal Kifle Corps, maintained communication over a 

line 200 miles in length, using but four intermediate 

stations. These facts give an idea of the great value 

of the heliograph under favorable circumstances. 

The heliograph may, of course, be used with any 
source of illumination, its range depending upon the 
strength of the light, and indeed it is so convenient an 
instrument that its employment at night for flashing 
signals has grown into great favor Avith signalers. 
During this campaign it was used between Kassassin 
and Mahsameh for signaling with the light of the moon 
at its full. 

The " call n with the heliograph is most simple. Turn 
the spot of light upon the other station, and wait until 
it answers by showing its light in return. 

The request for the adjustment of the heliograph at 
another station during the transmission of a message is 
effected by merely keeping the light turned ou. When 
the latters light is adjusted to shine full and clear, the 
asking station's light is dropped. 

The apparatus for night work consists of a lime light 
and a hand lantern, both fitted with shutters moved 
by keys so as to vary the exposure at will. The 
former is accompanied by all the paraphernalia nec- 
essary for making and holding oxygen. A powerful 
lens secures parallelism of the rays of light. An out- 
side view of this lamp is given in Fig. 146. The com- 
bustible is spirits of wine contained in a large reservoir forming the 
base of the lamp. The lime pencil is carried by a holder capable of ad- 
justment by means of a rack and pinion not seen in the sketch. The 
gas is brought to the lamp from a gas-tight bag through a rubber pipe, 
and its flow is regulated by the tap a. At & is a small hole provided 
with a darkened eye-piece, so that the signal-man may inspect and adjust 
the light without injury to his eyes. On a clear dark night this light 
can be seen over 20 miles. The hand lantern is used for distances not 
exceeding from 4 to 6 miles. It burns colza oil. 



M 



lUse of the duplex mir 
ror in heliographing . 



283 



A view of the exterior with dimensions is given in Fig. 147. The 
key for operating the shutter is conveniently placed at the top of the 
handle. Both forms of lantern are supplied by J. De Fries & Sons, 
London. 

Each cavalry regiment in the British army has four non-commissioned 
officers and eight men in their signal corps, or four complete " stations" 
of three men each. Each infantry battalion has two non-commissioned 
officers and four men, or two " stations." In addition, each cavalry troop 
and infantry company has a supernumerary trained signal-man. 

The instruction and practice necessary to keep the signal-men and 




supernumeraries up to their work is conducted by a specially selected 
officer of the regiment or battalion, and amounts to three days per 
week for the former and one day for the latter. A quarterly return is 
made to the lieutenant-colonel commanding by this officer, giving the 
names and proficiency of the men under his instruction. One column 
of the return calls for the " rate of sending," as a comparative test. 
It has been found that if the letters of the alphabet be repeated three 
times, mixed together, and then separated into twenty groups of un- 
equal length, the time occupied in their transmission is the same as that 



284 



required for a message of twenty words of different lengths averaging 
five letters to the word. The time spent in sending this message is 
then reduced to " words per minute." Ten is considered fair signaling 
with large flags, but higher rates are reached with the small flag, lamp r 
and heliograph. 

The signal officers and men of the regiments and battalions are sent 
to the Camp of Maneuver at Aldershott, where they receive instruction 

Mgl47. 




- - 4*i irt; 



in field and brigade signals under the immediate supervision of Major 
M. F. Thrupp, the Inspector of Army Signaling, who also examines and 
passes the regimental instructors. 

Signal-men in the field are armed with the sword-bayonet and short 
Martini-Henry carbine slung over their back. The heliographs are car- 
ried in neat leather cases over the shoulders. Three men form a com- 
plete party, and, as a rule, are provided with an outfit consisting of 



285 

two flags (one large and one small), with the requisite poles, one helio- 
graph and stand, one hand lantern, one lime light and stand, with the 
accompanying gas and pressure bags, retort and chemicals for generat- 
ing oxygen (chlorate of potash and binoxide of manganese), together 
with printed blank forms in blocks; one set as a record of dispatches 
sent, the other of dispatches received. 

Generally speaking, in the late campaign the transport of one party 
comprised three mules, one for provisions and signal apparatus, packed 
in convenient boxes; the second for the men's kits and camp kettles, the 
third for the tents, &c. A fourth man is usually added to the group of 
three, for cooking, &c, and a relief in case of need. Cavalry signalers, 
not being designed to form permanent stations, carry only flags and 
heliographs, in leather buckets strapped to the saddle. 

The Corps of Signalers in this campaign was composed of 1 captain, 
2 lieutenants, and 90 men, volunteers from various regiments, under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. C Keyser, of the Eoyal Fusiliers, an 
officer of experience in the late Afghan war. This corps was for duty 
under the Chief of Staff, and had no connection with the regimental 
signalers. 

The men appear to have been selected solely with reference to their 
proficiency as signalers, without regard to other desirable qualities- 
Their behavior was not what should have been expected from persons 
charged with such responsible duties. 

The work they did in Egypt was not of very much importance. The 
flatness of the country and the frequent mirage greatly restricted the 
use of the heliograph, their most powerful instrument. 

A line of four stations was maintained between Ismailia and Kassas 
sin, a distance of twenty miles, and was worked by heliographs, flags 
or lime light, as occasion demanded. These stations would have suf- 
ficed, but an extra one was kept up at Tel-el-Mahuta to control the canal 
traffic. 

The first warning of the approach of the Egyptians in the action of 
August 28 was conveyed by heliograph from Major-General Graham, a^ 
Kassassin, to Major-General Drury-Lowe, commanding the cavalry en- 
camped at Mahsameh. The sending instrument was advantageously 
placed on a small house at the former place, and was doing excellent 
work when one of the Egyptian shells struck the building, and the sig- 
nalers, to use Colonel Keyser's expression, "incontinently bolted," de- 
serting their post at a most critical moment and leaving General Drury- 
Lowe without information of the occurrences at the front. The absence 
of an officer at so important a station seems odd, to say the least. 

The Corps of Signalers started out with a full supply of wheeled trans- 
port, which as usual broke down on the first march out from Ismailia. 
All spare carriages and store-wagons had to be left behind and recourse 
had to mules. One animal then carried two complete sets of day and 
night apj)aratus in panniers, the heavy boxes of spare articles, &c, being 
forwarded by train. 



286 

The final labors of the signalers were in Cairo, after the occupation, 
where they maintained heliographic and limelight communication from 
the roof of the Abdin palace, the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, 
to the citadel, which, from its commanding position, was used as the 
repeating station to the cavalry camp at Abbasieh, the infantry camp 
across the Mle, at Ghezireh, and the barracks at Kasr-el-Nel. This serv- 
ice was soon replaced by telephones, and Colonel Keyser's men returned 
to England. 



XXVII. 

THE MILITARY POLICE. 

The provision made for the maintenance of order in the various camps 
and outside the camps, in the towns and villages where portions of the 
army were quartered, included a Provost-Marshal, Colonel H. Gr. Moore r 
V. C.. Arygle and Sutherland Highlanders, as administrator, assisted 
by a corps of Military Police, some mounted and some on foot ; in all, 4 
officers and 138 men. 

Of the mounted police, 39 were drawn from the regular establishment 
of the permanent camp of instruction at Aldershott, and 34 were volun- 
teers from various cavalry regiments, especially recommended by their 
commanding officers for sobriety, good behavior, intelligence, and force 
of character. They were assembled at Aldershott for organization and 
equipment. They were armed with swords and revolvers, and were 
given a light outfit of transport, a Maltese cart and a water-cart, for 
use when marching as an independent military unit, as at Tel-el-Kebir. 

Of the foot police, 55 were volunteers from the London Metropolitan 
Police, selected on account of their zeal and capacity and of their famil- 
iarity with the habits of criminals, while the remainder, 10 in number, 
were volunteers from regiments at home who had been named for vigor 
and good conduct by their superior officers. This detachment had a 
similar amount of equipment to that given their mounted colleagues. 
The men carried revolvers and sword-bayonets. 

All the members of the Military Police Corps were made permanent 
or acting non-commissioned officers, in order to give them that authority 
over delinquents which is derived from higher rank. To distinguish 
them, each man wore on his left arm a broad white canvas band, with 
M. P. in large black letters stamped upon it. 

In former times the provost marshal had the power of summary pun- 
ishment, and could inflict on any offender lashes not to exceed 50 in 
number. Since the abolition of flogging, in 1881, this rapid canceling 
of a score is no longer possible, and the provost-marshaPs duties are 
confined to the arresting of delinquents and the reporting of the facts 
of the case to the commanding officer of the regiment or corps to which 
the delinquent is attached. 

The Military Police are charged with the general good order of the 



287 

camp or town as distinguished from that of the special encampment of 
a particular troop or battalion, patrolling the whole neighborhood day 
and night. Under the military commandant, a guard-house is estab- 
lished, where all straggling and drunken soldiers are confined, as well as 
all caught breaking the peace in any way. The prisoners are sent back 
to their own quarters every morning, and the charges against each are 
heard and the punishment awarded according to the Army Act in force. 
The instructions governing the Military Police are very clear : 

They are to prevent soldiers from committing outrages on civilians ; to protect their 
property from trespass and depredation ; to apprehend soldiers who are heyond bounds 
without passes, or who, having passes, may behave improperly, or who are not dressed 
according to regulations. They are to examine the passes of all ranks below that of 
sergeant In carrying out their orders they must be particular not to give cause for 
complaint, to be prompt and decided, but civil and temperate on all occasions in the 
performance of their duty. They must be clean and smart in their appearance and. a 
pattern to other soldiers. . 

In an advance, and particularly after an engagement, the mounted 
portion of the Military Police are ordered to keep well to the front, in 
order to prevent pillage, ravishing, and other crimes likely to be com- 
mitted in the heat of excitement. 

The provost-marshal issues licenses to shop-keepers to open refresh- 
ment saloons, where beer or light wine is allowed to be sold to the troops. 
In Egypt, all persons detected in the act of selling strong spirits to the 
soldiers were flogged by the native authorities (the lashes not exceed- 
ing 300 in number), and their liquor was confiscated and destroyed. 

The Military Police were late in joining the army, only arriving at 
Ismailia September 2. Their presence, which was much needed on 
account of certain irregularities that had manifested themselves, soon 
brought about an improvement in discipline. It may be remarked that 
they had, as a whole, absolutely no affiliations with the troops, were 
a body of men with entirely different traditions and associations, and 
had nothing in common with the soldiers whose infractions of discipline 
they were espeially designed to check. 

The police work in the desert was very light, as might have been 
expected, but it increased greatly after reaching Cairo. The good be- 
havior of the troops on the whole was a matter of constant remark. 
The writer of this report takes pleasure in recording, as the result of his 
own observation, extending over many weeks, the rarity of cases of in- 
toxication or other misdemeanor, the soldierly bearing, neat appearance, 
and generally good behavior of the British troops in Egypt. 

Exceptions to this rule did occur, as a matter of course, one being of 
a serious and disgraceful nature. Two men of the Royal Irish Regiment 
committed a grave crime in the village of Tel-el-Kebir, just after the 
battle, and received in punishment seven years' penal servitude. 

Great dissatisfaction was felt on the part of the British officers with the 
lack of a means of summary punishment to take the place of flogging. 
Confinement remains now, practically, the sole mode of punishment. 
The guarding of one prisoner involves the labor of at least four other men, 



288 

■whose services are lost in more useful ways, while the 'prisoner himself is 
relieved of disagreeable, painful, and at times perilous duty, is well shel- 
tered, ivellfed, and otherwise scrupulously cared for. 

During the campaign men sentenced to imprisonment of less than six 
weeks were retained with their regiments or corps; if more than six 
weeks and less than six months, they were sent to a base prison at Alex- 
andria, and if of more than six months, they went back to England. 

The hands of the Provost-Marshal were greatly strengthened by the 
co-operation of the native magistrates, who might be trusted to mete out 
a full measure of justice to inhabitants apprehended in acts prejudicial 
to the good order of the troops or to the peace of the neighborhood. 
Under other and ordinary circumstances the Military Police itself must 
have had cognizance of and jurisdiction in all such cases. 

The plan of having a separate corps clothed with special powers, to 
look after instances of disorder among the troops, derives further war- 
rant to careful consideration from the success which attended its prac- 
tice during this campaign. 



XXVIII. 

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

This section is rather a collection of notes, which may serve to make 
the arrangements and methods adopted in Egypt reasonably clear, than 
a treatise on the subject of army hospitals and hospital practice in gen- 
eral. 

The Medical Department of the British army has undergone within 
the last fifteen years important and wide-reaching changes. Formerly 
the Surgeon was an officer regularly attached to a regiment or corps ? 
and he served with it until promoted to wider fields of usefulness* 
Identified with the fortunes of the regiment and intimately acquainted 
with the physical history of the men, his value was great if his sphere 
was somewhat restricted. 

The withdrawal of the Surgeons from the direct authority of the Prin- 
cipal Medical Officer of the station or district, which was involved in 
their being made subject to their immediate military superiors in the 
■corps to which they were gazetted, was regarded with disfavor, and the 
system known as •'unification" was introduced. According to this, a 
Surgeon is assigned to temporary duty with a particular body of men 
after they reach their destination. Thus a battalion proceeding to the 
West Indies would leave England either with its former Medical Officer 
retained for the voyage out or with one detailed for the time being. On 
arrival at its post, the local Principal Medical Officer would order one of 
his subordinates to care for the wants of its members. 

This unification is a hotly-debated point, much being advanced in way 
•of argument on each side. In its favor are urged a more direct pro. 
fessional accountability for proper methods and treatment, as well as 



289 



record, an escape from non-professional military control, simplification 
of the hospital service, and increased economy. Against it may be put 
the testimony of individual representatives of the medical corps, to the 
effect that the younger officers are not so desirable socially now as 
formerly; that the surgeon no longer knows his patients, thus render- 
ing malingering much more easy than previously; that the medical 
officers are too anxious for military distinction, pressing to the front to 
the neglect of their own duty, &c. When doctors disagree, who shall 
decide ? 

One result is the concentration of poAver and responsibility in the hands 
of the Principal Medical Officer of the Force or District. He exercises 
command over all officers and men of the Medical Department proper 
or the Army Hospital Corps, and medical supervision and superintend- 
ence over all hospitals. 

These responsible duties were performed in Egypt by Deputy Sur- 
geon-General J. A. Hanbury, M. B., 0. B., with the local rank of Sur- 
geon-General. 

As his chief assistant, under the title of " Sanitary Officer," was Bri- 
gade-Surgeon J. A. Marston, M. D., with the temporary rank of Deputy 
Surgeon-General. 

It may be well to remark that in England a special corps, the Army 
Hospital Corps, is organized to carry on the hospital service and to di- 
rect the u bearer columns" charged with the collection of the wounded 
after a battle, and their transport to the stations where the wounds are 
temporarily dressed, prior to removal to the established hospitals. This 
corps may be described as a sort of lay handmaid to the Medical Depart- 
ment. Its officers are " Captains of Orderlies " and " Lieutenants of Or- 
derlies," and it is mostly recruited from the ranks of the army. 

For the second service mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the 
handling of the wounded, what are known as "bearer companies" are 
formed, the professional personnel and equipment being drawn from the 
Army Medical Department and the Army Hospital Corps, while the 
necessary animals and drivers are furnished by the Commissariat and 
Transport Corps. 

In Egypt, each bearer company was organized as shown in the an- 
nexed table. 





o 

'S? 

a 

1 

bo 


a 
o 

» 

S3 
GO 


O 

S 
o 

DO 

a 
'3 

« 


m 

-+3 

a 
-2 



o 

3 


o 

i 

© 

i 


a 

a 

6 
d 


00 

M 
03 

> 

T3 

P 


i 

i 


Horses . 




Corps. 


Officers. 


d 
d 


bC 

1 








.2 


ft 


09 

3 




4 


4 












6 


2 


6 


"5 
5 


1 

19 

6 






1 


.... 


1 
1 


345 
10 




61 
17 








55 


1 


















Total 


4 


4 


l 


i 


2 


155 


55 


7 


2 


6 


10 


26 


78 





948 EG- 



■19 



290 

The mules were mainly to carry 26 litters and 60 cacolets in pairs. 
A cacolet is a frame for transporting a man in a sitting posture — a sort 
of arm-chair at the side of a mule. 

Each bearer company has two operating tents and a full equipment 
of materials for establishing dressing stations. 
Sick- carriage is provided at the rate of 10 per cent, of the force. 
Dressing stations are pitched as near the battle-field as practicable, 
and are indicated by the Geneva Cross. 

The two bearer companies were divided into half companies. The 
latter were distributed as follows : 
Eight half of No. 1 Company, 1st division. 
Left half of No. 1 Company, 2d division. 
Right half of No. 2 Company, cavalry division. 

Left half of No. 2 Company was left at Alexandria for use there and 
at Ramleh. 

The field hospital is planned to accommodate 200 patients, and is 
arranged in four sections. The establishment is as follows: Surgeons - 
major, 3 ; Surgeons, 4; Captain of Orderlies, 1. Total officers, 8 ; non- 
commissioned officers and men, 37. 

The field-hospital tent is of the Bell pattern, double fly, and can con- 
tain four patients. Of these there are fifty, besides ten operating tents 
and tents for the personnel. 
The field hospitals were eight in number, distributed as follows : 
No. 1 at Alexandria. 

No. 2 was stationed at Tel-el -Mahuta, afterwards at Kassassin, and 
was attached to the 1st division. It was closed at Ismailia on Septem. 
ber 21. 

No. 3 acted as a base hospital at Ismailia for a few days. It after- 
ward proceeded by rail to Kassassin, and finally to Cairo. 

No. 4 remained at Ismailia as part of the base hospital until moved 
to Cairo, after the occupation. 
No. 5 at Ramleh. 

No. 6. Of this, one half remained at Ismailia with the base hospital, 
the other at Mahsameh, at the cavalry camp. The two were amalga- 
mated after Tel-el-Kebir and brought to Cairo. 

No. 7 acted as part of the base hospital at Ismailia, and afterwards 
was transferred to Cairo. 
No. 8 at Ismailia. 

Each field hospital had a clever carpenter capable of making any de- 
sired form of splint. 

The mattresses supplied are in four parts (divided transversely), so 
that any portion may be removed from under a patient frr purposes of 
inspection or operation. 

Two base hospitals were formed. 

One at Alexandria, administered by No. 1 field hospital, was supplied 
with cots from home. Its capacity was 500 beds. A cotton warehouse 



291 

was appropriated for this purpose; a large, airy building, well adapted 
to such use. 

At Isinailia, as already mentioned elsewhere, the Khedive's palace 
was utilized as the principal base hospital. This is a large two-storied 
edifice, in the Italian style, with ample wings and high ceilings. It was 
most valuable in this connection, the walls being thick enough to resist 
the rays of the sun, while the window-shutters permitted the keeping 
out of the brilliant light, and, what was of even more importance, the 
persistent Egyptian fly. 

The principal want in this hospital was a sufficient distribution of 
water. The latrines were even here in shocking condition and of a type 
not known in Christian countries. Earth-closets were soon provided and 
the latrines closed. 

The accommodation afforded by the palace was supplemented as 
needed by tents. The personnel was drawn from No. 4, a portion of No. 
6, and the medical staff of No. 7 and of No. 8 field hospitals. 

Eeserve hospitals were established at Cyprus and Gozo. The former 
had 400 beds, with a staff of 8 medical officers, one officer of orderlies, 
and 20 non-commissioned officers and men; the latter, 200 beds, with 4 
medical officers, one officer of orderlies, and 12 non-commissioned offi- 
cers and men. 

Two hospital ships were stationed at Ismailia — the Carthage, a fine, 
large, new mail steamer of the Peninsular and Oriental Line, and the 
Courland, designed primarily for wounded and bad cases. Their capacity 
was 270 beds, and their personnel was 8 medical officers, 1 officer of 
orderlies, and 26 non-commissioned officers and men. 

The messing for sick or wounded was at the rate of 3s. 6d. per diem, 
and was undertaken by the owners. 

These vessels were supplemented by five auxiliary hospital ships, the 
Orontes, Tamar, Iberia, Lusitania, and Nepaul, whose services could be 
utilized as desired. Each was capable of making up, on the average, 
300 beds, with a due proportion of medical officers and hospital order, 
lies. 

To supply ice, that essential in medical or surgical practice in hot 
countries, four large ice-machines were sent out. One was mounted at 
Ismailia, at the mouth of the Sweet Water Canal, and one at Alexan- 
dria. Two others were brought out in the Carthage, but never set up. 
Five cwt. of the article was sent daily to the front. 

As volunteer aids, 23 female nurses and 2 superintendents came from 
England, members of the Netley National Aid Society. These good 
women and invaluable assistants were distributed as follows : 

Four nurses on board the hospital ship Carthage. 

Four nurses at base hospital, Alexandria. 

Seven nurses at base hospital, Ismailia. 

One superintendent and four nurses at Gozo. 

One superintendent and four nurses at Cyprus. 



292 

The medical comforts were provided on a liberal scale. They consisted 
of brandy, champagne, other wines of various kinds, soups, beer, milk, 
arrowroot, jelly, ice, &c. They were distributed among the base and 
field hospitals for use, besides a large supply at the advanced depot at 
Kassassin. , 

The hospital diet was the army ration supplemented by such medical 
comforts as were deemed necessary. 

The men who became ineffective were shipped as fast as possible 
to England, Malta, &c. It was thought best to keep the hospitals in 
Egypt free, as well as to give the sufferers the increased chance afforded 
by cooler climate and more favorable surroundings. The question of 
temporary or permanent invaliding was decided later, according to the 
merits of each case. 

The diseases mostly encountered were dysentery, diarrhea, heat apo- 
plexy, fever, and a small amount of ophthalmia towards the end of the 
campaign. The number of cases, percentage, &c, could not be deter- 
mined. 

The Sweet Water Canal, whose condition has been frequently referred 
to in this report, did not, as was feared, give rise to disease, or if it was 
instrumental in producing, for instance, diarrhea, it could only have 
been to a very slight extent, for this class of malady was found even 
among men who drank distilled water exclusively. The muddiness of 
this particular water was of small moment, as pocket filters were issued 
to the troops at the rate of one to about every fifteen men ; and lacking 
these, filters could be readily improvised from tin cans, &c, or the sedi- 
ment could be precipitated by the addition of a small quantity of alum. 
It must rather be accepted as a fact that the dysenteric troubles found 
their cause in the heat and exposure to which the soldiers were sub- 
jected. 

Antiseptic surgery was employed from the first. The wounds, when 
ready for dressing, were washed with very dilute carbolic acid and then 
dusted with iodoform. The bandages were either of carbolic-acid gauze 
or boracic-acid lint, a protector inclosing all. Before the operation the 
surgeon's hands and the surgical instruments were dipped in weak car- 
bolic acid. The results of this treatment were considered to be good, 
but they had not been worked out in detail or tabulated. 

Heat apoplexy was probably the only true climatic disease. 

The arrangements at Tel-el-Kebir comprised a dressing station of 
twenty-five tents near the dam in the Sweet Water Canal, under Dep- 
uty Surgeon- General Marston, aided by 2 surgeons-major, 3 surgeons, . 
3 temporary assistants, and 1 volunteer, 10 in all, with 17 men of the 
Army Hospital Corps. 

The plan pursued in each case was : 

1st. To give the wounded man a little opium. This had the effect of 
quieting him until his turn came for operation. 

2d. A drink of water was administered and then such food given as 
seemed advisable, beef, beef tea, milk, &c. By this time the patient 



293 

was as nearly comfortable as possible, and could await without uneasi- 
ness the leisure of the surgeon. 

3d. Examination of the wound. 

4th. Such operation as was absolutely necessary. 

5th. Transport down the canal to Kassassin, the sufferer being thor- 
oughly nursed and nourished. A medical officer accompanied each tow. 

Three Egyptian tents were utilized at Tel-el-Kebir. Two amputa,- 
tions were made and numberless other operations. In all, 180 Euro- 
peans were treated and nourished at this station. 

The following paragraphs are from notes of a conversation with Dep- 
uty Surgeon-General Marston, and contain some of the suggestions of 
his experience. The language is not his. 

Do not hesitate to move a wounded man, if necessary. Do not move him from the 
stretcher he is on, unless necessary. It is far better to move the wounded than have 
the wards crowded. 

There are usually too many paraphernalia about a hospital and too much medicine. 

All medicine should be put up in its most compact and concentrated form. The 
necessary solution can be made on the spot. 

The first dressing of a wound on the battle-field should be as simple as possible, for 
usually there is not time to do the work well. It should be a small bandage lightly 
put on, otherwise the limb swells above and below and gives pain to the patient and 
trouble to the operator. 

Every officer and man should be labeled in some simple and effective way for 
identification if killed, or wounded beyond the power of speech. 

Iron tubing f inch in diameter can be fashioned by an ordinarily good smith into a 
great variety of useful appliances. 

A very simple yet efficient mode of relieving a wound from pressure is by means of a 
rough cage made of three wooden battens bent into shape, pushed under the bed-clothes. 
A large one covered with mosquito netting may be used to keep out insects. On the 
inside at the top a hook is placed, to which is hung a bottle containing antiseptic lotion, 
with a camel's-hair brush in the mouth of the bottle. The patient, if strong enough, 
is ordered to use this on his wound or bandage frequently (thus giving him an occu- 
pation), and to throw it into the fire when the wound is healed. 

The disposition of offal is an important point. If a harbor is at hand, an easy 
method is by filling the windpipes of slaughtered animals with sand and sinking them 
in the sea. On shore, dead animals should be buried to leeward of mounds or sand hills 
with reference to the prevailing wind. It was found in Egypt that if buried to 
windward they were soon uncovered. If it is not possible to bury animals, they should 
be ripped up and the viscera interred and fire applied to the inside of the body. 
Lastly, if even this be impracticable, stab the body all over ; it will soon dry up and 
give little or no offense. 

The dry-earth system of latrines, if well looked to, leaves nothing to be desired. An 
ounce of MacDougall's powder should be added to every few pounds of earth. If doors 
and windo ws are left open amputations may be made without fear. The stools should 
be removed twice daily without fail. 

In dry climates a little carelessness about nuisances buried will produce no harm, 
but if the weather be rainy it is impossible to take too great precautions in this matter. 

The necessities of a hospital maybe arranged in the following order of importance : 

1st. Feeding. 

2d. Latrines. 

3d. Washing accommodation. 

4th. Nursing and clothing. 

5th, and last. Physics. 



294 

In selecting a building for temporary use as a hospital, the first thing to attend to is 
ample movement of air. Knock oat window-sashes, make holes in ceilings and in 
gable ends, but be sure to get fresh air in abundance. 

Tools, materials, and other accessories are of secondary importance. A very few 
appliances will suffice, but the men must be well trained. 

The practical good sense of the foregoing remarks is obvious, and 
should be of value to the layman as well as to the professional man. 

The temperature in Egypt was the only meteorological phenomenon 
subject to much change. The wind was constant from the northward 
and the sky rarely clouded. Of rain there was none. 

The thermometer ranged in the daytime from 90° to nearly 100° 
Fahrenheit. A few observations on this score may be quoted. 

August 27, 1 p. m., 94° ; August 31, 96° j September 1, evening, 80° ? 
September 11, 11 a. m., 93°, with fresh breeze blowing at the time. 

Each man carried on his person a supply of lint and bandages for 
preliminary dressings. 

The medical comforts issued at Kassassin on September 9 included 
such unwonted delicacies as iced champagne. 

Although no pains had been spared by the authorities to provide for 
the proper treatment of the sick and wounded, it would appear that the 
details were not always carried out with the same scrupulousness, and 
much discontent was felt and expressed. One officer who was sent 
wounded to the Carthage found the food provided scant in quantity 
and indifferent in quality, while the medical officers on board lived in 
comparative luxury. His indignant complaint was attended by an im- 
provement in fare. He exonerated the medical authorities from blame, 
attributing the faults to the steamer people, " who had to make three 
shillings and sixpence worth of food do for one person." But should a 
wounded officer be obliged to protest against such treatment in a hos- 
pital ship 1 

Another officer presented himself wounded at the field hospital at 
Kassassin after the night charge of August 28. He found no food or 
water, and there was no latrine for his use. When he complained of 
hunger he was merely asked why he had not brought his rations with 
him. 

The whole subject has been investigated by a parliamentary commis- 
sion, whose report* is not yet made public, but it is believed that the 
deficiencies were in minor matters, and were mainly experienced in the 
early stages of the campaign, when all corps were alike hampered by 
lack of transport. 

A ready means of recognizing the surgeon at a distance is absolutely in- 
dispensable. Sis uniform should be so distinct from all others that no doubt 
can exist on this point. 

*This report, contained in a Parliamentary blue-book of over 700 pages, gives 
much valuable information : Army Hospital Service Inquiry Committee, printed by 
George E. B. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, East Harding street, Fleet street, Lon- 
don. Price, 10 shillings. — O. N. I. 



295 



XXIX 



THE ARMY POST-OFFICE. 



Mail facilities were provided for the army in the field by the only 
organization in Egypt which contained no regular troops, but was com- 



posed of volunteers exclu- 
sively. Its members were 
taken from the 24th Mid- 
dlesex Kegiment, of the 
Bine Volunteer force, a 
regiment formed of em- 
ployes and officials in the 
General Post-Office, in 
London. 

The corps consisted of 
Major George H. Sturgeon, 
1 captain, 1 staff sergeant, 
4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 
and 33 men, all of whom 



F£ff.24S. 








had applied for this serv- 
ice. The sergeants had all 
been postmasters at vari- 
ous branch offices. During 
their absence they were granted a continuance of their salaries from the 
Post-Office, and, in addition, received army pay; that is, sergeants 2s. 
4$., corporals Is. 8^., and privates Is. per diem. The non-commissioned 
officers wore swords and revolvers, the privates swords only. 

A complete and light field equipment was provided, some points of 
which are worthy of mention as being serviceable and convenient. 

The tent is shown in Fig. 148. The frame is of round wooden poles, 
socket jointed at the middle, about 2 J inches in diameter. The uprights 
set into square sill pieces, also in two parts, pinned together. The cor- 
ner junctions are sketched roughly in Fig. 149. The gable-ends are 
made by longer poles which project beyond the roof and carry a second 
ridge pole, over which a second roof or fly may be drawn backwards or 
forwards as desired. The rear may be raised to make a sort of booth 
and give increased space under cover. The ground dimensions are 10 
feet square. The uprights are secured by rope guys, which run from the 
upper extremities and are made fast to the sill pieces. The total weight 
is 156 pounds. 

The newspaper sorting box is shown in Fig. 150. The back is of 
canvas. By withdrawing the retaining keys a a the sides can be folded 
around upon the top and bottom, to which they are respectively hinged. 



296 



Fitj.JSO. 



The hinges at the corners of the pigeon-holes permit the shelves to fold 
together, and the whole affair makes a compact package, 4 feet 9 inches 
by 1 foot by 10 inches. 

The sorting box for letters is similar 
in design, but smaller, being 3 feet long 
by 2 feet wide and 8 inches deep. It 
has forty pigeon-holes. 

A very handy sorting pouch, made of 

canvas and used at temporary stations, 

is shown in Fig. 151. It can be strapped 

,*| to the ridge pole or eaves pieces of the 

tent. 

The portable table has a deal top, to 
which a stamping pad is fixed. The legs 
fold up underneath, or are spread out 
and hooked in place, as desired. 
The sorting boxes are transported in a large canvas bag, together 
with the table. 




JFiy.lSl 



ttg.l$2. 



1 



I 












Fig. 152 represents a standing canvas pouch supported by sticks pass- 
ing through canvas lugs on the outside, and entering canvas caps, as 
shown. This was convenient when placed at the end of the stamping 
table. 

The office lanterns were simple tin frames with three glass sides. 

A field office was established at Eamleh, and one sergeant and four 
men were left to operate a main distributing office at Port Said. Here 



297 

the mail for each battalion or corps was put into a bag by itself and 
sent to the front. Field offices were maintained at Mahuta, Mahsameh, 
and Kassassin, and a daily service kept up after August 27. The home 
mails were three in number weekly, each way. These post-offices af- 
forded the same facilities for transmitting small amounts of money as 
are offered by those of the United Kingdom. 

The service was carried on to the satisfaction of those in the field, and 
no complaints were heard. 



XXX. 

THE INDIAN CONTINGENT. 

The soldiers from the United Kingdom, spoken of collectively as " Im- 
perial Troops," were in large majority in the British expeditionary force 
in Egypt. They were the earliest to arrive, and some of them still re- 
main supporting the Khedive's authority. They were the first in indi- 
vidual importance to the people at home ; they received constant and 
kindly notice at the hands of the newspaper press j they were mass ed 
together at Tel-el-Kebir, and they won the principal part of the honors 
of that day. But they were not alone in their work. Soon after reach- 
ing Kassassin they were joined by a strong detachment of Her Majesty *s 
Indian subjects, known as the "Indian Contingent,*'' a body so peculiar 
in all respects as to require notice apart, the differences in organization 
and equipment between it and the Imperial Troops being too great to 
permit of joint treatment. 

The approximate strength of the Contingent was to be as follows : 

European troops 2, 000 

Native troops 3, 900 

Total effective 5,900 

To which should he added — 
Native followers 6, 400 

Total 12,300 

Horses 1,600 

Mules 4,000 

Ponies 700 

The force was to be composed of— 

One battery of field artillery. 

One battery of mountain artillery. 

Two companies of sappers and miners. 

Three regiments of cavalry. 

Two battalions of British infantry. 

Three regiments of native infantry. 



298 



It was organized as follows : 



ARTILLERY. 



Lieutenant-Colonel T. Van Straubenzee, R. A., commanding. 

H Battery, 1st brigade, field battery. 

7th Battery, 1st brigade, Northern division, mountain battery. 



sappers and miners. 



Colonel J. Browne, C. S. I., R. E., commanding engineer. 
A Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. 
I Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. 



CAVALRY BRIGADE. 

Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson commanding. 
2d Regiment Bengal Cavalry. 
6th Regiment Bengal Cavalry. 
13th Regiment Bengal Lancers. 

INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

Brigadier-General O. V. Tanner, C. B., commanding. 

1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders. 

7th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry. 

20th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry (Punjaub). 

29th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Beloochees). 

ADDITIONAL. 

1st Battalion Manchester Regiment. 

A reserve to this force was established at Aden, which is officially, if 
not geographically, a portion of India, composed of two native regiments, 
the 4th and 31st Madras Native Infantry. 

Approximate contemplated strength, $x., of the Indian Contingent. 



Corps or department. 



ARTILLERY. 

H Battery, 1st brigade 

7th Battery, 1st brigade, 
Northern division. 

SAPPERS AND MINERS. 

A Company, Madras 

I Company, Madras 

CAVALRY. 

2d Regiment, Bengal 

6th Regiment. Bengal 

13th Lancers, Bengal 

INFANTRY. 

1st Battalion Seaforth High- 
landers. 



29 



O 
Ob 

to 

2 



140 
106 



804 



O 

d 

g 3 
s a 



156 



121 
121 



376 
422 
499 



130 
81 



33 



314 
340 
383 



164 



114 
5 



391 
465 



57 



188 
231 
267 



Mules. 



4 
156 



104 



150 
150 
150 



630 



16 



221 



36 



299 



Approximate contemplated strength, Sfc. y of the Indian Contingent — Continued. 





© 

o 
m 

V 

n 


1 

CD 
O 

1 

1 
U 
U 


95 

1 

.2 

m 

8 


T3 

a 
d 


6 
d 
£ . 

ga 
Is 


u 
'o 


© 

1 


0B 

© 


Mules. 


Corps or department. 


O 
Pi 

1 




CO 

© 

o 


Artillery — Continued. 

7th Bengal Native Infantry 

20th Bengal Native Infantry 

29th Bombay Native Infantry . 
1st Battalion Manchester Beg- 
iment. 

MISCELLANEOUS. 


8 
10 

9 
25 

29 


..... 


2 

2 
2 

56 


"694* 

...... 

12 
3 
2 


788 
614 
639 

23 


99 
114 

78 
216 

500 

1,497 

2,076 

100 

18 


8 

10 

9 

9 




356 
356 
356 
620 


16 
16 
16 
16 


. 1 

1 
1 

25a 
















5 
2 
3 






4 


10 












1 


390 
100 
423 








3 




















1 






4 


44 




1 






20 
















Total 


165 

10 

10 


2 


76 

3 

1 


1,775 


3, 817 

784 
743 


6,184 

115 
97 


1,571 

10 
11 


753 


3,803 


104 


533 


ADEN RESERVES. 

4th Madras Native Infantry . . . 
81 et Madras Native Infantry . . . 





















A portion of this reserve, the 31st Begirnent of Madras Native Infan- 
try, and a small detachment of others, numbering less than 100, were 
dispatched from Aden a day or two before the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, 
but were turned back when the news of the fight could be given them. 

The total of the force actually embarked for Egypt is as follows: 

British officers 192 

Warrant officers 133 

British non-commissioned officers and men 1, 727 

Native non-commissioned officers and men 4, 677 

Total effective 6,729 

Add followers , 6,740 

Grand total 13,469 

Of animals embarked the account stands thus: 

Horses 1,775 

Ponies 775 

Mules 4,742 

Slaughter cattle 228 

Slaughter sheep 1, 000 

Total 8,520 



300 

The table subjoined gives the details of each corps as it went on board 
the transports, and shows incidentally the plan of sea transport adopted. 





Name of transport. 


Date of 
arriva] 
at Suez. 


British. 


Native 


Animals. 


Corps. 


bS 

H 

© 

o 


© 
O 

1 


a* 

© 

a 

6 
d 


O 

. as 
feifl 

|i 

m 



oa 


© 


© 

i 


i 

1 


Sir Herbert Macpherson and 

staff. 
Brigadier-General Wilkinson 

and staff. 




Aug. 21 
Aug. 21 
Sept. 4 


13 
3 
6 








66 

14 
10 


19 

7 

4 
3 

162 






....do 










































Sept. 4 
Aug. 22 
Aug. 22 


7 
4 
2 


1 


160 


.... 


113 














7th Battery, ] st brigade, North- 
ern division. 


2 

2 


54 

48 
2 


100 

58 


55 

72 


7 
3 




146 




154 




























Total 


6 

4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 


4 


104 158 


127 


10 

~92~ 
62 
57 
72 
102 
78 


"47" 
30 
30 
40 
48 
40 


300 




Tenasserim 

Dry burgh Abbey. 


Aug. 24 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 26 
Aug. 28 
Aug. 28 
Sept. 3 




2d Bengal Cavalry 




78 
56 
51 
66 
94 
76 


74 
50 
50 
60 
70 
65 


14 








14 








12 










9 




Hampshire 






14 




1 


.... 


38 








! 




Total 


9 

2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 


1 





421 


369 |463 [235 


101 






Aug. 21 
Aug. 25 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 9 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 13 






55 
50 
66 
87 
94 
88 
32 


75 
45 
50 
65 
86 
80 
■ 28 


58 34 


16 










57 
70 
85 
99 
118 
25 


26 
35 
42 
50 
50 
19 


14 






1 


.... 


18 






15 




St. Columba 

Corinth 






15 








6 


























Total « 


10 

1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 


1 




472 

~80~ 
88 
73 
84 
73 
83 


429 512 :286 84 






Aug. 25 
Aug. 22 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 23 


~ 60~.~8rili" 
59 82 1 SO 




13 










12 










62 
59 
66 
61 


87 43 


14 










88 
79 
88 


46 
36 
59 


9 










15 




WistowHall 


Aug. 27 


1 


.... 


18 


Total 


10 
~24~ 


1 




481 


367 


511 277 


81 






Aug. 8 

Aug. 20 
Aug. 22 




1st Battalion Seaforth Highland- 
ers.! 
7th Bengal Native Infantry 




57Q 




92 


7 






Merton Hall 

Sicily 








3 

8 






470 
327 


70 
57 


6 

4 




147 






48 












Total 


8 

~~ 5~ 
4 






797 

313~ 

260 


127 
60~ 
105 


10 

~ 6~ 

3 


.... 


195 




Allegheny 


Aug. 28 
Aug. 28 


~~ 2~ 
2 


.... 




20th Bengal Native Infantry 
(Punjaub). 


80 
114 








Total 


9 


4 


.... 


573 


165 


9 




194 




Clan Macdonald . . 


Aug. 25 
Aug. 27 




29th Bombay Native Infantry 
(Beloochees). 


6 
3 


2 
2 





377 
373 


104 
28 


7 
3 


.... 


110 
84 








Total 


9 


4 


.... 


750 


132 


10 




194 






Sept. 3 

Ang. 25 
Aug. 27 
Aug. 27 




1st Battalion, Manchester Begi- 


24 


7 


644 




231 


4 
















1 


8 






5 

39 

5 
























Wistow Hall 
































Total 


1 


8 






49 

























♦Arrived after September 13. 



t From Aden. 



301 





Name of transport. 


Date of 
arrival 
at Suez. 


British. 


Native. 


Animals. 


Corps. 


i 

u 

sa 

o 


s 

I 

O 

a 

u 

is 


a 
© 

a 

tS 
O 

6 


5 

^a 
& a 

a 




m 

J 


m 
<D 

1 

H 


00 




05 

3 


Engineers : 

A Company, Madras Sap- 
pers. 
I Company, Madras Sappers . 
Field-telegraph train 




Aug. 23 

Aug. 8 
Sept. 1 

Aug. 21 
Aug. 27 
Sept. 1 


3 
5 


8 


4 
2 


121 

121 
22 


49 

74 

25 


3 

4 


.... 


36 




72 




20 
























10 










WistowHall 


.... 


1 


















6 


























Total 




1 






16 








Veterinary Department 


WistowHall 


Aug. 27 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 7 


1 

1 
1 
1 

4 








2 
2 


1 
1 








































2 


1 





















Total 






6 


3 










Aug. 9 
Aug. 21 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 25 
Aug. 27 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 9 












Commissariat Department 




1 


211 
20 

380 
53 








Hydaspes 


"*2" 


30 
35 




3 
3 














88 
















.... 


1 

4 




















8 
1 
6 


1 








Boskenna Bay 




2 










2 
























Total 


2 | 72 


.... 


3 


679 


7 


.... 


88 






Aug. 27 
Aug. 30 
Aug. 31 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 9 
Sept. 9 

Sept. 13 






.... 

1 


1 
1 
1 






66 

80 

203 

114 






155 










.... 


1 
1 
1 


185 




Inchni Ornish 






190 








230 






1 






147 1 


344 










15 

30 




36 




Boskenna Bay 






1 
1 






.... 


80 








128 
14 




306 




St. Columba 










14 




'".J- 


1 




88 


....... 


190 














13 

13 
200 

90 
118 

98 
104 
136 






38 


















24 










3 
1 

1 


— 


.... 


1 
1 
1 


440 






1 
1 
2 

1 


2 
1 

1 


195 








238 








224 








1 

2 


— 


1 


.... 


200 




Chilkat .. 




173 














Total 


7 


8 


11 




1,657 


4 


7 


3,262 






Aug. 22 
Aug. 27 

Aug. 23 






1111 


6 

1 
















"Wistow Hall 
















= 


= 


4" 
2 











Field pay establishment 










1 


2 






1 
















Total 


1 

1 


2 






6 

3~ 

1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
4 
1 


1 










Aug. 25 




= 








1 
























Aug. 28 
Aug. 31 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 7 
Sept. 9 


1 

1 


"i 






1 
















Cambodia 




1 


1 
1 
2 

1 








1 
2 
1 

1 
1 


























Boskenna Bay 


3 






















St. Columba 

Kandala 






2 
1 












2 





2 









*228 beeves and 1,000 sheep. 

tThis transport broke down between Bombay and Aden and was towed back to India. 

X After September 13. 



302 





Name of transport. 


Date of 
arrival 
at Suez. 


British. 


Native. 


Animals. 


Corps. 


so 

8 

O 


1 

o 

1 


a 



C3 

b 
p 


d 

O 


1 

i 


09 

i 

w 


m 
<B 

'a 
© 
Ph 


03 

3 






Sept. 9 
Sept. 13 
Sept. 13 


1 

1 

.... 








2 


i 














1 
1 
4 












.... 














176 






















Egbert* 








2 


56 










Chilkat 
































Total 


11 

~Y 

i 
i 


12 


= 


12 


252 

397 

525 
498 


8 








P. and 0. steamer 
Sutlej. 


Aug. 30 

Aug. 31 
Sept. 7 







Ambulance column transport. .. 


1 
1 






1 

1 












Boskenna Bay 






















Total 


3 


2 






1,420 

122 
10 

1 


2 


1 






Sept. 9 
Sept. 9 


= 


~~ 3~ 


1 












do 


















1 


.... 


2 























* After September 13. 

The force, it will be observed, was composed of about one-third British 
troops serving in India and two-thirds " natives." The former ceased 
to receive the extra pay allowed by the Indian Government after pass- 
ing Aden, which is under the Bombay presidency, and technically the 
western limit of India. 

The peculiarities of organization are so many and so great that it will 
only be possible, in the limits of this report, to mention the most striking. 

Taking the British soldier first in order, it may be broadly stated 
that when employed under the Indian Government every effort is made 
to render him a mere fighting machine by relieving him as far as possi- 
ble of the cares and routine duties generally incident to camp life. He 
has a native cook to prepare his food for him; a "dhobie" or washer- 
man to keep his linen clean; water-carriers, scavengers, sweepers, and 
diggers. His shoes are brushed for him, and, at night, in barracks, he 
is insured cool and refreshing sleep by the fanning of "punkahs" moved 
by natives. If a mounted man, his horse is groomed and fed for him. 
This extraordinary consideration is a legacy from earlier days, and seeks 
its justification in the necessity of maintaining, in India, the prestige of 
the European as a superior being. 

The number of non-combatant natives associated with the Indian 
troops in these and other capacities, under the term "followers," is 
made the larger through the operation of that singular and apparently 
ineradicable institution, "caste," which limits every man's occupation 
to one thing and no more. In garrison, for instance, where the exi- 
gencies of actual campaigning do not occur, the number of servants that 



303 

the least exacting of European subalterns must retain is simply incred- 
ible. One brings the water, another cleans the boots, a third sweeps 
the house, a fourth waits at the table on the master of the house alone, 
a fifth serves the guests, a sixth is the body-servant, &c. 

The British soldier enjoys in a less degree the benefits of the same 
system. Such a service, sweetened by increased pay, is certainly the 
ideal of military life, but the reverse of the picture is less attractive. 
The acclimation in India of a newly-arrived regiment is accompanied 
by a terrible loss of life; only those who survive the process can reap 
the rewards, which are great in proportion to the risks incurred. 

The native troops, through employment in the Empress-Queen's serv- 
ice, acquire, ipso facto, a special distinction among Hindoos. They also 
have followers, although in smaller numbers than their European col- 
leagues. It must be remembered, however, that they are recruited from 
a class of the population accustomed to having servants, and that to 
serve the Queen is honorable in the highest degree. 

A minor but sometimes important advantage flowing from military 
service is derived from the right of all soldiers to priority of hearing in 
the native courts, if embroiled in litigation, and from the feeling that 
they never receive less than a full measure of equity. 

It is readily conceivable that such a system would naturally tend to 
gradual expansion, and would require, on the part of those in authority, 
a careful watchfulness against abuse. The experience of the late Af- 
ghan war showed the necessity of reducing the number of non-combat- 
ants in camp to a minimum, and in 1879 a circular was issued by the 
Military Department of the Government of India, covering the point 
with great minuteness, establishing for all troops in the field a uniform 
schedule of baggage, camp-equipage and followers, known as the Kabul 
scale. This scale, the standard used in fitting out the Indian Contin- 
gent is given in the following table in so far as it was applicable : 



304 






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306 



Kabul scale of followers. 



Followers, &c. 



Officers 



Native officers 



P 












.2 a 






P..S 

2a 

a e« 
g go 

ill 



.2 ® 

fc£> 
©•J* 



o a 

fcJCt> 



Muleteers 

Camelmen 

Litter bearers 

Litter bearers 

Mates (in charge of litter parties) 

Pony boy and pony 

Drivers 

Artificers and workmen 

Hospital establishment 

Bazaar 



Sick-carriage 

Cooks and washermen 

Cooks 

Spare horses 

Grooms 

Grooms for each 10 per cent, of troop hois 
each spare horse. 

Puckalees (e) 

Bhisties (/) 

Sweepers 

Diggers 



and for 



1 personal servant each ; 2 servants for each au- 
thorized charger; 1 mess servant for every 
three officers. 

1 servant to every two officers ; 1 groom and 1 
pony for each. 

1 for every 3 mules. 

1 for every 4 camels. 

6 for each large litter (or dooly) carried by 4 men. 

4 for each small litter (dandy) carried by 2 men. 

1 for every 4 doolies and 1 for every 6 dandies. 

1 for every 2 troop horses. 
As needed. 

All necessary for executing repairs. 
As per regulation. 

2 per cent, on strength, to be selected by the 
commanding officer. 



(a) 



(a) 



(a) 



& 



2 



(6) 



(6) 



d2 
d2 



(b) 



c2 



a For 7 per cent, of troops and 3 per cent, of followers. 
b For 5 per cent, of troops and 3 per cent, of followers, 
c Per company. 
d Per troop. 

e Drivers of pack animals carrying each two large leather water-stuns (puckals). lne animal in 
India is usually a camel or a bullock. Mules were, however, specially substituted in this campaign. 
/ Men whose duty it is to do the dirty work about the camp. 

It is in the organization of the cavalry that the greatest differences 
are to be found between the European and Indian regiments. For this 
reason the cavalry is more minutely described here than the other corps. 

It must be remembered that, in the first place, every native regiment, 
mounted or unmounted, is commanded by a British officer, known simply 
as the Commandant, with a second in command. Every squadron of 
cavalry and each wing of an infantry battalion has a British Commander 
and a British subaltern on probation. Each regiment of either branch 
has a British adjutant, a surgeon and two probationers. These officers 
belong to the staff corps of one or other of the three Indian presidencies, 
Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, each of which maintains its own army, 
subject to the control of the central Government of India. The army- 
list titles and the rank and precedence of these officers are similar to 
those of the Imperial Officers, but the pay is much greater, being in fact 
enough to live on. They take precedence over all native officers, who 
are never allowed to rise beyond the command of a cavalry troop or an 
infantry company. 

The Indian cavalry regiments consist of six troops. The standard 
strength is 550 of all ranks. They are armed with the Snider carbine. 



307 

The scabbard of the cavalry sword is of uniform pattern, but the blade 
is selected by the trooper to suit his own taste. 

The pay of native officers and men is according to a very complicated 
scale, reaching for the former as high as 300 rupees per month. Cer- 
tain medals are accompanied by pensions, so that their possessor may 
receive as much as 60 rupees per month in addition. (A rupee is worth 
about 44.5 cents.) These pensions continue not only during the enlist- 
ment but until death. 

In the cavalry regiments, the pay begins with 28 rupees (about $12.50) 
a mouth. Enlistments are for a term of three years, but the service is 
so popular that the soldier usually re-enlists over and over again until 
he becomes entitled to the pension of 4 rupees a month and upwards, 
awarded after fifteen years of service, or to the 40 rupees given after 
thirty years of service. The average period of service is between fifteen 
and twenty years. The measure of the popularity referred to above may 
be obtained from consideration of the fact that a roster is kept in each 
regiment of the applicants for future vacancies, a roster amounting in 
some cases to many times the possible wants, and that, on enlistment, the 
recruit must make a cash deposit of from £30 to £35 sterling (roughly 
from $150 to $175). This deposit is to cover the expense of his outfit, 
including his mount, his uniform, his share of tent and mess equipment, 
everything, in fact, except his arms aud ammunition. It is returned to 
him when discharged. 

Every two troopers have one follower, as groom and servant, and one 
pony to carry their kits, tent, &c. This tent is a light canvas shelter 
weighing but 30 pounds. The pony can always carry these articles and 
two days' rations. If a larger quantity of provisions be ordered to be 
carried, the transport department supplies the necessary mules. 

The entire expense of maintaining the follower and pony is borne by 
the two troopers jointly. Moreover, in India, the trooper has to feed 
and clothe himself and feed his horse. It is evident that but little can 
remain of his pay at the end of the mouth; still, something is saved, 
and the accumulation continues slowly but surely, for a native's wants 
are slight, and his groom (or syce) usually finds aud cuts forage for 
horses and pony in the open fields. 

The six troops are again divided into three squadrons. In order to 
prevent too great concert of thought and action, the plan was adopted 
after the Indian mutiny of introducing heterogeneous and opposing ele- 
ments into each military unit. As a general rule, therefore, one squad- 
ron in every regiment is composed of Sikhs, one of Mohammedans, and one 
of Hindoos. Other races are also drawn upon for squadrons occasionally, 
but these three make the most frequent combination. The natural jeal- 
ousy existing between these people serves to suppress coalition on the 
one hand, aud, on the other, to stimulate a wholesome spirit of emula- 
tion. 



308 

This arrangement is not without its disadvantages, however, caste and 
prejudice bringing great complexity into the internal economy of the 
camp, as to cooking, &c, and particularly as to latrines. 

The powers of punishment lodged in the hands of the Commandant 
are very extensive, including imprisonment up to two years, dismissal, 
and the minor methods universal in military services. Flogging is still 
permitted, its abolition in the British army not having affected the Indian 
troops. The offenses are usually of a mild character, for the men are 
very docile. They require, however, a special treatment on the part of 
their officers, many small points of discipline essential with Europeans 
being entirely and purposely overlooked with them, while in other re- 
pects they are subjected to a very taut rein. 

The Commandant holds a species of police court twice a week, when 
all the officers, British, native, and non-commissioned, that can be spared 
from duty are present. Here breaches of discipline are adjudged, com- 
plaints, requests, &c, heard and attended to. Much of the good feel- 
ing in these composite bodies depends upon the publicity of these " dur- 
bahs, "every effort being made to cultivate respect for and confidence 
in the justice and probity of the superior officers. As the uniform and 
kits are generally maintained by the natives themselves, all regimen- 
tal expenditures involving them directly or indirectly are discussed on 
these occasions, materials and manufactured articles being purchased by 
contract in open board where every one has the right of speech. 

Each man pays 2 rupees a month into a regimental remount fund which 
is used to replace horses worn out in ordinary service. The Government 
furnishes substitutes for animals that are killed or disabled either in 
action or through fatigue incurred in long marches or through excess- 
ive exposure. 

Great attention is paid by the commandant to physical education and 
technical sports, such as tent-pegging, mounted sword exercise, swim- 
ming parades across rivers on horseback, steeple-chases, with prizes, &c. 

The drill is according to the British tactics, even the English words 
of command being retained, but very rigid adherence to the details is 
neither exacted nor expected. 

The principles above mentioned for the cavalry hold as well for the 
infantry, being modified in application to suit the altered circumstances 
of the case. 

The foot soldier receives less pay, about £1 sterling per month, but his 
expenses are proportionately less. He has no horse or pony to keep, and 
his tentage and other camp equipage are supplied and transported for 
him. On enlistment he receives a bounty of 30 rupees, and after eight- 
een months' service he is allowed 4 rupees annually for clothing. 

The composition of an infantry regiment in India is similar to that 
of a British battalion, viz, eight companies. The war strength is, how- 
ever, much less. For the Egyptian campaign the total effective was 
ordered to be 832 of all ranks. The service arm is the Snider rifle. 



309 

When the difficulty of living fairly well and patting aside for a rainy 
day in a country so poor as India is considered, together with the pres- 
tige enjoyed by the soldier as belonging to the Queen's service, the cer- 
tainty of being above want, the probability of retiring with a good pen- 
sion, and the comparatively high social class from which the recruits 
are drawn, it is not to be wondered at that Her Majesty's native In- 
lian troops should be a fine set of men. In fact, they exhibit their 
pride and self-respect in a singularly dignified bearing and in a mili- 
tary record of much merit. Nothing could surpass the grace with 
which these men walked their posts as sentries or executed their ma- 
neuvers, -while their small-arm drill is precise and formal to the verge 
of solemnity. 

On outposts the cavalrymen are peculiarly valuable. They are very 
keen-sighted, alert, and alive to their responsibility. 

The main fault these troops exhibit is an absolute incapacity to un- 
derstand that anything wanted by the Queen's soldiers should not be 
seized at once and as a matter of course. The formality of requisition 
and payment produces in their minds a feeling of good-humored con- 
tempt. Having the might, they marvel at not being permitted to ex- 
ert it. 

The engineer equipment was particularly strong in sand-bags and 
water-troughs (both iron and wood), and about five miles of steel rails 
were sent out with all of their fittings. In the railway work done by 
the Indian sappers at Ismailia the plant from England was used. 

The telegraph outfit was of a light overhead wire. 

The artillery was fitted out with 500 rounds per gun, and 300 rounds 
per carbine; the infantry with 500 rounds per rifle; the cavalry with 300 
rounds per carbine. 

Of the two batteries in the Indian Contingent, one of 9-pdrs. was 
known as H battery, 1st brigade. Its officers were a major, a captain, 
and three lieutenants, besides a surgeon and a veterinary surgeon. 

The 9-pdr. gun is being replaced by newer and more powerful pieces. 
It may, therefore, be dismissed with but few words of description. In 
form it resembles the 13-pdr. Its caliber is 3 inches, its length of bore 
is 66 inches. It has but three grooves, and it throws studded projectiles 
(similar to the 16-pdr). of the usual type. 

H.l was only engaged at Tel-el-Kebir. 

The other battery, technically 7.1, Northern division,, consisted of 
six 7-pdr. screw-jointed steel guns, Fig. 153, designed and made by Sir 
William G. Armstrong & Co. These guns are in two parts, each weigh- 
ing two hundred pounds, a practicable load for a pack animal. The 
gun is specially intended as a mountain howitzer of high power. It 
is thought that the results of practical experience had with these guns 
warrant a detailed account of their construction, equipment, and per- 
formances. 

The gun is separated into two portions underneath the truunion band 



310 



B, Fig. 153, which 

f'Tj^"] 

1 i i 






slips loosely over the chase A. At the end towards 
the breech B is threaded internally. 
This female thread corresponds with a 
male thread cut on the front end of the 
breech portion 0. An ordinary pipe 
coupling will give an idea of the prin- 
ciple. To make the joint tight, a steel 
ring or gas-check is inserted between 
the nose on the breech portion and the 
seat in the muzzle portion, after the 
maimer of a gasket. 

The parts of the gun are easily han- 



?:- 



i 



J?iff.l34. 




«! * 



died by three men. 
A leather cap over 
the thread on the 
breech part (see 
Fig. 154) protects 
it from injury, 
while a soft wooden 
plug, with a leather apron, performs the 
same office for the female thread on the 
muzzle portion. The general descrip- 
tion of the gun is as follows : 

Length : 

Nominal inches . . 68. 25 

Total ..do.... 70.45 

Of breech portion do 25. 7 

Of muzzle portion .do.. .. 45. 5 

Of bore do 66. 5 

Of rifling do.... 55.5 

Preponderance, average, 17 pounds at 24 inches 
from center of trunnions. 

Caliber inches.. 2.5 



Weight, average: 

Of breech portion pounds . . 

Of muzzle portion do ... . 

Total do.... 

Rifling : 

Grooves — 

Number 

Width inch.. 

Depth do . . . 

Spiral increasing from 1 in 80 at breech to 

1 in 30 at muzzle. 
Commencing at 11.17 inches from bottom 

of bore. 
Vent of hardened copper, 5.25 inches from 

bottom of bore. 
Powder chamber enlarged to 2.56 in diam. 
The gun is sighted on right side only, and the tangent scale set at an angle of 1°, 
to correct drift. 



200 
200 
400 



8 
0.5 
0.05 



311 



The following sights are supplied with the gnu: Oue tangent scale 
of steel, graduated iu degrees, from 0° to 15°. The head of the scale 
has a slow-motion arrangement for reading to minutes, and a deflection 



JPYtf.lSff. 



JVg.JJJ. 




Method of uncoupling gun. 

leaf. Immediately beneath the sighting-notch is a small circular hole, 
which is used for fine laying in combination with the cross- wire fore- 
vsight. One fore-sight, screwed into a sight-ring shrunk on to the chase 
in front of the trunnions. It consists of an ordinary hog-backed sight, 
standing on a small open frame containing cross- wires. 

The gun consists of three parts — the chase A, the trunnion B, and 
the breech-piece C. 

Fig. ISO. 





Gun uncoupled. 

On service, the trunnion is always attached to the chase, but slides 
loosely on it, being prevented from coming off by the fore-sight ring. 

To insure the breech-piece and chase coming together correctly, a 
key is fixed on the end of the chase, and this key enters a recess cut in 
the corresponding end of the breech-piece. 

A steel gas-check is fitted into the joint, but this gas-check remains 
permanently in the breech-piece, and it is not necessary to remove it. 

When the breech and chase ends of the guns are placed together 
they are firmly connected, simply by screwing the trunnion, which may 
be regarded as a connecting nut, until the lines on the trunnion and 
breech-piece correspond, or nearly so. The band is run up by hand as 
far as possible, then a protecting-ring of iron is put over one trunnion 
and struck sharply with a sledge, which is ordinarily carried alongside 
of the trail of the gun. In the joining of the two parts the gun is always 
placed vertically, the breech sitting in an iron block placed in the toe- 
plate of the trail, and shaped to receive the cascabel, through the ring 
of which an iron bar is passed. (Figs. 155, 156, 157). By this means 
the breech is prevented from turning through the effect of the blow. 

The trunnions are stamped T and S, respectively, to indicate which 
is to be struck to tighten and which to slacken. 

The projectiles are shown in the figures 160, 161, 162, and 163. 

The case shot has 78 bullets of 16J to the pound, filled in with clay 
and sand. Fig. 160. 

The shell, Fig. 161, weighs, empty, 6 pounds 12 ounces; when filled 
and fuzed its weight is 7 pounds 6 ounces. The bursting charge is 4 
ounces of powder. 

The shrapnel are of two patterns, as shown in Figs. 162 and 163, both 
weighing 7 pounds 6 ounces. 

The old pattern contains 40 bullets, at 55 to the pound, and 48 at 40 
per pound ; the new has 56 bullets at 26 to the pound and 18 bullets at 
32 to the pound, and 10 segments. In both, the bursting charge is one- 
half ounce powder. 

The time fuze employed has already been described (see page 19). The 
percussion fuze is given in section in figure 164. 

The charge is 1 pound 8 ounces of R. L. G. powder, in a serge bag. 

All the ammunition is of Armstrong's make, that house supplying 
the battery complete in every detail except men and mules. 



313 



Case Shotr 7 Tbs. 



\ Fig. 161. 

jShen,7ZbSi6oz.,Towaer, 4oz. 





\. 2 i44-J ) i<h tf-G^L Ch£.cK±. 



The carriage is formed of two bracket sides of plate steel, the edges of 
which are flanged outward to give the] rigidity of angle irons, with less 
weight. These bracket sides are connected by three steel transoms and 
a steel toe-plate, and are formed to receive] the gun trunnions and steel 
axletrees. A brass mounting|following the form of bracket side and of 
trunnion and axletree is fitted to each bracket, to give stiffness and bear- 
ing surface. The axletrees are removable for purposes of transport. 

The wheels are 3 feet in diameter, the spokes and felloes of wood, the 
tire of iron, and the nave of gun-metal. 

The carriage is fitted with a stool-bed of T-iron, the front of which 
hooks loosely upon a cross-bar carried by the bracket sides, and at the 
rear has a cross-bar, the ends of which rest in notched racks riveted to 
the brackets. A sliding brass quoin is attached to the stool-bed by clips- 
The quoin is worked, as required, by a hand- wheel which turns a screw 
resting in the end of the stool-bed and working through a screwed part 
of the quoin. A cap of wood is laid on the face of the quoin to cushion 
the shock and prevent indentation of the surface. 

A toggled check-rope is passed through the wheels and over the toe, 



314 



Fig. 162. 
Shrapnel iPTb. 6oz. 
Old Pattern. PowOer^oz. 



Fie/. 163. 

Shrapnel, Plb. 6oz. 

JS&w Pattern. Powder fri 





2-4# 



2 ^J> . -v 



Tig. 164. 

PercussiorvTFuse. 

1 -35* 




w 

under the trail handspike, to lash the wheels and check the recoil on 
firing. 

Upon each bracket there is a staple and strap to secure it when packed 
on a saddle. 

A grease- tin is carried on the bracket side. 

DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHTS. 

Feet. Inches. 

Height, center of gun 2 2 

Length of carriage with wheels 5 1 

Length of carriage without wheels 4 2| 

Length of axletree 3 7 

Angle of trail 33° 



315 




M le vation, maximum : 

Bottom step 

Second step 

Third step 

Top step 

Depression, maximum, top 



. 25° 

. 17° 

. 7° 

. 2° 

. 10° 



316 

Wheels: 

Feet. Inches 

Track 3 

Diameter 3 

Cwts. Qrs. Lbs. 

Carriage complete, but without gun 4 2 20 

Trail 1 27 

Wheels.. 1 2 25 

Elevating arrangement 1 11 

Dismounting block and trunnion collar 1 18 

Axletree 2 23 

The parts of the gun and carriage, the equipment and ammunition are 
all carried on the backs of mules in specially-designed pack-saddles. 
The projectiles and charges stow in strong leather cases shown in the 
accompanying drawings, Figs. 166 and 167. Each gun requires six 



JFip.166. 




C. Case SJiot. 
J}. SheH. 
13. Shrapn el. 



Section onAB. 




'l&n rviih.Lir2 rvmovecL 



Ammunition boxes — leather 



mules for the first line, the loads being distributed among them as fol- 
lows : 

Muzzle portion first mule. 

Breech portion second mule. 

Carriage , third mule. 

Axle, coupling block, trunnion guard, elevating gear, and two store- 
boxes fourth mule. 

Wheels fifth mule. 

6 ammunition boxes sixth mule. 

In each box were five shrapnel, two shell, and one canister, and eight 
charges, making, with those carried on fourth mule, fifty-two rounds 
with the piece. 

In action each gun is attended by a second line of five saddled mules 
as reliefs to the first five enumerated above, of three more mules carry- 
ing a reserve of forty-eight rounds of ammunition, and four spare mules, 
one of which is saddled as a spare-ammunition mule. Altogether, each 
gun requires eighteen mules in the fighting lines. 

A pioneer mule accompanies each subdivision (pair) of guns, and three 
others are loaded with tools of various kinds. 



317 
The following is the detail of the weights carried by the battery mules 




First gun mule. 



Chase and trunnions of the gun 

Canvas apron 

Xieather cap (on gun) 

Gun cradle, with straps 

2 wooden gun bearers 

Saddle and bridle 

Picketing chain 

Nose-bag 

Spare shoes and nails 

Tarpaulin, 6 by 4 feet 

Surcingle 



Lbs. 


lz. 


200 





4 


8 


20 


8 


7 


4 


19 





2 


8 


2 


8 


110 


6 





1 






Total 264 14 



318 



8» 




Second gun mule. 



Breech of gum 

Leather vent apron 

Leather cap on gun 

Gun cradle, with straps 

2 iron gun hearers 

Saddlery as on first gun mule 

Total 



Lbs. Oz. 


200 







1 


7 





19 


8- 


13 




32 10 



272 3 



319 




I 

Third gun mule. 

Lbs. Oz 

Carriage, without wheels, axletrees, or elevating gear 167 

Carriage cradle, with straps 21 

Trail handspike on carriage 5 8 

Rammer and sponge, with cap and jointed handle, on carriage 8 12 

Set of priming wires on carriage 4 

Sledge, on carriage 7 4 

Tin grease-box, filled 1 5 

Saddlery as on first gun mule 32 10 

Total 243 11 



320 




Fourth gun mule. 



Lba. Oz. 

Cradle „ 21 

Steel axletree 79 

Elevating gear 39 

Dismounting block and trunnion guard 47 

2 leather boxes for stores, tools, &c, and four canisters and cartridges 71 13 

Saddlery as on first mule 32 10 



Total 290 7 



321 




Fifth gun mule. 



Lbs. Oz. 
Wheels 193 

Axle arms, with girth and strap 14 4 

Saddlery, picketing chains, nose-bag, shoes, tarpaulin, &c 45 10 



Total 252 14 

948 EG 21 



322 




\\\\Wv\YM 

f 

Ammunition mule. 

Lbs. Oz. 

2 leather ammunition boxes 41 8 

2 canvas cartridge-bags 2 12 

16 cartridges 25 

12 combination fuzes 7 3 

6 percussion fuzes 2 6 

4 shell filled 29 

10 shrapnel 70 

2 case-shot » 14 4 

Sundries 1 

Saddlery as on first gun mule * 32 10 

Reaping hook, stable gear, &c 29 8 

Total 255 3 



323 

Each gun's crew consists of 9 men. The total personnel of the battery 
was 106 British non-commissioned officers and men and 147 fighting 
natives, drivers, &c, all enlisted men. There was the usual allowance 
of artificers, viz, a farrier, four shoeing smiths, two collar-makers, and 
two wheelers. The number of followers is given in preceding tables. 

Besides the battery-mules were 82 others for transporting the camp 
equipage, kits, cooking utensils, &c. These make up a total of 230. As 
additional transport, 78 mules were allotted to the battery, sufficient to 
carry 6 days' rations. 

The men are unmounted, except the sergeant-major, the quartermas- 
ter sergeant, two trumpeters, a farrier sergeant, and the collar-maker. 
The muleteers who drive the baggage mules (one to three mules) are 
hired followers and not enlisted men. The same may be said of the 
water-carriers, nine in number, who distribute water on the march. 

When it is remembered that this was the first battery equipped with 
these jointed guns, the comparatively small number of defects in design 
and construction developed by actual service is quite noteworthy. 

The saddles are being constantly modified into the object of less- 
ening the height of the load. The gun portions will, of course, always 
be transported, as now, on the back of the animal, and fore and aft, so 
to speak, but the load is a difficult one to carry, being both heavy and 
top-heavy. The girths must be kept extremely tight, or else sore 
backs and accidents ensue. The mules carrying these loads are more 
frequently relieved than the others. Of all the gun loads, the wheels 
are the easiest to carry, as they balance perfectly and have a low center 
of gravity. 

The brass facing on the bracket, Fig. 165, which receives the axle, is 
too light and yields under the shock of the heavy 
recoil. In nearly all the carriages, this part had 
been strengthened by iron plates riveted on by 
the battery smiths. Fig. 174. 

The rear- sight socket, a piece of copper screwed 
into the gun, is liable to work loose and affect the 
pointing, while it is exposed to injury in mount- 
ing and dismounting. 

Similarly, the front sight screws into a copper ***2SS£**" ""'" 
bouching which frequently moves in its seat. 

The trunnions being fixed and the breech free to turn about its axis, 
if sufficiently urged, it is noticed that firing the gun is apt to slacken 
the joint, the passage of the shell along the bore tending to unscrew 
the breech from the trunnion band. No accident has as yet arisen on 
this score, because the guns are carefully watched and the coupling set 
up afresh whenever necessary. The existence of a leak of gas at the 
joint would be shown by its exit through an escape channel drilled in 
the center of each trunnion. 




324 

The feather marks on the outside of the gun to indicate that the joint 
is properly made are exact only when the gun leaves the maker's hands. 
In practice it is found that each gun requires separate adjustment, so 
that it becomes highly necessary for every crew to know its own gun, 
not only in order to have no leakage of gas, but also to make the allow- 
ance in sighting occasioned by the rotation of the breech portion away 
from the normal position in one direction or the other. 

The vent projects beyond the surface of the gun, as seen in Fig. 153, 
in order to give the necessary length of socket for the friction tube. 

Great care has been taken that no accident to the vent should arise 
from this peculiarity of construction. It would appear, however, desir- 
able to devise some other equivalent scheme. 

The recoil is very heavy, owing to the lightness of the gun and car- 
riage, but this disadvantage is unavoidable. 

The cascabel hole and bearer are inconvenient in practice. Lieuten- 
ant H. H. Eogers, R. A., one of the officers of the battery, 
9 ' " suggests that the knob be shaped 'as shown in Fig. 175, the 
straight bar to fill into the dismounting block (made square 
J in section), and thus holding the breech against turning. In 

^ C place of the iron bearer he would substitute a stout wooden 

bar with an iron devil's claw. 
formoTcas- ^ wooden bearer through the trunnion holes is used for 
cabel Jcnob. handling the carriage. If this is not placed and maintained 
fairly, an awkward lift results during the operation of packing on the 
mule. It would be well, as suggested, to do away with this bearer, and 
replace it by a pair of short iron levers, 14 inches long, permanently 
hinged to each bracket. When not in use, they would be close to the 
carriage ; when in use, they would stand at right angles to it. 

The proof of the practicability of jointed guns is found in the fact that 
the construction of others in three pieces is seriously contemplated in 
official circles. It is probable that the interrupted screw will be tried 
in this connection as an experimental substitute for Armstrong's coup- 
ling. 

Against the disadvantages of the 7-pdr., some of which are enumerated 
above, a portion remediable, the others inherent in the system, must be 
weighed the comparatively high powers in this its earliest expression, 
burning more than one-fifth of the weight of its projectile in powder, 
giving a good muzzle velocity (1,440 feet per second), and working range 
of 4,000 yards ; its lightness and transportability; the ease and rapidity 
of coming into action, the evolution requiring only 35 seconds ; its ability 
to go wherever a mule can find footing; the accuracy of its fire, and the 
size of the shell it throws. The piece and equipment were spoken of in 
high terms by the officers of the battery, after several years' acquaint- 
ance and experience with it, these terms amounting to positive enthu- 
siasm. 



325 

The battery left Bombay on August 9 and reached Suez on the 22d, 
where it remained several days inactive. It arrived at Ismaili on Sep- 
tember 2. On the morning of the 4th it started for the front, reaching 
Kassassin the uext morning, having bivouacked at Tel-el-Mahuta. At 
9 a. m. it was ready for work, having with it all the camp equipage and 
6 days' pro visions for man and beast. 

(The usual rate of progress of amule battery is somewhat over 4 miles 
an hour on a good road.) 

The 7-pdrs. took part in the fight of September 9, being at gun-drill 
when the Egyptians made their appearance. They fired between 50 and 
60 rounds before the enemy withdrew. The guns were limbered up, 
pushed ahead, and brought into action again at 2,800 yards, the Egyp- 
tians now "running like hares." A second advance was made and the 
battery engaged for a third and last time, the total'expenditure of am- 
munition being 90 rounds per gun. The practice was excellent. One 
shrapnel alone is credibly reported to have killed ten Egyptians j good 
work for so light a piece at such long range. 

At Tel-el-Kebir the battery accompanied the Indian Contingent along 
the south bank of the Sweet Water Canal, coming into action in echelon 
divisions right and left, engaging a battery of seven Lahitte howitzers, 
in gun-pits on the canal bank, in advance of the main line of defenses, 
as well as the guns in the redoubts on either side of the canal. For a 
few minutes the fire was very hot. After the lines were carried by the 
Seaforth Highlanders, the 7-pdrs. shelled the native village lying south, 
of the intrenchments. A heavy redoubt on the other side of the canal, 
about 1,800 yards distant, was still giving much trouble with its cross- 
fire on the advancing troops, when the screw-guns concentrated their 
fire on it and blew up its magazine.* After this the battery shelled the 
Egyptians, who were running away from all points, and advanced past 
the intrenchments, firing at the main camp and the railway station. 
The battery then ceased its fire, having expended about 60 rounds of 
ammunition, mostly shrapnel, during the action. 

With the balance of the Indian Contingent it went to Zagazig, mak- 
ing at the start an awkward mistake in marching two miles up the 
wrong side of the canal and having to retrace its steps to the bridge 
at Tel-el-Kebir. From Zagazig it proceeded with the Contingent to 
Belbeis, Khankah, and Cairo, the only corps of British troops that 
marched the entire distance from Ismailia. 

From the time of leaving its post on the northwest frontier of India, 
near Abbottabal, until it reached Cairo, not a single animal was lost, and 
the men enjoyed unusually good health. 

Before the Indian Contingent left Bombay three months' advance pay 
was given to every man and officer desiring it, and arrangements for re- 

* Tliis statement is made on the authority of Lieutenant Rogers. 



326 

mittances were perfected in all details. This shows the care which 
marked the organization and preparation of this force. 

Long experience and constant practice in the field, marching and 
campaigning for years together, have brought these troops to a high 
pitch of facility in movement and transport. Before starting on this 
expedition every person knew his own duty, and if it was necessary,, 
he could readily know his neighbor's duty as well, each point being 
worked out and clearly put in a pamphlet issued for the occasion by 
the military department of the Indian government. 

A three months' supply of provisions was shipped with the Contin- 
gent. The ration for native troops was as follows: 



Atta* ) pounds . . 2 

or > 

Eice ) ., do If 

Dhalt ounces.- 4 

Ghee do.... 2 

Salt do.... Of 

Onions do.... 1 

Peppers do 0£ 

Chillies do.... 0£ 

Turmeric do 0£ 

Once a week one pound of fresh meat was issued, the rice or atta 
allowance being reduced one-half on that day. Tea and sugar are given 
to the sick and wounded only, but may be issued on special occasions 
after great fatigue or exposure or in a bad climate. Tobacco is issued 
on payment at the rate of one ounce per diem. The price charged is 
the first cost to the Government. 

For followers the ration was simpler, viz : 

Wheat flour or rice pounds. . If 

Dhal ounces . . 4 

Ghee do 1 

Salt do.... Of 

The forage ration for horses was 8 pounds of grain daily, with 14 
pounds of hay in lieu of grass. For ponies the ration was half that 
for a horse. 

The commissariat and other stores used in India are put up, as far 
as possible, in packages of the uniform weight of 100 pounds. The 
advantage of this plan lies in the facility with which animals may be 
loaded, these packages necessarily balancing, no matter what their na- 
ture, on opposite sides of the saddle. The economy of time and trouble 
is obvious. 

*Atta is the native flour. t Dhal is a species of grain. 



327 

An extra issue of clothing, &c., was made for the occasion, as shown 
in the following table : 



Articles. 


EC 

I 

m 

'u 

W 


ft 

© 

I 


EC 

1 

o 




1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 


1 

2 


1 




2 








1 










1 
2 




Flannel belt 


1 














1 
1 


1 






1 






1 








1 








1 








1 








1 











When campaigning, a small grant of money, called batta, is made to 
men of all grades. It varies according to the rank of the recipient, and is 
supposed to compensate to some extent for the expense of getting ready, 
for fitting out generally, and for wear and tear of clothing on active 
service. In Egypt the batta was increased by one-half to followers and 
by other proportions to the native troops. * 

The Transport Department, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hay- 
ter, was particularly strong and well up to its work. 

As before stated, the troops in India are constantly in the field. 
Marching is a habit with them, and the preparations for a move a 
matter of small moment. The mode of packing the equipment is a 
subject of careful drill, according to a regularly established system. 
In the words of a distinguished British officer, speaking of this sys- 
tem, " even the colonel's mustard-pot has its own place." 

Wheeled vehicles were definitely discarded and pack-animals exclu- 
sively employed. A large number of camels were to have been secured 
at Suez, but this expectation was not realized. 

The animals allotted for regimental transport, together with rations 
for two weeks, were, as far as possible, shipped on board the same 
steamer with the troops. This wise provision enabled the latter to 
march to the front as soon as landed at Ismailia, without waiting. The 
result was in marked contrast with the delay occasioned by the dilato- 
riness of the British Transport Service. 

The liberality of the scale upon which the Indian Transport was or- 
ganized is seen in the fact that the sick-bearers or litter-men numbered 
over 1,400, and the muleteers, &c, belonging to the Transport Corps 
proper, including non-commissioned officers, drivers, veterinary and far- 
riers' establishment, saddlers, and other artificers, no less than 1,900 
more. The nature of the country in which the operations were to take 



328 

place was thus appreciated in advance and every precaution taken to 
insure adequate and practicable modes of conveyance. 

The impression prevailed in the early stages of events that the In- 
dian Contingent would march from Suez across the desert to Cairo, a 
line offering vastly more difficulties and obstacles than that actually 
selected. The fact that the preparations made would have sufficed for 
the greater undertaking made the lesser the more easy of accomplish- 
ment. 

The Transport Corps supplied animals and drivers to each regiment, 
&c, to carry out the provisions of the Kabul scale, and to convey two 
days' rations and stores in addition. To every eight drivers there was 
a native sergeant, and to every two sergeants a native officer (entitled 
jemadar) of standing equivalent to that of our warrant officers. The 
Transport Corps was thus arranged in units of 25 animals, 24 pack and 
1 spare, the sections being capable of indefinite combination or division. 
The drivers were public followers, unarmed non-combatants. They 
Wore a simple blouse of drab drilling under a broad leather belt, with 
A. T. on the buckle. 

With the exception of the 20th Bengal and 29th Bombay Eegiments, 
which sailed from Karachee, and the Aden reserves, which sailed from 
Madras, the troops were all embarked at Bombay. 

The recently constructed Prince's Dock at that port rendered the 
embarkation simple in the extreme. Each transport was first taken 
alongside a coal-shed, the bunkers filled with coal, and the internal 
fittings put up in accordance with the Transport Eegulations. She 
was then hauled a short distance ahead, abreast of large warehouses, 
whence she received her stores of all kinds, provisions, forage, &c, and 
finally moved close to the railway terminus. The troops were kept 
back in the hills, twelve hours distant from Bombay, and were only 
brought to the seaboard when the transport was ready to receive them. 
Each detachment was railed alongside its own transport in the morn- 
ing, and embarked without delay or confusion, a few hours only being 
required to get 400 men on board from the time of reaching Bombay 
until steaming out of the dock. 

In spite of every exertion on the part of the central authorities, and 
of their well-digested code of rules, a number of animals were badly 
damaged on the voyage to Aden through careless stabling, as the ships 
had to cross the Arabian Sea in the trough of the swell raised by the 
southwest monsoon. The 13th Bengal Lancers is stated to have lost 
over 40 horses through injuries and overcrowding. 

The same orderly method which marked the embarkation prevailed 
at Ismailia. The readiness of each corps as landed to proceed at once 
in obedience to orders elicited the commendation of those in a position 
to observe. Nor was this commendation qualified by any subsequently 
d-. veloped deficiency. It is stated by an officer of high standing that 



329 

4 'the commissariat and transport of this contingent were simply per- 
fect." 

The medical arrangements were based on a hospital provision for 15 
per cent, of sick of the estimated effective strength of the force, and for 
3 per cent, of the estimated number of followers ; that is, for 815 sick, 
one-third being accommodated in field hospitals and two-thirds in gen- 
eral hospitals. A base hospital was established at Suez. 

The old system of regimental hospitals has been abandoned. Under 
the present regime the surgeon attached to any corps is supposed to 
render only such temporary assistance as may be required in camp, on 
the march, or during an action, sending all cases needing treatment for 
more than twenty-four hours to the field hospital, if there be one at hand. 
In action they apply but the first dressings to wounds, and are not to 
undertake any serious surgical operation. Field dressings were sup- 
plied in packages of uniform pattern. They were composed of pieces 
of dressing (simple ointment with 2 per cent, carbolic acid, spread on 
the lint), a piece of gutta-percha tissue, and some pins. 

The field hospitals were equipped for 100 beds each, and were in four 
sections, each a working unit by itself. The personnel consisted of 1 
senior surgeon, or surgeon -major, in charge, 4 assistants, 7 apothecaries, 
or other medical subordinates, and 20 ward servants (nurses). In the 
wards for the native troops it was necessary to have the nurses of proper 
caste, out of respect to religious prejudice. Besides, there was a long 
list of cooks, water-carriers, sweepers, scavengers, writers, storekeepers, 
carpenters, a cutler, tailors, washermen, &c, in all 80 men. 

The outfit of stores was an estimated supply for three months. The 
instruments, surgical apparatus, and library of professional books were 
selected. Under the head of "medical comforts" were such articles as 
brandy (3 dozen), Tarragona wine (6 dozen), lime juice, sago, arrowroot 
and barley, extract of beef, condensed milk, concentrated soups, pre- 
served potatoes, compressed vegetables, &c. 

For the European sick the usual field ration was supplemented by 
such medical comforts as were necessary. 

The diet for the native sick consisted of such parts of the ration as they 
could consume, with one-half ounce tea and three-fourths ounce sugar 
\for tea), 2 ounces rice and 1 ounce sugar (for rice), with medical com- 
forts. 

In addition to the foregoing articles were full sets of toilet and kitchen 
utensils, special clothing, bedding, lamps, &c. Each field hospital flew 
the Geneva Gross. 

The tentage was on a liberal scale — 29 double-fly and 34 single-fly 
tents (the former 12 by 8 feet and the latter 12£ by 10 feet) to each field 
hospital. 

In providing for the carriage of the sick all ambulances were discarded 
and only litters employed. Of these there were 290 in all, 68 doolies 
(large litters) and 222 dandies, with the requisite bearers, mates, &c, 



330 

divided into three bearer columns, each in charge of a warranted medi- 
cal officer, as shown in the following table: 





Litters. 


Bearers. 


Corps. 


06 

£ 

o 
P 


02 
9 

a 

P 


o5 

S-i 

33 


to 


05 

© 
fl 




23 
23 
22 


74 
74 
74 


5 
5 
4 


19 
19 
19 


476 




475 




475 










68 


222 


14 


57 1,426 



It will be seen that nearly 300 wounded could be transported at once. 

With each litter were two leather water-bottles. 

The columns again were divided into five companies of 100 men each, 
under the supervision of one " sirdar" or superintendent, and the com- 
panies into sections of 25 each, under a "mate." 

It may be well to explain that these litters are simply cots slung from 
poles, which rest on the shoulders of the bearers. The duties of the lat- 
ter included general work in and about the hospitals, pitching and 
striking tents, &c. 

The veterinary department appears to have been the weak point of 
the expedition, four officers to over 6,000 animals. In this respect the 
Indian Contingent contrasts unfavorably with the Imperial Force, in 
which the veterinary arrangements were especially well ordered. 
' The " bazar," an authorized sutler's establishment, found its place in 
the Contingent, as seen in the table, page 30G. 

Another expression met with in the same table may need a word of 
explanation. u Conservancy" is used to denote the general cleaning of 
camps, the care of latrines, &c. In this force the duty fell to certain of 
the followers attached to the various corps for the purpose. 

The probability of warlike operations in Egypt began to assume 
definite shape after the massacre at Alexandria on June 11, and the 
possibility of dispatching a force from India was seriously considered 
in that country. The Indian Government, acting under instructions 
from home, began at once preparing an expeditionary body to be held 
subject to telegraphic orders. The selection of the regiments was made, 
the men and officers warned to be in readiness to start at a moment's 
notice, the stores and equipments were collected at Bombay, and a list 
of steamers available for transport duty was made out. 

The first detachment to start was Company [, Madras Sappers, in the 
Malda, which left Bombay on July 21. It was intended to accumulate 
a number of troops at Aden, distant only about 1,200 miles from Suez, 
while awaiting definite sanction for their employment in Egypt. 

The war may be said to have begun officially on July 28, when the 
British Parliament agreed to the vote of credit for the expenses of the 



331 

expedition. The following day the Indian Government issued an order 
for the embarkation of its portion of the force, although, technically, the 
co-operation of Indian troops was only authorized on the 31st, when a 
resolution was offered in the lower house of Parliament, and passed by 
both branches, authorizing the diversion of enough of the Indian revenue 
to cover the necessary outlay. This sum was subsequently estimated to 
be about £1,800,000 sterling. 

On August 8, the advance of the now well-known Indian Contingent, 
consisting of one company of Sappers and Miners and the 1st battalion 
of the Seaforth Highlanders ^(late 72d foot), arrived from Aden at Suez, 
which had been previously occupied by British blue-jackets and marines 
of the East India squadron, under Eear- Admiral Hewett. Here the 
troops just named remained until August 20, the day previously agreed 
upon for the seizure* of the Suez Canal,' when 400 of them marched 8 
miles to the northward towards Chalouf, returning at 4 p. m. without 
having encountered the enemy. They suffered severely from the heat, 
having moved out in heavy order under the terrible sun over the sands 
of the desert. The balance of the battalion took part in the operations 
of the day, as detailed in Section XI of this report, which treats of the 
seizure of the canal. 

The day following, August 21, the main body came up the canal in 
the Sphinx, a small hired steamer, which joined the gun-boats Mosquito 
and Seagull at Chalouf. (See Plate 47.) The latter, with two compa- 
nies of the same battalion, remained at Chalouf to guard that portion 
of the canal, while the Mosquito, with the Sphinx following, pushed 
on slowly to the northward, landing from time to time to reconnoiter. 
The results were only negative. ISear the southern end of the Little 
Bitter Lake is a lock in the Sweet Water Canal, where it was known 
that the Egyptians had been encamped. The gun-boat shelled this 
place on approaching, prior to the landing of a party of the Highland- 
ers. The camp was found deserted and a sluice-gate in the canal open, 
through which the water was running freely into the desert. The gate 
was closed, the telegraph line destroyed (severing communication be- 
tween Nefiche and the stations near Suez), and the detachment returned 
to the ships, having fired at a small party of Egyptians, who took to 
their heels at once. 

The Mosquito and Sphinx now crossed the Bitter Lakes and passed 
into the short stretch of 7 miles intervening between them and Lake 
Timsah. At Serapeum, 2J miles from the Bitter Lakes, the land is 
higher than at any other point in the southern half of the canal, with a 
rocky substratum, furnishing an admirable position for the defense or 
blocking of the canal. It was supposed that the Egyptians would make 
a stand here. For this reason the place was shelled from a distance* 
There being no response to the fire, the Seaforth Highlanders landed. 
Finding none of the enemy in sight, they marched a mile inland to close 
another opened lock in the Fresh TV ater Canal. This done they returned 



332 

to Serapeum, where they encamped for several days. Serapeum was 
the only point on the canal even temporarily guarded by the army. 

The troops from India proper began to arrive at Suez on August 20, 
the 7th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry preceding. On the 21st 
Major- General Macpherson arrived in the Hydaspes and assumed gen- 
eral command. 

The impression which had originally prevailed that the Indian Con- 
tingent would operate independently from Suez, as a base, towards 
Cairo, as an objective point, now gave place to the certainty of joint 
action with the British troops along the Ismailia-Zagazig line. Guards 
from the Contingent were established at' the various railway stations 
between Suez and Nefiche, at Serapeum, Fazoid, Geneffe, and Chalouf, 
to protect the railway, which afforded the only means of getting loco- 
motives to Ismailia. 

The 13th Bengal Lancers were the first to reach the front, a detach- 
ment arriving at Ismailia on August 25 and pushing on immediately to 
Mahsameh. Two days later the Cavalry Division, under Major-General 
Drury-Lowe, had been strengthened by portions of the 2d Bengal Cavalry 
and 13th Bengal Lancers. On the 29th the Seaforth Highlanders left 
Serapeum for Ismailia, and with all convenient speed the Contingent was 
concentrated at Kassassin. Its military operations from this time on 
merge into those of the army as a whole. 

Instead of acting as an independent unit at Tel-el-Kebir, its brigade 
of cavalry joined General Drury-Lowe, and one of its two batteries (H.l) 
was attached to the Artillery Brigade, under Brigadier-General Good- 
enough, R. A. There was thus left but a comparatively small force under 
General Macpherson's immediate command. This force was made up 
of the Seaforth Highlanders, such portions of the three native infantry 
regiments as were left after supplying entire guards from Suez to Is- 
mailia, and parts of the guards from Ismailia to Kassassin, a squadron 
of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and a company of Madras Sappers. Asso- 
ciated with it on the other side of the canal, and acting under General 
Macpherson's orders, were the Naval Light Battery, the Naval 40-pdr. 
railway gun, and the captured 8 cm Krupp, also on a railway truck. 

Excellent work was done in this part of the battle-field, and twelve 
guns were captured. The dash displayed by the Indian Contingent 
rivaled that shown by the 2d and Highland brigades, on the right of 
the line. The details of the fight are given elsewhere, together with 
the high praise awarded the Contingent by the Commander-in-Chief. 

One instance may be permitted to show the stamina of the Indian 
trooper and his horse. The last detachment of the Contingent to arrive 
in time for the fight was a troop of the 6th Bengal Cavalry. After a 
sea voyage of sixteen days, it landed at Ismailia at 8 p. m. on Septem- 
ber 11. At 11 p. m. it started for Kassassin, which it reached the fol- 
lowing afternoon. It joined the cavalry division, marched on Tel-el- 
Kebir, and thence to Cairo, not a man or horse having fallen out on the 



333 

way during the three days of forced marching. Cavalry capable of such 
a performance is not cavalry to be thought lightly of. 

As a hasty review of the work done by the Indian Contingent, it may 
be broadly stated that whatever duty it was called upon to execute 
was accomplished rapidly, quietly, and well. A long campaign might 
have developed defects in organization, administration, or morale not 
manifest during the scant fortnight of its share in the war in Egypt. 
On this point speculation is open to all $ but taking the Contingent upon 
its record, one is forced to the conclusion that Lord Beaconsfield's so- 
called "coup de theatre" in 1878, when Indian troops were brought to 
Malta as a reserve in the event of hostilities with Kussia, was a real 
menace, whose complete meaning was only made clear four years later. 
These oriental soldiers of the British Empire can be brought on any 
field of action by the scores of thousands (there are about 17,000 cav- 
alry and 100,000 infantry habitually under arms); indeed, the number 
has hardly any limit. That the practice, once begun, of drawing upon 
this reserve will ever be abandoned, should future complications require 
a sudden reinforcement of her military strength, cannot be hoped for 
by any possible enemy of England. It must, on the contrary, be taken 
into account in the problem as a factor capable of almost indefinite ex- 
pansion. 

The recovery of Great Britain's former military prestige was merely 
a question of time and opportunity, but it is impossible not to believe 
that for this recovery she is indebted, to a certain extent, to the real 
worth and unbounded possibilities of her Indian Contingent. 



XXXI. 

MISCELLANEOUS. 

In this section are gathered such items and conclusions as are of in- 
terest, either technical or general, but which do not find a proper place 
in the preceding subdivisions of the report. 

ARAB MARES. 

1. It was remarked as a singular and suggestive fact that among the 
horses captured from the Egyptians or found in various parts of the 
country as occupied there were no Arab mares. These valuable and 
usually unpurchasable animals must have been very carefully hidden, 
in the fear that they might possibly fall into the hands of the British. 

FOULNESS OF LAEE TIMSAH. 

2. The speedy return of the base to Alexandria after the battle of Tel- 
el-Kebir was further advisable on account of the condition of Lake 
Timsah. There is no tide in this harbor, only a slight general set of 



334 

the water in the Suez Canal according to the season. The presence of 
so many ships packed closely together, in the small basin, had resulted 
in the accumulation underneath them of all sorts of filth, rubbish, offal, 
&c, thrown overboard. Through the lack of a strong cleansing cur- 
rent, the water had no chance of adequate renewal, and hence was very 
foul, while the bottom, as found on heaving up an anchor, was reeking 
and noisome. 

BERTHING CAPACITY OF LAKE TIMSAH. 

3. The normal capacity of Lake Timsah as a harbor was greatly en- 
hanced by the fact that the wind was constant in direction. In conse- 
quence the transports could be anchored in lines abreast, close to each 
other, without regard to the ordinary necessity of " swinging room." 

The berthing of the arriving ships was in charge of Staff Commander 
Patch, R. N., of the Orion, who was appointed Harbor-Master. So well 
was this duty performed that the port, which had been pronounced by 
the president of the Suez Canal Company barely sufficient for two ves- 
sels, was made to contain no less than 103 at one time. 

THE BELL TENT. 

4. The regulation army tent is of the Bell pattern, 10 feet hi gh and 
12 feet 6 inches in diameter at the base. There are two flies inside and 
out, with ventilating holes at the top. It is intended to accommodate 
15 men. At the bottom is a deep flap, which can be buttoned up to ad- 
mit air. The pole is 2 inches in diameter, in two parts (for convenience 
of transport and storage), connected by a socket joint. 

COINCIDENCE OF THE TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIG-N WITH THE 

NILE HIGH WATER. 

5. The annual high water in the Nile occurs towards the end of Sep- 
tember, and the water falls but very slowly for several weeks. The 
coincidence of the termination of the campaign with the Nile rise was 
more than a mere matter of chance. Had Arabi not been crushed at 
Tel-el-Kebir, the result to the British force would have been very dam- 
aging. With full control of the water-flow in the numerous canals and 
ditches spread out over Egypt, the Egyptians could have carried on a 
strong defensive fight, with all the advantages on their side. 

TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 

6. It can hardly be said that any tactical problems were solved in 
the campaign. It was demonstrated that a night march in attacking 
order could be made to end in a successful engagement, but it may be 
considered as legitimately permissible to question the possibility of 
repeating the advance on Tel-el-Kebir under other and less favorable 
conditions of soil, atmosphere, and enemy. 



335 

INCREASED PROBABILITY OF ATTACK AT DAWN IN THE FUTURE. 

7. On the other hand, General Wolseley has proved by the logic of 
events the efficacy of the strategy involved in an attack at early dawn, 
a point always urged by him as the outcome of the improvement in 
modern weapons. In future wars it may be safely predicted that the 
defense will be frequently subjected to assaults at this moment, and will 
be forced to increased vigilance and stronger outposts towards the end 
of the night to repel the enemy or keep him at a distance until the day 
has completely broken. 

The campaign was fruitful in at least one strategical lesson of great 
importance. 

CONCERNING UNIFORM. 

8. Contrary to generally received ideas, the red coats of the British 
were less conspicuous than the white or blue uniforms worn by the 
Egyptians. Visibility is merely a matter of background, after all, and 
the sand and glaring light of the desert were relatively worse for the 
latter than the former. 

Towards the end of September, a gray serge tunic was issued for trial 
to the troops in Egypt. It looked much cooler than the garment it re- 
placed, and it would certainly stand the wear and tear of a campaign 
far better. The appearance of most of the British coats was very bad. 
They were stained with perspiration, spotted with dirt and grease, and 
were altogether far from creditable, although the marks were an un- 
avoidable sequence of hard work and rough campaigning. They were 
in marked contrast with the " khakhi" dress of the Indian Contingent, 
a drab color, with which the cotton drilling used in the hot season in India 
is dyed. Absolutely, of course, one was as clean as the other, but rela- 
tively the khakhi looked fresh and neat, while the red serge was hope- 
lessly begrimed. 

The traditions of an army are not lightly to be neglected. England's 
soldiers in any other color but the immemorial scarlet can hardly be 
conceived, but a suitable attire for active service in hot climates was 
greatly needed by them when in Egypt. Such an attire could easily 
be found in the color and material which have stood the test of Indian 
campaigning. 

THE DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN AMMUNITION. 

9. The experience at Alexandria after the bombardment, when all 
ammunition found in the Egyptian magazines was destroyed, was re- 
peated at Tel-el-Kebir od a similarly large scale. 

As Arabi's army had disappeared, and, practically, the whole of 
Lower Egypt was in the hands of the British, and, furthermore, as the 
latter were acting in the name of the Khedive to re-establish his au- 
thority, there was certainly no necessity for this measure. Its object 
is not evident. 



336 



MILITARY BARRACKS AT ABBASIEH. 

10. The military establishment at Abbasieh is on the edge of the 
desert to the north and east of Cairo, and was intended for a school of 
instruction. The barracks are large and well planned in all respects, 
are provided with ample wash-rooms, &c. A mortar battery and some 
siege guns were mounted on the desert side. Accommodation was avail- 
able here for about 5,000 men. 

The condition of these barracks when the Egyptians marched out was 
filthy beyond words. Sleeping apartments and corridors had been used 
as latrines, and the walls were infested with vermin. 

EGYPTIAN FIELD PIECES. 

11. The field guns employed by the Egyptians were of three types : 
9 and 8 cm Krupp steel B. L. E., and Lahitte 9 cm M. L. E. howitzers of 
bronze. Lettering these types A, B, and 0, the following is the return 
of artillery captured during the campaign on the Ismailia and Tel-el- 
Kebir line : 



Date. 


Place. 


Type. 


No. 


Aug. 25 

Sept. 9 

9 

9 

13 

13 

13 


Tel-el-Mahuta 


A 

B 
A 
C 
A 
B 
C 


6 

2 
1 
1 
42 
10 
7 


.'.do 


do 


Tel-el-Kebir 

do 


do 





The principal particulars of these guns are given in the next table : 







Width in 


CO 

a 


© 

a 




a 


Height of 


PI 








EC 


centimeters. 


. 


;3 


wheels i n 


£ 




m 




> 

© 

o 

o 

a 

a 




be 
o 

.5 

I 
© 


1 


5J 
PI 

O 
Ph 

a 

© 
M 

c3 

o 


© 

-SCO 

53 

°g 
*>* 

© 


meters. 


o 

1.1 

cm 3 

5 

1 

© 

rt 


© 

o 
o 

OS 
H 

H 


-m> 

00 




CO 
53 

1 

Hi 


00 

© 

1 


' s 

o 

O 

1 


01 

p, 
>> 
H 


pi 
pi 


CD 

| 

3 














Lb. oz. 


Lb. oz. 










Z&*. 


A 


16 


7 


1.4 


395 


2.02 


1 8 


14 10 


1.56 


1.24 


1.60 


1.65 


11 


B 


12 


7 


1.1 


269 


1.93 


1 


9 14 


1.56 


1.24 


.99 


1.65 


7 


C 


6 


2.2 


2.5 


{ 


1.32 
.95 


| 11 


8 6 


C 1.20 
X .98 


} 1.20 


C .84 
\ .66 


3.40 

.87 


1 



NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. 

12. The writer of this report was impressed by the intelligence dis- 
played by the non-commissioned officers whom he observed, as well as 
by the very large share they seemed to have in the business routine of 
the companies. 

THE RESERVES. 

13. He was also very especially impressed by the physique and good 
bearing of the men of the reserves, of whom no less than 11,030 out of 



337 

.1,650 responded to the call. Of the balance, the absence of 135 could 
oe satisfactorily accounted for. About 1,500 joined various regiments 
tnd 15,000 still remained at home. As the first real test of the new army 
system, this result is certainly encouraging. This new system has for 
ts object the passing of a large number of men annually through the 
active line in order that a numerous and well-trained reserve may be 
formed. It is in this way that England purposes building up a large 
regular force ready for mobilization, trusting to the militia and volun- 
;eers for effective supplement. 

OFFICERS. 

14. This report would be incomplete without mention of the character 
of the British officers as a body. 

The most indifferent observer could not fail to notice on their part a 
lesire to be in the midst of the work, whether campaigning or fighting ; 
i cheerful manner under even the most trying circumstances; and a 
commendable spirit of good-fellowship. Their great object was to secure 
]he opportunity of distinction and to profit by it when secured. If for- 
tunate in this respect, the troubles and hardships incident to their life 
were as nothing. The Commander-in-Chief was supported by a set of 
officers who only required permission to go ahead and do their duty — 
the execution followed at once, and was marked by intelligence, zeal, 
and perseverance. 

It is impossible not to attribute this morale to the fact that their pro- 
motion is always by selection, captains retiring at forty years of age, majors 
at forty-five, &c. This is not the place to discuss the general question 
of how the flow of advancement should be regulated, but none the less 
is it a duty to record the conviction that the plan adopted in the British 
army (while not free from abuse or gross favoritism) produced, in the 
body of officers who controlled and carried out the operations in Egypt, 
a corps of young, active, zealous, and capable men, of whom no service, 
however high its standard, need be ashamed. 

THE PRACTICE OF MENTIONING: JUNIORS IN DISPATCHES. 

15. To this circumstance is due one of the most marked features of 
all the official reports, whether naval or military. 

Every officer's record is based mainly on the commendation lie receives 
from his superiors as officially expressed. The practice is an inherent 
part of correspondence relating to deputed work, and is unsparingly 
resorted to when the case seems to warrant it. The sense of duty well 
done may be all an officer has a right to expect, but until human nature 
changes entirely, even the most conscientious person ivill not fail to find a 
stimulus to still greater exertions in the field or more prolonged and earnest 
labors in the cabinet in the thought that his efforts, if successful, will be- 
948 EC 22 



338 

come part of the annals of the service to which he devoted his life without 
reserve. 

BALLOONS WERE NOT USED. 

16. When the character of the country over which G-eneral Wolse- 
ley marched to Tel-el-Kebir is considered, the failure to employ balloons 
for the purpose of lookout and reconnaissance is explicable only on the 
assumption that the means were not on hand in England. The natness 
and barrenness of the desert made it absolutely impossible to approach 
unobserved from a very moderate elevation. It would seem as though 
captive balloons would have been among the first provisions for the 
campaign, as they certainly would have been among the most useful. 

LONO SERVICE VERSUS SHORT SERVICE. 

17. The principal technical issue of the war in Egypt was the merits 
of the short-service system, a bone of contention even to-day in the 
British army. 

Whether long-service (twenty- one years) men would have done bet- 
ter is a question attended with all the difficulty which is proverbially 
involved in the proving of a negative. They might have been hardier, 
more seasoned, indeed the evidence drawn from the record of the marines 
is clear on this point (the younger men furnished more than their quota 
of invalids), but that they would have behaved with more steadiness on 
the march and more coolness in the fight cannot be shown. No system 
can be satisfactory which does not provide for a leaven of old soldiers. 
It takes time to teach the recruit that the enemy feels exactly as uncom- 
fortably as he feels himself, and the best master is a comrade in ranks 
to whom fighting is no new matter, and who stands to his work because 
it is his duty and his habit to do so. 

The present tendency of army reform is towards a happy combination 
of the old and the new systems, retaining such features of the one as will 
yield a supply of capable non-commissioned officers and a nucleus of 
hardened campaigners, and of the other as will continue the process of 
swelliug the reserves by annual increments of trained men, ready to 
return when wanted to fill their old battalions up to the war strength. 

Given a few years for the results of the method to manifest them- 
selves, it is not to be doubted that the British infantry will be counted, 
as of old, most formidable, and its presence on a European battle-field 
as a potent factor in the result. 

THE CAMPAION AS A WHOLE. 

18. While the enemy encountered in Egypt was not of a nature to 
develop the highest qualities of the British soldier, still, as a fairly ade- 
quate trial of the scheme which has been in operation for the last dec- 
ade, the campaign, although full of lessons in detail, must be regarded 
also as abounding in promise for the future. 



339 

UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT TOO ELABORATE. 

19. One great danger threatens the organization as a whole in the 
tendency to increase the equipment beyond the needs of actual work. 
Thorough preparation for fighting should be the first care of those in 
authority. Subordinate only to that is the reduction of the outfit to a 
least possible amount. It seems iil-advised, to say no more, to adhere 
in times of peace to uniforms, trappings, and paraphernalia generally 
which are unhesitatingly discarded when ivar breaks out. Of the armies 
of all the larger European powers, that of England is unquestionably 
most open to this criticism. It may, however, be safely predicted that 
this objection will not hold much longer, so determined are the persons 
responsible for the well-being of the army to render it as efficient as is 
possible. Much opposition will be met, for a more conservative body 
than English army officers cannot be found, but prejudice and opposi- 
tion will hardly prevail in the face of the real necessities of the case, 
now completely understood. 

THE CHARACTER OE THE EGYPTIANS. 

20. From the time Alexandria was first occupied until the war was 
ended the Egyptians may be said to have invariably wasted their 
opportunities. At hardly any time was Alexandria even reasonably 
secure. Ramleh could have been turned by a night advance, and the 
city taken, for the garrison was weak to imprudence. 

The neglect to seize or block the Suez Canal is almost incredible. 
That Arabi should have been guided by the interested counsels of M. 
de Lesseps is but a further proof of his utter incapacity. 

Every phase of the campaign was marked by stupidity on the part of 
the Egyptian commanders, while cowardice on that of the rank and file 
was shockingly frequent. The British expeditionary force, with certain 
reservations already specified, did its work well, but no one can believe 
that the nature of this work was a real measure of the ability of Eng- 
land's soldiers. 

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS. 

21. The extensive employment and valuable services of seamen on 
shore during the campaign are not features peculiar to the British navy 
alone. 

In our service, parties of blue-jackets and marines are frequently 
landed in various parts of the world for police duty in cases of emer- 
gency, panic, or distress, and in times of general peace their perform- 
ances make up the real active history of the Navy. These parties are 
not organized alike, while their equipment, ranging over the whole field 
of individual taste, is in marked contrast with the uniformity observed 
in certain foreign services. 

This report cannot find a better ending than in the urgent recommen- 
dation to abolish so-called "battalions" from our ships of war, and sub- 



340 

stitute in their stead homogeneous "lending parties," capable of self- 
supporting and sustained action in the iield at some little distance from 
the base, and of indefinite combination at will into efficient naval bri- 
gades. 

The details of such a scheme must be worked out by a central authority \ 
and their observance be insisted upon as a better criterion than the now 
popular and {con rispetto) ourlesque dress-parade. 



War Series, No. m. 
INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



REPORT 



OF TH« 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 



iw 



EGYPT, 

18 8 2. 



Part II PLATES. 



Part I— TEXT. 
Part II— PLATES. 



PLATE? %. 




• M. L.R.Armstrong. 
% Xin. Smooth Bore 

• M CRT AS 



Section through A.B. 




Section through 
CD. 



Bottom of 
Ditch is ioft. above 

SEA LEVEL 



FORT SILS1LEH. 



Scale of plan. 
so 



Scale of sections 

50 



ioo Yos. 



PLATE 3- 




H 
co 
D 
< 
o 

o 

CO 

o 

h 
PS 
o 
pt, 



PLATE 4. 




P 

O 
< 

a 
z 
w 

z 
o 

< H 



o * 

H g 

h 

o 

h 
O 
W 

W 



( 



PLATE 5 



FORT PHAROS 



S"/TCT/C/V THROUGH A3. 




Yas 'o <r o 



so 



:plate 6. 



POUT PHABOS. 



Fig. 44 




Sketch of scarp n.w.face 



Fig. 45. 



% 









V///////////7///// 



Section through west face 



Fig.46. 




Section through 
east face 



>////////'// / 



Fig. 47. 



Fig. 48. 




Horizontal Section 
through casement 




Section through 
north west face 



Scale in feet 
so 



too reer 



PLATE 7. 



NL.Jj, .R. Armstrong-. 

X//V How I TZER. 

)Mortar. 




FORT PHAROS 

PLAN OF RIFLED GU/V 
BATTERY. 



PLATE 8. 






Q 




< 




E- 




K 




O 




fc. 


ITI 


fc 


o 


O 


< 




X 


> 


ft 


H 


E- 


z 
<; 


O 




ft 


Q 


ft 


Q 


O 


Z 


^ 
£ 


o 

K 

O 


W 


w 


h 


(T 


h 


O 


< 




ffl 


z 




w 


(X 


Z 


W 


P 


ft 


o 


ft 


cr 


D 





PLATE 9. 







>-> < 

® pu 
W 

CO o 

w 
o 

< 

E- 
w 

w 

o 
o 

Q 
2 

O 

o 



PLATE 10. 




PLATE 11. 






p 




w 




p 




j 








i 




o 




Oh" 




w 




CO 


c/i 




o 


J 


PC 


J 

<£ 


<^ 


Oh 


X 


.. 


PU 


CO 




J 


h 


W 


PC 


ffi 


o 


CO 


fe 


O 






PL 


K 


o 




w 


< 


o 


m 


< 


CO 


fc 


w 




J 


£ 


m 


PC 


>< 


tq 




h 


fc 


en 


z 


W 


1-1 


^ 






H 


oT 


&H 


PC 


o 


< 
o 
en 


O 




CO 


PC 


P 


£ 


D 


£ 


O 

(T. 



PLATE 12. 




> 

P 

5 S 



Pd w 
O ffi 



cri w a 
O 

p. 



PLATE 13. 




P 
W 

pa 
< 
w 

5 

4 



PLATE 14. 




fa 




o 




o 




K 




u 




£ 




p 




ffi 




o 




p 




o 




cc 




ffi 




h 




J 


CO 


fa 


fa 


fa 


m 


H 


p 




w 


fa 


W 


o 


H 


< 






Z 


fa 




fa 


- 


< 


2 


o 


£ 


CO 





H 


P 






fa 


w 


fa 


J 


O 


N 
N 


P 


P 


fa 


£ 


fa 




£ 


tx{ 


o 


O 


CQ 


P 




h 


CO 


CO 


< 




> 


P 


p* 


Z 


(X 


< 


fa 


O 


p 


z 


Z 

P 


z 


O 


o 


fa 




CD 
CO 


Q 
<1 


< 


z 




fa 


Z~ 


z 


p 


u 


o 


H 


CO 


S 






ffi 


fa 


H 


Z 




H 




fa 




O 



PLATE 15. 




Causeway, 
to 



A Armstrong- M.LJFL- 
M JLTnch Smooth JBorc. 
• Mortar. 



FORT ADA. 



faffW to s o 

In i I 



/^■o »/?/».; 



PLATE 16. 




PLATE 17. 



Si 




ii 




u / 





PLATE 18. 




£&$? ; lips l&ISl 



^•..i-'- 



* 




PLATE 19. 




PLATE 20- 



tWlSP 




THE RAS-EL-TIN LINES. 



SCALE OF PLAN 



PLATE -21 



Tower battery 

2 8IN.M.L.R.&. 1-6/ilNSB 



CENTRAL BATTERY 
•IOIN. &. 2-9IN. M.L.R. ARMSTRONG 




"SCALE OF SECTIONS 



PLATE 22. 




THE HOSPITAL BATTERY. 




-Scale or plan & of sections 

50 



PLATE 23. 



\ B 




Scale in feei 



PLATE 24. 




THE TOWER BATTERY 
RAS -EL -7W LINES. 





Section throuoh 6 



Scale in rttt 

so 



100 ft. 



IT.ATK -25. 



THE LIGHT HOUSE FORT. 

SCALE 




PLATE 26. 




O 

W 

D 
O 

h 

2 



o 

o 

h 
w 

<! 
PQ 

W 
h 
O 

Z 
o 



PLATE 27. 




v.\iv\s"m \. v^\y<~\\\Sy ^. s 



THE SOUTHERN BASTION OF THE LICxHT HOUSE FORT 

FIRST GUN DISABLED, 



PLATE 28. 




K 
o 

K 

< 

ri ffi 



oo 



PLATE 29. 




PLATE SO. 



FORT SALEH AG A 




#XtN. Smooth Bones 
I) 6ft in Smooth Bores. 

© M'JRfAR 



Scale or p!.an. 



PLATE 31. 




O 

< 

<3 

Oh 
g 

a 
w 

<c 

H 

. E- 
PQ ^ 

PQ w 



h 
O m 

h 
h 

<: 

pq 



iPJLuATR 32 




FORT MARABOUT. 



PLATE 33. 




PLATE 34. 






PQ 




CO 




£ 




*— • 


m 


N 


pq 


4h 


H 


CD 


PQ 


< 


< 


hi 


W 


G 


J 


o 


W 


H 


2 

o 


o 

Ph 


o 


E 


fe 


o 

w 


o 


w 




p^ 


h 


w 


Cu 


w 


|D 


W 


o 


H 


o 


CO 


Z 


P 


& 


P 


w 


O 


h 


o 


CO 


w 


W 


p^ 


> 


o 


> 


fe 




w 




X 




h 



PLATE 35. 




PLATE 36. 



the mex lines 




SL 



MAFIT£i.LO 




\M .X .Armstrong-. 
()£¥. inch Smooth J3or?t:. 
y X i nch Smooth JBorc. 
A 6'/i inch Smooth J3o re. 
• AToHTAR. 



PLATE 37. 




PLATE 38- 




H 




2 






£ 


h 


o 


Pd 




o 


O 


fc 


O 




2 


fc 


P 


O 


o 




K 


IH 


h 




£ 


h 


Q 


h 




<< 


o 


PQ 


w 




K 


PC 


£ 


W 


w 


£ 




O 


£ 




C/3 


£ 


2; 


Pd 


o 


H 


w 


h 


X 


en 


h 


W 





£ 



PLATE 39- 




PLATE 40. 




PLATE 41. 




PLATE 42. 




' M Hi >V' \ 



CD 



PLATE 43. 




PLATE 44. 




PLATE 45. 



THE POSITION AND DEFENSIVE WORKS AT 

RAMLEH. 




PLATE 46. 



THE OUTPOST 

AT 

ANTON IADES 
GARDEN. 




f*A» 






& 



''///////A 



\ ^ 777P> W 



Sect/oh of pea/ce atj 




Parapet at. c 






* ifk 



*" Sect/o/v at . -£/. 



Z7+ 




SecT/O/VJ AT PO/A/TS OAf 
PLATE XL/X. 



Section through redoubt Tny 




Sect/on or pp//vcipal battery 7c 

* 6" k 
'/////SS/JAyf 6" UP? 

SEcr/n/v or redoubt, j 






M EOI 



"^5 



TERRA 



A/£TA/V 



Or STATUTE M/LES 



VWmtes in nautical mibsa. 


liy rail in statute miles 




Aj'j'io.iiiiiatcpnpi'l'/tj/.,,. 


Ales Irin to Aboukir 14 


Alexandria to Kafr Dnwar 


16 


Cairo 


- 350,000 


AboukirtoRosctta- IT 


Kiitr 1 tow mi to Danianhour 


21 


Alexandria 


- 212,000 


Rosettato Dnmietta ■ 79 


Damanlionr to Tantah • • 


38 


Tan tab- - - 


- 00,000 


Damletta to Port Said 37 


Tantah to Benha 


J4 


Zagazig - - 


- 44,0110 


1'iirt Sm.lt, i Kantara ■ 23 


Benha to Cairo 


28 


Damietta - 


■ 29,000 


Kftufnra to Isinailia- . ]<i 






Dainanliour 




Ismiiitia to Sentneum ■ 8 


Alex Iria to Cairo 


127 


Mausoura - 


. 16,000 


Seroiienui todialonf • 20 








15(!tl(l 


Olioloitf to Suez ■ - . . 12 


Isinailia to Keflcbc ■ ■ • • 


2 


Snez .... 


■ 13,000 




N.ii. 1.. toMagfor 


1 


Sliibin-elKu 


ni 12.000 


3>nUmee» n, statute Miles 


Magfar to Mainta 


4 


Port Said - 


• 9,000 


(t/ojifl canal bank. 


Mabuta to Maksanich - • 


8 


Benba - . - 


- ij,000 




Mabsameh to Kaesassin ■ 


2 


Isinailia • • 


- 3.000 


1.1 .1 K.lni to ISellieis 18 


Kassassiu to TelelKebir 


9 






Belboif. to Cairo 31 


Tel-ol-Kebir to Zagazig • 
Zagazig 10 Benha 


» 

22 








Benba to Cairo 


28 










lj 









v:c: 



-;: ■ 



( ii, , 



■:,_%. 






"""" 






ixL$fc&.i*\ 



Mv 






JPLATE 48. 



PORT SAID. 

AND 

HARBOR 




G£> Arab towa/ 
2> Qoa i JSug-e/v i e: 
C Jtt/£r ouJVopa. 

*Z tt.Af.S'.jWoAIARCH. 



r Jto^o/r L Arsenal 

<S? jB/!RRA CHS. 



fRERH wa reft. 



ISMAILIA. 




GLsJR. AtLYYAYSTAT/ON. 

It Temporary Ha/lyyay. 
C-Kheoi yes J?a lace, usep as 
a base mosp/tal. 

cL Co*1A7/S£/iRJATjijANOlNG. 
G Canal LOCK A/VO BRIO&E- 
JHfiAfitCH RAILWAY TO P/ER. 

<? Central wharf. 

Tis&OUTJi YYHARr. 
t InoiAH C-O/VT/A/GEAtTS 

VYHARP. 

J Head quar ters. 

JtRoYAL E/VGS/VER PARK. 



PLATE 49. 



Cavalry r] 

2&MILES Division ^ 

Mau.Gen. Drury Lowe 



1st. Division 
Lt. Gen. Willis 



R.H.A. 
13 PORS 



N.A 
G.B. 



n 1st. Brigade 
SI Sir Baker Russell 
Household Cavalry 
4th. Dragoon Guards 
|7th. " 
|J 2nd. Brigade mounted Infantry 
681 Brig.Gen. Wilkinson 
6th. Bengal Cavalry 
13th. " Lancers. 
Portion of 
2nd. Bengal Cavalry 



! 2nd. 

i Brigade 
do 

iRDS 

J Mao. Gen. 
i 

Graham 
T 



1200 
YDS. 



| Yo £ K 1st. 

(Lancaster or 
[royal 

IRISH GUARDS 

I FUSILIERS vvn * v * 
I ROYAL BRIGADE 

I "* 1S " Duke 

[MARINE OF 

LIGHT ~ 
INFANTRY W>NNAUGHT 



Grenadiers 



3rd. 



i Highland 

' Brigade 
iooo 

YDS. 

| Sir 
i Archibald 
i Allison- 




Ammunition Column 
escorteo by 
i Company West Kent Regt. 



-^ IOOO YOS. » 

I ROYAL ! 

! highlanders 

4th. 
Brigade 



GORDON 



JCAMERONj 



Lt.Col. 
'ash6u»nhan 
j highland 

LIGHT 
1 INFANTRY 



«-_j. 1000* YDS. _. 

KINGS 

RtfrYAL 

RIFLE 

CbRPS. 

DVKEOF 

Cornwall's 



Head Quarters 

ESCORTED BY 



^!£iD_TELEGRAP| 



Lipwt Infantry r oy/vu Marine. Artillery 



AND 

i troop ) 9th. Hussars. 



Rno Division 
Sir Edwaro Hainley 



20O0 
YDS. 



THE MARCH ON TEL-EL-KEBIR 

September 13t"h,. 

1882. 




Indian Contingent 
Major General 
Sir Herbert T Macpherson V.C. 



PLATK 50. 



THE LINES OF TEL EL KEBIR 




PLATE 51. 




5 

I 



PLATE 52. 




PLATE 53- 




PLATE 54. 




O 

m 

h 

o 

Q 

W 

w 

h 

ffi 

s 

& 
w 

h 



PLATE 55. 



A Plan of battery on north ^ .- " 

BANK OF CANAL ' 



Revetment rushes / 
/ 

AND MUD PLASTER. / 





Vn 



NORMAL SECTION CANAL BANK 

REAR ELEVATION AND SECTION OF CANAL BA 



- 

\ , & OECTlON ON 

PARAPET 

NO REVETMENT 



X 




Plan of shelter 7oyds 

/7///// C ,N REAR OF PARAPET 



D Section of a shelter 30yds 



tTERIOR y/^%£' 

mT %^/ \rrtrrS' 




THICK AT TOP 



4~ *6' » 




Plan 



AND SECTION OF GUN EMPLACEMENT 




33' 

jmrrnqTTrrn77Y 
7 of /hu/uuuAuALou/i 







Revetment moo plaster and straw' 



F Plan of retrenchment for horses and magazine in rear of gun E 34 vo.. back 




6 MA6AZINE IN REAR OF 
ANOTHER GUN 



SCALE OF PLANS. 
S O IP to JO «p 50 FT. 
SCALE OF SECTIONS 
» tO 20 30 4-0 



PLATE 56. 



H. Section through traverse in front of gap and adjacent parapet. 

6' 



3.8 

'""""n. /uiiiiimtm 



■r^y^ 




Section of shelter in rear of ©ap. 
len6th of shelter 54*. *" 



>/)// it/tittm 



I.J. Section of parapet 

BETWEEN I AND J. 




Section of shelter in rear 

OF THE ABOVE """">^ / * 



J.K. Section of parapet from J to K. 



y fimtfftryrr ^7nm 




L. Retrenchment inreaRofgun L. length 60 yos. 

This isthe average style of shelter 
in rear of parapets. 



\ \ ■'■: r . 

M OuTVYOr\foR EIGHT GUNS '.FIRING THRCfUGH EMBRASURE^ 




Section of Main Work 



Section of Envelopes. 
3' 



Revetment 






js/sss/ss/s/x*- 20 



Scale OF Plan. 

SO (00 



Scale of Sections. 



\ " J] 




PLiS.TE 57. 



N 



SsCT/OA/ THROUGH 0ATTER.Y 

2' ¥77777777777777777)}^ <l . 
77?? J ^>77777\*- :l 



JPlANOFA GUN P/T/A/ REAR OP 
O.P. 




Q 



3 Sect/ on or battery Q 

GRASS 

>/) »J »*////////*/% 'Wth* w i >f7777777777, 




PLAN or 8ATTEPY Q 




&s 




S-5T 



grass tfeveTMEAfT 



T-U 




GRASS 



SCALE Or PLAN 



SCALE OF SECT/ONS 9f Or PLAN Or G-UNPi T 



Softer 

-J 



PLATE 58. 




Scale of Section!*. 

20 30 40 



ft. 



PLATE 59. 



Sect/ on at v. scale 



77rm ^""* "' *"^ %£f-;jF 



W 



Trace or 

REDOUBT VY 



SCALE Or PLAN 




Work generally similar to battery . u. 
but only roR rouR guns. The 

PARAPET HERE IS ONE PoOT H/GHEP. 



The section or the envelope is 

THE SAME AS V ABOVE. 



Section at X 

7' 

The parapet here is but just begu/v. 



v \ 

■*■ Trace or battery !y 



V/vn/V/SHEO E/VTBRASUPE 



IT/VF/W/SHE0 HERE 
scale or P>LA V 




Section or above 



J. HE ENVELOPE IS ONLY BEGUN IN PL A CCS 
SCAL C Or SEC T/ONS 



PLATE GO. 




— * ExTCR/QR 



£ C 



■&ECTIOAI TAKEN BETtV fC/V 



SecTIOAI OP A 



Gl/AI EMPLACEMENT AT C 

,,-rcH s to B ^er 




INTERIOR REVETMENT CONSISTS OP AN OCCASIONAL 
BUNCH Of GRASS STUCK INTO THE EARTH . -ZV« 
GRASS HAS EVIDENTLY RUN SHORT. 20 YAROS 
IN REAR ARE TWO SHELTERS EACH f YAROS LONG 
ANO 4< FEET HIGH MADE OF EARTH COLLECTED //V 
BASHETS. 



&ECT/OA/ 



jg' S"ect/o/v 



G Sectioai 



</c-"^yN 



JSxTER, 
"77777777777 



JiAfTERY. 



JT' 




■4* G-UA/S RIRING- THROUGH WELL. REVETTEO EMBRASURES. 
J-f *SECT/OA/ 



J£' 



GrUN EMPLACEMENT. 
\ 




M 



JtfEO AND MUD PLASTER REVETMENT 
PARAPET 3'tH/CM ATTOR. 
Th/S EMPLACEMENT HAS THREE ROUGH 
EMBRASURES , BUT OA/LY ROOM TO 
WORK ONE GUN. 



-I ' *J ' -/t-" • JSach cons/sts OP TWO 
GUN EMPLACEMENTS S/MILAR TO THIS. SIDE TOS/DE. 
SOME TIMES REVETTED WITH GRASS , SOMETIMES WITH 
REEDS , OR REE OS AND Ml/O PLASTER. 




JlEfETMEA/T OP G-RASS. 






~/< 



GALE OF Put 



Scale of sections. 



Plan of Upper Deck of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship 'Jumna". 




:■■.; i : '^m 






Plan of Mess Saloon Waists and Seamen's Quarters of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship 'Jumna". 




•H- 






I 



ttrn 



■^mjmmm 




Plan of Main Troop Deck of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna". 




« « « « » j 6 * 

L = = 'L ® 



^§ Hi§ C B 



~,r'j|jjt } 
■.■it -isJEiJfe 



Plan of Lower Saloon, Lower Troop Deck and Steerage of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna". 



I — f^v— m 



i 



•^S=fB 



i m 



_,,- 




Plan of Hold of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship 'Jumna". 



_r--£4=^ 



PH 



=t 




MIDSHIP SECTION OF TRANSPORT, 

Shewuuj Fittings ibr Horse 



PLATE 6 6 




PLATE 67. 



V, 



& h 






r 




PLATE 68. 



DETAILS OF SINGLE HORSE STALLS. 



CROSS SECTION 




MckaigBcvcrd,, 



YB.^rr cjxrryingltfules 
this weed plug it> removed 
allowing thepartuvg fiar 
to drop % ixvehes. 



Cuth 

halted to Deck,) 



1'Z 6 V 



Scale % bijch, tc a Foot'. 
? 9 



PLATE 69. 



DETAILS OF SINGLE HORSE STALLS 






ftBclt-\ 




RoUingShvre 
(about every 8** Stall) 



PLAN B.B 



Stanchion 



Side Bate or Parting Bar 9,3 



jritf-linfl Tfocr 9x3 



Stanchion- 



f Stanchion 



CLeat 




VVn| 



WaterCour.se 
WaUrrtbursc 

WaterCoufve 

WaterCoun 
WaterCburte, 



PLAN A. A 

» ' ° | r Athwartship Rail 6* 4 



° i /-Wood 

' CflOCks 

yyiiiott 



I. 



°"''Z Battens 



U. 



tH 



JU, 



~WEoW 



'yz'EbrvOertB B<^to^£^,4' 
Spdkea tvJJeck, 

Curb bitted to Deck & to heel of Stanchion 6x4 



jn 



*isr 



dp 

tx&ed 



a^b\ 

Shed/ of Stanchion 



Scale % Inch to a/Foot . 



6 Feet 






PLATE TO. 



DETAILS OF SINGLE HOftSE STALLS 



FRONT ELEVATION 




&crb Ouxins 



Sruh- '/<t Jrich tc a Foot. 
r 2 a 



PLATE 71. 




PLATE 72. 




PLATE 73. 




JPL^TE 









* 


.s3 


£ 


i 






SS 


$ 


0) 






.«0 




fS 




5? 




N> 


Cj 


nJS 


K 


£ 




$ 


-Ho 


N 


OS 


^ 


Q> 


%0 

*> 


1 
1 


3 


^3 
Si 


^ 


i 


^0 


i 


NJ 




! 


1 

.3C 


« 

£ 
3 


\ 




NJ 


.8 


SJ 


S 


-S 


-\ 


K 


^3 


^ 

$ 


Q> 


M 


Js. 


V 


^ 


^ 


©i 


•3 


1 




>o 


3 


ST 

5! 


5 

^ 

<• 


^ 


8 


fc 


01 


si 


V> 


*? 




a 


u 


3 


' ra 




« 
« 




0> 




4 




> 












& 












£ 











PLATE 75. 




Pli^'TE 76. 




PLATE 77. 



PECULIAR FEATURES OF 13 P5. EQUIPMENT 
FfC/08 





O^T~x* 






3PLA.TE 78. 



PECULIAR FEATURES OF 13 PS. EQUIPMENT. 

BOX FOR CUN AND WAGON LIMBER 
AND HIND WAGON. 



F/C.//0 




mmmmm ^^^^^ 



NO I E . TAe exterior of hind 

wagon box is fJve .sti7/ve 
our gun & wcufc/v timfter, 
hut tfoe trays are differ- 
-entty %ftjbbed . 



*'£ W 




SECTION OF FRONT WAGON BOX. 



sie mmmmmifmmm 



<mmm. 




^m 



I 



I 



on 



i 



"Ss 



^t^^^^m^^^^Mmm\^ 



PLATE 79. 



PECULIAR FEATURES OF 13 P5. EQUIPMENT 



F/0. 11 & 




T - 7 






d 



V 



U~ 



15 



J 1 



FIG. 114 




lBJa'07 



PUBLICATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 



INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



WAE SERIES. 

I. — Operations of the French Navy during the recent war with Tanis, 1881. Trans- 
lated from L'Ann6e Maritime by Lieutenant M. Fisher Wright. 
II. — The war on the Pacific coast of South America, between Chili and the allied 
republics of Peru and Bolivia, 1879-'81. By Lieutenant Theodorus B. M. 
Mason. 
III. — Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882. 

By Lieutenant Commander Caspar F. Goodrich. 
IV. — The operations of the French forces in Tonquin. (In preparation.) 



Q-ElSriCRA.L INFORMATION SERIES. 

1. — Observations upon the Korean coast, Japanese-Korean ports, and Siberia, made 
during a journey from the Asiatic Station to the United States through Siberia 
and Europe, June 3 to September 8, 1882. By Lieutenant B. H. Buckingham 
and Ensigns George C Foulk and Walter McLean, United States Navy. 
II. — Reports on the Exhibits at the Crystal Palace Electrical Exhibition of 1882. 
By Ensign Frank J. Sprague, United States Navy. (In print.) 
III. — Examples, conclusions, and maxims of modern naval tactics, 1884. 
By Commander W. B. Hoff. (In preparation.) 



PUBLICATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. 



/ X F O Ii M A T I f) X FRO M A 1) II O A /> 



WAR SERIES. 

I.— Operations of the French Navy during the recent war with Tunis, 1881. Trans- 
lated from L'Ann6e Maritime by Lieutenant M. Fisher Wright. 
II. — The war on the Pacific coast of South America, between Chili and the allied 
republics of Peru and Bolivia, 1879-'81. By Lieutenant Theodorus B. M. 
Mason. 
[II. — Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, I8t 

By Lieutenant Commander Caspar F. Goodrich. 
IV.— The operations of the French forces in Tonqnin. (In preparation.) 



GENERAL INFORMATION SERIES. 



1.— Observations upon the Korean coast, Japanese-Korean ports, and Siberia, made 
during a journey from the Asiatic Station to the United States through Siberia 
and Europe, June 3 to September 8, 1882. By Lieutenant B. H. Buckingham 
and Ensigns George C. Foulk and Walter McLean, United States Na\ 
II. — Reports on the Exhibits at the Crystal Palace Electrical Exhibition of 1882. 

By Ensign Frank J. Sprague, United States Navy. (In print.) 
II T. — Examples, conclusions, and maxims of modern naval tactics, 1884. 
By Commander W. B. IToff. (In preparation.) 



X 



' " 



LIBRARY OF CONGRFQc 

, ilillBlill 
029 966 343 7 




